Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Several environmental organizations sued a California county, alleging that the county’s operation of the Lopez Dam and Reservoir had harmed the threatened South-Central California Coast steelhead trout by altering water flows and degrading downstream habitat. The steelhead population in Arroyo Grande Creek depends on high, pulsing freshwater flows for migration and spawning, but the dam’s operational schedule reduced these flows, impeded migration, and facilitated predatory species’ access to the creek. The plaintiffs claimed that these practices violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) by causing unlawful “take” of steelhead and also breached California Fish & Game Code section 5937, which requires dam operators to maintain fish in “good condition.” The creek is also home to two other ESA-listed species: the California red-legged frog and the tidewater goby.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted a mandatory preliminary injunction, compelling the county to take affirmative actions such as changing flow releases and implementing new habitat protection measures. The court ordered the county to consult with federal agencies about these measures but did not specifically weigh the potential harm to the frog and goby, which the county argued might result from the new water release schedule. Both sides presented competing expert evidence on the impact to all three species.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. The appellate court held that when mandatory injunctive relief under the ESA could benefit one protected species while potentially harming another, the district court must consider the balance of equities and public interest as they relate to the other listed species. The court clarified that this balancing does not include economic or developmental interests but is limited to the welfare of other endangered or threatened species. Because the district court had not conducted this analysis, the injunction was vacated for further proceedings. View "SAN LUIS OBISPO COASTKEEPER V. COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO" on Justia Law

A California nonprofit organization focused on preventing deceptive environmental claims filed a lawsuit against a manufacturer of feminine hygiene products. The organization alleged that the manufacturer labeled and advertised certain products, including period underwear, pads, and panty liners, as “organic” or “made with organic cotton” in violation of the California Organic Food and Farming Act (COFFA). The complaint stated that these products contained less than the minimum required percentage of certified organic materials and included nonagricultural and nonorganically produced components not permitted under state or federal organic standards.The case was first heard in the Alameda County Superior Court. The manufacturer moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that COFFA applies only to agricultural products, cosmetics, and pet food—not to personal care products such as feminine hygiene items. The Superior Court agreed with the manufacturer and granted judgment on the pleadings, concluding that COFFA did not govern the products in question. The nonprofit timely appealed that decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that COFFA applies broadly to all products sold as “organic” or containing “organic” materials in California, unless specifically exempted, and that the statute’s plain language encompasses feminine hygiene products. The court found no basis for an implied exception for personal care products and determined that the trial court erred in its interpretation. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment, clarifying that COFFA’s standards and labeling requirements apply to the manufacturer’s products at issue. View "Environmental Democracy Project v. Rael" on Justia Law

A freight train operated by Norfolk Southern derailed in East Palestine, Ohio, in early 2023, releasing hazardous materials and causing widespread evacuations and concern over health, environmental, and economic impacts. Numerous lawsuits were filed by affected individuals and businesses, which were consolidated into a master class action. The parties reached a $600 million settlement, which included provisions for a settlement fund and attorney’s fees. The district court approved the settlement and the attorney’s fees request, designating co-lead counsel to allocate fees among the plaintiffs’ attorneys, including Morgan & Morgan, a firm representing some individual claimants.After the district court in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio approved the settlement and fee awards, Morgan & Morgan, despite having received nearly $8 million in fees, objected to the process and timing of fee allocation, specifically challenging the settlement’s “quick pay” provision and the authority given to co-lead class counsel to distribute fees. Morgan & Morgan also raised concerns about transparency and the adequacy of its own fee award, arguing that the allocation process might have undervalued its contributions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Morgan & Morgan lacked standing to challenge the quick pay provision, as it did not suffer a concrete, particularized injury from the timing of payment and had assented to the settlement terms. The court also affirmed the district court’s decision to delegate initial fee allocation authority to co-lead class counsel, finding no abuse of discretion and noting the court retained jurisdiction for oversight. However, the Sixth Circuit found the district court had failed to address Morgan & Morgan’s specific concerns about its fee allocation and remanded that narrow issue for further consideration. The judgment was thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "In re E. Palestine Train Derailment" on Justia Law

