Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

David Schaffner, Jr. and Theresa Sue Schaffner filed a lawsuit against Monsanto Corporation, alleging that Monsanto violated Pennsylvania law by failing to include a cancer warning on the label of its weed-killer, Roundup. The Schaffners claimed that this omission caused Mr. Schaffner to develop non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma due to his exposure to Roundup. The case was initially filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, and was later removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (JPML) then transferred the case to the Northern District of California for consolidated pretrial proceedings.In the Northern District of California, the MDL Court had previously ruled in similar cases that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) did not preempt state-law tort duties to include a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. Following this precedent, the MDL Court denied Monsanto’s motion for summary judgment on preemption grounds. The case was subsequently remanded to the Western District of Pennsylvania, where the parties stipulated to a judgment in favor of the Schaffners, reserving Monsanto’s right to appeal the preemption issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether FIFRA preempted the Pennsylvania duty to warn. The court held that FIFRA’s preemption provision, which prohibits states from imposing labeling requirements different from those required under federal law, did preempt the state-law duty to include a cancer warning. The court reasoned that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had approved Roundup’s label without a cancer warning, and FIFRA regulations require pesticide labels to conform to the EPA-approved label. Therefore, the Pennsylvania duty to warn was not equivalent to the federal requirements and was preempted by FIFRA. The Third Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court. View "Schaffner v. Monsanto Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves the Center for Biological Diversity's efforts to protect the Canadian lynx, a threatened species, from incidental trapping in Minnesota. The Center sued the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, alleging that the state had not done enough to prevent trappers from accidentally capturing lynx. This led to a proposed consent decree requiring Minnesota to implement additional restrictions on trapping methods to protect the lynx.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the case and approved the consent decree over objections from three pro-trapping organizations. These organizations argued that the decree was prejudicial and harmful to their interests and that state law did not permit the adoption of the new regulations in the manner proposed. The district court found the consent decree to be a reasonable compromise that balanced the interests of both parties and had a reasonable relationship to the claims and defenses in the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's approval of the consent decree. The appellate court examined whether the consent decree was procedurally fair and reasonable. It found that the negotiations were conducted in good faith and at arm's length, and that the trappers had ample opportunity to raise their objections. The court also determined that the consent decree was reasonable because it aimed to reduce the number of lynx deaths and furthered the objectives of the Endangered Species Act. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the consent decree and affirmed the judgment. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. MN Trappers Association" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its denial of small refinery exemptions under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program. The RFS program mandates that refineries blend renewable fuels into fossil fuels or purchase credits to comply. Small refineries can petition for exemptions if compliance causes disproportionate economic hardship. In 2022, the EPA denied all pending exemption petitions, arguing that compliance costs are passed on to consumers, thus no refinery faces economic hardship due to the RFS program. The EPA also provided alternative compliance options for certain refineries whose exemptions were initially granted but later denied.Previously, the EPA had granted exemptions based on a Department of Energy (DOE) study and a scoring matrix that considered various economic factors. However, following a Tenth Circuit decision and the Supreme Court's ruling in HollyFrontier, the EPA revised its approach, focusing solely on compliance costs and the RIN cost passthrough theory. This led to the denial of all pending petitions, including those of Sinclair Wyoming Refining Company and Wynnewood Refining Company, which had initially received exemptions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the EPA's rationale for denying the exemptions was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the EPA's interpretation of "disproportionate economic hardship" was too narrow and inconsistent with the Clean Air Act. The court also found that the EPA failed to adequately support its assumption that refineries could always purchase RINs ratably and pass the costs to consumers. Consequently, the court vacated the EPA's denial actions, except for two refineries deemed ineligible on other grounds, and dismissed Growth Energy's petition for lack of standing. The court denied Sinclair's petition challenging the alternative compliance action and dismissed Wynnewood's petition for not challenging a final agency action. View "Sinclair Wyoming Refining Company LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

