Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Dakota Bay, LLC owns property adjacent to McCook Lake in Union County, South Dakota, and planned to construct a canal connecting its land to the lake. To facilitate this, Dakota Bay’s owner, Michael Chicoine, applied for a shoreline alteration permit and a water permit to use an existing irrigation well to fill and maintain the canal. The McCook Lake Recreation Area Association, which holds a permit to pump water from the Missouri River into McCook Lake, opposed the project. The Association argued that constructing the canal would require a permit to appropriate water from McCook Lake and that the canal would increase water loss from the lake, potentially impairing the Association’s ability to maintain lake levels.The South Dakota Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources Water Management Board held hearings and ultimately denied the Association’s petition for a declaratory ruling, finding that the canal’s construction would not constitute an appropriation of water from McCook Lake. The Board also granted Dakota Bay’s application to use well water for the canal, finding that unappropriated water was available, the use was beneficial and in the public interest, and that it would not unlawfully impair existing water rights. The Association appealed both decisions to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, which affirmed the Board’s rulings and also upheld the Board’s decision to quash subpoenas issued by the Association.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decisions. The Court held that constructing the canal would not result in an appropriation of water from McCook Lake and thus did not require a water appropriation permit. The Court also held that Dakota Bay’s proposed use of well water for the canal was a beneficial use in the public interest and that the Board did not abuse its discretion in quashing the subpoenas, clarifying that administrative proceedings are governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, not the rules of civil procedure. View "Mccook Lake Recreation Area V. Dakota Bay, LLC" on Justia Law

Texas submitted a State Implementation Plan (SIP) to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2012, asserting that its emissions did not significantly contribute to ozone pollution in downwind states and therefore no additional mitigation was necessary. The SIP included charts of declining ozone levels in certain metropolitan areas, a brief discussion of wind patterns, a map of 2010 ozone levels, and some raw measurement data, but did not analyze or quantify Texas’s impact on other states’ air quality. Texas’s submission focused on areas geographically close to Texas and did not address whether its emissions might interfere with maintenance of air quality standards in other states.After determining the SIP was technically complete, the EPA delayed substantive review pending the Supreme Court’s decision in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., which clarified the agency’s authority under the Clean Air Act’s Good Neighbor Provision. During the delay, EPA provided Texas with updated modeling data showing that Texas emissions contributed to downwind ozone problems, but Texas did not supplement its SIP. In 2016, EPA formally disapproved the SIP, finding it failed to address statutory requirements, particularly by not evaluating impacts on maintenance areas and by relying on outdated control measures. Texas and industry groups petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review, arguing EPA’s process was procedurally and substantively flawed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that EPA’s review complied with statutory and procedural requirements, and that the agency acted within its authority in disapproving the SIP. The court found EPA’s reasoning was not arbitrary or capricious, and that the SIP’s failure to analyze Texas’s impact on all relevant downwind areas, including maintenance areas, justified disapproval. The court also rejected arguments that EPA was required to approve the SIP due to procedural delays or reliance on updated data. View "State of Texas v. EPA" on Justia Law

A group of local residents and an environmental organization alleged that a nonprofit entity operating a large compound in Deerpark, New York, was discharging stormwater and wastewater containing fecal coliform bacteria into nearby surface waters in violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The plaintiffs claimed that these discharges, which they supported with water testing data, exceeded legal limits and were the result of ongoing construction and improper maintenance of the defendant’s wastewater treatment plant. The affected waters are used by the plaintiffs for recreational purposes and are part of a larger watershed.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs’ initial complaint, finding that their pre-suit notice of intent to sue was deficient and thus failed to satisfy the CWA’s notice requirement. The court treated this requirement as jurisdictional and dismissed the case without prejudice. After the plaintiffs sent a new, more detailed notice and refiled their claims, the district court again dismissed the case, this time with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the revised notice still lacked sufficient information to enable the defendant to identify the alleged violations and the specific location of the discharges.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the CWA’s pre-suit notice requirement is jurisdictional and whether the plaintiffs’ notice was adequate. The Second Circuit held that the notice requirement under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) is not jurisdictional but is instead a mandatory condition precedent to suit. The court further found that the plaintiffs’ notice provided sufficient information to inform the defendant of the alleged violations, including the pollutant, the standards allegedly violated, and the location of the discharges. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mid-New York Environ. v. Dragon Springs" on Justia Law

