Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Best Development Group, LLC proposed to develop a Grocery Outlet store in King City. The King City Planning Commission approved the project, determining it was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) under the class 32 categorical exemption for infill development. Efrain Aguilera appealed this decision to the King City Council, which denied the appeal and upheld the exemption. Aguilera and Working Families of Monterey County then filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the class 32 exemption did not apply because the project was not in an urbanized area and the environmental assessment was inadequate.The Monterey County Superior Court denied the petition, ruling that the class 32 exemption did not require the project to be in an urbanized area as defined by CEQA and that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the project met the exemption criteria. The court also found that the City was not required to conduct a formal environmental review.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the terms “infill development” and “substantially surrounded by urban uses” in CEQA Guidelines section 15332 should not be interpreted using the statutory definitions of “infill site,” “urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses” from other sections of CEQA. The court found that the regulatory intent was to reduce sprawl by exempting development in already developed areas, typically but not exclusively in urban areas. The court also determined that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that the project site was substantially surrounded by urban uses, based on the environmental assessment and aerial photographs.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding that the class 32 exemption for infill development applied to the Grocery Outlet project, and no further CEQA compliance was required. View "Working Families of Monterey County v. King City Planning Com." on Justia Law

Friends of the South Fork Gualala (FSFG) filed a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) proceeding against the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFIRE) regarding the approval of a timber harvesting plan by Richardson Ranch, LLC. FSFG's counsel, Daniel Garrett-Steinman, who suffers from bipolar disorder, requested disability accommodations under rule 1.100 of the California Rules of Court, seeking extensions of time and other procedural relief. The trial court granted six of these requests over eight months but denied the seventh request, leading to this appeal.The Sonoma County Superior Court had previously granted FSFG's petition in part, vacating CalFIRE's approval of the timber plan due to inadequate consideration of various environmental impacts. However, the court denied FSFG's claim that the late publication of a complete response to public comments rendered the approval defective. FSFG argued that the trial court's denial of the seventh accommodation request prevented a fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the incomplete response.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the seventh accommodation request. The appellate court found that the trial court had reasonably concluded that further delays would create an undue financial and administrative burden and fundamentally alter the nature of the expedited CEQA proceeding. The court also noted that FSFG had the option to retain additional counsel, which it failed to do. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Friends of the So. Fork Gualala v. Department of Forestry and Fire Protection" on Justia Law

Casa Mira Homeowners Association (Casa Mira) applied for a coastal development permit to construct a 257-foot seawall to protect a condominium complex, sewer line, apartment building, and a segment of the Coastal Trail in Half Moon Bay from erosion. The California Coastal Commission (Commission) denied the request for the condominiums and sewer line, built in 1984, but approved a 50-foot seawall for the apartment building, built in 1972, and concluded that relocating the Coastal Trail inland was a feasible alternative to shoreline armoring.The San Mateo County Superior Court granted Casa Mira's petition for a writ of mandate, vacating the Commission's decision. The court found that the Commission misinterpreted "existing structures" in the California Coastal Act to mean structures existing before January 1, 1977, and concluded that the Commission's finding regarding the feasibility of relocating the Coastal Trail was not supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that "existing structures" in section 30235 of the Coastal Act refers to structures that existed before the Act's effective date of January 1, 1977. Therefore, the condominiums and sewer line built in 1984 are not entitled to shoreline armoring. However, the court also found that the Commission's decision to relocate the Coastal Trail inland was not supported by substantial evidence, as the original staff report indicated that rerouting the trail would sacrifice its aesthetic and recreational value and was not a viable alternative.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment regarding the interpretation of "existing structures" but affirmed the trial court's determination that there was no substantial evidence supporting the Commission's finding that armoring was unnecessary to protect the Coastal Trail. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs of appeal. View "Casa Mira Homeowners Assn. v. Cal. Coastal Com." on Justia Law

