Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Rural residents of Alaska, including Alaska Natives, have long relied on subsistence fishing in navigable waters such as the Kuskokwim River, which runs through the Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuge. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) was enacted to protect this way of life by establishing a rural subsistence priority for fishing and hunting on “public lands.” For decades, the federal government and the State of Alaska have disagreed over whether “public lands” under Title VIII of ANILCA includes navigable waters where the United States holds reserved water rights, especially after Alaska’s own subsistence laws were found unconstitutional for not providing a rural preference.After the federal government assumed management of the rural subsistence priority, a series of Ninth Circuit decisions known as the Katie John Trilogy held that “public lands” in Title VIII does include such navigable waters. The United States implemented this interpretation, managing subsistence fishing on the Kuskokwim River within the Refuge. However, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sturgeon v. Frost, which interpreted “public lands” differently in another section of ANILCA, Alaska asserted renewed authority over the river, issuing conflicting fishing orders that did not prioritize rural subsistence users.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction in favor of the United States and intervenors, holding that the Katie John Trilogy remained binding and that Alaska could not interfere with federal management of the rural subsistence priority.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Katie John Trilogy is not clearly irreconcilable with Sturgeon v. Frost, as the statutory context and purpose of Title VIII support a broader interpretation of “public lands” that includes navigable waters for subsistence purposes. The court also found that subsequent congressional actions ratified this interpretation. The judgment and injunction were affirmed. View "United States v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The United States government brought suit against several defendants, including EZ Lynk, SEZC, Thomas Wood, and Bradley Gintz, alleging that their product, the EZ Lynk System, violated the Clean Air Act by enabling vehicle owners to bypass or disable emissions controls. The EZ Lynk System consists of a physical device that connects to a vehicle’s diagnostics port, a smartphone app, and a cloud-based service. Through this system, users can download and install “tunes” created by third-party technicians, including “delete tunes” that defeat emissions controls. The complaint detailed how EZ Lynk collaborated with tune creators, provided technical support, and maintained an online forum where users discussed using the system to delete emissions controls.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the government’s complaint sufficiently alleged that the EZ Lynk System was a “defeat device” under the Clean Air Act. However, the district court dismissed the complaint, holding that EZ Lynk and its principals were immune from liability under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The court reasoned that EZ Lynk merely published third-party information (the delete tunes) and did not create them, thus qualifying for Section 230 immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Second Circuit agreed that the complaint adequately alleged the EZ Lynk System was a defeat device. However, it held that the complaint also sufficiently alleged that EZ Lynk, Wood, and Gintz directly and materially contributed to the creation of the unlawful delete tunes, making them ineligible for Section 230 immunity. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding is that Section 230 immunity does not apply where a defendant directly and materially contributes to the creation of unlawful content. View "United States v. EZ Lynk" on Justia Law

The State of Vermont brought a lawsuit in state court against 3M Company, alleging that 3M’s production of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), known as “forever chemicals,” had contaminated Vermont’s natural resources, including water, wildlife, soil, and sediment. The case focused on contamination at the Rutland City landfill and a former 3M manufacturing facility in Rutland, Vermont. In 2023, Vermont’s Department of Environmental Conservation sent 3M a letter identifying it as a potentially responsible party for PFAS contamination, and Vermont’s counsel later forwarded this letter to 3M’s counsel in the context of the ongoing litigation.After receiving the letter, 3M conducted an internal investigation and determined that, during its ownership of the Rutland facility, it had manufactured copper-clad laminates in accordance with military specifications that required the use of PFAS. On January 3, 2024, 3M removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), asserting a federal defense based on its compliance with military requirements. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont found that 3M’s removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), reasoning that the thirty-day removal period began when 3M received Vermont’s email with the DEC letter, and remanded the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s remand order de novo. The Second Circuit held that Vermont’s correspondence did not provide sufficient information for 3M to ascertain that the case was removable under the federal officer removal statute, and thus the thirty-day removal period had not begun when 3M received the email. The court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. 3M Co." on Justia Law

