Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The State of New Jersey sued the Dow Chemical Company in state court for the design, manufacture, marketing, and sale of 1,4-dioxane, a substance alleged to be highly toxic and a likely human carcinogen. Dow used 1,4-dioxane to inhibit 1,1,1-trichloroethane (TCA) to create a cleaning agent for metal. New Jersey claims that Dow’s products containing 1,4-dioxane caused substantial environmental harm. The case centers on whether the lawsuit should be heard in state or federal court.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey remanded the case to state court. The District Court found that Dow was not acting under the United States Government when it produced and sold 1,4-dioxane inhibited TCA. Dow had argued that it acted under the federal government’s direction, citing the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). However, the District Court concluded that Dow’s relationship with the government did not meet the criteria for federal-officer removal, as Dow had independently produced and sold the product before any relevant federal regulations were implemented.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit held that Dow did not satisfy the “acting under” requirement of the federal-officer removal statute. The court explained that Dow’s production and sale of 1,4-dioxane inhibited TCA were not directed, guided, or controlled by the federal government. Dow’s actions were independent and predated the government’s product specifications. Therefore, the case was properly remanded to state court, as Dow could not litigate under the federal-officer removal statute. View "Attorney General New Jersey v. Dow Chemical Company" on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) extending the construction deadline for the Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (MVP) Southgate Project. Initially, FERC issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the Southgate Project in June 2020, setting a construction completion deadline of June 18, 2023. However, due to unresolved permitting issues for the Mainline, which Southgate extends from, the construction could not proceed as planned. MVP requested an extension shortly before the deadline, citing delays in Mainline permitting as the reason for not meeting the original deadline.The Commission granted MVP's extension request, finding that MVP had demonstrated good cause due to unavoidable circumstances, specifically the Mainline permitting delays. FERC also maintained that its previous assessments of market need and environmental impacts for the Southgate Project remained valid and did not require reevaluation.Eight environmental organizations petitioned for review, arguing that FERC's decision to extend the construction deadline and its refusal to revisit prior assessments were arbitrary and capricious. They contended that MVP had not made reasonable efforts to advance the Southgate Project and that the market need and environmental impact analyses were outdated.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC reasonably found that MVP had satisfied the good cause standard for the extension, given the permitting and litigation delays with the Mainline. The court also upheld FERC's decision not to revisit its prior findings on market need and environmental impacts, concluding that the information presented by the petitioners did not constitute significant changes in circumstances. Consequently, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Appalachian Voices v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Cascade County discovered petroleum contamination under a county shop complex in 1996 and notified the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). A 2000 report identified the contamination source as four county-owned tanks. The DEQ approved a corrective action plan in 2006, and the County requested the site be designated as a multiple release site for reimbursement eligibility, which the DEQ declined. The County completed remediation in 2008 and submitted receipts to the Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board, but the costs exceeded the statutory maximum for a single release. The Board indicated further reimbursement requests would be denied.The County sought a writ of mandamus to compel the DEQ to assign multiple release numbers, but the DEQ and the County eventually stipulated to dismiss the action in 2013. The County then filed four separate applications for reimbursement in 2014, which the Board denied, stating the DEQ had classified all contaminations under a single release number. The County contested this, and a Hearing Examiner found four discrete releases but ruled the claims were time-barred. The Board adopted most of the Examiner's findings but rejected the conclusion of four releases. The district court later ruled in favor of the County, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, directing the Board to reimburse the County.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the Board had a clear legal duty to review the County's reimbursement claims, despite the County not submitting them in the manner required by Board regulations. The Court held that the Board must review and determine the eligibility of the claims submitted by the County for reimbursement of remediation costs. The District Court's order denying the County's writ of mandamus was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to issue the alternative writ of mandate. View "Cascade v. Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board" on Justia Law

