Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

GreenPower Motor Company Inc. (GreenPower) and San Joaquin Valley Equipment Leasing, Inc. (San Joaquin Leasing) were involved in the California Hybrid and Zero-Emissions Truck and Bus Voucher Incentive Project (HVIP), which subsidizes the price of qualifying electric vehicles (EVs). GreenPower's participation in the HVIP program was suspended following an investigation by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) into their compliance with HVIP requirements. Subsequently, the Attorney General's Office began investigating potential violations of the HVIP program and issued subpoenas to GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing for documents related to their compliance with HVIP.GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing filed a petition for writ of mandate in Sacramento County Superior Court to compel CARB to issue vouchers for their EVs. Meanwhile, the Attorney General issued subpoenas as part of a separate investigation. When GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing did not comply, the Attorney General filed a petition in the City and County of San Francisco Superior Court to enforce the subpoenas. The trial court ordered GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing to show cause for their non-compliance and eventually required them to produce the requested documents.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce the subpoenas and that the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction did not apply because the issues in the Sacramento action and the present proceeding were factually and legally distinct. The court also found that the subpoenas were valid, specific, and relevant to the Attorney General's investigation into potential violations of the HVIP program and the California False Claims Act. The order requiring compliance with the subpoenas was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Bonta v. Greenpower Motor Co." on Justia Law

Janet Cote owns a property that was previously a gas station site. After discovering significant petroleum contamination in the soil, she applied for and received reimbursement from the Petroleum Cleanup Fund (PCF). The Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) later denied further reimbursement for costs associated with a licensed engineer and additional items on Cote’s property. The Environmental Division affirmed the ANR’s decision in part and reversed in part. Cote appealed the denied reimbursements.The Environmental Division held a two-day hearing and concluded that the ANR must reimburse Cote for electrical work, concrete work, and wastewater work, as these were pre-approved and the ANR’s subsequent denial was unreasonable. However, the court upheld the ANR’s denial of costs for a licensed engineer and other punch list items, finding the ANR’s decision reasonable and consistent with the law.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the ANR’s denial of reimbursement for the licensed engineer and punch list items was reasonable. The court found the Environmental Division’s analysis lacking, as it did not adequately explain why the ANR’s denial was reasonable or provide sufficient findings of fact. The court noted that the Environmental Division merely restated the ANR’s conclusory arguments without proper analysis.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, instructing the Environmental Division to make adequate factual findings and any additional conclusions necessary on the disputed reimbursement claims. The court emphasized the need for clear reasoning and analysis to support the decision. View "In re Cote/Maquam Shore Market" on Justia Law

The Gila River Indian Community (GRIC) sued two landowners, the Schoubroek and Sexton families, alleging that their farms were pumping groundwater originating from the Gila River, infringing on GRIC’s water rights. GRIC sought to stop the pumping and have the wells sealed. The San Carlos Apache Tribe intervened in support of GRIC.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona found that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 and § 1331, rejecting the defendants' argument that the Arizona state court's Gila River Adjudication had exclusive jurisdiction. The district court granted summary judgment for GRIC, concluding that the defendants' wells were pumping subflow from the Gila River and ordered the wells to be shut down. The court also denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on claim preclusion grounds, despite a 2007 dismissal with prejudice of a similar complaint by GRIC.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court had jurisdiction but not exclusive jurisdiction. It held that the Decree did not provide the district court with prior exclusive jurisdiction over non-parties to the Decree. The court also found that the Arizona state court did not have prior exclusive jurisdiction over the claims.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment on claim preclusion, recognizing that the 2007 dismissal did not preclude GRIC’s current claims due to the specific context of the settlement agreement. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for GRIC, finding that GRIC had not provided clear and convincing evidence that the wells were pumping subflow or were within the subflow zone. The court vacated the district court's remedy of shutting down the wells and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gila River Indian Community v. Schoubroek" on Justia Law

Energy Transfer LP, involved in the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) project, filed a lawsuit in North Dakota against Greenpeace International and others, alleging various tort claims related to the 2016 Standing Rock Protests. Unicorn Riot, a Minnesota-based news organization, and its journalist Niko Georgiades, who reported on the protests, were subpoenaed by Energy Transfer for documents and communications related to the protests. Unicorn Riot objected, citing the Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act (MFFIA), which protects newsgatherers from disclosing unpublished information.The Hennepin County District Court denied Energy Transfer's motion to compel Unicorn Riot to produce the requested documents but ordered Unicorn Riot to produce a privilege log. Both parties appealed. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to compel but reversed the order requiring a privilege log, concluding that the MFFIA prohibits such an order.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the MFFIA applies to newsgatherers even if they engage in unlawful or tortious conduct, as long as the conduct does not fall within the statutory exceptions of Minn. Stat. §§ 595.024–.025. The court also held that the MFFIA does not prevent district courts from ordering the production of a privilege log, but district courts should consider whether producing such a log would impose an undue burden on the responding party.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court to determine the appropriate scope of the privilege log, considering potential undue burdens. View "Energy Transfer LP v. Greenpeace International" on Justia Law

ELG Utica Alloys, Inc. ("ELG") sued a group of its former customers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, asserting claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). ELG had remediated contamination at one portion of a 23-acre facility in 2007 and continued to remediate contamination at a different portion of the facility pursuant to a 2015 consent order with the New York State government. ELG sought contribution for the costs of the 2015 cleanup from the defendants, alleging they were also responsible for the contamination.The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the six-year statute of limitations for certain CERCLA claims had elapsed. The District Court granted the motion, reasoning that the remediation began in 2007, and the 2015 work was a subsequent step in the work that commenced in 2007. Therefore, the statute of limitations started to run in 2007 and elapsed in 2013, before ELG sued. The District Court also imposed spoliation sanctions on ELG for shredding over 23,000 pounds of potentially relevant documents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court that the statute of limitations on ELG’s claims commenced once on-site physical remediation began in 2007. The court also found no error in the District Court’s imposition of spoliation sanctions. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court and remanded to the District Court to order the agreed-upon spoliation sanction. View "ELG Utica Alloys, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp." on Justia Law

