Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the U.S. Sugar Corporation and other industry petitioners challenging the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 2022 rule that classified certain industrial boilers as "new" sources of hazardous air pollutants, even though they were built before the applicable emission standards were proposed in 2020. The EPA used a 2013-era dataset to establish these standards, excluding more recent data to maintain consistency with still-valid 2013 standards. Environmental petitioners argued that this exclusion violated the Clean Air Act.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The lower court had previously remanded the EPA's 2011 rule without vacatur, allowing the invalid standards to remain while the EPA revised them. The industry petitioners argued that the EPA's classification of boilers built after June 4, 2010, as "new" sources was incorrect, as these boilers were constructed before the 2020 proposal of the new standards. The environmental petitioners contended that the EPA's decision to use outdated data was arbitrary and capricious.The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA's classification of boilers built before August 24, 2020, as "new" sources was incorrect under the Clean Air Act. The court found that the proper date to determine whether a boiler is "new" should be when each specific emission standard is first proposed, not when any standard for the category was first proposed. Therefore, the court set aside the EPA's 2022 rule to the extent that it defined sources constructed before August 24, 2020, as "new."The court also held that the EPA's decision to rely on the 2013-era dataset was neither unlawful nor arbitrary and capricious. The court found that the EPA's choice was reasonable given the limited nature of the remand and the need for consistency across standards. Thus, the court denied the environmental petitioners' petition for review. View "United States Sugar Corporation v. EPA" on Justia Law

The case involves the environmental review of commercial aquarium fishing permits in Hawai‘i. In 2017, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court ruled that the permitting process for commercial aquarium collection must undergo environmental review under the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act (HEPA). Following this ruling, the Environmental Court voided all existing permits and enjoined the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) from issuing new permits without completing HEPA review. The Pet Industry Joint Advisory Council (PIJAC) then prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to continue commercial aquarium fishing in the West Hawai‘i Reef Fishery Management Area (WHRFMA).The Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) initially rejected the EIS, citing fourteen reasons. PIJAC revised the EIS and, after a public comment period, submitted it again. BLNR's vote on the revised EIS resulted in a 3-3 tie, leading to the EIS being "deemed accepted" by operation of law. Plaintiffs sued BLNR in the Environmental Court for the First Circuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The court ruled against the plaintiffs, finding that the EIS adequately disclosed facts for the agency to make an informed decision. Plaintiffs appealed, and the State cross-appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss.The Hawai‘i Supreme Court held that the State is a proper defendant in the case and should defend the EIS. The court also determined that the "rule of reason" should be used in conjunction with HEPA’s content requirements to evaluate an EIS. The court found that the EIS was legally sufficient as it met HEPA’s content requirements and provided enough information for BLNR to make an informed decision. Consequently, the court affirmed the Environmental Court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss and its grant of summary judgment for PIJAC. View "Kaupiko v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Holtec International applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a license to construct and operate a spent nuclear fuel storage facility in New Mexico. The NRC denied multiple requests for intervention and a hearing from various petitioners, including Beyond Nuclear, Sierra Club, and Fasken Land and Minerals. These petitioners argued that the NRC acted unreasonably and contrary to law in denying their requests.The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) found the petitioners' contentions inadmissible and denied their petitions to intervene. The NRC affirmed the Board’s decisions. Beyond Nuclear, Environmental Petitioners (including Sierra Club), and Fasken each petitioned for review of the orders denying intervention. The case was held in abeyance until the NRC issued Holtec a license, after which the case was removed from abeyance for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions and found that the NRC reasonably declined to admit the petitioners' factual contentions and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court held that Beyond Nuclear did not raise a genuine dispute of law or fact regarding the NRC’s authority to consider Holtec’s application. The court also found that Environmental Petitioners failed to demonstrate any genuine disputes of material fact or law in their contentions related to statutory authority, alleged misrepresentations by Holtec, and compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Additionally, the court determined that Fasken’s late-filed contentions were procedurally defective, untimely, and immaterial.The court denied all the petitions for review, affirming the NRC’s decisions to deny the requests for intervention. View "Beyond Nuclear, Inc. v. NRC" on Justia Law

