Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The Swampbuster Act and United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) regulations work together to provide farmers with the right to request reviews of wetland certifications. The Swampbuster Act’s review provision (“Swampbuster Review Provision”) provides that a prior wetland certification “shall remain valid and in effect . . . until such time as the person affected by the certification requests review of the certification by the Secretary.” In turn, a regulation (“Review Regulation”) provides procedural requirements a farmer must follow to make an effective review request.   Appellant filed an action alleging that: (1) the Review Regulation contravenes the Swampbuster Review Provision; (2) the Review Regulation was never submitted to Congress or the Comptroller General as required by the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”); and (3) the NRCS’s decisions to refuse to consider Appellants 2017 and 2020 review requests violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Review Regulation imposes reasonable procedural requirements a farmer must follow to make an effective review request and thereby delimit a prior wetland certification. Because the Swampbuster Review Provision is silent as to the nature of an effective review request, the Review Regulation does not conflict with the Swampbuster Review Provision. Further, the court wrote that the CRA’s judicial review provision precludes review of Appellant’s CRA claim. Finally, the court held that the NRCS’s decisions to refuse to consider Appellant’s review requests were not arbitrary and capricious because Appellant failed to comply with the Review Regulation. View "Arlen Foster v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture" on Justia Law

The eight-acre San Jose City View Plaza contained nine buildings, including the Bank, built in 1971, which later housed the County Family Court. The Bank was eligible for listing on the California Register of Historic Resources and National Register of Historic Places. The site development permit provided for the demolition of all structures, followed by the construction of three, 19-story office towers, 65,000 square feet of ground-floor retail, and five levels of underground parking.The city council certified the Downtown Strategy 2040 final environmental impact report under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000 (CEQA)), finding that the Plaza required a supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR). The draft SEIR identified the proposed demolition of the buildings as a “significant unavoidable impact” and presented mitigation measures, to document the structures, advertise their availability for relocation, and otherwise make the structures available for salvage. The city voted not to designate the Bank as a city landmark and approved the permit, certifying the Final SEIR and rejecting project alternatives as infeasible because the “anticipated economic, social, and other benefits” of the project outweighed its “significant and unavoidable impacts.”After the trial court denied a mandate petition filed by opponents, the Bank was demolished. The court of appeal affirmed. The Final SEIR’s discussion of mitigation for the unavoidable loss of significant historic resources complied with CEQA. San Jose did not abuse its discretion by briefly considering and rejecting additional mitigation measures. View "Preservation Action Council of San Jose v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) issued its “final determination to regulate perchlorate in drinking water” under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Drinking Water: Regulatory Determination on Perchlorate. That determination started a clock under the Safe Drinking Water Act requiring EPA to propose regulations within twenty-four months and promulgate regulations within eighteen months of the proposal. But EPA never promulgated perchlorate regulations. Instead, nine years later, the agency purported to withdraw its regulatory determination. Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) petitioned for review of this action, arguing that EPA lacks the authority to withdraw a regulatory determination under the Act and that, even if EPA possesses such authority, it acted arbitrarily and capriciously by doing so. EPA, joined by Intervenor American Water Works Association, defends its action.   The DC Circuit granted NRDC’s petition, vacated EPA’s withdrawal of its regulatory determination, and remand to the agency for further proceedings. The court held the Safe Drinking Water Act does not permit EPA to withdraw a regulatory determination. The court explained that first, and most fundamentally, EPA’s interpretation of what Congress intended in the statute cannot overcome the statute’s directive that the agency “shall” regulate. And second, the history EPA cites is not inconsistent with the court’s interpretation. The 1996 amendments undoubtedly gave the agency more discretion in determining which contaminants to consider for regulation and whether to regulate them in the first instance. But they also balanced that discretion with a mandatory scheme requiring EPA to regulate after it determines to do so. View "NRDC v. Michael Regan" on Justia Law

In this "highly unusual" personal jurisdiction dispute the Supreme Court held that Texas courts have specific jurisdiction over German automobile manufacturers based on their intentional post-sale tampering with affected vehicles that were owned, operated, and serviced in Texas.The State and several local governments brought civil actions to enforce state environmental laws against Defendants - German automobile manufacturers that intentionally evaded federal emissions standards by embedding illegal emissions-defeating technology in graded vehicles. At issue was whether the manufacturers' contacts with Texas satisfied the constitutional requisites to exercising specific personal jurisdiction. The trial court ruled that the manufacturers were amenable to specific personal jurisdiction in Texas, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the manufacturers developed the product, controlled the distribution stream that brought the product to Texas, and "called all the shots," the trial court did not err in exercising specific personal jurisdiction over the German manufacturers. View "State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft" on Justia Law

Front Range Feedlots, LLC challenged certain orders issued by the Colorado State Engineer, and the District Court for Water Division 1 (the “water court”). Specifically, Front Range challenged the State Engineer’s authority to issue an Order to Comply with a February 4, 2020 substitute water supply plan issued to Front Range (the “2020 SWSP”). Front Range further contended that the water court abused its discretion in several ways when it issued its Order Granting Mandatory Injunction, requiring Front Range to comply with the 2020 SWSP and the Order to Comply. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded: (1) under the plain language of the applicable statutes, the State Engineer had the authority to issue the Order to Comply; (2) the State Engineer had the authority to enforce the terms and conditions of the 2020 SWSP after the expiration of that SWSP and Front Range’s withdrawal of its related water court application; (3) the State Engineer properly attached the 2020 SWSP terms and conditions to Front Range, rather than to the water rights at issue; (4) the State Engineer had jurisdiction to require the replacement of depletions from pre-application pumping; and (5) the water court properly exercised its discretion in ordering Front Range to acquire additional replacement sources. View "Front Range Feedlots v. Rein et al." on Justia Law

