Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Sierra Club sought review of the EPA’s approval of new Pennsylvania National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) to govern pollution output at coal-burning power plants, as required by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7408(a). Sierra Club argued that the standards wrongly claim to reduce pollution output at Pennsylvania’s most advanced plants while simply rubber-stamping an average of current pollution output as its supposed new gold standard and criticized the proposal’s minimum temperature threshold—a measure that allows plants to nearly quintuple their pollution output when operating below 600 degrees Fahrenheit—as unsupported and unsupportable given the technical record before the agency. Sierra Club claims that the approved standards lack enforceable reporting regulations.The Third Circuit remanded to the EPA, finding that “the regulatory regime which springs forth from these three defining characteristics is neither supported by adequate facts nor by reasoning found in the administrative record.” Given the EPA’s concession that technological advances may allow for a more environmentally friendly standard than the one approved, reliance on a study that is more than 25 years old is neither a persuasive nor reasonable basis for adopting the standard it approved. The EPA is able neither to offer a reasonable justification for failing to require a stricter standard nor to justify the standard it endorsed. View "Sierra Club v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Federal Highway Administration (FHA) issued a solicitation for the "Deweyville" project, consisting of reconstructing approximately 12 miles of road running through Alaska's Tongass National Forest. The FHA provided a Waste Site Report, which identified sites that a contractor could use to dispose of waste materials and provided access to the “Categorical Exclusion,” prepared under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321–70.2, which stated that waste sites are expected to be sourced at existing quarries identified in the Waste Site Report. The solicitation placed responsibility for licenses and permits on the contractor, including Clean Water Act permits, 33 U.S.C. 1344, and purchasing wetland mitigation credits. Kiewit’s successful bid included approximately $1,000,000 for wetland mitigation fees. Kiewit requested an equitable adjustment for the cost of purchasing mitigation credits for the wetlands it encountered at government-designated waste sites. The Claims Court upheld the denial of that request.The Federal Circuit reversed. The contract documents dictate that, unless a contractor decided to expand the government-designated waste sites, “[n]o further analysis of the environmental impacts of” such sites would be necessary. That the FHA, during the NEPA process, had already assessed the project’s effects on wetlands bolstered Kiewit’s reasonable conclusion that it would not need to conduct further wetlands analysis at designated waste disposal areas. Kiewit reasonably interpreted the documents to mean what they say—that no further environmental impacts analysis would be required if a contractor chose to dispose of waste at government-designated sites. The FHA effected a constructive contract change when it required Kiewit to perform wetland delineation at those sites. View "Kiewit Infrastructure West Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying the petition filed by the City of Bozeman seeking judicial review of a final order of the Department of Natural Resources (DNRC) granting Utility Solutions, LLC's application to change a water right, holding that the court did not err in determining that the City's water facility plan did not qualify as an interest protectable from adverse effects under Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-402(2)(a).Utility Solutions filed its change application for authorization to change the place of use of its water use permit. The City filed an objection, arguing that the application would adversely affect the City's possessory interest in the area that was established by the City's adoption of a growth policy, as expanded geographically by an updated water facility plan. The DNRC hearing examiner granted the change application, concluding that although the change application resulted in a geographic overlap of the place of use with the City's water facility plan, the overlap did not result in an adverse effect within the meaning of section 85-2-402(2)(a). The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in affirming the DNRC's determination that Utility Solutions carried its burden to prove the City did not have an interest protectable from adverse effects. View "City of Bozeman v. Montana Department of Natural Resources & Conservation" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied the Refinery's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. The court weighed the markedly thin showing of potential injury by the Refinery against the substantial public interest in transparency and openness in cases involving the government's administration of an important statutory and regulatory scheme, holding that the Refinery has not overcome the customary and constitutionally-impeded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.In this case, the Refinery has failed to demonstrate that requiring it to proceed in its own name will risk the disclosure of sensitive and highly personal information; the Refinery itself faces no risk of physical or mental harm; and the Refinery has chosen to sue a government agency regarding the operation of a statutory program and, in particular, applications for special exemptions from the law's obligations. The court held that none of the factors commonly involved in analyzing a request to proceed anonymously weigh in the Refinery's favor. Furthermore, the Refinery's additional arguments add nothing to its side of the scale either. View "In re: Sealed Case" on Justia Law

POET petitioned for review of a letter from the Assistant Administrator of the EPA, contending that the letter embodies the EPA's final decision to deny POET's application to generate D3 Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) by producing cellulosic ethanol from corn-kernel fiber at its facility in Hudson, South Dakota.The Eighth Circuit held that the controversy regarding the EPA's alleged denial of the application is moot and dismissed the petition. In this case, POET has since filed a new, non-identical application to generate D3 RINs at its Hudson facility, which is currently pending for the EPA's review. View "POET Biorefining - Hudson, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