Rodney and Tonda Ross, along with Laura Field, sued Norman Terry Nelson and his corporate entities for trespass and nuisance. Nelson operated an industrial hog-farming operation and installed pipelines beneath a public road to transport treated pig waste to his farmland, which caused odors and fly infestations affecting the Rosses' property. The plaintiffs claimed Nelson did not have permission to install the pipelines and that the resulting conditions constituted a nuisance.The Phillips District Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the trespass claim, ruling that Nelson needed the landowners' permission to install the pipelines, which he did not have. The court also denied Nelson's motion for summary judgment on the nuisance claim, concluding that Nelson was not entitled to the statutory presumption of "good agricultural practice" under Kansas' right-to-farm statutes because his actions violated state law by trespassing on the plaintiffs' land. The jury awarded damages to the plaintiffs for both trespass and nuisance, including punitive damages.The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's rulings. It held that Nelson's installation of the pipelines exceeded the scope of the public highway easement because it was for his private and exclusive use, thus constituting a trespass. The court also agreed that Nelson was not entitled to the right-to-farm statutory protections because his agricultural activities were not "undertaken in conformity with federal, state, and local laws," given the trespass.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. It held that Nelson's use of the public highway easement for private pipelines was outside the easement's scope and constituted a trespass. The court also held that Nelson's agricultural activities did not conform to state law, disqualifying him from the statutory presumption of good agricultural practices and the right-to-farm protections. View "Ross v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Beverly Dale Jolly worked as an inspector at nuclear plants from 1980 to 1984, where he was exposed to asbestos-containing products manufactured by Fisher Controls International, LLC and Crosby Valve, LLC. In 2016, Dale was diagnosed with mesothelioma. He and his wife Brenda sued multiple defendants, settling with all except Fisher and Crosby for $2,270,000. The jury awarded Dale $200,000 and Brenda $100,000. The Jollys filed a motion for a new trial nisi additur, claiming the verdicts were inadequate. The trial court granted the motion, increasing Dale's award to $1,580,000 and Brenda's to $290,000, while allowing Fisher and Crosby the option to reject the additur for a new trial.The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Fisher and Crosby appealed, questioning the trial court's grant of the new trial nisi additur and the partial denial of their motion for setoff. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case, focusing on whether the trial court applied the correct standard and procedure for a new trial nisi additur and whether it properly allocated the pretrial settlement proceeds for setoff purposes.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the trial court's decisions. It held that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the new trial nisi additur, finding the jury's verdicts inadequate but not grossly so. The court also upheld the trial court's allocation of the pretrial settlement proceeds, agreeing that the allocation was reasonable and that the setoff was correctly applied only to the same injury claims. The case was remanded for Fisher and Crosby to either accept the additur or opt for a new trial. View "Jolly v. Fisher Controls International, LLC and Crosby Valve, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Montana Legislature amended the Opencut Mining Act to create "dryland" permits for mining projects that do not affect water sources and are located away from populated areas. LHC, Inc. applied for such a permit for a project near the Clearwater River. The Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) approved the permit after LHC addressed initial deficiencies. Protect the Clearwater, an environmental group, challenged the permit, arguing it did not meet statutory requirements and that DEQ's environmental assessment was inadequate.The Fourth Judicial District Court granted a preliminary injunction to Protect the Clearwater, halting LHC's mining activities. The court found that Protect the Clearwater was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that DEQ erred in issuing the dryland permit. The court also determined that Protect the Clearwater would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities favored the injunction, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court's decision was based on Montana's general preliminary injunction statute, rather than the specific provisions of the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and concluded that the District Court improperly applied the general preliminary injunction statute. The Supreme Court held that Protect the Clearwater should have sought relief under MEPA's exclusive remedy provisions, given that the permit was issued under Title 75 and Title 82. The Supreme Court vacated the District Court's preliminary injunction and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the application for the injunction. View "Protect the Clearwater v Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