President Obama issued a Proclamation under the Antiquities Act expanding the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument (“Monument”) in southwestern Oregon. Proclamation 9564 (“Proclamation”). Murphy Timber Company and Murphy Timber Investments, LLC (collectively, “Murphy”) are Oregon timber businesses. Murphy owns woodlands and purchases timber harvested in western Oregon to supply its wood products manufacturing facilities. Concerned that the Proclamation imposed a new limitation on its timber supply and deleterious effects on its woodlands adjacent to the expanded Monument, Murphy sued the President, the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”), and the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States and intervenor environmental organizations. First, the Court has recognized constitutional challenges to presidential acts as reviewable. Second, the Court has held that actions by subordinate Executive Branch officials that extend beyond delegated statutory authority— i.e., ultra vires actions—are reviewable. The panel concluded that Murphy’s particularized allegations that the O&C Act restricts the President’s designation powers under the Antiquities Act satisfied the applicable jurisdictional standard. The panel held that the Proclamation’s exercise of Antiquities Act power was consistent with the text, history, and purpose of the O&C Act. Third, the panel held that the dissent’s concerns that the Proclamation and the O&C Act are in conflict are unsubstantiated. View "MURPHY COMPANY, ET AL V. JOSEPH BIDEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

In passing the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (“WIIN Act”), Congress directed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to design a fish-passage structure for the New Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam. The Corps settled on a design that would lower the pool of water by about three feet. The State of South Carolina and several of its agencies responded by suing the Corps and various federal officials. Their complaint alleged that the Corps’ design violated the WIIN Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, state law, a previous settlement agreement, and certain easements. The district court held that the Corps’ plan didn’t “maintain the pool” since it would lower it from its height on the date of the Act’s enactment. Corps argued that this reading ignores the clause “for water supply and recreational activities” and that a lowered pool that still fulfills these functions would comply with the Act.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment for Plaintiffs on their WIIN Act claim and the resulting permanent injunction against the Corps. The court left it to the district court to decide whether the Corps’ chosen design can maintain the pool’s then-extant water-supply and recreational purposes. The court explained that it agreed with the Corps that pinning the required pool height to the “arbitrary and unknowable-to-Congress date that the President signed the legislation” leads to “absurd results.” Plaintiffs suggest that the statute only obligates the Corps to maintain the pool at its “normal operating range.” But neither the statute nor the district court’s order makes clear this permissible “range.” View "State of South Carolina v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”), expressly preempts State and local regulations concerning the energy use of many natural gas appliances, including those used in household and restaurant kitchens. Instead of directly banning those appliances in new buildings, the City of Berkeley took a more circuitous route to the same result. It enacted a building code that prohibits natural gas piping into those buildings, rendering the gas appliances useless. The California Restaurant Association (“CRA”), whose members include restaurateurs and chefs, challenged Berkeley’s regulation, raising an EPCA preemption claim. The district court dismissed the suit.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that the CRA demonstrated that (1) at least one of its members had suffered an injury in fact, that was (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury was fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) it was likely, not merely speculative, that the injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. The panel held that, by its plain text and structure, the Act’s preemption provision encompasses building codes that regulate natural gas use by covered products. By preventing such appliances from using natural gas, the Berkeley building code did exactly that. The panel reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "CRA V. CITY OF BERKELEY" on Justia Law

After the San Francisco Planning Commission approved a final mitigated negative declaration for the owner’s proposed renovation of a residence, Kaufman, the owner of an adjacent property, appealed the matter to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, which reversed the approval. The owner filed a petition for writ of mandate against the City and County, the Board, the Planning Commission, and the Planning Department, naming Kaufman as a real party in interest. In response,Kaufman filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) law (Code Civil Procedure 425.16), arguing that the petition arose from his protected petitioning activity and lacked minimal merit. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded Kaufman attorney fees as the prevailing party. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in finding the mandamus petition arose from Kaufman’s protected conduct, as the activities that form the basis for the petition’s causes of action are all acts or omissions of the Board. That Kaufman’s administrative appeal preceded or even triggered the events leading to the petition’s causes of action against the Board did not mean that the petition arose from Kaufman’s protected conduct within the contemplation of the anti-SLAPP law. View "Durkin v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Under the Clean Air Act, Congress gave the Courts of Appeals jurisdiction to hear petitions for review of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) actions. But it mandated that petitions for review of “nationally applicable” actions be heard in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.Here, Petitioner challenges the EPA’s allocation of permits to consume hydrofluorocarbons—a type of chemical refrigerant—under the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act. Specifically, RMS argues that it received fewer permits than it was entitled to because the EPA improperly allocated some historic HFC usage to RMS’s competitors.Finding that the EPA’s action was nationally applicable, the Eleventh Circuit transferred the petition to the D.C. Circuit. The court reasoned that the Allocation Notice at issue allocated permits nationwide and was not restricted in geographic scope; therefore, it was nationally applicable. View "RMS of Georgia, LLC v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, et al." on Justia Law