Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the State of Alaska Department of Fish and Game (Alaska) challenging the Federal Subsistence Board's (Board) authorization of an emergency subsistence hunt for the Organized Village of Kake (the Tribe) during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Board allowed the hunt due to significant food supply chain disruptions, permitting the Tribe to harvest two moose and five deer on federal public lands in Alaska. The hunt was conducted by hunters selected by the Tribe, and the yield was distributed to both tribal and non-tribal residents of Kake.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska initially dismissed Alaska's claims related to the Kake hunt as moot. Alaska appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Alaska's claim that the Board lacked authority to authorize the hunt, remanding that specific claim for further proceedings. On remand, the district court ruled that the Board's approval of the hunt did not violate the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) and denied Alaska's request for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment that the Board had the authority under ANILCA to authorize the emergency subsistence hunt. The court held that Section 811(a) of ANILCA provided the Board with the authority to ensure rural residents have reasonable access to subsistence resources on federal lands, which includes the power to authorize emergency hunts. The court also vacated the district court's judgment on Alaska's improper delegation claim, ruling that the district court exceeded its mandate by addressing this claim, and remanded with instructions to dismiss it. View "ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME V. FEDERAL SUBSISTENCE BOARD" on Justia Law

Old Golden Oaks LLC applied for an encroachment permit and a grading permit from Amador County for a housing development project. The county deemed the applications incomplete and requested additional information. Old Golden Oaks filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the county violated the Permit Streamlining Act by requesting information not specified in the submittal checklists for the permits.The Superior Court of Amador County sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the encroachment permit checklist allowed the county to request additional information and that the county had statutory authority to seek information necessary for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Old Golden Oaks that the catch-all provision in the county’s encroachment permit submittal checklist violated the Permit Streamlining Act because it did not specify in detail the required information. However, the court found that the county could condition the completeness of the grading permit application on additional environmental information because the grading permit checklist informed Old Golden Oaks that the project must comply with CEQA. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding the encroachment permit but affirmed the judgment regarding the grading permit. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Old Golden Oaks v. County of Amador" on Justia Law

Montana Environmental Information Center and Earthworks (MEIC) submitted a formal information request to the Office of the Governor of Montana on November 29, 2021. The request sought various documents related to the Montana Department of Environmental Quality’s (DEQ) dismissal of an enforcement action against Hecla Mining and its President/CEO, as well as information on the Governor’s Office’s involvement in mining and environmental decision-making. The Governor’s Office did not respond to the request, prompting MEIC to follow up multiple times. When the requested records were not provided, MEIC filed a lawsuit against the Governor’s Office, seeking to compel production of the information.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County found that the Governor’s Office had a clear legal duty to honor MEIC’s request and issued a writ of mandamus compelling the production of the information. The Governor’s Office initially appealed but later stipulated to dismissal. MEIC then requested attorney’s fees, which the District Court denied, citing the Governor’s Office’s lack of bad faith and the potential for MEIC to obtain the information through other means.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and addressed whether a party who successfully vindicates its right to know under the Montana Constitution is entitled to a presumption towards awarding attorney’s fees. The Court held that there should be a presumption towards awarding attorney’s fees to plaintiffs who successfully enforce their right to know, as this encourages public engagement and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration of the attorney’s fees request, considering the presumption towards awarding fees and costs. View "MEIC v. Governor" on Justia Law