Port City Air Leasing, Inc. (Port City) leases land and buildings at Pease International Tradeport for aircraft-related services. Pease Aviation Partners LLC, doing business as Million Air Portsmouth (Million Air), proposed to lease adjacent land to build a similar facility and applied for a permit to dredge and fill wetlands to construct an access road. The New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) issued the permit in June 2022. Port City filed an administrative appeal with the New Hampshire Wetlands Council (Council), arguing that the permit issuance was unlawful and unreasonable. Million Air intervened and moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming Port City lacked standing.The Hearing Officer ruled that Port City lacked standing because it was not a "person aggrieved" under RSA 482-A:10, I, which includes the applicant and those entitled to notice by mail under RSA 482-A:8 and RSA 482-A:9. The Hearing Officer determined that Port City was not an "abutting landowner" entitled to notice. Port City's motion for reconsideration and rehearing was denied, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the Council's decision. The court held that Port City is not a "landowner" under RSA 482-A:9 because its lease does not grant interests equivalent to fee ownership. Consequently, Port City is not a "person aggrieved" with standing to appeal under RSA 482-A:10, I. The court also rejected Port City's due process claims, concluding that the absence of an administrative remedy does not violate its state or federal due process rights, as Port City still has potential legal remedies for any injuries. The court affirmed the dismissal of Port City's appeal. View "Appeal of Port City Air Leasing, Inc." on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a final rule implementing section 2613 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), as amended by the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act. The rule concerns the assertion and treatment of confidential business information (CBI) claims for information reported to or obtained by the EPA under the TSCA. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) challenged three aspects of the rule, arguing that it was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The American Chemistry Council (ACC) also challenged the rule, arguing that it allowed for the unlawful disclosure of information protected by section 2613(a) of the TSCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. EDF argued that the EPA's regulatory definition of "health and safety study" was impermissibly narrow, that the EPA should require substantiation and routine review of pre-commercialization CBI claims after commercialization, and that the EPA's use of permissive language in the rule was inappropriate. ACC argued that the rule allowed for the unlawful disclosure of specific chemical identities when downstream entities reported information without knowledge of the specific chemical identity.The court denied EDF's petition for review, holding that the EPA's definition of "health and safety study" was consistent with the statute and not arbitrary or capricious. The court also held that the TSCA does not require reassertion and substantiation of pre-commercialization CBI claims after commercialization and that the EPA's use of permissive language was reasonable. However, the court granted ACC's petition for review, holding that the rule was unlawful to the extent it required entities reporting by non-confidential accession numbers and without knowledge of the underlying chemical identity to assert CBI claims for the underlying chemical identity. The court vacated these requirements under the rule. View "Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA" on Justia Law

A group of 16 youths sued the State of Montana, the Governor, and multiple state agencies, alleging that the State's actions exacerbated the harm they were experiencing from climate change. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, specifically challenging certain provisions of Montana's State Energy Policy Act and the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) as unconstitutional. The plaintiffs argued that these provisions violated their constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment by promoting fossil fuel development and prohibiting the consideration of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in environmental reviews.The First Judicial District Court found in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the challenged provisions unconstitutional and enjoining the State from acting in accordance with them. The court concluded that the right to a clean and healthful environment includes a stable climate system and that the MEPA Limitation violated this right. The court also denied the State's motion for psychiatric examinations of the plaintiffs, finding no good cause for such examinations.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the right to a clean and healthful environment under the Montana Constitution includes a stable climate system. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the MEPA Limitation, as it infringed on their constitutional rights. The court also held that the MEPA Limitation was unconstitutional because it arbitrarily excluded GHG emissions from environmental reviews, thereby violating the plaintiffs' right to a clean and healthful environment. The court affirmed the permanent injunction against the State from acting in accordance with the unconstitutional provisions. View "Held v. State" on Justia Law