In 1997, an individual applied to the Utah Division of Water Rights to divert water from a surface source in the Weber Basin for irrigation and livestock purposes. The application was met with protests from the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, among others. After a hearing in 1998 and sporadic communications over the next two decades, the Utah State Engineer ultimately denied the application in 2018. The applicant sought judicial review in the Second District Court, arguing that the denial was improper because the water source contained unappropriated water, the application would not interfere with existing rights, and the application’s 1997 filing date should give it priority.While the case was pending in the Second District Court, the applicant died. His counsel moved to substitute the estate’s personal representative as the plaintiff under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1). The district court denied the motion, holding that the claim did not survive the applicant’s death because he had no perfected property right and any inchoate right was not mentioned in his will. The court also found that Utah’s general survival statute did not apply, and dismissed the case. The estate appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed whether the district court erred in denying substitution and dismissing the claim. The court held that the burden was on the movant to show the claim survived death. It found that neither common law nor statute provided for the survival of a claim for judicial review of an administrative denial of a water appropriation application. The court concluded that the claim abated upon the applicant’s death and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Marriott v. Wilhelmsen" on Justia Law

A group of farmers in Marion County, Oregon, formed an irrigation district to secure water for agricultural use by constructing a reservoir on Drift Creek. In 2013, the district applied to the Oregon Water Resources Department for a permit to store water by building a dam, which would inundate land owned by local farmers and impact an existing in-stream water right held in trust for fish habitat. The proposed project faced opposition from affected landowners and an environmental organization, who argued that the reservoir would harm both their property and the ecological purpose of the in-stream water right.The Oregon Water Resources Department initially recommended approval of the application, finding that the project would not injure existing water rights, as the prior appropriation system would ensure senior rights were satisfied first. After a contested case hearing, an administrative law judge also recommended approval. However, the Oregon Water Resources Commission, upon review of exceptions filed by the protestants, reversed the Department’s decision and denied the application. The Commission concluded that the proposed reservoir would frustrate the beneficial purpose of the in-stream water right—namely, supporting fish habitat—even if the required water quantity was maintained at the measurement point. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s order.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the public interest protected by Oregon water law includes not only the quantity of water guaranteed to a senior right holder but also the beneficial use for which the right was granted. The Commission was correct to consider whether the proposed use would frustrate the beneficial purpose of the in-stream right. However, the Court further held that, after finding the presumption of public interest was overcome, the Commission was required to consider all statutory public interest factors before making its final determination. Because the Commission failed to do so, the Supreme Court reversed its order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission" on Justia Law

Several entities affected by California’s new water quality testing rules challenged the State Water Resources Control Board’s adoption of the State Policy for Water Quality Control: Toxicity Provisions. These Toxicity Provisions require the use of the Environmental Protection Agency’s Test of Significant Toxicity (TST) to measure whole effluent toxicity, which assesses the combined toxic effect of all pollutants in water. The plaintiffs, including sanitary districts and clean water associations, argued that the TST is not an approved method under federal law, that the Toxicity Provisions were not properly authorized, and that the State Board violated state environmental and procedural laws in adopting them.The Superior Court of Fresno County denied the plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandate and upheld the Toxicity Provisions, finding that they were properly adopted and that the TST was not an improper change to federal standards. The plaintiffs appealed this decision, maintaining their arguments regarding federal and state law compliance.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that the TST is not an approved method for use in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting under the federal Clean Water Act. The court found that the TST creates a new statistical endpoint for toxicity that is not authorized by federal regulations, which only approve the NOEC and IC25 endpoints. Therefore, the Toxicity Provisions conflict with federal law to the extent they require the TST for NPDES compliance. However, the court also held that the State Board properly adopted the Toxicity Provisions as a state water policy under state law, and that the adoption complied with the California Administrative Procedure Act and the California Environmental Quality Act. The judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Camarillo Sanitary Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

