Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a challenge to the United States Department of the Interior’s approval of the 2024–2029 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, which authorizes up to three lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico region. Environmental organizations argued that the Department failed to adequately assess the risks to vulnerable coastal communities, did not properly consider the endangered Rice’s whale in its environmental sensitivity analysis, overlooked potential conflicts with other ocean uses, and did not sufficiently balance the program’s projected benefits against its environmental costs. The Department, in coordination with the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, had developed the program through a multi-year process involving public comment and environmental review.After the Department finalized the program, the environmental groups and the American Petroleum Institute (API) each petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. API later withdrew its petition but remained as an intervenor. The environmental petitioners sought to have the program remanded for further consideration, arguing violations of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). The Department and API contested the petitioners’ standing and the merits of their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the environmental petitioners had associational standing to pursue their claims. On the merits, the court found that the Department of the Interior had satisfied OCSLA’s requirements by reasonably evaluating environmental justice concerns, the selection of representative species for environmental sensitivity analysis, and potential conflicts with other uses of the Gulf. The court concluded that the Department’s decision-making process was reasoned and not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review, leaving the 2024–2029 leasing program in effect. View "Healthy Gulf v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Environmental organizations challenged the U.S. Bureau of Land Management’s approval of the Big Weekly Elk Forest Management Project in coastal Oregon, arguing that the project would harm the threatened marbled murrelet by allowing logging near its nesting habitat. The relevant Resource Management Plan (RMP) designates certain forest areas as Late-Successional Reserve (LSR) to protect murrelet and northern spotted owl habitat, and includes management directions for murrelet conservation. The project authorized thinning in LSRs adjacent to murrelet habitat and heavier harvesting in areas designated for timber production, with some voluntary protective measures.The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argued that the project violated the RMP and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) by failing to buffer all occupied murrelet sites and by not requiring surveys for murrelets in adjacent stands. They also claimed the Bureau failed to take a “hard look” at environmental impacts as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The district court granted summary judgment for the Bureau, finding its interpretation of the RMP reasonable and entitled to deference, and that its environmental review was sufficient.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Bureau’s narrow interpretation of “modifying nesting habitat” in the RMP was reasonable, genuinely ambiguous, and entitled to deference under Kisor v. Wilkie. The project conformed to the RMP and did not violate FLPMA. The court also found that the Bureau took the required “hard look” at environmental impacts under NEPA, adequately addressing potential effects on murrelets through tiered and incorporated analyses. The district court’s judgment in favor of the Bureau was affirmed. View "CASCADIA WILDLANDS V. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT" on Justia Law

A state agency issued a new revocable permit to a company for seed research operations on state-owned conservation land. The agency declared that an environmental assessment (EA) was not required, reasoning that the land’s use was not changing and that there would be minimal or no significant environmental impact. In making this determination, the agency relied on a 1982 finding of no significant impact (FONSI) that had been issued for sugar cane cultivation, not for seed research involving restricted use pesticides and genetically modified organisms. The agency did not analyze the potential environmental impacts of the new seed research activities.A group of plaintiffs challenged the agency’s exemption declaration in the Environmental Court of the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the agency failed to take a “hard look” at the environmental impacts and did not follow proper procedures under the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act (HEPA). The environmental court granted summary judgment in favor of the agency and the company, upholding the exemption. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) found that there were genuine issues of material fact and gaps in the agency’s record, and remanded the case to the environmental court for further proceedings to reassess the exemption.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that whether an agency has followed proper procedures or considered appropriate factors in declaring an EA exemption are questions of law reviewed de novo. The court concluded that the agency did not follow proper procedures or consider appropriate factors in its exemption declaration, as its record was insufficient and failed to address the environmental impacts of seed research operations. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment and the environmental court’s orders, and remanded the case with instructions that the agency must prepare an EA regarding the possible environmental impacts of the seed research use. View "Ke Kauhulu O Mn v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

