Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Crystal Geyser Water Company bought a closed water bottling facility and sought to revive it. Both the County and the City ultimately granted the necessary permits. This appeal concerned one of two lawsuits challenging these approvals, brought pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). In one suit, Appellants We Advocate Thorough Environmental Review and Winnehem Wintu Tribe alleged that the County’s environmental review for the bottling facility was inadequate under CEQA. In another, they alleged that the City’s decision to issue the wastewater permit for the bottling plant was also improper under CEQA. In this case, the County served as the lead agency and considered the potential environmental impacts of permitting the bottling facility before it or any other public agency issued a permit for the facility. But in Appellants’ view, the County’s analysis was inadequate. Appellants alleged the County: (1) provided a misleading description of the project; (2) defined the project’s objectives in an impermissibly narrow manner; (3) improperly evaluated the project’s impacts to aesthetics, air quality, climate change, noise, and hydrology; and (4) approved the project even though it would result in violations of the County’s and the City’s general plans. The trial court rejected all Appellants’ arguments. But the Court of Appeal found two contentions had merit: (1) the County defined the project’s objectives in an overly narrow manner; and (2) the process for evaluating the project’s impacts to climate change was flawed. Relevant to this point, the County initially informed the public that the bottling project would result in greenhouse gas emissions of one amount, but, after the period for public comments had ended, the County disclosed that the project would actually result in emissions nearly double what it initially estimated. Under the circumstances of this case, the appellate court found the County should have allowed the public further opportunity to comment on the project after this late disclosure. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "We Advocate Through etc. v. County of Siskiyou" on Justia Law

Rosemont Copper Company sought to dig a large open-pit copper mine in the Santa Rita Mountains just south of Tucson, Arizona. The United States Forest Service (“the Service”) approved Rosemont’s mining plan of operations (“MPO”) on two separate grounds. The district court held that neither ground supported the Service’s approval of Rosemont’s MPO.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that the Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the entirety of Rosemont Copper Company’s MPO. The court agreed with the district court’s holding that Section 612 of the Multiple Use Act granted no rights beyond those granted by the Mining Law. The court also agreed with the district court’s holding that the Service had no basis for assuming that Rosemont’s mining claims were valid under the Mining Law. The court remanded to the Service for further proceedings as it deems important, informed by the Government’s concession that Section 612 grants no rights beyond those granted by the Mining Law, and by the court’s holding that Rosemont’s mining claims on the 2,447 acres were invalid under the Mining Law. The court further noted that it did not know whether the Service would have decided that Part 228A regulations were applicable to Rosemont’s proposal to occupy invalid claims with its waste rock, and, if applicable, whether the Service would have construed those regulations to allow such occupancy. View "CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. USFWS" on Justia Law

Crystal Geyser Water Company bought a closed water bottling facility and sought to revive it. Both the County and the City ultimately granted the necessary permits. This appeal concerned one of two lawsuits challenging these approvals, brought pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). In one suit, Appellants We Advocate Thorough Environmental Review and Winnehem Wintu Tribe alleged that the County’s environmental review for the bottling facility was inadequate under CEQA. In another, they alleged that the City’s decision to issue the wastewater permit for the bottling plant was also improper under CEQA. The Court of Appeal addressed Appellants’ challenge to the City’s approval of the wastewater permit. The County served as the lead agency and the City served as one of several responsible agencies for the proposed bottling facility. According to Appellants, the City failed to comply with its obligations as a responsible agency for three reasons: (1) the City failed to make certain findings that were required under CEQA before issuing the wastewater permit for the bottling facility; (2) the City should have adopted mitigation measures to address some of the bottling facility’s environmental impacts before approving the permit; and (3) the City should have performed additional environmental review following a late revision to the permit. The trial court rejected all Appellants’ arguments. But the Court of Appeal agreed with Appellants on one point: The City should have made certain findings under CEQA before issuing the wastewater permit. Apart from needing to make one or more of these findings for each significant impact, the City also needed to supply a brief explanation of the rationale for each finding. The City, however, never complied with these requirements. “It instead, in a single sentence, said only this: The City has reviewed the County’s report on the project and ‘finds no unmitigated adverse environmental impacts relating to the alternate waste discharge disposal methods.’” Because the Court found this brief statement inadequate to satisfy CEQA, judgment was reversed. View "We Advocate Through Environmental Review v. City of Mt. Shasta" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a non-profit group composed of small business owners who fish in the Bay Area, sued various government agencies seeking to prevent the enforcement of a commercial fishing prohibition that applies generally in national parks. Plaintiff claims that the Golden Gate National Recreation Area (GGNRA) does not confer with National Park Service with the ability to regulate offshore waters. The district court granted summary judgment to the government entities.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the text and structure of the GGNRA Act confirm that Congress has given the Park Service administrative jurisdiction over the waters in question. Nothing in the GGNRA Act supports the Plaintiff's position, that the Park Service must first establish a property interest in the waters from the State of California. View "SAN FRANCISCO HERRING ASSOC. V. USDOI" on Justia Law

