Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

To comply with their duties under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the FAA issued an Environmental Assessment (EA) that evaluated the environmental effects of the construction and operation of an Amazon air cargo facility at the San Bernardino International Airport (the “Project”). In evaluating the environmental consequences of the Project, the FAA generally utilized two “study areas” – the General Study Area and the Detailed Study Area. Petitioners are the Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice and others (collectively “CCA”) and the State of California. In attacking the parameters of the study areas, the CCA asserted that the FAA did not conform its study areas to the FAA’s Order 1050.1F Desk Reference.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order amending the opinion initially filed on November 18, 2021, and amended on October 11, 2022; and (2) an amended opinion denying a petition for review challenging the FAA’s Record of Decision, which found no significant environmental impact stemming from the Project. The panel held that the FAA’s nonadherence to the Desk Reference could not alone serve as the basis for holding that the FAA did not take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the Project. Instead, the CCA must show that the FAA’s nonadherence to the Desk Reference had some sort of EA significance aside from simply failing to follow certain Desk Reference instructions. The panel held that the CCA had not done so here. The panel rejected Petitioners’ argument that the EA failed to assess whether the Project met California’s greenhouse gas emissions standards. View "CENTER FOR COMMUNITY ACTION, ET AL V. FAA, ET AL" on Justia Law

The City of Palm Springs closed off one of its downtown streets to all vehicular traffic for a period of three years to allow a tourism organization to install and display a large statue of Marilyn Monroe in the middle of the street. A citizens’ group called the Committee to Relocate Marilyn ("the Committee") petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate challenging the street closure, alleging the City did not have the statutory authority to close the street. Additionally, the Committee alleged the City erroneously declared the street closure categorically exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The City demurred to the petition for writ of administrative mandate, arguing it had the authority to close the street for three years under Vehicle Code section 21101(e), and its local equivalent, Palm Springs Municipal Code section 12.80.010. The City claimed the street closure was temporary, and therefore permissible. Further, the City argued the CEQA cause of action was untimely. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the City. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Committee pleaded allegations sufficient to establish: (1) the City exceeded its authority under the Vehicle Code and Municipal Code; and (2) the timeliness of its CEQA cause of action. After the notice of exemption was filed, the City abandoned its plan to vacate vehicular access to the street and elected to close the street instead. Because the City materially changed the project after it filed its notice of exemption, and it did not afford the public an opportunity to consider the revised project or its environmental effects, the notice of exemption did not trigger a 35-day statute of limitations. Instead, the CEQA cause of action was subject to a default statute of limitations of 180 days, measured from the date the Committee knew or should have known about the changed project. The Court determined the Committee timely filed its CEQA cause of action. In light of these conclusions, the Court reversed the judgment of dismissal, vacated the demurrer ruling, and instructed the trial court to enter a new order overruling the demurrer as to these three causes of action. View "Committee to Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—North Carolina Wildlife Federation and No Mid-Currituck Bridge-Concerned Citizens and Visitors Opposed to The Mid-Currituck Bridge (a community organization) sued the North Carolina Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration (together, “the agencies”) —asserting that the agencies violated the National  Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) in approving a bridge project. Specifically, the NEPA provides that for an action “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” the Act requires an agency to prepare a detailed Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs fault the agencies for glossing over the environmental impact of the extra 2,400 units that would be constructed under the bridge scenario. They claim that the EIS “made no attempt to evaluate the effect of the Toll Bridge’s additional development on the habitat, wildlife, and natural resources of the Outer Banks.” But the EIS does adequately account for this added development. The EIS noted that a bridge would likely lead to an increase in day visitors, which could lead to more beach driving. More beach driving may “increase the likelihood of collisions” with wild horses on the beaches, but would have “no effect on threatened and endangered species. The agencies also found no “appreciable improvement” in water quality under the no-build and existing roads scenarios. The agencies’ no-build baseline properly reflected the lower level of development that would result without the toll bridge. The agencies didn’t mislead the public about this fact. In sum, the agencies’ consideration of the no-build alternative did not violate the Act. View "No Mid-Currituck Bridge-Concerned Citizens v. North Carolina Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

