Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and Georgia Department of Natural Resources (“GDNR”) sued DeKalb County for violating the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). To resolve this suit, the parties agreed to a consent decree in 2011. Eight years later, South River Watershed Alliance, Inc. (“South River”) and J.E. sued DeKalb County for failing to follow the decree and violating the CWA. The CWA authorizes citizen suits for enforcement purposes, but such suits are not allowed when an “administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action . . . to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order.” Thus, this case turned on whether the 2011 consent decree—along with the ongoing efforts of the EPA and GDNR to require compliance—constitutes diligent prosecution. The district court determined that South River’s suit was barred by the diligent prosecution bar. On appeal, South River argued for the opposite result and requests injunctive relief to ensure DeKalb County’s compliance.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that South River wants the current consent decree discarded in favor of a more muscular alternative. The fact that South River disagrees with the prosecution strategy undertaken by the EPA and GDNR, however, is not enough to prove that the EPA and GDNR have failed to diligently prosecute DeKalb County’s CWA violations. To the contrary, the record shows that the EPA and GDNR have been diligent, which means that South River’s suit is barred under 33 U.S.C. Section 1365(b)(1)(B). View "South River Watershed Alliance, et al. v. DeKalb County, Georgia" on Justia Law

Wilmington charges its residential and non-residential property owners a stormwater management fee, based on an estimation of each property’s contribution to stormwater runoff. Because a precise measure of the actual amount of stormwater pollution from each property is impossible, the city devised a methodology for approximating the runoff attributable to each property based on recommendations from an engineering firm. For non-residential properties, the city assesses the fee based on a formula comprised of four variables. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) owns five properties in Wilmington, comprising 270 acres, classified as vacant, and used to store dredged material. USACE disputed whether the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1323, waived its sovereign immunity with respect to this fee.The Federal Circuit affirmed a Claims Court holding that the fees are not reasonable service charges, allowable under the CWA. Wilmington did not explain how the vacant land use code corresponded to the runoff coefficients nor whether its stormwater class fairly captured variability in vacant parcels, given that only one parcel contains any paved surface. Wilmington’s methodology, as applied, led to charges that are not a fair approximation of the properties’ proportionate contribution to stormwater pollution. View "City of Wilmington, Delaware v. United States" on Justia Law

The Sativa Water District was created in 1938 under the County Water District Law to provide potable drinking water to the residents living in a neighborhood in the unincorporated community of Willowbrook and parts of the City of Compton within Los Angeles County. On July 9, 2018, four named individuals— (collectively, Plaintiffs)—filed a putative class action lawsuit against the Sativa Water District. The Sativa Water District moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ entire lawsuit. Following a briefing, a hearing, and supplemental briefing, the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiffs asserted that the trial court erred in (1) granting the Sativa Water District’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, (2) denying Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the order dismissing the County as a defendant, and (3) decertifying their class as to the nuisance claim.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Reorganization Act grants a LAFCO discretion whether to permit a district to wind up its own affairs or whether instead to appoint a successor agency responsible for doing so. Because the LAFCO, in this case, took the latter route, Plaintiffs’ class action lawsuit against the dissolved district must be dismissed. The court further concluded that the trial court’s dismissal of the successor agency was proper because Legislature expressly granted civil immunity to that agency. View "Barajas v. Satvia L.A. County Water Dist." on Justia Law

In 2019, the United States Forest Service (“FS”) issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) authorizing livestock grazing for 10 years on land in the Upper Green River Area Rangeland (“UGRA”) in Wyoming. Two sets of petitioners-appellants, the Center for Biological Diversity and Sierra Club (collectively, “CBD”) and Western Watersheds Project, Alliance for Wile Rockies and Yellowstone to Unitas Connection (collectively “WWP”) challenged the UGRA Project under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), and the Administrative Procedures Act. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded: (1) the Fish and Wildlife Service’s failures in the Biological Opinion to consider certain impacts the UGRA would have on female grizzly bears was arbitrary and capricious, but that the Opinion’s reliance on certain conservation measures was not; and (2) the Forest Service’s reliance on the Fish and Wildlife Service’s Biological Opinion was arbitrary and capricious. As to WWP’s NFMA claims, the Court determined the ROD’s failure to consider the adequacy of forage and cover for migratory birds in the Project area was arbitrary and capricious. The Court remanded without vacated to the agencies to address deficiencies identified. View "Western Watersheds Project, et al. v. Haaland, et al." on Justia Law

