Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001, the City issued China Shipping a permit to build the Container Terminal, within the Port of Los Angeles. The settlement of a suit under the California Environmental Quality Act required the City to prepare an environmental impact report. The resulting 2008 Report found the project “would have significant and unavoidable adverse environmental impacts to air quality, aesthetics, biological resources, geology, transportation, noise, and water quality sediments and oceanography.” The City adopted more than 50 mitigation measures and several lease measures to reduce these impacts. China Shipping’s lease was never amended to incorporate the mitigation measures. Several measures were partially implemented; others were ignored entirely. In 2015, the City began a revised environmental analysis for the Terminal. The Board of Harbor Commissioners certified the final supplemental report in 2019. The City Council approved it in 2020, allowing the Terminal to operate under revised conditions. China Shipping refused to implement or to pay for any new measures. The Air District filed suit, seeking to set aside the Terminal's approvals and permit and nullification of the certification of the 2020 Report, to disallow continued operation of the Terminal.The Union sought permissive intervention, claiming that up to 3,075 of its members could lose their jobs. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the Union’s motion. The Union’s interest in the case was speculative and consequential—not direct and immediate, as required for permissive intervention—and the prejudice to existing parties outweighed the reasons supporting intervention. Other parties can be counted upon to support the jobs issue. Unlike the Attorney General and the California Air Resources Board, which were permitted to intervene, the Union has no legal interest in the CEQA issues. Another intervening party would complicate the litigation. View "South Coast Air Quality Management District v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In the first suit between the parties, the state trial court entered judgment against plaintiffs in August 2018. Plaintiffs then filed this second suit in federal court, asserting the same state law claims in addition to claims under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA).The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the state law claims as precluded by res judicata; dismissal of the CWA claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim; and denial of plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief. In this case, the non-CWA claims existed at the time of the state court judgment, and are the same as those asserted in the state court litigation. Furthermore, plaintiffs have forfeited any argument that the district court erred in dismissing the CWA allegations in the original, first, and second amended complaints. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' subsequent Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, which included a request for leave to file a third amended complaint. View "Stevens v. St. Tammany Parish Government" on Justia Law

Defendants Yolo County and its board of supervisors (collectively, the County) adopted a revised mitigated negative declaration and issued a conditional use permit to real parties in interest to operate a bed and breakfast and commercial event facility supported by onsite crop production intended to provide visitors with an education in agricultural operations (project). A trial court found merit in three of several arguments presented to challenge the decision, specifically finding substantial evidence supported a fair argument under the California Environmental Quality Act that the project may have had a significant impact on the tricolored blackbird, the valley elderberry longhorn beetle (beetle), and the golden eagle. The trial court ordered the County to prepare an environmental impact report limited to addressing only the project’s impacts on those three species. Further, the Court ordered the project approval and related mitigation measures would remain in effect, and the project could continue to operate. Plaintiffs-appellants Farmland Protection Alliance and Yolo County Farm Bureau appealed, contending the trial court violated the Act by: (1) ordering the preparation of a limited environmental impact report, rather than a full one, despite finding substantial evidence with respect to the three species; (2) finding the fair argument test was not met as to agricultural resource impacts; and (3) allowing the project to continue to operate during the period of further environmental review. Real parties in interest cross-appealed, arguing the trial court erred in finding substantial evidence supported the significant impacts on the three species. They requested an order vacating the judgment requiring the preparation of the limited environmental impact report (even though the limited environmental impact report was already certified by the County). The Court of Appeal concluded Public Resources Code section 21168.9 did not authorize a trial court to split a project’s environmental review across two types of environmental review documents. The trial court thus erred in ordering the County to prepare a limited environmental impact report after finding the fair argument test had been met as to the three species. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court concluded the trial court did not err in: (1) upholding the County’s determination that the project was consistent with the Code and the Williamson Act; and (2) finding substantial evidence supported the projects effects on the beetle. Judgment was reversed requiring the preparation of a limited impact report, and the case remanded with directions to issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the County to set aside its decision to adopt the revised mitigated negative declaration and to prepare a full environmental impact report for the project. View "Farmland Protection Alliance v. County of Yolo" on Justia Law

Respondent City of Tustin (City) reviewed a proposed construction of a new gas station and ancillary facility (project) pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code section 21000 et seq. (CEQA), and concluded the project was exempt from CEQA under the categorical exemption for “in-fill development.” After the City approved the project and filed a notice of exemption, appellant Protect Tustin Ranch (Protect) sought a writ of mandate to set aside the City’s approvals due to what it claimed was an erroneous finding by the City that the project was exempt from CEQA. The trial court denied Protect’s petition. The Court of Appeal found no error and affirmed the judgment. View "Protect Tustin Ranch v. City of Tustin" on Justia Law