The case involves current and former San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) employees who sued the United States, alleging that the Navy misled the City of San Francisco and the SFPD about the safety of a contaminated former Naval shipyard leased by the City for use as a facility for SFPD employees. The plaintiffs claimed that the Navy's misrepresentations about the safety of the site caused them to be exposed to hazardous substances, resulting in health problems.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, indicating that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) misrepresentation exception likely barred their claims. The plaintiffs then filed a Second Amended Complaint, which the district court also dismissed, concluding that the misrepresentation exception applied because the plaintiffs' claims were fundamentally based on the Navy's alleged misrepresentations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception applied because the plaintiffs' claims arose out of the Navy’s alleged misrepresentations, even if the misrepresentations were made to the City and the SFPD rather than directly to the plaintiffs. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) implicitly limited or suspended the misrepresentation exception, finding no indication that Congress intended CERCLA to override the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception. The court concluded that the claims were barred by the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception and affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "ABBEY V. USA" on Justia Law

The case involves the Westside Los Angeles Neighbors Network (appellant) challenging actions taken by the Los Angeles City Planning Commission (CPC) in March 2018 to implement parts of the Westside Mobility Plan. This plan aims to address congestion and mobility issues in the western part of Los Angeles. The appellant argued that the CPC’s actions did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and sought to invalidate them.The Los Angeles County Superior Court reviewed the case and rejected most of the appellant’s contentions, denying the petition. The court found that the CPC was a decision-making body authorized to certify the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the Streetscape Plan was categorically exempt from CEQA. The court also found that the EIR was legally adequate.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the CPC was authorized to certify the EIR as it was a decision-making body for the project. The court also found that the Streetscape Plan was categorically exempt from CEQA under Guidelines section 15301, which covers minor alterations to existing public structures. The court concluded that the appellant did not demonstrate that the Streetscape Plan fell within any exceptions to the categorical exemptions. Additionally, the court held that the EIR’s analysis of growth-inducing impacts was adequate and that the City had ensured that mitigation measures would be implemented.The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed, and the City of Los Angeles was awarded costs on appeal. View "Westside Los Angeles Neighbors Network v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

David Schaffner, Jr. and Theresa Sue Schaffner filed a lawsuit against Monsanto Corporation, alleging that Monsanto violated Pennsylvania law by failing to include a cancer warning on the label of its weed-killer, Roundup. The Schaffners claimed that this omission caused Mr. Schaffner to develop non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma due to his exposure to Roundup. The case was initially filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, and was later removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (JPML) then transferred the case to the Northern District of California for consolidated pretrial proceedings.In the Northern District of California, the MDL Court had previously ruled in similar cases that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) did not preempt state-law tort duties to include a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. Following this precedent, the MDL Court denied Monsanto’s motion for summary judgment on preemption grounds. The case was subsequently remanded to the Western District of Pennsylvania, where the parties stipulated to a judgment in favor of the Schaffners, reserving Monsanto’s right to appeal the preemption issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether FIFRA preempted the Pennsylvania duty to warn. The court held that FIFRA’s preemption provision, which prohibits states from imposing labeling requirements different from those required under federal law, did preempt the state-law duty to include a cancer warning. The court reasoned that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had approved Roundup’s label without a cancer warning, and FIFRA regulations require pesticide labels to conform to the EPA-approved label. Therefore, the Pennsylvania duty to warn was not equivalent to the federal requirements and was preempted by FIFRA. The Third Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court. View "Schaffner v. Monsanto Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves the Center for Biological Diversity's efforts to protect the Canadian lynx, a threatened species, from incidental trapping in Minnesota. The Center sued the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, alleging that the state had not done enough to prevent trappers from accidentally capturing lynx. This led to a proposed consent decree requiring Minnesota to implement additional restrictions on trapping methods to protect the lynx.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the case and approved the consent decree over objections from three pro-trapping organizations. These organizations argued that the decree was prejudicial and harmful to their interests and that state law did not permit the adoption of the new regulations in the manner proposed. The district court found the consent decree to be a reasonable compromise that balanced the interests of both parties and had a reasonable relationship to the claims and defenses in the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's approval of the consent decree. The appellate court examined whether the consent decree was procedurally fair and reasonable. It found that the negotiations were conducted in good faith and at arm's length, and that the trappers had ample opportunity to raise their objections. The court also determined that the consent decree was reasonable because it aimed to reduce the number of lynx deaths and furthered the objectives of the Endangered Species Act. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the consent decree and affirmed the judgment. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. MN Trappers Association" on Justia Law