Sackett began backfilling an Idaho lot with dirt to build a home. The Environmental Protection Agency informed Sackett that the property contained wetlands and that the backfilling violated the Clean Water Act, which prohibits discharging pollutants into “the waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). The EPA ordered Sackett to restore the site, threatening penalties of over $40,000 per day. The EPA classified the Sacket wetlands as “waters of the United States” because they were near a ditch that fed into a creek, which fed into Priest Lake, a navigable, intrastate lake. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the EPA.The Supreme Court reversed. CWA jurisdiction over an adjacent wetland requires that the adjacent body of water constitutes waters of the United States (a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters) and a continuous surface connection between the wetland and that water, making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”The Court reviewed the history of judicial interpretation of “the waters of the United States” and enforcement by federal agencies, which argued that the significant-nexus test was sufficient to establish jurisdiction over “adjacent” wetlands. Under that test, nearly all waters and wetlands are potentially susceptible to regulation, “putting a staggering array of landowners at risk of criminal prosecution for such mundane activities as moving dirt.” The CWA’s use of “waters” encompasses only relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies, ordinarily called streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes. Wetlands qualify as “waters of the United States” only if “indistinguishable from waters of the United States,” having a continuous surface connection to bodies that are waters of the United States in their own right, with no clear demarcation between waters and wetlands. View "Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

After extensive litigation, the United States, Michigan, and five federally recognized tribes entered the Great Lakes Consent Decree of 1985, governing the regulation of Great Lakes fisheries. The subsequent Consent Decree of 2000 had a 20-year term. The district court extended that Decree indefinitely “until all objections to a proposed successor decree have been adjudicated” and granted amicus status to the Coalition, which represents numerous private “sport fishing, boating, and conservancy groups” interested in protecting the Great Lakes. The Coalition has represented its own interests during negotiation sessions.As the parties were concluding their negotiations on a new decree the Coalition moved to intervene, stating that Michigan is no longer “willing or able to adequately represent the Coalition’s interests” and intends to abandon key provisions of the 2000 Decree that promote biological conservation and diversity, allocate fishery resources between sovereigns, and establish commercial and recreational fishing zones. The district court denied the Coalition’s most recent motion to intervene. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In finding the motion untimely, the district court properly considered “all relevant circumstances” including the stage of the proceedings; the purpose for the intervention; the length of time that the movant knew or should have known of its interest in the case; the prejudice to the original parties; and any unusual circumstances militating for or against intervention. View "United States v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