Mike Dennis developed mycosis fungoides, a subtype of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, after regularly applying Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide manufactured by Monsanto, for approximately 20 years. Dennis claimed his cancer resulted from exposure to Roundup, which he alleged was sold and marketed without adequate warnings about its carcinogenic risks, despite Monsanto’s knowledge of the potential danger. He brought claims for design defect, failure to warn (under both negligence and strict liability), and negligence. At trial, the jury found that Monsanto was liable for failing to warn about the cancer risk, determining Monsanto knew or should have known of the risk, failed to provide adequate warnings, and acted with malice or oppression. The jury awarded Dennis $7 million in economic damages and $325 million in punitive damages.Following the verdict, Monsanto moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Monsanto’s requests to overturn the liability findings but reduced the punitive damages award from $325 million to $21 million, finding the original award disproportionate to the compensatory damages. Monsanto timely appealed, arguing that Dennis’s failure to warn claims were preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and that the punitive damages were excessive and unconstitutional.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that FIFRA does not preempt state law failure to warn claims that parallel federal misbranding requirements, in line with United States Supreme Court precedent and California decisions. The court also found that the punitive damages award, as reduced by the trial court, did not violate due process, as it was based on highly reprehensible conduct directly related to Dennis’s harm. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in full. View "Dennis v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law

This case concerns the State Water Resources Control Board's intervention in the Tulare Lake groundwater subbasin pursuant to California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). After local agencies in the subbasin submitted a groundwater sustainability plan that the Department of Water Resources twice determined to be inadequate, the State Board designated the basin as probationary in April 2024. This designation triggered state-imposed monitoring, reporting, and fee obligations on certain groundwater extractors. In response, the Kings County Farm Bureau and others filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint, asserting that the State Board exceeded its authority and challenging the validity of the designation and associated fees on several grounds.The Superior Court of Kings County addressed both a demurrer filed by the State Board and a request from the Farm Bureau for a preliminary injunction. The trial court dismissed the equal protection claim with leave to amend, but overruled the demurrer as to claims that (1) the State Board used improper “underground regulations” not adopted under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), (2) the imposed extraction fee constituted an unlawful tax, and (3) general declaratory relief was appropriate. The trial court also granted a preliminary injunction, temporarily halting the State Board’s enforcement activities.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s order overruling the demurrer. The appellate court held that all actions by the State Board taken under sections 10735.2 and 10735.8 of the Act—including the designation of a probationary basin—are exempt from the APA unless the State Board voluntarily opts to adopt regulations using APA procedures. Therefore, the claim for improper “underground regulations” could not proceed. The court also held that a challenge to the extraction fee as an unlawful tax was barred by the constitutional “pay first” rule, as no exception applied. Lastly, the court determined that declaratory relief was unavailable because the Legislature provided for review of State Board actions exclusively by writ of mandate. The appellate court ordered the trial court to grant the demurrer without leave to amend as to these three claims. View "State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the State Water Resources Control Board’s designation of the Tulare Lake groundwater subbasin as a probationary basin under California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). The Tulare subbasin is categorized as high-priority and critically overdrafted, requiring coordinated local management and submission of a sustainability plan. Local agencies formed a single groundwater sustainability plan, which the Department of Water Resources twice found inadequate, leading the State Board to designate the subbasin as probationary. Following this, the Board imposed monitoring and reporting requirements with associated fees, prompting farmers and landowners, including Kings County Farm Bureau, to challenge the Board’s actions as exceeding its authority and lacking proper notice.Before reaching the California Court of Appeal, the Superior Court of Kings County reviewed the matter. The trial court had issued a preliminary injunction against the State Board, barring it from enforcing requirements and fees related to the probationary designation. The trial court found the plaintiffs likely to succeed on several claims, including improper denial of “good actor” exclusions and failures in notice, and determined the balance of harms weighed in favor of plaintiffs. A nominal bond was set, and the trial court later denied objections to the bond amount.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing an overly broad injunction affecting the entire Tulare subbasin, where only certain areas had plausible claims. The court clarified that the State Board must exclude any basin portion where a local agency demonstrates compliance with sustainability goals, but this exclusion does not require an independently approved plan for every area. The appellate court reversed the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial court to consider whether a narrower injunction may be appropriate. The petition for writ of supersedeas was denied as moot. View "Kings County Farm Bureau v. State Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

