Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Michigan's Kalamazoo River was contaminated by papermills for decades, including by the release of PCBs. In 1990 the EPA added the River to the National Priorities List of Superfund sites; three paper companies formed KRSG, which entered an Administrative Order on Consent (AOC), agreeing to perform a remedial investigation. KRSG sought a declaratory judgment under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) against several firms (not including IP) that the defendants were liable for “any response costs that may be incurred" in the future "in connection with the Site.” In 1998, the district court found KRSG's members and defendants Rockwell and Eaton liable for the contamination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in 2001.In 2010, GP sued NCR, IP, and Weyerhaeuser, alleging that NCR arranged the disposal of PCB-containing substances in the area and that Weyerhaeuser was an owner. IP argued that it was not liable because it owned papermill property only as a secured creditor. The defendants argued that GP’s claims were time-barred under CERCLA’s three-year limitations period for contribution and identified several events in the prior litigation that may have caused the limitations period to begin running. The district court found that the claims concerning 2006–07 Administrative Settlement Agreements and Orders on Consent and one sub-claim from the 1990 AOC were time-barred, but that the remaining claims were not.The Sixth Circuit reversed. When the district court entered the 1998 declaratory judgment in the KRSG litigation, CERCLA’s statute of limitations for contribution claims began running. View "Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP. v. NCR Corp." on Justia Law

Pesticides sold in the United States generally must be registered by the EPA. Private parties can petition the EPA to cancel the registration of a pesticide, and the EPA is required to resolve those petitions “within a reasonable time.” The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) petitioned the EPA to cancel the registration of tetrachlorvinphos (“TCVP”), for use in household pet products. After delays, the EPA eventually denied NRDC’s petition.The court held that the EPA’s denial of NRDC’s petition was not supported by substantial evidence. The EPA failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its denial of NRDC’s petition and made several arbitrary calculations. The EPA’s errors primarily impacted two calculations central to its denial of NRDC’s petition: (1) the amount of TCVP dust released by the pet collars, and (2) the assumption that pet owners will trim the collars by at least 20%.The court found that it could only uphold agency action based on the reasons the agency gave for its decision. The panel held further that the EPA’s assumption that only 14.6% of the dust released from the collars was TCVP was troubling on the merits. The court held that it would not defer to the EPA’s highly inaccurate calculation that pet owners will trim pet collars by 20% when fitting the collar onto a pet’s neck. The court concluded that it was apparent that the EPA’s denial of NRDC’s petition was simply not supported by substantial evidence when considered on the record as a whole. View "NRDC V. USEPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the energy companies’ extraction of fossil fuels and other activities were a substantial factor in causing global warming and a rise in the sea level, bringing causes of action for public and private nuisance, strict liability, strict liability, negligence, negligent failure to warn, and trespass.The court held that the district court lacked federal question jurisdiction under Sec. 1331 because, at the time of removal, the complaints asserted only state-law tort claims against the energy companies. The court held that Plaintiffs’ global-warming claims did not fall within the Grable exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. In addition, Plaintiffs’ state law claims did not fall under the “artful-pleading” doctrine, another exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, because they were not completely preempted by the Clean Air Act.Further, the court found Plaintiffs’ claims were not removable under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The court also held that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute, Sec. 1442(a)(1), because the energy companies were not “acting under” a federal officer’s directions. The court then rejected the energy companies’ argument that the district court had removal jurisdiction over the complaints under Sec. 1452(a) because they were related to bankruptcy cases involving Peabody Energy Corp., Arch Coal, and Texaco, Inc. Finally, the court held that the district court did not have admiralty jurisdiction because maritime claims brought in state court are not removable to federal court absent an independent jurisdictional basis. View "COUNTY OF SAN MATEO V. CHEVRON CORP." on Justia Law

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the “Service”) published the Kenai Rule, codifying its ban on baiting Kenai Refuge brown bears and its closing of the Skilak Wildlife Recreation Area (“Skilak WRA”) to certain animals.The court held that the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”) preserved the federal government’s plenary power over public lands in Alaska. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Service exceeded its statutory authority in enacting the Kenai Rule. The court held that while the Alaska Statehood Act transferred the administration of wildlife from Congress to the State, the transfer did not include lands withdrawn or set apart as refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife, like the Kenai Refuge. Next, the court held that Plaintiff’s assertion that the Service could preempt the State’s hunting regulations on federal lands in Alaska was unsupported by the law.Further, the court rejected Safari Club’s contention that the Skilak WRA aspect of the Kenai Rule violated the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997 (“Improvement Act”). The court held that The Improvement Act did not require the Service to allow all State-sanctioned hunting throughout the Kenai Refuge. Moreover, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Service violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by acting arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing the Kenai Rule. Finally, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ two-part National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) argument. The panel concluded that there was no basis for reversal. View "SAFARI CLUB INTERNATIONAL V. DEBRA HAALAND" on Justia Law

In 2016, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service exercised its authority under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to designate nearly 14,000 acres of riparian land in New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona as critical habitat for the New Mexico Meadow Jumping Mouse. Two New Mexico ranching associations whose members graze cattle on the designated land challenged the Service’s critical habitat determination. The district court rejected each argument and upheld the Service’s critical habitat designation. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding: (1) the Service’s method for assessing the economic impacts of critical habitat designation complied with the ESA; (2) the Service adequately considered the effects of designation on the ranching association members’ water rights; and (3) the Service reasonably supported its decision not to exclude certain areas from the critical habitat designation. View "Northern New Mexico Stockman, et al. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, et al." on Justia Law