A chemical manufacturer and two trade associations challenged an EPA rule regulating emissions from certain facilities, specifically disputing the EPA’s assessment of cancer risk from ethylene oxide emissions. The EPA had determined that emissions from these sources posed an unacceptable risk to public health and tightened emissions standards accordingly. The EPA’s assessment concluded that the maximum lifetime individual risk of cancer from exposure to ethylene oxide was significantly higher than what is generally considered acceptable.The petitioners initially raised their complaints during the EPA’s rulemaking process and sought reconsideration after the final rule was issued. The EPA granted reconsideration and solicited further public comment, ultimately affirming its decision to use its existing cancer-risk assessment and rejecting an alternative assessment proposed by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). The petitioners then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and found that the EPA had adequately explained its modeling approach and decisions. The court held that the EPA’s reliance on its 2016 cancer-risk assessment was not arbitrary or capricious and that the EPA had properly considered and rejected the TCEQ’s alternative assessment. The court also found that the EPA had provided sufficient opportunities for public comment and had not violated any procedural requirements. The court denied the petitions for review, upholding the EPA’s rule and its assessment of the cancer risk from ethylene oxide emissions. View "Huntsman Petrochemical LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

A neighbor, Myrna Nathin, appealed the Environmental Division's denial of her motion to reopen a judgment declaring an Act 250 land-use permit for an adjoining property abandoned. Nathin argued she did not receive adequate notice of the petition to abandon the permit. The property in question, located on Burchard Road in Dover, Vermont, was initially permitted for subdivision and infrastructure development in 1993, with extended deadlines for completion. However, no construction occurred, and the current landowners, the Beasleys, sought to abandon the permit in 2022.The district commission declined to review the abandonment petition, citing jurisdictional issues, and the Environmental Division later declared the permit abandoned in January 2023. Nathin, who lives in New Jersey, claimed she did not receive the notice sent to her Vermont address and only learned of the abandonment in August 2023. She filed a motion for relief from judgment under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which the Environmental Division denied, stating she lacked standing as she was not a party to the original proceeding.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that Nathin did not have standing to file a Rule 60(b) motion because she was not a party to the abandonment proceeding. The Court also found that the Environmental Division had adhered to its procedural rules and that Nathin's lack of notice did not warrant reopening the case. The Court emphasized that procedural rules must be enforced to ensure fairness and regularity, and Nathin's failure to intervene in the original proceeding precluded her from seeking relief. View "In re Burchard Road Petition" on Justia Law

3M Company operates a manufacturing facility in Cordova, Illinois, producing chemical products containing PFAS. The State of Illinois sued 3M, alleging that PFAS from the Cordova Facility contaminated the Mississippi River, violating state environmental laws. The State's complaint specifically excluded PFAS contamination from any other source, including AFFF used by the U.S. military at the nearby Rock Island Arsenal.The case was initially filed in Illinois state court. 3M removed it to the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, citing the federal officer removal statute, arguing that some contamination might have come from AFFF provided to the military, thus invoking a federal government contractor defense. The State moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court granted the motion, finding that the State's complaint excluded AFFF-related contamination, focusing solely on PFAS from the Cordova Facility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that 3M could not satisfy the fourth element required for removal under the federal officer removal statute, which necessitates a colorable federal defense. The court noted that the State had unequivocally conceded that it would not seek relief for mixed PFAS contamination and that any recovery would be barred if contamination was not solely from the Cordova Facility. Consequently, 3M's government contractor defense was deemed irrelevant under the State's theory of recovery. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to state court. View "Raoul v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

The case involves the proposed development of the Betabel Project by the McDowell Trust, which includes a large commercial roadside attraction in San Benito County. The County's Board of Supervisors certified an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and approved a conditional use permit for the project. The Center for Biological Diversity and the Amah Mutsun Tribal Band opposed the project, arguing that the EIR violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and that the project approval violated state planning and zoning laws. They filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge the project approval.The San Benito County Planning Commission initially approved the project and filed a Notice of Determination (NOD) on October 14, 2022. The Center and the Amah Mutsun Tribal Band appealed this decision to the County Board of Supervisors, which denied the appeals and filed a second NOD on November 10, 2022. The trial court sustained the McDowell Trust's demurrer, agreeing that the CEQA causes of action were time-barred because the petitions were filed more than 30 days after the first NOD.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred. The appellate court determined that the 30-day limitations period for filing a CEQA challenge began with the second NOD filed on November 10, 2022, following the final decision by the Board of Supervisors. The court emphasized that the Planning Commission's decision was not final due to the timely appeals. Therefore, the writ petitions filed on December 9, 2022, were within the 30-day period. The appellate court reversed the judgments of dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to overrule the demurrer. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Benito" on Justia Law