During excavation of an inactive gold mine in southwestern Colorado, a blowout caused the release of at least three million gallons of contaminated water into Cement Creek. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) conceded its responsibility for the spill and its impacts. The State of New Mexico, the Navajo Nation, and the State of Utah separately filed civil actions, under the Clean Water Act, in New Mexico and Utah against the owners of the mine, the EPA, and the EPA’s contractors. Defendant Environmental Restoration, LLC moved to transfer the Utah case to the District of New Mexico for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. The United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation granted the motion and centralized proceedings in New Mexico. Later, the Allen Plaintiffs (individuals who farm land or raise livestock along the Animas River or San Juan River) filed a complaint in New Mexico that included state law claims of negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence. The district court consolidated the Allen Plaintiffs’ suit, including the state law claims, into the Multidistrict Litigation. Defendant Environmental Restoration, LLC moved to dismiss the Allen Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the Allen Plaintiffs did not file their complaint within Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations and therefore they failed to state a claim. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that New Mexico’s three-year statute of limitations applied to the Allen Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. The district court certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court had to apply the point source state’s statute of limitations to state law claims preserved under the CWA. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Allen, Jr., et al. v. Environmental Restoration" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the grant of summary judgment against Blackstone Headwaters Coalition in this citizen suit brought against various defendants involved in the development of a construction site, holding that North and South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991), construed the scope of 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(6)(A)'s limitation on citizen suits too broadly.In Scituate, a First Circuit panel held that the limitation on citizen suits established by 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(6)(A) precludes a citizen suit that seeks to obtain declaratory or prospective injunctive relief from a violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. In the instant case, a panel of the Court relied on Scituate to affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment against Blackstone. The Court then reconsidered its decision in Scituate, vacated the panel opinion in this case, and reversed the grant of summary judgment in part, holding that, contrary to Scituate, the limitation set forth in section 1319(g)(6)(A) bars only a citizen suit that seeks to apply a civil penalty for an ongoing violation of the CWA and does not bar a citizen suit for declaratory and prospective injunction relief to redress an ongoing violation of the CWA. View "Blackstone Headwaters Coalition v. Gallo Builders, Inc." on Justia Law

Michigan's Kalamazoo River was contaminated by papermills for decades, including by the release of PCBs. In 1990 the EPA added the River to the National Priorities List of Superfund sites; three paper companies formed KRSG, which entered an Administrative Order on Consent (AOC), agreeing to perform a remedial investigation. KRSG sought a declaratory judgment under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) against several firms (not including IP) that the defendants were liable for “any response costs that may be incurred" in the future "in connection with the Site.” In 1998, the district court found KRSG's members and defendants Rockwell and Eaton liable for the contamination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in 2001.In 2010, GP sued NCR, IP, and Weyerhaeuser, alleging that NCR arranged the disposal of PCB-containing substances in the area and that Weyerhaeuser was an owner. IP argued that it was not liable because it owned papermill property only as a secured creditor. The defendants argued that GP’s claims were time-barred under CERCLA’s three-year limitations period for contribution and identified several events in the prior litigation that may have caused the limitations period to begin running. The district court found that the claims concerning 2006–07 Administrative Settlement Agreements and Orders on Consent and one sub-claim from the 1990 AOC were time-barred, but that the remaining claims were not.The Sixth Circuit reversed. When the district court entered the 1998 declaratory judgment in the KRSG litigation, CERCLA’s statute of limitations for contribution claims began running. View "Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP. v. NCR Corp." on Justia Law