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) approved over 4,000 permits for oil and gas wells on public land in New Mexico and Wyoming from January 2021 to August 2022. Environmental organizations challenged these permits, alleging that BLM failed to adequately consider the climate and environmental justice impacts of the wells. The district court dismissed the claims, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing.The plaintiffs appealed, asserting standing based on affidavits from their members who live, work, and recreate near the drilling sites, claiming injuries to their health, safety, and recreational and aesthetic interests. They also claimed standing based on the wells' overall contribution to global climate change and an organizational injury from the government's failure to publicize information about climate change.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently link their alleged harms to the specific agency actions they sought to reverse. The court emphasized that plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each challenged permit by showing a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged action and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. The court found that the plaintiffs' generalized claims about the harms of oil and gas development were insufficient to establish standing for the specific permits at issue.The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claims of organizational standing, finding that the alleged injuries were limited to issue advocacy and did not demonstrate a concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization's activities. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) manages wild horse herds in southern Wyoming under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. This Act mandates the protection and management of wild horses on public lands. The land in question is a checkerboard pattern of alternating public and private ownership. Since 1979, BLM managed these herds with the consent of private landowners. However, in 2010, private landowners revoked their consent, making it difficult for BLM to maintain the herds. In 2022, BLM amended its Regional Management Plan (RMP) to change two Herd Management Areas (HMAs) to Herd Areas (HAs), reducing the wild horse population goal to zero in two areas and significantly reducing it in another.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming reviewed the case and ruled in favor of BLM, finding that the agency had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in amending the RMP. The court held that any challenge to BLM’s decision to remove horses was unripe and that BLM had complied with the relevant statutes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and found that BLM failed to consider whether its decision would achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance, as required by the Wild Horse Act. The court held that BLM’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not base its decision on this statutory requirement. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case to determine the appropriate remedy, considering the practical consequences of vacatur and the potential for BLM to substantiate its decision on remand. View "American Wild Horse Campaign v. Raby" on Justia Law

In 2010, the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill released crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico. Matthew Williams, the plaintiff, performed oil spill clean-up work in the Gulf that summer. On September 24, 2020, Williams was diagnosed with chronic pansinusitis, an inflammatory condition of the nasal passages. Williams filed a lawsuit against BP Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America Production Co., alleging that his condition was caused by exposure to oil, dispersants, and other chemicals during the cleanup work. Williams presented two expert witnesses, Dr. Michael Freeman and Dr. James Clark, to establish causation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi reviewed the case. BP filed motions to exclude the expert reports under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert, and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Williams lacked admissible expert testimony to establish causation. The district court granted BP’s motions to exclude the expert testimonies and the motion for summary judgment, leading Williams to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the district court’s exclusion of Dr. Freeman’s testimony, finding it unreliable as it did not properly apply the differential etiology approach. Similarly, the court found Dr. Clark’s testimony unreliable due to errors in his report, including references to another case and incorrect assumptions about benzene concentrations. Without admissible expert testimony, Williams could not establish specific causation, a necessary element in toxic tort cases. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of BP. View "Williams v. BP Expl & Prod" on Justia Law

Marjorie Johnson, the owner of farmland, was denied a permit by the Village of Polk to drill a new well for irrigating her farmland. She sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance requiring a permit for new wells in the village’s wellhead protection area was invalid, arguing it was preempted by the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act (NGWMPA) and violated state law by interfering with her existing farming operations.The district court for Polk County denied her request for declaratory judgment and her petition in error. The court found that the ordinance was not preempted by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature intended for both local natural resources districts (NRDs) and municipalities to have control over water sources. The court also found that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the land was previously irrigated through an agreement with a neighbor, and it was the dispute with the neighbor, not the ordinance, that resulted in the land being dryland.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the ordinance was enacted under the necessary statutory grant of power to the municipality, as the Wellhead Protection Area Act and other statutes granted villages the authority to adopt controls to protect public water supplies. The court also found no field or conflict preemption by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature did not intend to deprive municipalities of their statutory authority to require permits for wells within wellhead protection areas. Finally, the court agreed that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the existing farming at the time of the permit request was dryland farming, and it was the neighbor’s actions, not the ordinance, that prevented irrigation. View "Johnson v. Village of Polk" on Justia Law

Upper Missouri Waterkeeper and seven Broadwater County residents challenged the approval of a subdivision by 71 Ranch, LP, arguing it did not meet the "exempt well" exception for a water rights permit. They sought attorney fees under the Montana Water Use Act, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), and the Private Attorney General Doctrine. The District Court denied their request for fees under all three claims.The First Judicial District Court found that the subdivision's environmental assessment was inadequate and that the County abused its discretion in approving the subdivision. The court ruled in favor of Upper Missouri on most claims but denied their request for attorney fees. The plaintiffs appealed the denial of fees.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court that the Water Use Act did not authorize fees. However, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of fees under the UDJA, finding that the District Court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court held that the equities supported an award of attorney fees and that the declaratory relief sought by Upper Missouri was necessary to change the status quo. The case was remanded to the District Court to determine a reasonable amount of fees and their apportionment. The Supreme Court did not address the private attorney general claim. View "Upper Missouri v. Department of Natural Resources and Conservation" on Justia Law