Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries
Peabody Midwest Mining, LLC v. Secretary of Labor
Methane is considered the most dangerous gas in underground mining; in sufficient concentrations, methane can ignite and cause a potentially catastrophic explosion. To protect worker safety, Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) regulations thus require miners to deenergize equipment and cease work when they detect certain methane concentrations. But during the methane inundation at the Francisco mine the miners did not stop work. They instead continued operating an energized drill, trying to stop the flow of methane. MSHA issued two orders citing the mine operator, Peabody Midwest Mining, LLC, for violating the applicable safety regulations and designated those violations as unwarrantable failures. It also individually cited the mine’s manager as Peabody’s agent. An administrative law judge and then the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission agreed with MSHA that Peabody violated MSHA safety regulations, that those violations constituted unwarrantable failures, that mine manager was individually liable, and that civil penalties were appropriate. Peabody and the manager petitioned for review in this court.
The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that MSHA safety regulations unambiguously prohibited Peabody’s operation of an energized drill in a high-methane environment, and substantial evidence supports the Commission’s unwarrantable failure and individual liability determinations. Further, as the Commission recognized, by permitting miners to work with energized equipment, the manager risked incurring the very hazard section 75.323(c)(2) is intended to address, i.e., potential ignition [in a] high-methane environment. View "Peabody Midwest Mining, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law
Louisiana State v. NOAA
The National Marine Fisheries Service promulgated a rule requiring shrimp trawlers 25 feet or longer operating in offshore waters from North Carolina to Texas to install turtle excluder devices (TEDs), subject to a few preconditions. In 2012, NMFS proposed a more restrictive rule requiring TEDs for skimmer trawlers. The Final Rule required TEDs on all skimmer trawlers over 40 feet, including those that operate inshore. Louisiana’s Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) sued NMFS under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging the Final Rule as arbitrary and capricious. Louisiana moved for summary judgment, focusing on the merits of its claims. NMFS opposed and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The district court granted NMFS’s motion, holding that Louisiana had not carried its summary judgment burden to establish standing.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that based on the record and procedural history of the case, the district court did not err in concluding that Louisiana failed to establish that it has standing to challenge the NMFS’s, Final Rule. The court reasoned that while the Final Rule’s EIS noted that the rule would adversely affect the shrimping industry across the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana failed to provide evidence, particularly substantiating the rule’s impact on its shrimping industry or, ergo, “a sufficiently substantial segment of its population.” Nor does Louisiana’s invocation of the “special solicitude” afforded States in the standing analysis rescue this argument, or for that matter, the State’s other arguments. View "Louisiana State v. NOAA" on Justia Law
W. Va. Land Resources, Inc. v. American Bituminous Power Partners, LP
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Environmental Quality Board (EQB) modifying an "Underground Injection Control Permit" issued to American Bitumious Power Partners, L.P. (Ambit) allowing Ambit to pump or inject acid mine drainage (AMD) into an abandoned underground mine, holding that the EQB acted within its discretion when it modified the permit.The permit at issue allowed Ambit to inject increased volumes of AMD that was sought in Ambit's permit application. The EQB concluded that the DEP's issuance of the permit was arbitrary, capricious, and in violation of applicable statutory and regulatory provisions governing the process for issuing permits. In modifying the permit, the EQB reduced the higher quantities of AMD sought by Ambit and ordered that Ambit would only be permitted to inject the same amounts of AMD approved earlier. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the EQB's findings supported by the substantive evidence on the record; and (2) the EQB's conclusions were neither arbitrary nor capricious nor an abuse of discretion. View "W. Va. Land Resources, Inc. v. American Bituminous Power Partners, LP" on Justia Law
WILDEARTH GUARDIANS, ET AL V. USFS, ET AL