A company that supplies oil and propane hired a trucking business to deliver 10,000 gallons of heating oil to its property in Putnam, Connecticut. During the delivery, the trucking company’s employee allegedly failed to monitor the filling process, resulting in an overflow that contaminated the soil and groundwater. The supplier claimed it incurred over $500,000 in remediation and related expenses due to the spill.The supplier filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, asserting common-law negligence and recklessness claims under Connecticut law. The complaint cited specific federal Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs) as evidence of the trucking company’s duties and alleged breaches. The trucking company moved to dismiss, arguing that the supplier’s claims were preempted by the federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) and, alternatively, that the recklessness claim was insufficiently pleaded. The district court granted the motion, holding that the HMTA preempted the state-law claims and that the recklessness claim failed to state a claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Second Circuit held that the HMTA does not preempt the supplier’s Connecticut common-law claims for negligence and recklessness, so long as those claims are based on duties that are “substantively the same” as federal requirements under the HMTA and HMRs. The court found that the mental state required for negligence and recklessness under Connecticut law is not inconsistent with the HMTA’s standards for civil violations. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "DCC Propane LLC v. KMT Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves two companies, Skyline Tower Painting, Inc. (Skyline) and Television Tower, Inc. (TTI), which were sued by a group of plaintiffs for allegedly causing lead paint contamination in a Baltimore neighborhood. TTI owns a TV tower that was coated with lead-based paint, and Skyline was contracted to clean the tower using hydroblasting, a process that dislodged and dispersed the lead paint. The plaintiffs, who own property within a 4000-foot radius of the tower, claimed that the hydroblasting caused lead paint chips and dust to spread throughout their community, posing health risks and reducing property values.The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in Maryland state court, asserting claims for negligence, negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity. The defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court, invoking CAFA’s local-controversy exception. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted the motion to remand, finding that the local-controversy exception applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, despite the defendants also filing petitions for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453. The court dismissed the § 1453 petitions as unnecessary. On the merits, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the local-controversy exception to CAFA applied. The court found that more than two-thirds of the proposed class members were Maryland citizens, and that TTI, a Maryland citizen, was a significant defendant from whom significant relief was sought and whose conduct formed a significant basis for the claims. View "Skyline Tower Painting, Inc. v. Goldberg" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved a 1,000-foot natural-gas pipeline crossing the U.S.-Mexico border. The Sierra Club and Public Citizen challenged this approval, arguing that FERC should have exercised jurisdiction over a longer 157-mile pipeline extending into Texas, considered the environmental impact of the entire pipeline, and evaluated alternatives to the border-crossing segment. They also claimed that FERC's approval of the border-crossing pipeline was arbitrary and capricious.The lower court, FERC, concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the 157-mile Connector Pipeline because it did not cross state lines or carry interstate gas upon entering service. FERC conducted an Environmental Assessment for the 1,000-foot Border Facility, found minimal environmental impact, and deemed it in the public interest. After FERC reaffirmed its conclusions on rehearing, the petitioners sought judicial review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC reasonably declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Connector Pipeline under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, respecting state regulatory authority. The court also found substantial evidence supporting FERC's conclusion that the Connector Pipeline would not transport interstate gas initially, thus not subjecting it to Section 7 jurisdiction. The court rejected the petitioners' claims that FERC's approval of the Border Facility was arbitrary and capricious, noting the presumption favoring authorization under the Natural Gas Act.Regarding the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the court found that FERC reasonably defined the project's purpose and need, appropriately limited its environmental review to the Border Facility, and did not need to consider the upstream Connector Pipeline's impacts. The court denied the petition, affirming FERC's decisions. View "Sierra Club v. FERC" on Justia Law

The American Burying Beetle, the largest carrion beetle in North America, was listed as an endangered species by the Fish and Wildlife Service in 1989. In 2015, the Service began reevaluating the Beetle's status, prompted by a petition from private entities. The Service's Species Status Assessment Report revealed that the Beetle's current range is larger than initially thought, with several large, resilient populations across the United States. The Service concluded that the Beetle faces a relatively low near-term risk of extinction but is likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future due to future land-use changes and climate change. Consequently, in 2020, the Service downlisted the Beetle from "endangered" to "threatened" and established a Section 4(d) Rule for its conservation.The Center for Biological Diversity challenged the downlisting and the sufficiency of the protections for the Beetle as a threatened species. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the Service, concluding that the Downlisting Rule did not violate the Endangered Species Act, was supported by the administrative record, and was reasonably explained. The court also found that the Center failed to establish standing for its challenges to the Section 4(d) Rule.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the Service's conclusion that the Beetle was not endangered at the time of the decision in 2020 was reasonable and consistent with the record evidence. The court also found that the Center lacked standing to challenge the Section 4(d) Rule on appeal. The Service's decision to downlist the Beetle to threatened status was based on the best available scientific and commercial data, and the Service's predictions about the Beetle's future viability were adequately explained and supported by the record. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. FWS" on Justia Law