The plaintiff Kern Water Bank Authority Conservation (“KWBA”), is a public agency consisting of five water districts. KWBA operates Kern Water Bank ("KWB"). Surface water from various sources, including the Kern River, is diverted onto land owned by the KWBA to recharge the KWB. In dry years, KWBA recovers water from the KWB. The defendant Buena is a water storage district located within Kern County.The Kern Water Bank Project ("the Project") was proposed by KWBA and is designed “to directly divert up to 500,000 [acre-feet-per-year] from the Kern River within the KWB through existing diversion works and recharge facilities located on the KWB lands, and/or to deliver water directly to KWBA’s participating members’ service areas via [existing canals]. KWBA prepared an Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) to evaluate the Project's environmental impacts. At issue on appeal is whether: (1) the Project descriptions of Project water and existing water rights satisfied The California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) requirements; (2) a complete quantification of existing Kern River water rights was not required; and (3) the EIR properly evaluated the environmental impacts. The appellate court found the EIR complied with CEQA requirements by inadequately assessing long-term recovery operations on groundwater levels. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that there will not be a significant impact on groundwater levels because the Project will not increase long-term recovery beyond historical (baseline) operations. The appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment and ruled that defendant shall recover costs on appeal. View "Buena Vista Wat. Storage Dist. v. Kern Wat. Bank Authority" on Justia Law

The California State Water Resources Control Board signed a Management Agency Agreement (“MAA”) with the U.S. Forest Service to formally recognize it as the management agency on Forest Service lands to implement water management plans. The U.S. Forest Service issued grazing permits in three allotments-- the Bell Meadow, Eagle Meadow, and Herring Creek Allotments (the “BEH Allotments”). Plaintiffs alleged that the Forest Service’s allowance of livestock grazing in the BEH Allotments led to fecal matter runoff. The only claim at issue here alleged that the government violated Section 313 of the Clean Water Act by failing to comply with requirements of California’s Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act.The panel held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing under the associational standing doctrine because at least one member of each plaintiff organization averred that they regularly hike in all three Allotments. rest Service would instead implement the agreed-upon Best Management Practices (“BMP”s) and the provisions of the MAA. Second, plaintiffs asserted that the MAA was superseded by the State Board’s adoption of the 2004 “Policy for Implementation and Enforcement of the Nonpoint Source Pollution Control Program” (“2004 NPS Policy”). The panel held that this argument was refuted by the text of that document. The panel concluded that plaintiffs failed to show that government violated the reporting and permitting requirements of the relevant Cal. Water Code. The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment to defendants with respect to plaintiffs’ claims based on asserted violations of the basis plan’s water quality objectives. View "CENT. SIERRA ENVTL. RES. CTR. V. STANISLAUS NAT'L FOREST" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part the judgment of the superior court affirming the Board of Environmental Protection's decision to upheld a cleanup order issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 38, 1365 against Sultan Corporation for hazardous substances located on its property, holding that the Board improperly declined to address the availability of a third-party defense.In upholding the Commissioner's remediation order the Board expressly declined to reach the issue of whether the third-party defense afforded by Me. Rev. Stat. 38, 1367(3) was available to Sultan in an appeal of a Commissioner's section 1365 order because of the Board's conclusion that even if the defense were available, Sultan failed to prove the elements of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the Board's order in which the Board declined to address the availability of the third-party defense, holding that the question of whether the defense was available was a threshold issue that must be determined before the Board or a court can consider the merits of the defense. View "Sultan Corporation v. Department of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

Appellee, Signal Peak Energy, sought to expand its mining operations, resulting in the expected emission of 190 million tons of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”). The Department of the Interior (“Interior”) published an environmental assessment (“EA”) which explained that the amount of GHGs emitted would amount to .44 percent of the total GHGs emitted each year globally. A group of environmental groups challenged the Interior's approval of the proposed expansion.The Ninth Circuit first noted that the parties’ dispute was not moot. The panel further held that Interior violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to provide a convincing statement for why the project’s impacts were insignificant. Moreover, the panel was unpersuaded that Interior was required to use the social cost of carbon metric to quantify the harm. Further, the panel found that it was less clear whether the agency had any other available metric to evaluate the project's impact. The panel remanded to the district court to decide whether an environmental impact statement was required. View "350 MONTANA V. DEBRA HAALAND" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Department of Marine Resources (DMR) to grant an aquaculture lease to Mere Point Oyster Company, LLC (MPOC) in Maquoit Bay, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.MPOC applied for a ten-year aquaculture lease for a site in Marquoit Bay located near the shorefront property of Maquoit Bay, LLC and its sole members, Paul and Kathleen Dioli (collectively, the Diolis). DMR approved the application. Thereafter, the Diolis filed a Me. R. Civ. P. 80C petition requesting review of DMR's decision. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) DMR did not err by approving the lease application without requiring MPOC to consider practicable alternatives; (2) DMR did not err by balancing the interests of MPOC and the public pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 6072's express requirements; and (3) the Diolis were not entitled to relief on any of their remaining allegations of error. View "Maquoit Bay LLC v. Department of Marine Resources" on Justia Law