Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Applicants Christian and Clark Katzenbach appealed the Environmental Division’s decision granting but imposing certain conditions on an Act 250 permit for operating their sand- and gravel-extraction project. Applicants challenged the court’s findings and conclusions under Criterion 5 and Criterion 8 of Act 250. The Vermont Supreme Court found no clear error in the trial court's findings under both criteria, but concluded one condition imposed under Criterion 5 was unreasonable in light of the trial court’s findings. The Supreme Court therefore struck that one Criterion 5 condition and affirmed in all other respects. View "In re Katzenbach A250 Permit #7R1374-1" on Justia Law

Various parties appealed the dismissal of their action challenging Reclamation’s current operating procedures, which were adopted in consultation with other relevant federal agencies to maintain specific lake levels and instream flows to comply with the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and to safeguard the federal reserved water and fishing rights of the Hoopa Valley and Klamath Tribes (the “Tribes”). The Tribes intervened as of right but then moved to dismiss the action on the ground that they were required parties who could not be joined due to their tribal sovereign immunity   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, due to a lack of a required party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. The panel held that the district court properly recognized that a declaration that Reclamation’s operating procedures were unlawful would imperil the Tribes’ reserved water and fishing rights. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the Tribes were required parties who could not be joined due to sovereign immunity, and that in equity and good conscience, the action should be dismissed.   The panel disagreed with Plaintiffs’ argument that the Tribes were not required parties to this suit because the Tribes’ interests were adequately represented by Reclamation. Because Reclamation is not an adequate representative of the Tribes, the Tribes are required parties under Rule 19. The court explained that The McCarran Amendment waives the United States’ sovereign immunity in certain suits. 43 U.S.C. Section 666(a). The panel held that even if the McCarran Amendment’s waiver of sovereign immunity extends to tribes as parties, the Amendment does not waive sovereign immunity in every case that implicates water rights. View "KLAMATH IRRIGATION DISTRICT, ET AL V. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a group comprised of municipalities, individuals, and a nonprofit organization all based in South Florida, filed this petition for review, claiming that the FAA violated the National Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”), the Clean Air Act, the Department of Transportation Act, and the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause. Among other things, Petitioners say the FAA’s Purpose and Need Statement was seriously deficient in violation of NEPA; its Cumulative Impact Assessment was improper and violated NEPA.   The Eleventh Circuit denied the petitions for review concluding that none of the Petitioners’ claims have merit. The court held that the FAA scrupulously adhered to the requirements of the relevant statutes and afforded the public numerous opportunities to comment on the proposed changes. The court explained that the FAA engaged in an exhaustive study of the South-Central Florida Metroplex Project’s impact on the environment and noise levels in the affected area, and it found no significant impact. It also provided ample opportunity for the various stakeholders to learn about and comment on the project and complied with all procedural requirements. View "City of North Miami v. FAA, et al." on Justia Law

This dispute arises out of the efforts of the federal Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to designate a new waste disposal site on Long Island Sound for byproducts of local dredging activities. New York State and the Town of Southold, New York (“Southold,” and together with New York, the “Plaintiffs”) challenged the EPA’s designation of the site pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), alleging a violation of the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”). They appealed a district court’s judgment granting Defendants EPA and the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection’s cross-motions for summary judgment.   The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that contrary to Plaintiffs’ claim, the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review applies and that under that standard, the EPA’s designation of the new disposal site passes muster under the CZMA. The court also held that Southold’s claim under the National Environmental Protection Act is not properly before the court. The court explained that New York failed to show that the EPA’s decision to impose additional restrictions on the Eastern Site undermines the agency’s efforts to achieve full consistency with the New York Program. Further, the court concluded that the EPA’s determination that its activity is fully consistent with the Southold Program is not arbitrary and capricious and that Southold’s NEPA claim is waived. View "Town of Southold, et al. v. Wheeler, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners, the owners of a large ranch in rural North Dakota, filed this petition for review related to their challenge of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) renewal of a Clean Air Act (CAA) Title V operating permit for Coyote Station, a coal-fired electric generating plant that is serviced by the nearby Coyote Creek Mine. Petitioners petitioned the EPA Administrator to object to the renewal of the permit, and the Administrator denied the petition on the basis that Petitioners failed to carry their burden of demonstrating that the permitting decision was contrary to the CAA.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court explained that in response to Petitioners’  petition, the EPA has interpreted the term “demonstrates” in Section 7661d(b)(2) to include an obligation to discuss the specific points in the NDDOH permit or reasoning to which Petitioners objected. The Administrator determined that because Petitioners failed “to engage with the facts that [the NDDOH] deemed to be most relevant, the [Petitioners] . . . failed to demonstrate that [the NDDOH’s] justification was unreasonable, or that its ultimate decision was contrary to the CAA.” The court concluded that this interpretation is entitled to deference under either Chevron or Skidmore because it is both reasonable and persuasive, a conclusion other courts have similarly reached. The court thus concluded that the Administrator’s interpretation of “demonstrates” in Section 7661d(b)(2) is entitled to deference. Finally, Petitioners’ arguments about the lack of a notice and comment period did not change the court’s conclusion View "Casey Voigt v. U.S. E.P.A." on Justia Law