In a consolidated appeal, defendant County of Placer decided to partially abandon public easement rights in Mill Site Road, a road that connected two adjacent residential subdivisions: Martis Camp (previously known as Siller Ranch) and the Retreat at Northstar (the Retreat). As originally planned, the connection between Martis Camp and the Retreat was intended for emergency access and public transit vehicles only. When the developments were approved in 2005, the environmental documents assumed there would be no private vehicle trips between Martis Camp and the Retreat or the Northstar community beyond; Martis Camp residents wishing to drive to Northstar-at-Tahoe (Northstar) would use State Route (SR) 267. However, sometime in or around 2010, residents of Martis Camp began using the emergency/transit connection as a shortcut to Northstar. In 2014, after efforts to have county officials stop Martis Camp residents from using the emergency access road failed, the Retreat owners filed an application requesting that the County Board of Supervisors (the Board) abandon the public’s right to use Mill Site Road. In 2015, the Board approved a partial abandonment, thereby restricting use of Mill Site Road to Retreat property owners and emergency and transit vehicles, consistent with what was described and analyzed in the prior planning documents. Then lawsuits followed. Plaintiffs, the Martis Camp Community Association (MCCA) and three individual Martis Camp property owners, appealed the denial of their petitions for writ of mandate challenging the County’s abandonment of Mill Site Road, as well as the dismissal (on demurrer) of the Martis Camp Homeowners’ inverse condemnation claim. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the portion of the judgment and order concluding that the County did not violate the Brown Act or the statutory requirements for abandonment of a public road, and affirmed the dismissal of the Martis Camp Homeowners’ inverse condemnation claim, but reversed and remanded as to plaintiffs’ California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) claim. View "Martis Camp Community Assn. v. County of Placer" on Justia Law

The EPA issued a regulation known as the Pathways II Rule, allowing renewable-fuel producers to use a measurement method "certified by a voluntary consensus standards body" (VCSB), or a method "that would produce reasonably accurate results as demonstrated through peer reviewed references." EPA then issued the Cellulosic Guidance to explain its interpretation of the applicable regulatory requirements and clarify the types of analyses and demonstrations that might meet them.The DC Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part POET's petition for review of the Cellulosic Guidance. The court held that POET's challenge to the Guidance's treatment of VCSB-certified methods is unripe because no such method yet exists and POET's registration efforts rely on the peer-reviewed alternative. In regard to POET's challenge to the Guidance's discussion of peer-reviewed methods, the court held that the Guidance announces a final, interpretive rule that lawfully construes the underlying regulation. View "POET Biorefining, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and substituted the following opinion.After ExxonMobil sought a revised Title V permit under the Clean Air Act concerning an expansion of a plant in Baytown, Texas, petitioners asked EPA to object on the grounds that the underlying Title I preconstruction permit allowing the expansion was invalid. EPA rejected petitioners' arguments and declined to object.The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that EPA's interpretation that Title V permitting is not the appropriate vehicle for reexamining the substantive validity of underlying Title I preconstruction permits is independently persuasive. Therefore, EPA's interpretation is entitled to the mild form of deference recognized by Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). View "Environmental Integrity Project v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The circuit court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of BP plc on all claims brought against it by the State and the South Dakota Petroleum Release Compensation Fund, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the Fund's claims.In its complaint, the Fund sought to recover payments made to BP's predecessor and subsidiary companies (collectively, BP) for the costs of cleaning up environmental contamination from underground petroleum storage tanks (UST) at twenty-seven sites in South Dakota. The circuit court granted summary judgment for BP on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in granting summary judgment on the Fund's claims for recovery of monies paid to BP for cleanup costs at twenty-seven UST sites; (2) did not err in granting summary judgment on the nineteen indirect claims against BP; and (3) did not err in denying the Fund's motion for sanctions. View "S.D. Petroleum Release Compensation Fund v. BP plc" on Justia Law

In this case involving six water right claims on Big Warm Creek the Supreme Court affirmed the Water Court's final order, holding that the Water Court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the Water Court (1) did not err by finding no ambiguity in the language of the deeds conveying portions of the Phillips Ranch, and the appurtenant water rights, from David Drum to Lloyd Knudsen, Wayne Norman, and Springdale Colony, Inc.; (2) did not err by declining to resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent; (3) did not err by apportioning the water pro-rata based on the parties’ historical use; and (4) did not abuse its discretion by denying Little Big Warm Ranch’s post-judgment motion for relief from the court’s final order. View "Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC v. Doll" on Justia Law