The University of California (Regents) approved a new development for additional academic space and campus housing, certified a final supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR), then filed a notice of determination regarding the project, which identified ACC as the developer and CHF as the ground lessee and borrower in connection with the housing. SBN challenged the certification of the SEIR under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), citing various omissions. A first amended petition, substantively identical to the initial petition, added ACC and CHF as real parties in interest, Public Resources Code 21167.6.5(a)). SBN subsequently filed a first amendment to that petition, seeking to add ACC’s parent companies (jointly, ACC) as real parties in interest.ACC and CHF argued SBN failed to name them as parties within the applicable limitations period. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of ACC and CHF, citing Code of Civil Procedure 389(b). The courts declined to dismiss the entire petition. SBN would have no way to challenge the SEIR if the case was dismissed, whereas ACC and CHF were parties in a related case challenging the same SEIR and unlikely to be subject to a harmful settlement. The court concluded ACC and CHF were not indispensable parties, noting the unity of interest between those parties and the Regents. View "Save Berkeley's Neighborhoods v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that neoprene production from the Pontchartrain Works Facility (PWF) exposed residents of St. John the Baptist Parish, Louisiana, to unsafe levels of chloroprene. Plaintiff filed suit against Denka and DuPont—the current and former owners of the facility—as well as the DOH and DEQ in state court. After removal to federal court, the district court denied plaintiff's motion to remand, granted each defendants' motion to dismiss, and dismissed the amended petition for failure to state a claim.After determining that removal was proper under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and that the state agencies have consented to federal jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the equitable doctrine of contra non velentem tolls prescription of plaintiff's claims against DuPont and DOH. Consistent with Louisiana's contra non valentem analysis as to what plaintiff reasonably knew or should have known at the time, the court disagreed that, on the record before it, plaintiff had constructive knowledge sufficient to trigger the running of prescription over a year before she filed suit in June 2018. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's holding that plaintiff's claims were prescribed.The court concluded that plaintiff's custodial liability claims against DuPont fail for the same reason as her claims against Denka: a failure to state a plausible duty and corresponding breach. The court agreed with the district court's grant of Denka's motion to dismiss for failure to state a plausible claim of negligence and strict custodial liability arising from Denka's past and current neoprene manufacturing at the PWF. In this case, plaintiff fails to adequately allege a duty owed by Denka, and consequently whether Denka breached such a duty. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's declaratory relief claims against DEQ. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Butler v. Denka Performance Elastomer, LLC" on Justia Law

Canton’s 2006 Tree Ordinance prohibits the unpermitted removal, damage, or destruction of trees of specified sizes, with exceptions for agricultural operations, commercial nurseries, tree farms, and occupied lots smaller than two acres. If Canton issues a permit, the owner must replace removed trees on its own or someone else’s property or pay into Canton’s tree fund. For every landmark tree removed, an owner must replant three trees or pay $450. For every non-landmark tree removed as part of larger-scale tree removal, an owner must replant one tree or pay $300.In 2016, Canton approved the division of F.P.'s undeveloped property, noting the permitting requirement. The parcels were bisected by a county drainage ditch that was clogged with fallen trees and debris. The county refused to clear the ditch. F.P. contracted for the removal of the trees and debris and clearing other trees without a permit. Canton determined that F.P. had removed 14 landmark trees and 145 non-landmark trees. F.P. was required to either replant 187 trees or pay $47,898. F.P. filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for F.P. on its as-applied Fifth Amendment claim; although the ordinance, as applied to F.P., was not unconstitutional as a per se physical taking, it was unconstitutional as a regulatory taking and as an unconstitutional condition. Canton has not made the necessary individualized determination; the ordinance fails the “rough proportionality” required by Supreme Court precedent. View "F.P. Development, LLC. v. Charter Township of Canton" on Justia Law

Ordinances banning “land uses in support of” new oil and gas wells and “land uses in support of” wastewater injection in unincorporated areas of Monterey County were enacted as part of Measure Z, an initiative sponsored by PMC and passed by Monterey County voters.The trial court upheld, in part, a challenge to Measure Z by oil companies and other mineral rights holders. The court of appeal affirmed. Components of Measure Z are preempted by state laws. Public Resources Code section 3106 explicitly provides that the State of California’s oil and gas supervisor has the authority to decide whether to permit an oil and gas drilling operation to drill a new well or to utilize wastewater injection in its operations. Those operational aspects of oil drilling operations are committed by section 3106 to the state’s discretion and local regulation of these aspects would conflict with section 3106. View "Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. County of Monterey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Margaret McCann appealed a judgment in favor of defendant City of San Diego (City) on McCann’s petition for writ of mandate and an order denying her request for a preliminary injunction. McCann challenged the City’s environmental review process related to its decision to approve two sets of projects that would convert overhead utility wires to an underground system in several neighborhoods. McCann’s primary concern was the need for the underground system to be supplemented with several above-ground transformers, which would be housed in three-foot-tall metal boxes in the public right-of-way. According to McCann, the City violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by failing to prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) for both sets of projects. The Court of Appeal concluded McCann’s claims were barred as to the first set of projects because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies to challenge the City’s determination that the projects were exempt from CEQA. The Court determined the City complied with the CEQA. However, the Court found merit in McCann’s argument the City’s finding that the projects would not have a significant environmental impact due to greenhouse gas emissions was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court found remand was necessary to allow the City to conduct a further review to determine if the greenhouse gas emissions were consistent with the City’s Climate Action Plan. Judgment was therefore reverse in part and affirmed in all other respects. View "McCann v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

The Clean Water Act requires states to adopt water quality standards regulating pollutants in their navigable waters, including the designated uses for the water body, such as supporting aquatic life or recreational use and the “water quality criteria” necessary to protect those uses, 33 U.S.C. 1313(c)(2)(A). The EPA approved Montana’s water quality standards in 2015. In 2017, Montana obtained EPA’s approval of a variance in the water quality standard, which covered 36 municipal wastewater treatment facilities for up to 17 years and allowed those facilities to discharge more nitrogen and phosphorus into wadeable streams than would be permitted under the approved base water standards.The Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge. The Act did not preclude the EPA from taking compliance costs into account when approving the variance requests. Congress has not directly spoken to that precise question and the EPA reasonably construed section 1313(c)(2)(A) as permitting it to consider compliance costs. The EPA’s variance regulation neither requires compliance with the highest attainable condition at the outset of the variance term nor requires compliance with base water quality standards by the end of that term. The regulations include numerous features to ensure that dischargers and waterbodies subject to variances continued to improve water quality, consistent with the goals of the Act, including supporting aquatic life and recreational uses whenever attainable. View "Upper Missouri Waterkeeper v, United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law