Environmental groups sued ExxonMobil under the Clean Air Act for thousands of unauthorized emissions from the company’s complex in Baytown, Texas. Applying guidance from the Fifth Circuit, the district court determined that Plaintiffs proved traceability for only 3,651 of the 16,386 violation days. It ordered Exxon to pay $14.25 million dollars, lessening the penalty by more than five million dollars to reflect the reduced number of justiciable violations.   The Fifth Circuit found no error in the district court’s fact-intensive analysis of standing or penalty. The court explained that the district court properly accounted for the reduced number of violations in its final balancing of the statutory factors, reducing the penalty multiplier from 50% of the value of noncompliance to 10%. Thus, the district court’s conclusion on economic benefit stands.   Further, the court explained that in considering the length of only select few of those thousands of violations would not fully reflect the extent of Exxon’s unlawfulness. Thus, the court would not disturb the district court’s conclusion that the duration factor weighs for a penalty. The court additionally explained that there was no abuse of discretion on the seriousness factor. The district court considered each violation; it found that the traceable violations involved relatively high levels of emissions and necessarily considered the amount of each violation when it added them up to reach the 1.5-million-pound figure. Exxon does not offer any alternative definitions of “seriousness” that the district court could have applied instead. View "Env TX Citizen Lobby, et al v. ExxonMobil, et al" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the Forest Conservation Act of 1991 (the Act) and regulations promulgated by the Maryland Department of Natural Resources (DNR) required a right to appeal the approval of a forest conservation plan and that a county agency's approval of a forest conservation plan is a "final decision" for appeal purposes.At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the approval of a forest conservation plan, as well as an associated waiver that authorizers a developer to remove trees that would otherwise be protected under the Act, is a final agency decision subject to independent judicial review under the Harford County Forest Conservation Program. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court of special appeals with directions to remand the case for further proceedings in the circuit court, holding that the Act and regulations promulgated by DNR require a right to appeal the approval of a forest conservation plan and that a county agency's approval of a forest conservation plan is a "final decision" for appeal purposes. View "Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. CREG Westport I, LLC" on Justia Law

The Federal Communications Commission approved a request by Space Exploration Holdings, LLC to fly its satellites at a lower altitude.The D.C. Circuit rejected the merits of a competitor's claim that the FCC did not adequately consider the risk of signal interference. The D.C. Circuit also declined to review a claim brought by another competitor and an environmental group because the competitor's asserted injury did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the NEPA and the environmental group lacked standing. View "Viasat, Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

In 1997, EPA adopted stricter NAAQS for ozone. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone. The agency later adopted an implementation rule that, among other things, construed the Act’s anti-backsliding provision to apply not only when EPA relaxes a NAAQS but also when it strengthens one. The EPA reasoned that if Congress desired to maintain existing controls when a NAAQS is relaxed, Congress also must have intended to maintain such controls when a NAAQS is strengthened. The D.C. Circuit previously sustained the EPA’s interpretation.The Sierra Club challenged the EPA’s decisions to lift antibacksliding requirements in Houston and Dallas. The EPA responded that the proper and exclusive venue for the Sierra Club’s challenge is the Fifth Circuit. Thus, the D.C. Circuit transferred the case to the Fifth Circuit. View "Sierra Club v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Clean Water Act empowers citizens to sue for violations of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1); a citizen-suit plaintiff must “give[] notice of the alleged violation” to the “alleged violator,” and also to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and to the state in which the alleged violation occurs. After the plaintiff has provided the required notice, it must wait 60 days before suing, to give the alleged violator an opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance. Shark River Cleanup Coalition, a non-profit citizen’s group, delivered a notice letter alleging a Clean Water Act violation.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Coalition's subsequent suit. Under the applicable regulation, Notice regarding an alleged violation “shall include sufficient information to permit the recipient to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, the activity alleged to constitute a violation, the person or persons responsible for the alleged violation, the location of the alleged violation, the date or dates of such violation, and the full name, address, and telephone number of the person giving notice, 40 C.F.R. 135.3(a). The Coalition’s Notice was deficient in that it did not “include sufficient information to permit [Defendants] to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated[.]” View "Shark River Cleanup Coalition v. Township of Wall" on Justia Law