Pesticides sold in the United States generally must be registered by the EPA. Private parties can petition the EPA to cancel the registration of a pesticide, and the EPA is required to resolve those petitions “within a reasonable time.” The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) petitioned the EPA to cancel the registration of tetrachlorvinphos (“TCVP”), for use in household pet products. After delays, the EPA eventually denied NRDC’s petition.The court held that the EPA’s denial of NRDC’s petition was not supported by substantial evidence. The EPA failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its denial of NRDC’s petition and made several arbitrary calculations. The EPA’s errors primarily impacted two calculations central to its denial of NRDC’s petition: (1) the amount of TCVP dust released by the pet collars, and (2) the assumption that pet owners will trim the collars by at least 20%.The court found that it could only uphold agency action based on the reasons the agency gave for its decision. The panel held further that the EPA’s assumption that only 14.6% of the dust released from the collars was TCVP was troubling on the merits. The court held that it would not defer to the EPA’s highly inaccurate calculation that pet owners will trim pet collars by 20% when fitting the collar onto a pet’s neck. The court concluded that it was apparent that the EPA’s denial of NRDC’s petition was simply not supported by substantial evidence when considered on the record as a whole. View "NRDC V. USEPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the energy companies’ extraction of fossil fuels and other activities were a substantial factor in causing global warming and a rise in the sea level, bringing causes of action for public and private nuisance, strict liability, strict liability, negligence, negligent failure to warn, and trespass.The court held that the district court lacked federal question jurisdiction under Sec. 1331 because, at the time of removal, the complaints asserted only state-law tort claims against the energy companies. The court held that Plaintiffs’ global-warming claims did not fall within the Grable exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. In addition, Plaintiffs’ state law claims did not fall under the “artful-pleading” doctrine, another exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, because they were not completely preempted by the Clean Air Act.Further, the court found Plaintiffs’ claims were not removable under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The court also held that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute, Sec. 1442(a)(1), because the energy companies were not “acting under” a federal officer’s directions. The court then rejected the energy companies’ argument that the district court had removal jurisdiction over the complaints under Sec. 1452(a) because they were related to bankruptcy cases involving Peabody Energy Corp., Arch Coal, and Texaco, Inc. Finally, the court held that the district court did not have admiralty jurisdiction because maritime claims brought in state court are not removable to federal court absent an independent jurisdictional basis. View "COUNTY OF SAN MATEO V. CHEVRON CORP." on Justia Law

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the “Service”) published the Kenai Rule, codifying its ban on baiting Kenai Refuge brown bears and its closing of the Skilak Wildlife Recreation Area (“Skilak WRA”) to certain animals.The court held that the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”) preserved the federal government’s plenary power over public lands in Alaska. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Service exceeded its statutory authority in enacting the Kenai Rule. The court held that while the Alaska Statehood Act transferred the administration of wildlife from Congress to the State, the transfer did not include lands withdrawn or set apart as refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife, like the Kenai Refuge. Next, the court held that Plaintiff’s assertion that the Service could preempt the State’s hunting regulations on federal lands in Alaska was unsupported by the law.Further, the court rejected Safari Club’s contention that the Skilak WRA aspect of the Kenai Rule violated the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997 (“Improvement Act”). The court held that The Improvement Act did not require the Service to allow all State-sanctioned hunting throughout the Kenai Refuge. Moreover, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Service violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by acting arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing the Kenai Rule. Finally, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ two-part National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) argument. The panel concluded that there was no basis for reversal. View "SAFARI CLUB INTERNATIONAL V. DEBRA HAALAND" on Justia Law