Gold Coast Commodities, Inc. makes animal feed using saponified poultry and plant fats at its Rankin County, Mississippi facility. Because its production process involves, among other things, old restaurant grease and sulfuric acid, Gold Coast is left with about 6,000 gallons of oily, “highly acidic,” and “extremely hot” wastewater each week. The City of Brandon, Mississippi, told a state agency that it believed Gold Coast was “discharging” that “oily, low-pH wastewater” into the public sewers. As a result, the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality launched an investigation. Two months before the Department’s investigation, Gold Coast purchased a pollution liability policy from Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company. After the City filed suit, Gold Coast—seeking coverage under the provisions of its Policy—notified the insurer of its potential liability. But Crum & Forster refused to defend Gold Coast. The insurer insisted that because the Policy only covers accidents. The district court agreed with Crum & Forster—that the City wasn’t alleging an accident.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that here, the Policy is governed by Mississippi law. In Mississippi, whether an insurer has a duty to defend against a third-party lawsuit “depends upon the policy's language.” The district court found that the “overarching” theme of the City’s complaint, regardless of the accompanying “legal labels,” is that Gold Coast deliberately dumped wastewater into the public sewers. The court agreed with the district court and held that Gold Coast isn’t entitled to a defense from Crum & Forster. View "Gold Coast v. Crum & Forster Spclt" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Regents adopted a long-range development plan (LRDP) for UC Berkeley through the year 2020. An Environmental Impact Report (EIR, California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, 21000) noted the LRDP “represents a maximum amount of net new growth.” which the University could substantially exceed only by amending the LRDP. In 2018, the Regents approved a new development for additional academic space and campus housing and certified a Supplemental EIR, which established an updated population baseline.SBN challenged decisions to increase enrollment beyond the level described in the 2005 EIR without further CEQA review. On remand, the trial court found that parts of the SEIR did not comply with CEQA and ordered the Regents to revise the SEIR and suspend enrollment increases. The Regents cited its certification of a 2021 LRDP and related EIR and Senate Bill 118, which modifies section 21080.09 to clarify that “Enrollment or changes in enrollment, by themselves, do not constitute a project” under CEQA and limit the remedies available if a court finds deficiencies in an environmental review based on enrollment.The court of appeal vacated, holding that certification of the 2021 EIR and S.B. 118 moot SBN’s challenge to the enrollment increases and make unenforceable the orders suspending enrollment increases. The SEIR’s project description complied with CEQA and there was no error in the discussion of mitigation measures for historic resources. View "Save Berkeley's Neighborhoods v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the current owner of environmentally contaminated real property, brought CERCLA cost recovery claims against the Estates of Norma and Edgar Beard and Etch-Tek, Inc. Mayhew Center, LLC, had purchased the property from the Beards. Walnut Creek Manor, LLC, owner and operator of a retirement community adjacent to the property, sued Mayhew. The district court concluded that Mayhew’s property was the source of the tetrachloroethylene, or PCE, found on Walnut Creek Manor’s site and held Mayhew liable under CERCLA and the California Hazardous Substance Account Act for any future response costs. Mayhew sued Norma Beard, asserting cost recovery and contribution claims under CERCLA and other claims seeking to hold her liable for the judgment against it in the Walnut Creek Manor action and the contamination on both properties. The district court consolidated the two actions, and the parties settled. Mayhew defaulted on its mortgage, and the property was placed in a state court receivership. The district court concluded that the claims against the Beard Estates and Etch-Tek were barred by claim preclusion.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal, as barred by claim preclusion, of claims brought under the CERCLA and remanded for further proceedings. The panel concluded that the Mayhew/Beard action ended in a final judgment on the merits. As to the identity of claims, however, the panel concluded that claim preclusion did not apply. Mayhew’s CERCLA claim, which sought apportionment of the liability stemming from the Walnut Creek Manor action, was distinct from GP Vincent’s CERCLA claim, which sought reimbursement for costs incurred in connection with the remediation of GP Vincent’s property’s own contamination. View "GP VINCENT II V. THE ESTATE OF EDGAR BEARD, ET AL" on Justia Law

Rosemont Copper Company (Rosemont) challenged the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS) designation of certain areas in southern Arizona as critical habitat for jaguar under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Rosemont sought to develop a copper mine and related processing facilities in the area. The Center for Biological Diversity (Center) sued after the FWS concluded that Rosemont’s proposed mine project would not destroy or adversely modify the designated critical habitat. Rosemont intervened and filed crossclaims against the FWS. The district court concluded that the FWS erred in designating occupied critical habitat because the record did not establish that jaguar occupied this area when this species was listed as endangered. But it upheld the FWS’s designation of this same area and an adjacent area as unoccupied critical habitat. The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Center.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the FWS, vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Center, remanded with instructions for the district court to vacate the FWS’s critical-habitat designations, and remanded to the agency for further proceedings. The panel held that because the FSW did not comply with Section 424.12(e) its designation of Unit 3 and Subunit 4b as unoccupied critical habitat was arbitrary and capricious. The panel concluded that the FWS did not provide a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, or articulate a satisfactory explanation to justify its designations of Unit 3 and Subunit 4b as unoccupied critical habitat. View "CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. USFWS, ET AL" on Justia Law