A group of seven Utah counties, known as the Seven County Infrastructure Coalition, applied to the U.S. Surface Transportation Board for approval to construct an 88-mile railroad line in Utah's Uinta Basin. This project aimed to connect the oil-rich region to the national freight rail network, facilitating crude oil transportation to Gulf Coast refineries. The Board prepared a 3,600-page Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) addressing the project's significant environmental effects and feasible alternatives. However, the EIS did not fully analyze the potential environmental impacts of increased upstream oil drilling and downstream oil refining.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reviewed the case after petitions were filed by a Colorado county and several environmental organizations. The D.C. Circuit found numerous violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the EIS, specifically criticizing the Board for not sufficiently analyzing the environmental effects of upstream oil drilling and downstream oil refining. Consequently, the D.C. Circuit vacated both the EIS and the Board's final approval order for the railroad line.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the D.C. Circuit's decision. The Court held that the D.C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases. The Supreme Court clarified that NEPA requires agencies to focus on the environmental effects of the proposed project itself, not on separate projects that are distinct in time or place. The Court concluded that the Board's EIS complied with NEPA's procedural requirements by addressing the environmental effects of the 88-mile railroad line, without needing to evaluate the impacts of upstream oil drilling or downstream oil refining. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Alaska Department of Fish and Game (Alaska) challenging the Federal Subsistence Board's (Board) authorization of an emergency subsistence hunt for the Organized Village of Kake (the Tribe) during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Board allowed the hunt due to significant food supply chain disruptions, permitting the Tribe to harvest two moose and five deer on federal public lands in Alaska. The hunt was conducted by hunters selected by the Tribe, and the yield was distributed to both tribal and non-tribal residents of Kake.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska initially dismissed Alaska's claims related to the Kake hunt as moot. Alaska appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Alaska's claim that the Board lacked authority to authorize the hunt, remanding that specific claim for further proceedings. On remand, the district court ruled that the Board's approval of the hunt did not violate the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) and denied Alaska's request for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment that the Board had the authority under ANILCA to authorize the emergency subsistence hunt. The court held that Section 811(a) of ANILCA provided the Board with the authority to ensure rural residents have reasonable access to subsistence resources on federal lands, which includes the power to authorize emergency hunts. The court also vacated the district court's judgment on Alaska's improper delegation claim, ruling that the district court exceeded its mandate by addressing this claim, and remanded with instructions to dismiss it. View "ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME V. FEDERAL SUBSISTENCE BOARD" on Justia Law

Old Golden Oaks LLC applied for an encroachment permit and a grading permit from Amador County for a housing development project. The county deemed the applications incomplete and requested additional information. Old Golden Oaks filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the county violated the Permit Streamlining Act by requesting information not specified in the submittal checklists for the permits.The Superior Court of Amador County sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the encroachment permit checklist allowed the county to request additional information and that the county had statutory authority to seek information necessary for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Old Golden Oaks that the catch-all provision in the county’s encroachment permit submittal checklist violated the Permit Streamlining Act because it did not specify in detail the required information. However, the court found that the county could condition the completeness of the grading permit application on additional environmental information because the grading permit checklist informed Old Golden Oaks that the project must comply with CEQA. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding the encroachment permit but affirmed the judgment regarding the grading permit. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Old Golden Oaks v. County of Amador" on Justia Law

Montana Environmental Information Center and Earthworks (MEIC) submitted a formal information request to the Office of the Governor of Montana on November 29, 2021. The request sought various documents related to the Montana Department of Environmental Quality’s (DEQ) dismissal of an enforcement action against Hecla Mining and its President/CEO, as well as information on the Governor’s Office’s involvement in mining and environmental decision-making. The Governor’s Office did not respond to the request, prompting MEIC to follow up multiple times. When the requested records were not provided, MEIC filed a lawsuit against the Governor’s Office, seeking to compel production of the information.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County found that the Governor’s Office had a clear legal duty to honor MEIC’s request and issued a writ of mandamus compelling the production of the information. The Governor’s Office initially appealed but later stipulated to dismissal. MEIC then requested attorney’s fees, which the District Court denied, citing the Governor’s Office’s lack of bad faith and the potential for MEIC to obtain the information through other means.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and addressed whether a party who successfully vindicates its right to know under the Montana Constitution is entitled to a presumption towards awarding attorney’s fees. The Court held that there should be a presumption towards awarding attorney’s fees to plaintiffs who successfully enforce their right to know, as this encourages public engagement and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration of the attorney’s fees request, considering the presumption towards awarding fees and costs. View "MEIC v. Governor" on Justia Law