The case concerns a land exchange between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the J.R. Simplot Company, involving land that was formerly part of the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes had ceded this land to the United States under an 1898 agreement, which Congress ratified in 1900. The 1900 Act specified that the ceded lands could only be disposed of under certain federal laws: homestead, townsite, stone and timber, and mining laws. In 2020, BLM approved an exchange of some of these lands with Simplot, who sought to expand a waste facility adjacent to the reservation. The Tribes objected, arguing that the exchange violated the restrictions set by the 1900 Act.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reviewed the Tribes’ challenge and granted summary judgment in their favor. The court found that the BLM’s approval of the exchange violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it did not comply with the 1900 Act’s restrictions. The court also held, in the alternative, that the exchange failed to meet requirements under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court certified the case for interlocutory appeal to resolve the legal question regarding the interplay between the 1900 Act and FLPMA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the 1900 Act’s list of permissible land disposal methods is exclusive and that the BLM’s exchange under FLPMA was not authorized because FLPMA is not among the listed laws. The court further held that FLPMA does not repeal or supersede the 1900 Act’s restrictions, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Tribes under established Indian law canons. The court concluded that BLM’s authorization of the exchange was not in accordance with law. View "SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES OF THE FORT HALL RESERVATI V. USDOI" on Justia Law

The case centers on the southwestern willow flycatcher, a bird listed as an endangered subspecies by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service since 1995. The New Mexico Cattle Growers’ Association petitioned the Service to remove the bird from the endangered species list, arguing that it is not a valid subspecies and thus does not qualify for protection under the Endangered Species Act. Their petition relied heavily on a 2015 scientific article by Robert Zink, which critiqued previous studies supporting the subspecies classification. The Service conducted a thorough review, including public comment and expert consultation, and ultimately reaffirmed the subspecies designation, finding that the best available scientific evidence supported its continued listing.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Service’s decision after the Cattle Growers filed suit, claiming the agency’s determination was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Service and its intervenors, the Center for Biological Diversity and the Maricopa Audubon Society, finding that the Service had reasonably explained its reliance on scientific studies and its application of the non-clinal geographic variation standard to determine subspecies validity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the Service’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious, as it was based on a reasonable and well-explained evaluation of scientific evidence. The court rejected the Cattle Growers’ arguments regarding the indeterminacy of the non-clinal geographic variation standard and found no merit in claims of constitutional or procedural deficiencies. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "New Mexico Cattle Growers' Association v. FWS" on Justia Law

Wildlife Preserves, Inc., a non-profit conservation organization, conveyed land comprising most of the Sunken Forest Preserve—a rare maritime holly forest on Fire Island, New York—to the United States government in the 1950s and 1960s. The deeds included restrictions requiring the land to be maintained in its natural state and operated as a preserve for wildlife, prohibiting activities such as hunting, trapping, and any actions that might adversely affect the environment or animal population. Over time, the National Park Service managed the property as part of the Fire Island National Seashore. In response to a significant increase in white-tailed deer, which threatened local flora and fauna, the government adopted a 2016 management plan involving exclusion fencing and deer population reduction within the Sunken Forest.Wildlife Preserves filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, arguing that the 2016 plan violated the deed restrictions and triggered a reversionary interest in the property under New York law. The district court denied Wildlife Preserves’ motion for summary judgment and granted the government’s cross-motion, holding that the suit was time-barred under the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations due to a prior fence constructed in 1967.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, but on alternative grounds. The court held that, under New York law, the 2016 management plan did not violate the deed restrictions. The court reasoned that the plan’s fencing and deer reduction measures were consistent with the requirement to maintain the land in its natural state and operate it as a wildlife preserve, and that the restrictions must be strictly construed against the grantor. Thus, summary judgment for the government was affirmed. View "Wildlife Preserves v. Romero" on Justia Law

