Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Under the Clean Air Act, Congress gave the Courts of Appeals jurisdiction to hear petitions for review of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) actions. But it mandated that petitions for review of “nationally applicable” actions be heard in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.Here, Petitioner challenges the EPA’s allocation of permits to consume hydrofluorocarbons—a type of chemical refrigerant—under the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act. Specifically, RMS argues that it received fewer permits than it was entitled to because the EPA improperly allocated some historic HFC usage to RMS’s competitors.Finding that the EPA’s action was nationally applicable, the Eleventh Circuit transferred the petition to the D.C. Circuit. The court reasoned that the Allocation Notice at issue allocated permits nationwide and was not restricted in geographic scope; therefore, it was nationally applicable. View "RMS of Georgia, LLC v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, et al." on Justia Law

This case concerned California’s efforts to relicense its hydropower facilities at Oroville Dam. Before the license expired, California’s Department of Water Resources (DWR) began the process for relicensing these facilities. It also, in connection with this effort, prepared a statement of potential environmental impacts, known as an environmental impact report or EIR, under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Three local governments - Butte County, Plumas County, and Plumas County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (together, the Counties) - filed writ petitions challenging the sufficiency of DWR’s EIR. The trial court found none of the Counties' arguments persuasive and entered judgment in DWR’s favor. On appeal, the Court of Appeal considered this case for the third time. In its first decision, the Court found the Counties’ challenge largely preempted by the Federal Power Act, but the California Supreme Court vacated that decision and asked the appellate court to reconsider in light of one of its precedents. In the appeals court's second decision, it again found the Counties’ challenge largely preempted. But the Supreme Court, taking up the case a second time, reversed the appellate court's decision in part. While the Supreme Court agreed that some of the remedies the Counties sought were preempted, it found they could still challenge the sufficiency of DWR’s EIR. It thus remanded the matter to the appeals court for further consideration. Turning to the merits for the first time since this appeal was filed over a decade ago, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "County of Butte, et al. v. Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

the Biden Administration issued an executive order that re-established an interagency working group (“Working Group”) to formulate guidance on the “social cost of greenhouse gases.” That order directed the Working Group to publish dollar estimates quantifying changes in carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide emissions (collectively, “greenhouse gases”) for consideration by federal agencies when policymaking. Working Group has since published “Interim Estimates” based largely on the findings of its predecessor working group. The Plaintiffs-States (“Plaintiffs”) challenge E.O. 13990 and the Interim Estimates as procedurally invalid, arbitrary and capricious, inconsistent with various agency-specific statutes, and ultra vires. They obtained a preliminary injunction in the district court. Defendants appealed, and the Fifth Circuit panel stayed the injunction.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed this action because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to prove standing. Plaintiffs’ allegations of “injury in fact” rely on a chain of hypotheticals: federal agencies may (or may not) premise their actions on the Interim Estimates in a manner that may (or may not) burden the States. Such injuries do not flow from the Interim Estimates but instead from potential future regulations, i.e., final rules that are subject to their own legislated avenues of scrutiny, dialogue, and judicial review on an appropriately developed record. View "State of Louisiana v. Biden" on Justia Law

The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program requires gasoline and diesel fuel refiners, blenders, and importers to ensure that a certain portion of their annual transportation fuel production consists of renewable fuels, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)). United, a small Pennsylvania refinery, has periodically received hardship exemptions from those requirements, including in the 2017 and 2018 compliance years. In 2019, United sought an exemption. Rather than accepting United's data at face value—as in previous years—EPA asked how United had accounted for the financial benefit of its 2018 RFS exemption. United's amended financial statement explained that revenue from selling its renewable fuel credits (RINS) generated in a particular year was included in net revenues for that year, even if the RINs actually were sold in a later calendar year. United’s amended figures showed a three-year refining margin that was higher than the margin in United’s original submission and higher than the industry average. The Department of Energy (DOE) evaluated United’s submission and initially recommended that United not receive an exemption. DOE later changed its recommendation to account for the effects of COVID-19 and suggested a 50 percent exemption for 2019.EPA denied United any exemption, declining to consider events “that did not emerge until 2020, the year after the petition in question.” The Third Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting United’s argument that EPA arbitrarily relied on an “accounting trick” that artificially inflated United’s running average net refining margin. View "United Refining Co v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc. (“Cactus Canyon”) appeals a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (“Commission”). In 2020, Cactus Canyon was issued three citations by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).   The Fifth Circuit denied Cactus Canyon’s petition, holding that the ALJ properly interpreted Section 56.14101(a)(3) to include the low brake pressure alarm as a component of the truck’s “braking system.” Cactus Canyon contends that the alarm is not such a component because it has no effect on the braking system’s ability to stop and hold equipment. But the plain language and purpose support the inclusion of the alarm in the “braking system.” The court concluded that the braking standard unambiguously supports the Government’s interpretation. Since a “system”—by definition at the time of the standard’s passage—is composed of parts, the Section’s reference to “braking systems” extends to its related components, including those that do not simply function to stop and hold the vehicle. View "Cactus Canyon Quarries v. MSHR" on Justia Law