An agency's self-imposed limitation at issue in these cases consolidated for argument was the Environmental Hearing Board’s rule that no private party to an appeal could be compelled to reimburse another party unless it has pursued or defended the appeal in bad faith or for an improper purpose. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the to-all-appearances per se bad-faith standard that the Board applied to any effort to recover fees against a private party was incompatible with the intent embodied in the Clean Streams Law (“CSL”). The Board justified its contrary view with an overbroad reading of Pennsylvania case law, relying upon an assumed equivalency between permit applicants and citizen objectors that the Supreme Court could not reconcile with the parties’ respective roles and incentives in pursuing or defending such appeals under the CSL. The Supreme Court further concluded that the Department of Environmental Protection should stand on an equal footing with all other parties at the outset of a fee-shifting inquiry, subject to disparate treatment only when it bears disparate responsibility for whatever prompted a successful appeal. View "Clean Air Council, et al. v. Dept. Env. Prot. et al." on Justia Law

Section 401 certification obligates any applicant for a federal license or permit to conduct activity that may result in a discharge into the navigable waters of the United States to obtain certification (or waiver of certification) from the state governing the area where a discharge would originate. The Section 401 regulatory scheme remained unchanged until July 2020, when the EPA promulgated CWA Section 401 Certification Rule (“2020 Rule”). Several states, environmental groups, and tribes (“Plaintiffs”) filed lawsuits challenging the 2020 Rule. A different set of states and energy industry groups intervened to defend the 2020 Rule. The EPA publicly announced its intent to revise the 2020 Rule and moved in district court for a remand of the 2020 Rule so that the agency could reconsider it. The district court granted the EPA’s remand motion and granted Plaintiffs’ request for vacatur of the 2020 Rule. Intervenor-Defendants appealed the district court’s order vacating the 2020 Rule.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting a voluntary remand and vacated an EPA regulation promulgated under the CWA. The panel held that a court granting a voluntary remand lacks authority to also vacate the regulation without first holding it unlawful. The panel exercised its jurisdiction and held that courts may not vacate agency actions in conjunction with granting requests for voluntary remands without first holding the agency actions unlawful. Plaintiffs contended that if voluntary remand before merits determinations existed, then so too must the authority to vacate the challenged authority in the interim. The panel held that federal courts do not have unlimited equitable authority. View "IN RE: AMERICAN RIVERS, ET AL V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL" on Justia Law