A group of neighbors opposed the development of a public sports park on a 65-acre parcel in Maui. The State Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) sought and received a special use permit from the County of Maui Planning Commission to build the park. Several future members of the neighbors’ group, Maui Lani Neighbors, Inc. (MLN), received notice of the permit hearing, attended, and some testified, but none formally intervened in the proceedings. After the permit was granted, one future MLN member filed an administrative appeal but later dismissed it. MLN was then incorporated and filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, challenging the permit on zoning, environmental, constitutional, and procedural grounds.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit dismissed most of MLN’s claims, holding that they should have been brought as an administrative appeal of the Planning Commission’s decision under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14, and that MLN failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, but with different reasoning on some points. The ICA held that the administrative process provided an exclusive remedy for most claims, but allowed that some environmental claims under HRS chapter 343 (the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act, or HEPA) could proceed in circuit court if they did not seek to invalidate the permit.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the ICA’s judgment in most respects, but clarified that MLN’s claims under HRS chapter 343 were not subject to the exhaustion doctrine and could be brought directly in circuit court. The court held that, except for HEPA claims, MLN was required to challenge the permit through an administrative appeal, and that the declaratory judgment statute (HRS § 632-1) did not provide an alternative route. The court remanded the case to the circuit court to consider the HEPA-based claims. View "Maui Lani Neighbors v. State" on Justia Law

A labor union filed two lawsuits in 2014 against two related private developers responsible for constructing the Ritz-Carlton Residences towers in Waikīkī, as well as against the City and County of Honolulu. The union challenged the adequacy of the separate final environmental assessments (FEAs) for each tower under Hawaiʻi’s environmental laws, alleging that the developers improperly segmented the environmental review process. The City was included as a defendant because its Department of Planning and Permitting accepted the FEAs and issued findings of no significant impact for both towers. The lawsuits were consolidated.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the developers and the City, finding the FEAs sufficient and no improper segmentation. The developers also argued that the case was moot because the projects had been completed and sold. The union appealed, and the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi accepted transfer of the appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi held that the cases were not moot, as effective relief could still be granted, and that the public interest exception to mootness applied. The court found that there had been improper segmentation of the environmental review under the double independent utility test. The court remanded the case to the circuit court to determine whether the FEAs were sufficient as a combined review and, if not, whether a new environmental assessment or impact statement was required. In the present opinion, the Supreme Court awarded the union $112,721.10 in attorneys’ fees and costs against the private developers only, under the private attorney general doctrine, but denied fees against the City. The court found the union was a prevailing party and that the litigation vindicated important public policy. View "Unite Here! Local 5 v. Pacrep 2 LLC" on Justia Law

A company had been diverting large amounts of water from streams in East Maui for over twenty years under a series of annually renewed, so-called “temporary” permits issued by the state’s Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR). Each year, the company applied to renew these permits, which allowed it to use state land and divert millions of gallons of water daily. In 2020, before BLNR voted to renew the permits for 2021, an environmental group timely requested a contested case hearing, arguing that new evidence and changed circumstances warranted further scrutiny. BLNR denied this request and proceeded to renew the permits, adding some new conditions.The environmental group appealed to the Environmental Court of the First Circuit, challenging both the denial of a contested case hearing and the permit renewals. The Environmental Court found that the group had a constitutionally protected right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by state law, and that due process required a contested case hearing before the permits were renewed. The court vacated the permits but stayed its order to avoid disruption, temporarily modifying the permits to reduce the allowable water diversion. The court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the group.On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) held that the group’s protected interest was defined by some, but not all, relevant environmental laws, and that due process did not require a contested case hearing in this instance. The ICA further found that the Environmental Court lacked jurisdiction over the permit renewals and erred in modifying the permits and awarding attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reversed the ICA in relevant part. It held that the group’s constitutional right was defined by all cited environmental laws, including those governing coastal zone management. The court concluded that due process required a contested case hearing before the permits were renewed, and that the Environmental Court had jurisdiction to review both the denial of the hearing and the permit renewals. The Supreme Court also affirmed the Environmental Court’s authority to temporarily modify the permits and to award attorney fees and costs to the environmental group. View "Sierra Club v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

