Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

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The case involves the 68th Street Site Work Group (the "Group"), a collective of entities that had settled their liability for environmental cleanup costs with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Group sought to recoup some of these costs by filing a contribution action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) against several non-performing and non-settling entities, alleging that each defendant incurred arranger liability by arranging for the disposal of waste at the Superfund Alternative Site.The District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the claims against each of these defendants, concluding that the Group failed to allege that the defendants took intentional steps with the specific intent to dispose of hazardous waste and knew that the disposed-of waste was hazardous. The Group then sought to amend its complaint against seven of the defendants, but the district court denied the motion, standing by its prior interpretation of CERCLA’s arranger-liability provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that under CERCLA’s arranger-liability provision, a defendant is liable whenever they intentionally arrange for the disposal of a substance and the substance is hazardous. The court concluded that the district court erred by requiring the Group to allege that the defendants knew the disposed-of waste was hazardous. View "68th Street Site Work Group v. Alban Tractor Co., Incorporated" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute over a Final Rule issued by the Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in 2003. The rule withdrew a proposed rule that would have limited the maximum size of “mill sites” for mining claims on federal lands and instead codified the agency’s historical understanding that the governing statute imposes no such limit. Earthworks and several other conservation groups challenged the validity of the 2003 Rule under both the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing that the rule embodies an impermissible interpretation of federal mining law and that the BLM promulgated it in violation of NEPA and APA. The BLM responded that the appellants lacked standing to bring their suit.The District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the Department’s contention that the appellants lacked standing and ruled in favor of the Department on the statutory issue. The court concluded that the appellants had standing to sue, Section 42 is facially ambiguous regarding the aggregate size of mill sites but the Department’s interpretation of Section 42 is reasonable, it was not a violation of the NEPA for the BLM to issue the 2003 Final Rule without an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and it was not a violation of the APA for the BLM to promulgate the Final Rule without an additional round of notice-and-comment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court held that the appellants have standing and that the BLM’s interpretation of Section 42 of the Mining Law set out in the Final Rule is reasonable. The court also concluded that the Final Rule was not a “major Federal action” within the meaning of the NEPA, and it was not arbitrary or capricious for the BLM not to prepare an EIS for the Final Rule. Lastly, the court found that the Department did not violate the notice provision of the APA by issuing the Final Rule without an additional cycle of notice and comment. View "Earthworks v. DOI" on Justia Law

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This case involves a contractual dispute between Alabama Plating Technology, LLC (APT) and Georgia Plating Technology, LLC (GPT), DVEST, LLC, and Jin Kim. The dispute arose from an asset-purchase agreement for a brake-plating plant. After the purchase, APT claimed indemnity from the sellers for environmental issues, unpaid accounts payable, and certain inoperable assets, alleging these were retained liabilities or breaches of warranties by the sellers. The sellers sued APT for breach of contract due to setoff of losses against annual installment payments.The trial court found in favor of APT regarding the environmental issues and unpaid accounts payable, but sided with the sellers on the inoperable-assets claim. It also rejected APT's claim for attorneys' fees and legal expenses. Both parties appealed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's judgment denying APT relief on its inoperable-assets claim and its claim for attorneys' fees and legal expenses. It affirmed the trial court's judgment granting APT relief on its environmental-issues and unpaid-accounts-payable claims, and the denial of the sellers' request to accelerate the remaining installment payments owed to them by APT. View "Alabama Plating Technology, LLC v. Georgia Plating Technology, LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves eight landowners who sued Midland and Gladwin Counties in Michigan, alleging a taking under the federal and state constitutions following the failure of the Edenville Dam, which resulted in flooding of several cities downstream. The dam, built in 1924, had a history of flood control issues. In 2018, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission revoked the existing owner's license and transferred regulatory authority over the dam to the Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy. In compliance with Michigan law, the counties assembled a task force to manage the lake above the dam and filed a petition in 2019 to maintain the lake levels. In May 2020, several days of historic rainfall raised the water level three feet above its previous maximum, triggering the dam's failure and causing extensive damage to properties downstream.The district court granted summary judgment to the counties, concluding that their efforts to maintain the water levels did not show that they intended to flood the downstream properties and "take" their land. The landowners appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the counties' petition to maintain the lake depth at the same level that had existed for roughly a century did not show that they intended to flood the downstream properties. The court also noted that the counties played no part in regulating or controlling the dam's infrastructure. