Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The question this case presented for the Court of Appeal was whether a watermaster appointed by the trial court to implement and administer a water rights decree had the right to appeal the trial court’s orders interpreting the decree on the grounds the watermaster disagrees with the trial court’s interpretation and the orders would increase the watermaster’s administrative burdens and costs. The Court of Appeal concluded the watermaster did not have the right to appeal because the watermaster was not aggrieved by the trial court’s interpretation of the water users’ rights under the decree. View "Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Company" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's summary judgment order affirming a decision by the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to issue a mining permit to Glacier Stone Supply, Inc. and an ensuing order denying the motion to supplement the administrative record filed by Henry and Diane Belk, holding that there was no error.At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in its interpretation of a Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) provision concerning regulatory impacts on private property rights. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that the DEQ's analysis of regulatory impacts was sufficient under Mont. Code Ann. 75-1-201(1)(b)(iv)(D); (2) did not err in granting summary judgment to DEQ on its compliance with MEPA; and (3) did not err in denying the Belks' motion to supplement the record. View "Belk v. Montana Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Keep the North Shore Country's (KNSC) appeal from the decision of the Board of Land and Natural Resources approving Applicant's habitat conservation plan and authorizing Applicant to take fewer than two and a half Hawaiian hoary bats per year, holding that there was no error.To operate a proposed wind farm, Applicant was required to obtain an incidental take license as part of a habitat conservation plan approved by the Board. KNSC opposed the application citing the wind farm's potential impact on the ope'ape'a, the Hawaiian hoary bat. The Board approved the plan and authorized Applicant to take up to fifty-one ope'ape'a over the course twenty-one years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly applied the clear error standard in reviewing KNSC's challenges based on mixed questions of law and fact; (2) substantial evidence supported the Board's conclusions; and (3) there was no other error in the Board's proceedings. View "Keep the North Shore Country v. Board of Land & Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Appellant Save the El Dorado Canal sought reversal of a judgment entered after the trial court denied its petition for writ of mandate. The petition challenged certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) and approval of a project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The challenged project, the Upper Main Ditch piping project, was approved by the El Dorado Irrigation District and the El Dorado Irrigation District Board of Directors (collectively, respondents). On appeal, appellant contended respondents’ approval of the challenged project violated CEQA because: (1) the EIR failed to provide an adequate project description because it omitted “a crucial fact about the ditch the District proposes to ‘abandon,’ ” i.e., “the Main Ditch system is the only drainage system” for the watershed; and (2) the EIR failed to adequately analyze the impacts of abandonment to hydrology, biological resources, and risks associated with wildfires. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding respondents did not abuse their discretion in approving the Blair Road alternative. The draft and final EIR’s adequately apprised respondents and the public about both the nature of the watershed and the fact that the District would no longer maintain the abandoned portion of the Upper Main Ditch. These environmental documents also adequately analyzed the Blair Road alternative’s impacts to hydrology, biological resources, and risks associated with wildfires. View "Save the El Dorado Canal v. El Dorado Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

Two appeals consolidated for review centered on Placer County’s approval of a land use specific plan and rezoning to permit residential and commercial development and preserve forest land near Truckee and Lake Tahoe. The plaintiffs-appellants contended the County’s environmental review of the project did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act on numerous grounds, and the rezoning did not comply with the California Timberland Productivity Act of 1982. The trial court rejected each of plaintiffs’ claims except one, involving analysis of the project's impact on Lake Tahoe's water quality and greenhouse case emission mitigation measures. The Court of Appeal affirmed both judgments in part, finding measure 12-2 did not comply with CEQA, and the EIR’s analysis of the project’s impact on evacuation plans was supported by substantial evidence. The Court found substantial evidence did not support the County’s finding that no additional feasible mitigation measures existed to mitigate the project’s traffic impacts on state route 267, and the EIR’s discussion of the project’s energy impacts did not comply with CEQA. View "League to Save Lake Tahoe Mountain Area v. City of Placer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that substantial evidence did not support the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality's (TCEQ) decision granting an application filed by Dos Republicas Coal Partnership (DRCP) seeking renewal of a permit for wastewater discharge at a coal mine, holding that DRCP was the correct permit applicant.At the time of this dispute, TCEQ rules required both the operator and the owner of the facility to apply for a permit. DRCP owned the mine, but the dispute was whether DRCP or the contractor it hired to conduct day-to-day activities at the time was the mine's "operator." TCEQ concluded that DRCP was the mine's operator. The court of appeals disagreed, ruling that the application lacked the required applicant and should have been denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that DRCP was the entity responsible for the overall operation of the facility and was therefore the correct permit applicant. View "Texas Commission on Environment Quality v. Maverick County" on Justia Law