The case involves the Tohono O’odham Nation, the San Carlos Apache Tribe, Archaeology Southwest, and the Center for Biological Diversity (collectively, "Plaintiffs") who filed a lawsuit against the United States Department of the Interior, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Bureau of Land Management (collectively, "Department"). The Plaintiffs allege that the Department violated the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) by issuing two limited notices to proceed (LNTPs) for the construction of a transmission line by SunZia Transmission, LLC, before fulfilling its NHPA obligations. The Plaintiffs claim that the San Pedro Valley, through which the transmission line runs, is a historic property protected under the NHPA.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona allowed SunZia to intervene as a defendant. The district court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and subsequently granted the Department's and SunZia's motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court also denied the Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, deeming it futile. The Plaintiffs then appealed the district court's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order dismissing the action. The Ninth Circuit held that the LNTPs constituted final agency actions because they represented the Department's final decision that the requirements for a Programmatic Agreement (PA) had been satisfied, allowing SunZia to begin construction. The court found that the Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the Department violated the PA by failing to consult with the Plaintiffs on a historic property treatment plan that would evaluate whether the San Pedro Valley should be designated as a historic property. The court inferred that proper consultation would have likely resulted in the Valley being designated as such. Consequently, the Plaintiffs also plausibly alleged that the Department violated the PA by authorizing construction before properly identifying all historic properties affected by the project and ensuring that any adverse effects would be avoided, minimized, or mitigated. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "TOHONO O'ODHAM NATION V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR" on Justia Law

A group of neighbors appealed the Environmental Division’s decision affirming the District 4 Environmental Commission’s granting of an Act 250 permit amendment to JAM Golf, LLC for the construction of a housing development on a lot that was formerly part of the Wheeler Nature Park in South Burlington, Vermont. The neighbors argued that the landowner was required to show changed circumstances to amend the permit and that the development did not comply with Act 250 Criteria 8 and 10.The Environmental Division held six days of trial and conducted a site visit. In August 2024, the court affirmed the Act 250 permit amendment with conditions related to noise and safety during the construction period, concluding that the project complied with all relevant Act 250 criteria. The court also determined that the application should not be denied on the grounds of inequitable conduct because the neighbors failed to support assertions that the landowner made material misrepresentations in its application and on appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the permit-amendment argument was not preserved for appeal because it was not included in the statement of questions presented to the Environmental Division. The court also found that the Environmental Division did not err in allowing the landowner to elect to be assessed against the updated 2024 City Plan rather than the 2016 City Plan. The court determined that the evidence supported the Environmental Division’s findings that the project complied with Act 250 Criteria 8 and 10, including visual aesthetics, noise, and compliance with the local or regional plan. The court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "In re Wheeler Parcel Act 250 Determination" on Justia Law