Rural residents of Alaska, including Alaska Natives, have long relied on subsistence fishing in navigable waters such as the Kuskokwim River, which runs through the Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuge. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) was enacted to protect this way of life by establishing a rural subsistence priority for fishing and hunting on “public lands.” For decades, the federal government and the State of Alaska have disagreed over whether “public lands” under Title VIII of ANILCA includes navigable waters where the United States holds reserved water rights, especially after Alaska’s own subsistence laws were found unconstitutional for not providing a rural preference.After the federal government assumed management of the rural subsistence priority, a series of Ninth Circuit decisions known as the Katie John Trilogy held that “public lands” in Title VIII does include such navigable waters. The United States implemented this interpretation, managing subsistence fishing on the Kuskokwim River within the Refuge. However, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sturgeon v. Frost, which interpreted “public lands” differently in another section of ANILCA, Alaska asserted renewed authority over the river, issuing conflicting fishing orders that did not prioritize rural subsistence users.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction in favor of the United States and intervenors, holding that the Katie John Trilogy remained binding and that Alaska could not interfere with federal management of the rural subsistence priority.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Katie John Trilogy is not clearly irreconcilable with Sturgeon v. Frost, as the statutory context and purpose of Title VIII support a broader interpretation of “public lands” that includes navigable waters for subsistence purposes. The court also found that subsequent congressional actions ratified this interpretation. The judgment and injunction were affirmed. View "United States v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The United States government brought suit against several defendants, including EZ Lynk, SEZC, Thomas Wood, and Bradley Gintz, alleging that their product, the EZ Lynk System, violated the Clean Air Act by enabling vehicle owners to bypass or disable emissions controls. The EZ Lynk System consists of a physical device that connects to a vehicle’s diagnostics port, a smartphone app, and a cloud-based service. Through this system, users can download and install “tunes” created by third-party technicians, including “delete tunes” that defeat emissions controls. The complaint detailed how EZ Lynk collaborated with tune creators, provided technical support, and maintained an online forum where users discussed using the system to delete emissions controls.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the government’s complaint sufficiently alleged that the EZ Lynk System was a “defeat device” under the Clean Air Act. However, the district court dismissed the complaint, holding that EZ Lynk and its principals were immune from liability under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The court reasoned that EZ Lynk merely published third-party information (the delete tunes) and did not create them, thus qualifying for Section 230 immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Second Circuit agreed that the complaint adequately alleged the EZ Lynk System was a defeat device. However, it held that the complaint also sufficiently alleged that EZ Lynk, Wood, and Gintz directly and materially contributed to the creation of the unlawful delete tunes, making them ineligible for Section 230 immunity. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding is that Section 230 immunity does not apply where a defendant directly and materially contributes to the creation of unlawful content. View "United States v. EZ Lynk" on Justia Law

The State of Vermont brought a lawsuit in state court against 3M Company, alleging that 3M’s production of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), known as “forever chemicals,” had contaminated Vermont’s natural resources, including water, wildlife, soil, and sediment. The case focused on contamination at the Rutland City landfill and a former 3M manufacturing facility in Rutland, Vermont. In 2023, Vermont’s Department of Environmental Conservation sent 3M a letter identifying it as a potentially responsible party for PFAS contamination, and Vermont’s counsel later forwarded this letter to 3M’s counsel in the context of the ongoing litigation.After receiving the letter, 3M conducted an internal investigation and determined that, during its ownership of the Rutland facility, it had manufactured copper-clad laminates in accordance with military specifications that required the use of PFAS. On January 3, 2024, 3M removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), asserting a federal defense based on its compliance with military requirements. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont found that 3M’s removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), reasoning that the thirty-day removal period began when 3M received Vermont’s email with the DEC letter, and remanded the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s remand order de novo. The Second Circuit held that Vermont’s correspondence did not provide sufficient information for 3M to ascertain that the case was removable under the federal officer removal statute, and thus the thirty-day removal period had not begun when 3M received the email. The court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. 3M Co." on Justia Law

In 1997, an individual applied to the Utah Division of Water Rights to divert water from a surface source in the Weber Basin for irrigation and livestock purposes. The application was met with protests from the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, among others. After a hearing in 1998 and sporadic communications over the next two decades, the Utah State Engineer ultimately denied the application in 2018. The applicant sought judicial review in the Second District Court, arguing that the denial was improper because the water source contained unappropriated water, the application would not interfere with existing rights, and the application’s 1997 filing date should give it priority.While the case was pending in the Second District Court, the applicant died. His counsel moved to substitute the estate’s personal representative as the plaintiff under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1). The district court denied the motion, holding that the claim did not survive the applicant’s death because he had no perfected property right and any inchoate right was not mentioned in his will. The court also found that Utah’s general survival statute did not apply, and dismissed the case. The estate appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed whether the district court erred in denying substitution and dismissing the claim. The court held that the burden was on the movant to show the claim survived death. It found that neither common law nor statute provided for the survival of a claim for judicial review of an administrative denial of a water appropriation application. The court concluded that the claim abated upon the applicant’s death and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Marriott v. Wilhelmsen" on Justia Law