Enacted after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), creates a comprehensive remedial scheme that governs—and apportions liability for—oil-removal costs. OPA holds oil spillers strictly liable upfront for oil-removal expenses and allows them, if they meet certain requirements, to avail themselves of one of three liability defenses and to seek contribution from other culpable parties. The M/V SAVAGE VOYAGER was transporting oil through a Mississippi waterway when an accident at a boat lift— operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—caused a rupture in the SAVAGE VOYAGER’s hull, through which thousands of gallons of oil poured into the river.The owners of the vessel sued the United States, not under the OPA, but under the common-law admiralty regime. They cited the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA), a 1920 law by which Congress generally waived sovereign immunity for most admiralty claims. The interplay between the OPA and the SAA was an issue of first impression in the federal courts. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the vessel owner’s claims for removal costs. OPA authorizes no claim against the government for oil-removal damages and OPA’s comprehensive remedial scheme displaced the SAA’s more general sovereign-immunity waiver. View "Savage Services Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Tecuya Ridge, within the Los Padres National Forest, is home to densely populated forest stands that the Forest Service determined to be at risk of destruction by wildfire. The Tecuya Ridge Shaded Fuelbreak Project authorized thinning 1,626 acres of forest, including approximately 1,100 acres within the protected Antimony Inventoried Roadless Area. The Roadless Area Conservation Rule generally prohibits timber cutting, sale, or removal in areas like Antimony, with some exceptions.The Ninth Circuit vacated the approval. The Service’s conclusion that the Project was consistent with the Rule was arbitrary and capricious as was its determination that 21-inch diameter trees were “generally small timber.” The Service’s determination that the Project will “maintain or improve” Antimony’s characteristics was not arbitrary; the Service articulated a satisfactory explanation. The decision to “categorically exclude” the Project from review in an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement, under the National Environmental Policy Act was not arbitrary and capricious. The court agreed that Categorical Exclusion 6 (CE-6) applied and that no extraordinary circumstances prevented CE-6's application to the Project. Consistent with 36 C.F.R. 220.6, the Service analyzed each resource condition that should be considered in determining whether there were extraordinary circumstances related to the proposed action and determined that the Project would have “no significant impact” on each. The decision to locate the Project in the “wildland zone” instead of the “threat zone” was not arbitrary. View "Los Padres ForestWatch v. United States Forest Service" on Justia Law

The U.S. Forest Service proposed “thinning” overcrowded areas in Cuddy Valley within Los Padres National Forest. If some trees are not removed, the forest will face increased risks of wildfires, and insects and diseases may ravage the trees, according to the Forest Service.The Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge by environmental groups. The “CE-6” exemption, 36 C.F.R. 220.6(e)(6) to the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321, unambiguously allows the Forest Service to thin trees, including larger commercially viable ones, to reduce fire hazards without having to conduct an environmental impact statement or an environmental assessment. Its plain language does not limit thinning by tree age, size, or type. Nor is thinning defined to exclude commercial thinning. If the thinning project reduces fire hazards and meets certain other conditions, CE-6 greenlights the project, even if it means felling commercially viable trees. The Forest Service did not act arbitrarily in invoking the CE-6 exemption and did not violate the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1600, which sets certain aesthetic management standards. The Service did not have to explain how the project would meet such standards but did explain how the project area would retain sufficient scenic integrity. View "Mountain Communities for Fire Safety v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Environmental nonprofit organizations challenged the Fish and Wildlife Service’s 2020 Biological Opinion and Incidental Take Statement (BiOp) for the Mountain Valley Pipeline. The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2), requires that whenever an agency action “may affect listed species,” the agency must formally consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service, which must formulate a “biological opinion” on whether that action, in light of the relevant environmental context, “is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of [those] species.” The plaintiffs alleged that the agency failed to adequately consider the project’s environmental context while analyzing impacts to two species of endangered fish, the Roanoke logperch and the candy darter.The Fourth Circuit vacated the approval. Serious errors at steps two and three of the jeopardy analysis render the 2020 BiOp arbitrary and capricious. The court recognized that its decision will further delay the completion of an already mostly finished Pipeline, but reiterated the Act’s directive to: “halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.” In effect, the Fish and Wildlife Service attempted to pass off its summary of range-wide conditions and threats as an action-area analysis. Caguely referring to the “destruction and modification of habitat” within the action area, without explaining the specific causes or extent of this local degradation, leaves unclear at what the baseline condition for the logperch might actually be. View "Appalachian Voices v. United States Department of the Interior" on Justia Law