The United States Army Corps of Engineers partnered with the City of Dallas on the Dallas Floodway Extension (DFE) project, which began in 1999. Plaintiffs Timpy Ondrusek and Barbara Ann Ondrusek Wolfe own property that Dallas attempted to condemn for the DFE. They sued the Corps and the City in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming the Corps failed to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) to account for new information, violating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the claims, determining the case was not justiciable. The court found the plaintiffs had not shown Article III standing and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, but the district court again concluded the case was not justiciable, noting the levee design phase was only 35 percent complete, and dismissed the case as unripe without prejudice, denying leave to amend.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found the claims against the Army Corps of Engineers were ripe for decision, as the Corps' failure to comply with NEPA presented a present controversy. The court determined the plaintiffs had standing, as they alleged a concrete and particularized risk of environmental harm to their property due to the Corps' failure to prepare an SEIS. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the suit with respect to the Army Corps of Engineers, affirmed the dismissal with respect to the City of Dallas, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ondrusek v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

Casa Mira Homeowners Association (Casa Mira) applied for a coastal development permit to construct a 257-foot seawall to protect a condominium complex, sewer line, apartment building, and a segment of the Coastal Trail in Half Moon Bay from erosion. The California Coastal Commission (Commission) denied the permit for the condominiums and sewer line, built in 1984, but approved a 50-foot seawall for the apartment building, built in 1972, and suggested relocating the Coastal Trail inland as a feasible alternative to armoring.The San Mateo County Superior Court granted Casa Mira's petition for a writ of mandate, concluding that the term "existing structures" in the California Coastal Act referred to structures existing at the time of the seawall application, thus entitling the condominiums and sewer line to protection. The court also found insufficient evidence to support the Commission's decision to relocate the Coastal Trail instead of constructing the seawall.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that "existing structures" in the context of the Coastal Act refers to structures that existed before the Act's effective date of January 1, 1977. Consequently, the condominiums and sewer line, built in 1984, were not entitled to shoreline armoring. The court reversed the trial court's judgment on this point.However, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that the Commission's decision to relocate the Coastal Trail was not supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the Commission's revised staff report lacked a detailed factual basis and explanation for rejecting the original staff recommendation, which found no viable location for rerouting the trail while maintaining its aesthetic and recreational value. Thus, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Casa Mira Homeowners Assn. v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

A paint company was sued by Santa Clara County, California, along with other governmental entities, for promoting and selling lead-based paint, which was alleged to have created a public nuisance. The lawsuit sought abatement, not damages, to mitigate the hazards of lead paint. The California trial court ordered the paint companies to pay $1.15 billion into an abatement fund, later reduced to $409 million, to be used for future lead hazard control measures. The paint companies eventually settled, agreeing to pay $101,666,667 each into the fund.The paint company then sought indemnification from its insurers in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the payment into the abatement fund constituted "damages" under their insurance policies. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers, concluding that the payment was not for "damages" as it was intended to prevent future harm rather than compensate for past harm.The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the payment into the abatement fund did qualify as "damages" under the insurance policies, as it was essentially to reimburse the government for its ongoing efforts to remediate lead paint hazards.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Eighth District's decision, reinstating the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the insurers. The Supreme Court held that the payment into the abatement fund was not "damages" under the insurance policies because it was intended to prevent future harm rather than compensate for past harm. The court emphasized that the abatement fund was an equitable remedy aimed at eliminating the hazard of lead paint to prevent future injuries, not to compensate for any prior harm. View "Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) changing its air-quality standard for ozone under the Clean Air Act, which required states to amend their state plans. The EPA issued guidance memoranda to assist states, suggesting specific modeling and a minimum threshold for interstate emissions. Kentucky proposed a plan based on this guidance, but the EPA delayed action on the plan for two years and then disapproved it using different modeling and a lower threshold than initially recommended. Kentucky petitioned the court to vacate the EPA's disapproval.The EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan was challenged in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The EPA sought to transfer the case to the D.C. Circuit, arguing that the disapproval was a nationally applicable final action. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion, stating that the EPA's disapproval was not nationally applicable and was based on Kentucky's unique facts. The court also found that the EPA's action violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by acting arbitrarily and inconsistently with its prior guidance.The Sixth Circuit held that the EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the EPA failed to adequately explain its departure from prior guidance and did not consider Kentucky's reliance on the initial recommendations. The court vacated the EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court emphasized the importance of consistency and the need for the EPA to justify its actions when changing its approach. View "Kentucky v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law