The United States Forest Service oversees livestock grazing in the Colville National Forest in Eastern Washington, but it does not regulate or participate in the killing of wolves by the Department. Environmental organizations concerned about the wolves sued the Forest Service, challenging its grazing decisions. They alleged that those decisions will lead to an increase in the number of wolf attacks on livestock, which in turn will cause the Department to kill more wolves. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel explained to establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show it has suffered an injury in fact, the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. The Service did not dispute that Plaintiffs had a concrete interest in the welfare of gray wolves in the Colville National Forest. The key issues were whether any injury to the wolves would be caused by the allegedly unlawful conduct of the Service and whether a change in that conduct would redress that injury. Here, the claimed injury arose from the actions of a third party that is two steps removed from the Service. The Service does not kill wolves, nor does it regulate those that do. Rather, Plaintiffs object to grazing because it may lead to depredations, which may, in turn, lead the Department to consider and, in some cases, exercise its discretion to lethally remove wolves. Accordingly, the panel held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claims against the Service. View "WILDEARTH GUARDIANS, ET AL V. USFS, ET AL" on Justia Law
Lucas v. City of Pomona
The City of Pomona (the City) decided to allow commercial cannabis activities in specific locales within its boundaries. In doing so, the City determined it was exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Guidelines adopted to implement CEQA (Cal. Code Regs.) (Guidelines). Thus, when the City chose areas to locate commercial cannabis activities, it did not conduct additional environmental review under CEQA. Appellant wanted his storefront property included among the locales where commercial cannabis activity would be allowed. The City, however, excluded Appellant’s property. Appellant then filed a petition for writ of mandate to overturn the City’s designation of areas for permissible commercial cannabis activities. He contended the City made the decision improperly by foregoing further environmental review. The superior court denied the petition and entered judgment in favor of the City.
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the City properly determined that the Project is Exempt per Guidelines Section 15183 and requires no additional environmental review. The court explained that substantial evidence shows the Project’s proposed commercial cannabis activities were similar to or “consistent” with existing land uses or development density established by the 2014 EIR and General Plan Update and thus meet the statutory exemption per Guidelines section 15183. Further, the court found that substantial evidence—the General Plan Update, the 2014 EIR, the Project, the DOS, and Findings of Consistency—shows the Project “has no project-specific effects” that are “peculiar” to it. View "Lucas v. City of Pomona" on Justia Law
Citizens for Constitutional Integrity, et al. v. United States, et al.
Plaintiffs Citizens for Constitutional Integrity and Southwest Advocates, Inc. appealed the denial of their motion for temporary relief by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The Department of the Interior’s Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (the Office) granted a coal-mining permit for an expansion of the King II Mine (the Mine) in the Dunn Ranch Area of La Plata County, Colorado. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin mining under the expansion and ultimately vacate the permit. They alleged the Office conducted flawed assessments of the probable hydrologic impacts of the expansion, contrary to the requirements of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (the SMCRA or the Act). As authority for their motion, they invoked the Act’s citizen-suit provision, or alternatively, the Administrative Procedure Act (the APA). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded Plaintiffs were not entitled to temporary relief because their claims under the SMCRA and the APA were not likely to succeed on the merits. View "Citizens for Constitutional Integrity, et al. v. United States, et al." on Justia Law
Claremont Canyon Conservancy v. Regents of the University of California
To reduce wildfire risk on a large swath of hilly, forested, and fire-prone land on the University’s Hill Campus, the Regents prepared and approved a plan for vegetation removal projects. The Regents prepared and certified an environmental impact report (EIR) describing the projects and analyzing the plan’s environmental impacts under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, 21000). Two conservation organizations filed petitions challenging the adequacy of the EIR’s description of four vegetation removal projects and its discussion of certain environmental impacts. The trial court concluded the project descriptions were “uncertain and ambiguous” because the EIR provided “vague conceptual criteria” but no concrete information on how the “criteria will be implemented.”The court of appeal reversed. The challenged vegetation removal project descriptions comply with CEQA, and the EIR contains sufficient information to analyze the projects’ environmental impacts. Viewed as an informational document, the EIR includes sufficient detail to enable the public to understand the environmental impacts associated with the plan to remove vegetation in specific locations on the Hill Campus to reduce wildfire risk. It sufficiently identifies and analyzes alternatives to the project. The evidence amply supports the conclusion that it was not reasonably feasible to prepare a tree inventory in connection with the EIR. View "Claremont Canyon Conservancy v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law
Posted in:
California Courts of Appeal, Environmental Law
Tulare Lake Canal Co. v. Stratford Pub. Util. Dist.