The State of Maine filed two similar lawsuits against 3M Company, alleging that per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) manufactured by 3M had contaminated various natural resources across Maine. One suit targeted PFAS contamination from 3M’s production of Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF), a firefighting product, while the other (the “non-AFFF” case) sought recovery for PFAS contamination not related to AFFF. Maine included a disclaimer in the non-AFFF complaint, stating it was not seeking relief for contamination related to AFFF, including military specification (MilSpec) AFFF, which was produced under federal direction and used at military and other federally regulated sites.3M removed both cases to the United States District Court for the District of Maine under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), arguing that PFAS from AFFF and non-AFFF sources had plausibly commingled at various sites, giving rise to a colorable federal defense. Maine did not oppose removal of the AFFF case but moved to remand the non-AFFF case, contending that its disclaimer precluded any federal defense. The district court agreed with Maine, finding that the disclaimer shifted the burden to the State to prove contamination was not from AFFF, and thus remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the remand order. The court held that 3M’s theory—that PFAS contamination from MilSpec AFFF, for which it has a federal contractor defense, is commingled with other PFAS contamination—must be credited at this stage. The court concluded that the disclaimer did not eliminate 3M’s colorable federal defense or the “related to” nexus required for federal officer removal. The First Circuit ordered the case returned to federal court for further proceedings. View "Maine v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

Residents of Jackson, Mississippi, brought a class action lawsuit alleging that the city knowingly contaminated their drinking water with lead, failed to treat the water to prevent lead leaching, and misled the public about the water’s safety. The complaint details how city officials ignored warnings about the water system’s vulnerabilities, failed to repair critical treatment equipment, switched water sources in a way that worsened contamination, and delayed notifying residents of dangerous lead levels. Plaintiffs claim they and their families suffered significant health effects, including lead poisoning and related medical and developmental issues, as a result of consuming the contaminated water.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to state a substantive due process claim against the city and that the individual city officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity by claiming the city affirmatively introduced toxins into the water supply, misrepresented the water’s safety, and thereby deprived residents of the ability to make informed decisions about their health. The court also formally adopted the state-created danger doctrine as a viable theory in the circuit. The court reversed the dismissal of the due process claims against the city and vacated the dismissal of the state-law claims, remanding for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the individual city officials on qualified immunity grounds, finding the relevant rights were not clearly established at the time. View "Sterling v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) planned to conduct geotechnical work, such as soil and groundwater testing, in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta as part of preparations for the Delta tunnel project, a major water conveyance initiative. Several municipal, tribal, and public interest groups objected, arguing that DWR could not begin this geotechnical work until it certified that the tunnel project was consistent with the Delta Plan, as required by the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009. The plaintiffs asserted that the geotechnical work was an integral part of the overall project and that separating it constituted impermissible “piecemealing” under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Sacramento County agreed with the plaintiffs, issuing preliminary injunctions that barred DWR from conducting geotechnical work before submitting a certification of consistency. The court found that the geotechnical work was part of the covered action under the Delta Reform Act and that DWR’s project description in its Environmental Impact Report (EIR) included this work. The court also determined that the plaintiffs had a strong likelihood of success on the merits and would suffer procedural harm if the injunction was not granted.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s orders. The appellate court held that the Delta Reform Act does not require DWR to submit a certification of consistency before engaging in geotechnical work that precedes construction. The court reasoned that the purposes of CEQA and the Delta Reform Act differ, and the Act does not incorporate CEQA’s whole-of-the-action requirement or prohibition against piecemealing. The court directed the trial court to vacate the preliminary injunctions and reconsider the motions in light of this interpretation. View "Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

A mining company sought to develop an open pit gold mine in the Kuskokwim River watershed, on lands owned by Alaska Native Corporations. To operate the mine, the company needed state permits for a natural gas pipeline right-of-way across state lands and for water appropriations to dewater the mining pit and support operations. Local tribes objected, arguing that the mine and its associated infrastructure would have significant impacts on the watershed, which is culturally and economically important to them. The Department of Natural Resources approved the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits after considering the impacts of the permitted activities themselves, but not the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project.The tribes appealed the Department’s decisions to the Commissioner, arguing that both the Water Use Act and the Alaska Constitution required consideration of the cumulative impacts of the whole mining project. The Commissioner denied the appeals, finding that the Department was only required to consider the effects of the permitted activities themselves. The tribes then appealed to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage. The superior court affirmed the Department’s decisions, ruling that the agency was not required to conduct a cumulative impacts analysis of the entire mine project under either statute or the constitution.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether the Department was required to consider the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project when granting the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits. The court held that neither the Water Use Act nor the Right-of-Way Leasing Act required consideration of downstream effects of mining activity enabled by the permits. The court also held that Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution did not require the Department to consider the costs and benefits of developing private resources on private lands when deciding whether to grant permits for the use of state resources. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgments. View "Orutsararmiut Native Council v. Boyle" on Justia Law