The case involves the Tohono O’odham Nation, the San Carlos Apache Tribe, Archaeology Southwest, and the Center for Biological Diversity (collectively, "Plaintiffs") who filed a lawsuit against the United States Department of the Interior, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Bureau of Land Management (collectively, "Department"). The Plaintiffs allege that the Department violated the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) by issuing two limited notices to proceed (LNTPs) for the construction of a transmission line by SunZia Transmission, LLC, before fulfilling its NHPA obligations. The Plaintiffs claim that the San Pedro Valley, through which the transmission line runs, is a historic property protected under the NHPA.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona allowed SunZia to intervene as a defendant. The district court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and subsequently granted the Department's and SunZia's motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court also denied the Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, deeming it futile. The Plaintiffs then appealed the district court's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order dismissing the action. The Ninth Circuit held that the LNTPs constituted final agency actions because they represented the Department's final decision that the requirements for a Programmatic Agreement (PA) had been satisfied, allowing SunZia to begin construction. The court found that the Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the Department violated the PA by failing to consult with the Plaintiffs on a historic property treatment plan that would evaluate whether the San Pedro Valley should be designated as a historic property. The court inferred that proper consultation would have likely resulted in the Valley being designated as such. Consequently, the Plaintiffs also plausibly alleged that the Department violated the PA by authorizing construction before properly identifying all historic properties affected by the project and ensuring that any adverse effects would be avoided, minimized, or mitigated. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "TOHONO O'ODHAM NATION V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR" on Justia Law

A group of neighbors appealed the Environmental Division’s decision affirming the District 4 Environmental Commission’s granting of an Act 250 permit amendment to JAM Golf, LLC for the construction of a housing development on a lot that was formerly part of the Wheeler Nature Park in South Burlington, Vermont. The neighbors argued that the landowner was required to show changed circumstances to amend the permit and that the development did not comply with Act 250 Criteria 8 and 10.The Environmental Division held six days of trial and conducted a site visit. In August 2024, the court affirmed the Act 250 permit amendment with conditions related to noise and safety during the construction period, concluding that the project complied with all relevant Act 250 criteria. The court also determined that the application should not be denied on the grounds of inequitable conduct because the neighbors failed to support assertions that the landowner made material misrepresentations in its application and on appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the permit-amendment argument was not preserved for appeal because it was not included in the statement of questions presented to the Environmental Division. The court also found that the Environmental Division did not err in allowing the landowner to elect to be assessed against the updated 2024 City Plan rather than the 2016 City Plan. The court determined that the evidence supported the Environmental Division’s findings that the project complied with Act 250 Criteria 8 and 10, including visual aesthetics, noise, and compliance with the local or regional plan. The court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "In re Wheeler Parcel Act 250 Determination" on Justia Law

In 2019, New York City enacted Local Law No. 97, requiring significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from large buildings, aiming for a 40% reduction by 2030 and an 80% reduction by 2050, relative to 2005 levels. Shortly after, New York State passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act), targeting a 100% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2050, with an interim goal of a 40% reduction by 2030. The Climate Act tasked the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) with setting statewide emissions limits and established a Climate Action Council to develop a Scoping Plan for achieving these targets.Plaintiffs, representing residential buildings subject to Local Law No. 97, filed a declaratory judgment action claiming the local law was preempted by the Climate Act. The defendants, including the City of New York and its Department of Buildings, moved to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint entirely. However, the Appellate Division modified this decision, denying the motion regarding the preemption claim and affirming the rest. The Appellate Division held that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the Climate Act did not preempt Local Law No. 97.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the Climate Act does not preempt the field of regulating greenhouse gas emissions. The Court emphasized that the Climate Act's legislative findings and savings clause indicate an intent to allow complementary local regulations. The Court concluded that the State did not express or imply an intent to preempt local efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and thus, Local Law No. 97 is not preempted by the Climate Act. The certified question was answered in the negative, and the defendants' motion to dismiss was granted. View "Glen Oaks Vil. Owners, Inc. v City of New York" on Justia Law