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the dam's failure was caused by soil vulnerabilities, not inadequate spillways, as determined by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's independent forensic team. Therefore, the court concluded that no taking occurred as a matter of federal or state law. View "Bruneau v. Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute over water use permits and instream flow standards in the Nā Wai ‘Ehā region of Maui, Hawaii. The region includes the Waihe‘e River, Waiehu Stream, Wailuku River, and Waikapū Stream. Various parties, including MMK Maui, LP, Hui o Nā Wai ‘Ehā, the Maui Tomorrow Foundation, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Mahi Pono, LLC, and Wailuku Water Company, LLC, appealed from the Commission on Water Resource Management's decision regarding water use permits and instream flow standards.The Commission had designated Nā Wai ‘Ehā as a Surface Water Management Area, requiring existing and new water users to file surface water use permit applications. Over 140 applicants filed applications, including MMK, which operates two golf courses in the area, and Mahi Pono, which engages in agricultural operations on former sugar plantation lands.In 2016, the last remaining sugar plantation on Maui announced its closure. In response, the Hui/MTF filed a petition with the Commission to amend Nā Wai ‘Ehā’s Interim Instream Flow Standards. The Commission consolidated the permit and flow standards proceedings. In 2021, the Commission issued a decision amending the flow standards and granting various applicants surface water use permits.The parties appealed the Commission's decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii. The Supreme Court vacated the Commission’s decision and order with respect to the instream flow standards and the delegation of the Commission’s public trust duties, and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the decision and order in all other respects. View "In re Surface Water Use Permit Applications" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Michigan Attorney General's attempt to shut down Enbridge’s Line 5 Pipeline, which runs underwater across the Straits of Mackinac between Michigan’s Lower and Upper Peninsulas. The Attorney General filed the case in Michigan state court in 2019, alleging violations of three state laws. Enbridge responded by moving for summary disposition, arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The state court held oral argument on those dispositive motions, focusing on preemption issues, including whether the Attorney General’s claims were preempted by either the Pipeline Safety Act or the federal Submerged Lands Act.In 2020, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued a notice of revocation of the 1953 easement, calling for Line 5 to be shut down by May 2021, and simultaneously filed a complaint in state court to enforce the notice. Enbridge timely removed the Governor’s case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The district court denied the Governor’s motion to remand, holding that it had federal-question jurisdiction. The Governor subsequently voluntarily dismissed her case.Enbridge removed the Attorney General’s case to federal court in December 2021, citing the district court’s order denying the motion to remand in the Governor’s case. The Attorney General moved to remand this case to state court on grounds of untimely removal and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion on both grounds, excusing Enbridge’s untimely removal based on equitable principles and estopping the Attorney General from challenging subject-matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that Enbridge failed to timely remove the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), and there are no equitable exceptions to the statute’s deadlines for removal. The case was remanded to Michigan state court. View "Nessel v. Enbridge Energy, LP" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around the use of forecasts in the electric energy industry, specifically in proposing rates for electricity-generating entities. The New York Independent System Operator, Inc., a non-profit entity that operates New York’s electric grid and oversees the state’s wholesale electricity markets, proposed rates for the 2021–2025 period. It shortened the amortization period from twenty years to seventeen years, justifying the change by pointing to the recently enacted New York Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, 2019. The Act proclaims that by the year 2040, the statewide electrical demand system will be zero emissions.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) initially rejected the System Operator’s submission, deeming the justification for a seventeen-year commercial lifespan “speculative”. Independent Power Producers of New York, Inc., a trade association of electricity generators, sought judicial review of FERC’s rejection. The court granted their petition, holding that FERC failed to sufficiently explain its reasons for rejecting the System Operator’s proposal. On remand, FERC again rejected the System Operator’s analysis as “speculative”. Independent Power Producers sought rehearing before FERC, which granted its request. This time, FERC approved the System Operator’s submission. The Public Service Commission sought (re-)rehearing before FERC, which was denied. The Public Service Commission now petitions for judicial review in this court.