Defendants Southern Coal Corporation and Premium Coal Company, Inc. (collectively, “Southern Coal”) asked the Fourth Circuit to reverse a district court’s order granting a motion to compel compliance with a consent decree (the “Decree”) to which they previously acquiesced. The Decree operated to resolve allegations of approximately 23,693 Clean Water Act violations, pre-litigation, levied against Southern Coal by Plaintiffs Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and the United States of America (collectively, the “government”).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court properly found the Decree’s plain language to mandate compliance with the Clean Water Act and derivative permitting obligations. The court explained that although the plain language of the Decree clearly supports the district court’s conclusion that Southern Coal was obligated to maintain National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits—and that alone is sufficient basis to affirm—the court may also consider the circumstances surrounding the Decree and the general nature of the remedy agreed upon. Here, the underlying dispute revolved around tens of thousands of NPDES-permitting and CWA violations. It cannot reasonably be argued that, in formulating the Decree, the parties contemplated undermining its efficacy by authorizing the exact conduct that it sought to remedy. If Southern Coal intended such a backdoor to compliance, then it likely did not negotiate the Decree in “good faith” to forge an agreement that was “fair, reasonable, and in the public interest,” as it purported to do as a Decree signatory. View "US v. Southern Coal Corporation" on Justia Law

This appeal is the latest installment in a series of challenges to Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC’s (“MVP”) plans to build a natural gas pipeline. Because it intends to construct a portion of the pipeline in West Virginia, MVP obtained a Clean Water Act (“CWA”) certification from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department”). The certification reflected the Department’s conclusion that MVP’s activities during the pipeline’s construction would not violate the state’s water quality standards. Disagreeing with that determination, landowners and members of various environmental organizations in the state (collectively, “Petitioners”) petitioned for review of the Department’s certification.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the certification, finding the Department’s justifications for its conclusions deficient. The court found that the Department’s reasonable assurance determination suffers from four interrelated failures: It did not (1) sufficiently address MVP’s violation history, (2) include conditions requiring compliance with the O&G CGP and SWPPP, (3) provide a reasoned basis for relying on EPA’s upland CGP, or (4) articulate an adequate explanation for forgoing location-specific antidegradation review. Considering these oversights, the Department’s conclusion that MVP’s in-stream construction would be conducted in a manner that will not violate state water standards were arbitrary and capricious. View "Sierra Club v. West Virginia DEP" on Justia Law

The Oakland Waterfront Ballpark District Project proposes the redevelopment of Howard Terminal, a 50-acre site within the Port of Oakland, and five contiguous acres. It includes a 35,000-seat ballpark for the city’s Major League Baseball team, construction of 3,000 residential units, 270,000 square feet of retail space, 1.5 million square feet for other commercial uses, a performance venue, and up to 400 hotel rooms. There will be parking for 8,900 vehicles; nearly 20 acres will be set aside as publicly accessible open space. Howard Terminal borders an estuary. Portions of the site are currently used for various commercial maritime activities, but most of the land is devoted to truck parking and container storage. A rail line serving passenger and freight traffic runs down the northern border of Howard Terminal.Oakland issued a draft environmental impact report (EIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000) in 2021 and certified the final EIR a year later. A statement of overriding considerations concluded that the project’s benefits outweighed several significant environmental impacts that could not be fully mitigated. Excepting one wind mitigation measure, the trial court rejected challenges. The court of appeal affirmed. The court noted that the soil at the project site is contaminated from long years of industrial use; the ballpark and development will generate substantial new pedestrian and vehicle traffic in the neighborhood; and the site’s existing uses must be relocated but found the EIR adequate. View "East Oakland Stadium Alliance, LLC v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (‘‘MVP’’) submitted an application requesting both a Virginia Water Protection individual permit (“VWP Permit”) from Virginia’s Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) and the State Water Control Board (the “Board”) (collectively, “the Agencies”) and a certification from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) to build a pipeline. After an extensive review of MVP’s application, the Board adopted DEQ’s recommendation to approve MVP’s application. Petitioners filed this action against the Agencies and several individuals associated with the Agencies (collectively, “Respondents”), asking the court to review the Agencies’ decision.   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, concluding that Agencies’ decision to grant MVP’s application was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court explained that Petitioners’ argument that the Agencies failed to consider whether the Pipeline will comply with Virginia’s narrative water quality standard is belied by the record. DEQ addressed this issue in its responses to the public comments, in which it listed a host of conditions that it placed on the VWP Permit to “ensure that Virginia’s water quality is protected both during and after construction.” The court further explained that the DEQ described the indicators it uses to measure water quality, which Petitioners have not challenged. Accordingly, the court found it is clear from the record that DEQ considered a variety of factors in determining that the construction and operation of the Pipeline would comply with Virginia’s narrative water quality standard. View "Sierra Club v. State Water Control Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, in this case, are a group of Mississippi municipalities and associations harmed and threatened by this turn of events. They sued the Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) under Administrative Procedure Act (APA) Section 706(1) for the Corps’ refusal to prepare a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as assertedly required by NEPA and accompanying regulations. Invoking the federal government’s sovereign immunity, the Corps moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The parties agreed on the legal question at issue—namely, whether NEPA and related regulations impose on the Corps a discrete duty to act that a federal court can compel it to honor under APA Section 706(1)—but disagreed on the answer to the question.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to the Corps. The court explained that because the Corps has no duty to prepare the supplemental EIS the plaintiffs seek, Plaintiffs have no APA claim for unlawful agency inaction, and the Corps is immune from their suit claiming otherwise. For better or worse, Congress and the Corps have authority to act on Plaintiffs’ dire environmental concerns. The federal courts do not. View "Harrison County, MS v. U.S. Army Corps" on Justia Law