A group of environmental and fishing organizations challenged the operation of a large drainage project in California’s Central Valley, which collects and conveys irrigation return flows from nearly 100,000 acres of farmland and discharges them into a wetland connected to the San Joaquin River. The plaintiffs argued that the project’s discharges included pollutants not related to irrigated agriculture, such as groundwater seepage, runoff from non-irrigated lands, sediment, and water from a solar facility, and therefore should not be exempt from federal permitting requirements under the Clean Water Act (CWA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California previously granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, including the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and local water authorities, finding that the project qualified for the CWA’s exemption for “discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture.” On a prior appeal, the Ninth Circuit clarified that the defendants bore the burden of proving the exemption applied and that “entirely” meant wholly, not just a majority, of the discharge. The case was remanded for further proceedings under this standard.On the current appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s subsequent grant of summary judgment for the defendants. The Ninth Circuit held that the CWA exemption applies so long as the return flow does not contain additional point source discharges from activities unrelated to crop production. The court found that the alleged pollutants were either from nonpoint sources or from point sources related to crop production, and that plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the project’s exempt status under the CWA. View "PACIFIC COAST FED'N OF FISHERMEN'S ASS'NS, INC. V. NICKELS" on Justia Law

A coalition of trade associations, whose members operate stationary sources of air pollution and hold Title V permits under the Clean Air Act, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 2023 rescission of a longstanding affirmative defense. This defense had protected permit holders from liability for exceeding emission limits during emergency events, provided certain conditions were met. The EPA rescinded the defense, arguing it was unlawful because it encroached on the judiciary’s authority to impose civil penalties and rendered emission standards non-continuous, allegedly violating the Clean Air Act.The SSM Litigation Group petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The EPA and environmental intervenors contested the group’s standing, but the court found that SSM had associational standing, as its members were directly regulated and injured by the rescission. SSM’s standing was supported by the administrative record and further confirmed by declarations submitted in its reply brief, which the court accepted.On the merits, the D.C. Circuit reviewed EPA’s action under the Clean Air Act’s standard, which mirrors the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious review. The court held that EPA’s rescission was based entirely on erroneous legal grounds. First, the court found that the affirmative defense was a complete defense to liability, not a limitation on judicial remedies, and thus did not encroach on the judiciary’s authority. Second, the court determined that the defense did not render emission limitations non-continuous, as it did not suspend the underlying standards. The court concluded that EPA’s rescission was not reasonably explained and not in accordance with law, granted the petition, and reversed the rescission. View "SSM Litigation Group v. EPA" on Justia Law

Several commercial air tour operators challenged federal regulations that banned all commercial air tours over Mount Rushmore National Memorial and Badlands National Park. The dispute arose after the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Park Service, in response to statutory requirements and litigation, issued air tour management plans (ATMPs) in 2023 that prohibited such tours, citing negative impacts on visitor experience, wildlife, and tribal cultural resources. The operators argued that the agencies’ actions were arbitrary and capricious, violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and failed to consider reasonable alternatives or aviation safety.Previously, the agencies had attempted to negotiate voluntary agreements with the tour operators, as permitted by the Air Tour Management Act. However, after one operator declined to participate, the agencies shifted to developing ATMPs. This change was influenced by a writ of mandamus issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in In re Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, which compelled the agencies to bring certain parks into compliance with the Act. The agencies then considered several alternatives before ultimately banning all commercial air tours in the final plans.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the petitions for review filed by the tour operators. The court held that the agencies’ decision to end voluntary agreement negotiations and proceed with ATMPs was not arbitrary or capricious. It further found that the agencies complied with NEPA’s procedural requirements, used reasonable data, considered an adequate range of alternatives, and sufficiently addressed aviation safety concerns. The court concluded that the agencies’ decisions were reasonable and reasonably explained, and therefore denied the petitions to vacate the air tour management plans. View "Badger Helicopters Inc. v. FAA" on Justia Law

A Canadian mining company operated a lead-zinc smelter in British Columbia, discharging millions of tons of slag and contaminated effluent containing hazardous substances into the Upper Columbia River over several decades. This pollution injured fish and benthic organisms in the river, which holds significant cultural and practical importance for a federally recognized Native American tribe whose reservation borders the river. The tribe sought damages for the interim lost use of these injured natural resources, including losses with a cultural dimension, such as reduced fishing and diminished ability to use the river for traditional purposes.Litigation began in 2004, with individual tribal members, later joined by the tribe and the State of Washington, bringing claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) against the company. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington found the company liable for response costs and, after a trial, awarded the tribe investigative expenses and attorney’s fees. The case then proceeded to a third phase to determine liability for natural resource damages. The district court granted summary judgment to the company on the tribe’s claims for interim lost use damages, reasoning that CERCLA does not authorize recovery for injuries to “cultural resources” or for damages with a cultural component.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that CERCLA authorizes recovery for interim lost use of injured natural resources, even when those lost uses have a cultural dimension, provided the damages are for injury to natural resources as defined by the statute. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for trial to determine whether the tribe sustained damages from lost uses of injured natural resources. View "CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION V. TECK COMINCO METALS LTD" on Justia Law