In 2021, petitioners challenged the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) authorization of two liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminals in Cameron County, Texas, and a related pipeline. The court partially granted the petitions and remanded the case to FERC without vacating the orders. On remand, FERC reauthorized the projects, prompting petitioners to challenge the reauthorization, arguing non-compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act (NGA).Previously, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found FERC’s environmental justice analysis inadequate and required FERC to either justify its chosen analysis radius or use a different one. FERC was also directed to reconsider its public interest determinations under the NGA. On remand, FERC expanded its environmental justice analysis but did not issue a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which petitioners argued was necessary. FERC also did not consider a new carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) proposal as part of its environmental review.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found FERC’s failure to issue a supplemental EIS for its updated environmental justice analysis arbitrary and capricious, as the new analysis provided a significantly different environmental picture. The court also held that FERC should have considered the CCS proposal as a connected action or a reasonable alternative. Additionally, the court found FERC’s rejection of air quality data from a nearby monitor arbitrary and capricious. The court vacated FERC’s reauthorization orders and remanded the case for further proceedings, requiring FERC to issue a supplemental EIS and consider the CCS proposal. View "City of Port Isabel v. FERC" on Justia Law

Tennessee Gas proposed constructing a new compressor station (Compressor Station 327) in West Milford Township as part of its East 300 Upgrade Project. The site is within the Highlands Preservation Area, which has stringent environmental standards. Tennessee applied to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for a Highlands Applicability Determination (HAD), claiming an exemption under N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11) (Exemption 11) of the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act. The DEP issued the HAD, determining that the project qualified for Exemption 11.Food & Water Watch appealed the DEP’s decision, arguing that Exemption 11 should be narrowly construed so that the term “routine” modifies “upgrade.” The Appellate Division agreed, vacating the HAD and remanding the matter to determine if Compressor Station 327 qualifies as a “routine upgrade.” The court emphasized that statutory exemptions should be strictly construed to protect environmental interests and found that “routine” should modify all activities listed in Exemption 11.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment. The Court held that “routine” modifies only “maintenance and operations” and does not modify the other activities listed in Exemption 11, such as “upgrade.” The Court based its decision on the plain language of the statute, its grammatical structure, and the context within the law. The case was remanded to determine if the project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act, considering factors such as the project's location on already disturbed lands. View "In the Matter of Proposed Construction of Compressor Station" on Justia Law

Residents of St. Croix, Virgin Islands, sued Limetree Bay Terminals and Limetree Bay Refining after the companies reopened an oil refinery that released oil mist onto nearby properties, contaminating water supplies. The residents, who rely on cisterns for water, claimed the contamination posed health risks. The companies attempted to clean the cisterns and compensate affected residents, but not all residents had access to clean water. The residents sought a preliminary injunction to require the companies to provide bottled water.The District Court for the Virgin Islands granted the preliminary injunction, finding that both Terminals and Refining were responsible for the contamination under their federal operating permit. The court determined that the residents were likely to succeed on the merits of their case and faced irreparable harm without access to clean water. The court limited the bottled-water program to residents in certain neighborhoods who received need-based government assistance and required the residents to post a $50,000 bond.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit agreed that the residents were likely to succeed on the merits and faced irreparable harm. The court also found that the balance of equities and public interest favored the residents. The Third Circuit upheld the $50,000 bond, noting that the District Court had carefully considered the residents' ability to pay and the relative hardships to each party. The court concluded that the District Court had properly applied the law and exercised its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction and setting the bond amount. View "Boynes v. Limetree Bay Ventures LLC" on Justia Law