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the Public Service Commission’s petitions for review. The court found that FERC’s ultimate decision to approve the shortened amortization period satisfied the directives of the court's prior judgment. The court also found that FERC’s decision to not address the cost impact of the change was in line with the court’s precedents. The court concluded that the Public Service Commission can file a separate complaint to argue that the existing rate design is producing rates that are not just and reasonable. View "New York State Public Service Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) approval of a project to expand a natural-gas pipeline from western Pennsylvania to the New York metropolitan area. The petitioner, Food & Water Watch, argued that FERC overlooked environmental issues in approving the project. Specifically, they claimed that FERC's Environmental Impact Statement failed to quantify greenhouse-gas emissions from upstream drilling for the extra gas, to quantify ozone emissions from its downstream burning, and to categorize emissions impacts as either significant or insignificant. Additionally, Food & Water Watch argued that FERC did not adequately consider New York State and New York City laws mandating reductions in carbon-dioxide emissions.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The lower courts had approved the project, with FERC issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the East 300 Upgrade Project. FERC had prepared a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which estimated the downstream carbon-dioxide emissions but declined to address upstream environmental effects. FERC also declined to characterize downstream emissions as significant or insignificant.The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the petitioner's contentions and denied the petitions for review. The court found that FERC had reasonably concluded that there was too much uncertainty regarding the number and location of additional upstream wells. The court also held that FERC had reasonably explained its decision not to give a quantitative estimate of how much ozone would be produced as a result of the project. Finally, the court found that FERC had amply discussed the significance of GHG emissions and that it was not required to label the increased emissions and ensuing costs as either significant or insignificant. The court also found that FERC had reasonably explained why the New York State Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act did not undercut its finding of need for the project. View "Food & Water Watch v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

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Kevin Shibilski was charged with environmental and wire-fraud crimes and conspiracy to defraud the United States, related to his operation of three Wisconsin-based companies involved in recycling electronic equipment. Shibilski pleaded guilty to a single felony count of willful failure to pay employment taxes, and in exchange, the government dropped the other charges. During the sentencing hearing, Shibilski objected to the presentence report’s recommendations regarding relevant conduct under the Sentencing Guidelines, particularly the recommendation to hold him responsible for the total amount of unpaid employment taxes for all three companies. The district judge held a seven-hour sentencing hearing, most of which was consumed by the presentation of documents and testimony, including testimony from Shibilski himself.The district judge found Shibilski responsible for the full amount of unpaid taxes. The judge also declined to award credit for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), finding that Shibilski had falsely denied responsibility for relevant conduct. After weighing the statutory sentencing factors, the judge imposed a sentence of 33 months in prison, the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range.Shibilski appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the judge violated Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by unduly curtailing his attorney’s presentation of evidence, that the judge improperly denied credit for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a), and that the judge committed procedural error by failing to meaningfully address the statutory sentencing factors. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Shibilski" on Justia Law

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The case involves four North Carolina-based citizen groups ("Petitioners") who petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to require testing of fifty-four Per- and Poly- Fluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) prevalent in their community. The EPA granted the petition, agreeing to require testing on PFAS as a class through its own testing protocol. Petitioners sought judicial review of the EPA’s decision, contending it was in effect a denial of their petition.The district court dismissed Petitioners’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the EPA reasonably chose to grant Petitioners’ request to test the fifty-four PFAS as a category—PFAS generally—which the TSCA encourages the EPA to do. As to the EPA’s failure to adopt Petitioners’ specific testing program, the district court explained that Petitioners “have a right to petition [the] EPA to initiate proceedings for the issuance of rules and orders, but [they] do not have a right to compel the content of [the] EPA’s proceedings or to compel [the] EPA to issue a specific rule or order.”On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the EPA’s decision was a grant in fact. The court reasoned that the TSCA allows the EPA to group chemicals into scientifically appropriate categories for testing. The court also held that the TSCA does not give petitioners the unrestrained ability to force companies to conduct specific testing when the § 2603 requirements are met. The court concluded that by promptly commencing a proceeding for determining how to best test PFAS, the EPA gave Petitioners all that they were entitled to receive. View "Center for Environmental Health v. Regan" on Justia Law