After the Arcadia City Council approved J.W.’s application to expand the first story of her single-family home and add a second story (“the project”), Arcadians for Environmental Preservation (AEP), a grassroots organization led by J.W.’s next-door neighbor, filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus challenging the City’s decision. AEP’s petition primarily alleged the city council had erred in finding the project categorically exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and CEQA’s implementing guidelines. The superior court denied the petition, ruling as a threshold matter that AEP had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that AEP failed to exhaust its administrative remedies on the question of whether the project fell within the scope of the class 1 exemption. Further, the court found that AEP’s general objections to project approval did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Moreover, the court wrote that AEP has not demonstrated the City failed to proceed in a manner required by law when it impliedly found no exception to the exemption applied. Finally, the court held that AEP has not demonstrated the City erred in concluding the cumulative effects exception did not apply. View "Arcadians for Environmental Preservation v. City of Arcadia" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act gives the EPA the authority to establish national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for certain pollutants. To achieve, maintain, and enforce those standards, every state develops a State Implementation Plan (SIP), which the EPA reviews and, after public notice and comment, approves or disapproves. Upon approval, a SIP—and all the state regulations it includes—becomes enforceable in federal court. If the EPA determines that its prior approval of a SIP was in error, the EPA can revise the plan using the Clean Air Act’s error-correction provision, 42 U.S.C. 7410(k)(6). For almost 50 years, Ohio’s SIP included an air nuisance rule (ANR) that made unlawful the emission of various substances in a manner or amount that endangered public health, safety, or welfare, or caused unreasonable injury or damage to property. In 2020, the EPA proposed removing the ANR from Ohio’s SIP using the Act’s error-correction provision.After public comment, the EPA finalized the removal of the ANR from Ohio’s SIP on the grounds that the state had not relied on the rule to implement, maintain, or enforce any NAAQS. Objectors argued that the EPA improperly invoked section 7410(k)(6) and acted arbitrarily. The Sixth Circuit remanded without vacatur. The objectors established that vacatur of the EPA’s decision is sufficiently likely to redress injuries to their asserted physical, recreational, and aesthetic interests, and have established standing; they also established standing based on their asserted procedural injury. View "Sierra Club v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission granted a license to Interim Storage Partners to store spent nuclear fuel near the New Mexico border. New Mexico challenged the grant of this license, invoking the Administrative Procedure Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act. The Commission moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Objecting to the motion, New Mexico invoked jurisdiction under the combination of the Hobbs Act, and the Atomic Energy Act. The Tenth Circuit determined these statutes could combine to trigger jurisdiction only when the petitioner was an aggrieved party in the licensing proceeding. This limitation applied here because New Mexico didn’t participate in the licensing proceeding or qualify as an aggrieved party. "New Mexico just commented to the Commission about its draft environmental impact statement. Commenting on the environmental impact statement didn’t create status as an aggrieved party, so jurisdiction isn’t triggered under the combination of the Hobbs Act and Atomic Energy Act." The Court found the Nuclear Waste Policy Act governed the establishment of a federal repository for permanent, not temporary storage by private parties like Interim Storage. And even when an agency acts ultra vires, the Court lacked jurisdiction when the petitioner had other available remedies: New Mexico had other available remedies by seeking intervention in the Commission’s proceedings. So the Commission’s motion to dismiss the petition was granted for lack of jurisdiction. View "Balderas, et al. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, et al." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the Department Environmental Conservation (DEC) may process renewal and modification applications when those applications seek to mine land that falls within the scope of an undisputed prior nonconforming use, thus modifying the judgment of the courts below and the DEC and remitting for further proceedings.At issue was whether the DEC was barred from processing applications, including applications for renewal and modification permits, for permits to mine in covered counties when "local zoning laws or ordinances prohibit mining uses within the area proposed to be mined" see New York Environmental Conservation Law 23-2703(3). Petitioners here sought to annul a modified permit granted to Respondent, the owner and operator of a sand and gravel mine. The applications at issue implicated some prior nonconforming uses that were undisputed and others that were disputed but not resolved. Supreme Court denied the petition, and the appellate division modified and affirmed. The Court of Appeal affirmed as modified, holding that because prior nonconforming use was not taken into account by either DEC or the courts below, remand to the DEC was required for further proceedings. View "Matter of Town of Southampton v. New York State Dep't of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Irvine adopted a plan to guide development of the Irvine Business Complex (the IBC), which covered roughly 2800 acres in the City. It also prepared and approved a program environmental impact report (the 2010 PEIR) that studied the effects of the development plan under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Several years later, real party in interest and appellant Gemdale 2400 Barranca Holdings, LLC (Gemdale), submitted a plan to redevelop a 4.95-acre parcel in the IBC. The City determined all the environmental effects of the proposed project had been studied in the 2010 PEIR, and it found the project would have no further significant environmental effects. It approved the project over the objections of Hale Holdings, LLC, the managing member of plaintiff IBC Business Owners for Sensible Development (petitioner). Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of mandate. The trial court granted the writ and entered judgment in favor of petitioner. The City and Gemdale appealed, arguing the City correctly approved the project. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the contentions made on appeal: (1) there was insufficient evidence showing the project’s greenhouse gas emissions were within the scope of the 2010 PEIR; and (2) no exemption applied because the project involved unusual circumstances which could cause significant environmental effects. As such, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "IBC Business Owners for Sensible Development v. City of Irvine" on Justia Law