Tulare Lake Canal Company (TLCC) filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging Stratford Public Utility District (SPUD) failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when it granted an easement for a 48-inch water pipeline to Sandridge Partners, L.P. (Sandridge). TLCC applied for a preliminary injunction to halt the construction and operation of the pipeline pending CEQA compliance. The trial court determined TLCC was likely to prevail on the CEQA claim but concluded the relative balance of harms from granting or denying injunctive relief favored denying the injunction. TLCC appealed.
The Fifth Appellate District reversed. The court concluded it is a near certainty that SPUD failed to comply with CEQA when it granted the easement. The construction and operation of the proposed pipeline qualify as a discretionary project approved by SPUD, a public entity. As a result, SPUD was required by CEQA to conduct a preliminary review before granting the easement. This strong showing of likely success on the CEQA claims reduces the showing of relative harms needed to obtain the injunction. Second, the court concluded that the trial court erred in stating there was no evidence of harm to the public generally in allowing the proposed project to go forward. Third, the court found that there is a reasonable probability the preliminary injunction would have been granted if the trial court had identified the harm to the public interest in informed decision-making and included it in balancing the relative harms. View "Tulare Lake Canal Co. v. Stratford Pub. Util. Dist." on Justia Law
IN RE: KLAMATH IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. USDC-ORM
Disputes over the allocation of water within the Klamath Basin in southern Oregon and northern California, particularly during the recent period of severe and prolonged drought, have prompted many lawsuits in this and other courts. In this episode, Klamath Irrigation District (“KID”) petitions for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to remand KID’s motion for preliminary injunction to the Klamath County Circuit Court in Oregon. The motion had originally been filed by KID in that Oregon court but was removed to federal district court by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”), a federal agency within the U.S. Department of Interior. Reclamation was identified by KID as the respondent for KID’s motion.
The Ninth Circuit denied KID’s petition for writ of mandamus. The panel considered the five factors in Bauman v. U.S. District Court, 557 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2004), in determining whether mandamus was warranted. The panel began with the third factor—clear error as a matter of law— because it was a necessary condition for granting the writ of mandamus. The panel rejected KID’s attempt to circumvent KID II, the Tribes’ rights, and the effect of the ESA by characterizing the relief it sought as an application of the ACFFOD. The panel expressed no views on the merits of KID’s underlying motion for preliminary injunction and concluded only that the district court did not err in declining to remand the motion for preliminary injunction to the state court. The panel held that it need not consider the remaining Bauman factors because the third factor was dispositive. View "IN RE: KLAMATH IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. USDC-ORM" on Justia Law
L.A. Waterkeeper v. State Water Resources Control Bd.
The Regional Water Quality Control Board, Los Angeles Region (Regional Board) renewed permits allowing four publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) to discharge millions of gallons of treated wastewater daily into the Los Angeles River and Pacific Ocean. The Regional Board issued the permits over the objections of Los Angeles Waterkeeper (Waterkeeper). Waterkeeper sought a review of the permits before the State Water Resources Control Board (State Board), and the State Board declined to review. Waterkeeper then filed petitions for writs of mandate against the State and Regional Boards (collectively, the Boards). Waterkeeper further alleged the Regional Board issued the permits without making findings required under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The trial court issued four judgments and four writs of mandate directing the State Board to evaluate whether the discharges from each of the four POTWs were reasonable and to develop a factual record to allow for judicial review of whatever decision the State Board reached.
The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgments in favor of the Boards and reversed judgments and writs of mandate against State Board. The court agreed with the trial court that the Regional Board had no duty to evaluate the reasonableness of the POTWs’ discharges when issuing the permits. The Regional Board’s purview is water quality, not reasonable use, and the Legislature has not authorized the Regional Board to determine whether a POTW’s discharges could be put to better use. The court further held that Waterkeeper has not adequately pleaded entitlement to mandamus against the State Board, and the trial court should have sustained the State Board’s demurrer. View "L.A. Waterkeeper v. State Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law