In 2019, New York City enacted Local Law No. 97, requiring significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from large buildings, aiming for a 40% reduction by 2030 and an 80% reduction by 2050, relative to 2005 levels. Shortly after, New York State passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act), targeting a 100% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2050, with an interim goal of a 40% reduction by 2030. The Climate Act tasked the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) with setting statewide emissions limits and established a Climate Action Council to develop a Scoping Plan for achieving these targets.Plaintiffs, representing residential buildings subject to Local Law No. 97, filed a declaratory judgment action claiming the local law was preempted by the Climate Act. The defendants, including the City of New York and its Department of Buildings, moved to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint entirely. However, the Appellate Division modified this decision, denying the motion regarding the preemption claim and affirming the rest. The Appellate Division held that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the Climate Act did not preempt Local Law No. 97.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the Climate Act does not preempt the field of regulating greenhouse gas emissions. The Court emphasized that the Climate Act's legislative findings and savings clause indicate an intent to allow complementary local regulations. The Court concluded that the State did not express or imply an intent to preempt local efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and thus, Local Law No. 97 is not preempted by the Climate Act. The certified question was answered in the negative, and the defendants' motion to dismiss was granted. View "Glen Oaks Vil. Owners, Inc. v City of New York" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) granted the State of Louisiana primary enforcement authority over a class of underground carbon sequestration wells. Three environmental organizations, Deep South Center for Environmental Justice, Healthy Gulf, and Alliance for Affordable Energy, petitioned for review of the final rule granting that authorization, arguing that the rule would harm their interests.The petitioners claimed that the EPA's approval would force them to reallocate resources from their usual activities to oppose the Class VI well program. They also argued that the program would lead to increased energy costs, health risks, and environmental damage. The organizations asserted both organizational and associational standing, with Deep South claiming direct injury to its operations and Healthy Gulf and Alliance for Affordable Energy claiming injury on behalf of their members.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the petition, finding that all three organizations lacked standing. The court held that Deep South's claimed injuries were not cognizable under Article III because they were self-inflicted and amounted to a setback to abstract social interests. The court also found that Healthy Gulf and Alliance for Affordable Energy's alleged injuries were too speculative and attenuated to meet the requirements of imminence and traceability. The court emphasized that the petitioners' theories of injury relied on a chain of speculative events that were not certainly impending.Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury that was fairly traceable to the EPA's action and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Therefore, the petitions for review were dismissed. View "Deep South Center for Environmental Justice v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Texas and several companies challenging the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over the designation of two Texas counties, Rusk and Panola, as nonattainment areas for the 2010 sulfur dioxide (SO2) National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The EPA's designation was based on data submitted by the Sierra Club, which the petitioners argued was flawed and not representative of actual air quality.The EPA initially designated the counties as nonattainment in 2016, relying on Sierra Club's modeling data. In 2019, the EPA proposed to correct this designation, suggesting the data might have been insufficient and the designation could have been an error. However, in 2021, the EPA withdrew this proposal and denied the petitioners' request for reconsideration, maintaining the nonattainment designation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the EPA's reliance on Sierra Club's modeling, despite acknowledging its limitations and the presence of conflicting monitoring data, was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the EPA failed to reconcile the inconsistencies between the modeling and the monitoring data, which created an unexplained inconsistency in the rulemaking record.The court also addressed the petitioners' argument that the EPA did not properly consider Luminant's alternative modeling. The court concluded that the EPA did not act unlawfully in rejecting Luminant's model because it did not follow the required approval process for alternative models.Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit granted the petitions for review and remanded the case to the EPA for further proceedings, instructing the agency to engage in reasoned decision-making in accordance with the court's interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. View "Texas v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Village of Morrisville, Vermont, sought to renew its federal license to operate a hydroelectric project in the Lamoille River Basin. The project had been in operation since 1981. Morrisville applied for a water quality certification from the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, which is required under the Clean Water Act for projects that may result in discharges into navigable waters. After lengthy discussions and two rounds of revisions, Vermont issued a conditional water certification. Dissatisfied with the conditions, Morrisville argued that Vermont waived its certification authority by allowing Morrisville to withdraw and resubmit its application twice.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviewed the case and found that Morrisville had unilaterally withdrawn and resubmitted its application to negotiate more favorable conditions, rather than at the behest of the state. FERC concluded that there was no evidence of a coordinated scheme between Morrisville and Vermont to delay the certification process. Consequently, FERC determined that Vermont did not waive its statutory certification authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld FERC's decision. The court found that Morrisville's actions were unilateral and in its own interest, and there was no mutual agreement with Vermont to delay the certification process. The court distinguished this case from Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, where there was a clear agreement to delay certification. The court concluded that Vermont did not waive its certification authority and denied Morrisville's petitions for review. View "Village of Morrisville, VT v. FERC" on Justia Law

In 2006, Cabot Oil & Gas Company began fracking in Dimock Township, Pennsylvania. By 2009, their operations caused a residential water well explosion, leading to methane gas contamination in local water supplies. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) found Cabot in violation of environmental laws, resulting in the 2009 Consent Order, which mandated corrective actions and a $120,000 penalty. Cabot violated this order by 2010, leading to another consent order and additional fines. Over the next decade, Cabot received numerous violation notices and faced lawsuits, including a 2020 grand jury finding of long-term indifference to remediation efforts, resulting in criminal charges and a nolo contendere plea.Shareholders filed a derivative suit against Cabot’s directors, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties, including failure to oversee operations, issuing misleading statements, and insider trading. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the claims, finding no serious oversight failure or bad faith by the directors, and insufficient particularized allegations to support claims of material misrepresentation or insider trading.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, agreeing that the directors had implemented and monitored compliance systems, and that the shareholders failed to demonstrate bad faith or conscious disregard of duties. The court also found that the statements in Cabot’s disclosures were not materially misleading and that the shareholders did not adequately plead demand futility regarding the insider trading claim. Thus, the court upheld the dismissal of all claims with prejudice. View "Ezell v. Dinges" on Justia Law