Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

In 2019, New York City enacted Local Law No. 97, requiring significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from large buildings, aiming for a 40% reduction by 2030 and an 80% reduction by 2050, relative to 2005 levels. Shortly after, New York State passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act), targeting a 100% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2050, with an interim goal of a 40% reduction by 2030. The Climate Act tasked the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) with setting statewide emissions limits and established a Climate Action Council to develop a Scoping Plan for achieving these targets.Plaintiffs, representing residential buildings subject to Local Law No. 97, filed a declaratory judgment action claiming the local law was preempted by the Climate Act. The defendants, including the City of New York and its Department of Buildings, moved to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint entirely. However, the Appellate Division modified this decision, denying the motion regarding the preemption claim and affirming the rest. The Appellate Division held that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the Climate Act did not preempt Local Law No. 97.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the Climate Act does not preempt the field of regulating greenhouse gas emissions. The Court emphasized that the Climate Act's legislative findings and savings clause indicate an intent to allow complementary local regulations. The Court concluded that the State did not express or imply an intent to preempt local efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and thus, Local Law No. 97 is not preempted by the Climate Act. The certified question was answered in the negative, and the defendants' motion to dismiss was granted. View "Glen Oaks Vil. Owners, Inc. v City of New York" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) granted the State of Louisiana primary enforcement authority over a class of underground carbon sequestration wells. Three environmental organizations, Deep South Center for Environmental Justice, Healthy Gulf, and Alliance for Affordable Energy, petitioned for review of the final rule granting that authorization, arguing that the rule would harm their interests.The petitioners claimed that the EPA's approval would force them to reallocate resources from their usual activities to oppose the Class VI well program. They also argued that the program would lead to increased energy costs, health risks, and environmental damage. The organizations asserted both organizational and associational standing, with Deep South claiming direct injury to its operations and Healthy Gulf and Alliance for Affordable Energy claiming injury on behalf of their members.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the petition, finding that all three organizations lacked standing. The court held that Deep South's claimed injuries were not cognizable under Article III because they were self-inflicted and amounted to a setback to abstract social interests. The court also found that Healthy Gulf and Alliance for Affordable Energy's alleged injuries were too speculative and attenuated to meet the requirements of imminence and traceability. The court emphasized that the petitioners' theories of injury relied on a chain of speculative events that were not certainly impending.Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury that was fairly traceable to the EPA's action and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Therefore, the petitions for review were dismissed. View "Deep South Center for Environmental Justice v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Texas and several companies challenging the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over the designation of two Texas counties, Rusk and Panola, as nonattainment areas for the 2010 sulfur dioxide (SO2) National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The EPA's designation was based on data submitted by the Sierra Club, which the petitioners argued was flawed and not representative of actual air quality.The EPA initially designated the counties as nonattainment in 2016, relying on Sierra Club's modeling data. In 2019, the EPA proposed to correct this designation, suggesting the data might have been insufficient and the designation could have been an error. However, in 2021, the EPA withdrew this proposal and denied the petitioners' request for reconsideration, maintaining the nonattainment designation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the EPA's reliance on Sierra Club's modeling, despite acknowledging its limitations and the presence of conflicting monitoring data, was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the EPA failed to reconcile the inconsistencies between the modeling and the monitoring data, which created an unexplained inconsistency in the rulemaking record.The court also addressed the petitioners' argument that the EPA did not properly consider Luminant's alternative modeling. The court concluded that the EPA did not act unlawfully in rejecting Luminant's model because it did not follow the required approval process for alternative models.Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit granted the petitions for review and remanded the case to the EPA for further proceedings, instructing the agency to engage in reasoned decision-making in accordance with the court's interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. View "Texas v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Village of Morrisville, Vermont, sought to renew its federal license to operate a hydroelectric project in the Lamoille River Basin. The project had been in operation since 1981. Morrisville applied for a water quality certification from the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, which is required under the Clean Water Act for projects that may result in discharges into navigable waters. After lengthy discussions and two rounds of revisions, Vermont issued a conditional water certification. Dissatisfied with the conditions, Morrisville argued that Vermont waived its certification authority by allowing Morrisville to withdraw and resubmit its application twice.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviewed the case and found that Morrisville had unilaterally withdrawn and resubmitted its application to negotiate more favorable conditions, rather than at the behest of the state. FERC concluded that there was no evidence of a coordinated scheme between Morrisville and Vermont to delay the certification process. Consequently, FERC determined that Vermont did not waive its statutory certification authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld FERC's decision. The court found that Morrisville's actions were unilateral and in its own interest, and there was no mutual agreement with Vermont to delay the certification process. The court distinguished this case from Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, where there was a clear agreement to delay certification. The court concluded that Vermont did not waive its certification authority and denied Morrisville's petitions for review. View "Village of Morrisville, VT v. FERC" on Justia Law

In 2006, Cabot Oil & Gas Company began fracking in Dimock Township, Pennsylvania. By 2009, their operations caused a residential water well explosion, leading to methane gas contamination in local water supplies. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) found Cabot in violation of environmental laws, resulting in the 2009 Consent Order, which mandated corrective actions and a $120,000 penalty. Cabot violated this order by 2010, leading to another consent order and additional fines. Over the next decade, Cabot received numerous violation notices and faced lawsuits, including a 2020 grand jury finding of long-term indifference to remediation efforts, resulting in criminal charges and a nolo contendere plea.Shareholders filed a derivative suit against Cabot’s directors, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties, including failure to oversee operations, issuing misleading statements, and insider trading. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the claims, finding no serious oversight failure or bad faith by the directors, and insufficient particularized allegations to support claims of material misrepresentation or insider trading.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, agreeing that the directors had implemented and monitored compliance systems, and that the shareholders failed to demonstrate bad faith or conscious disregard of duties. The court also found that the statements in Cabot’s disclosures were not materially misleading and that the shareholders did not adequately plead demand futility regarding the insider trading claim. Thus, the court upheld the dismissal of all claims with prejudice. View "Ezell v. Dinges" on Justia Law

The County Commissioners of Boulder County and the City of Boulder filed a lawsuit against Exxon Mobil Corporation and three Suncor Energy companies, alleging that the defendants' fossil fuel activities contributed to climate change, causing harm to Boulder’s property and residents. Boulder sought damages for public and private nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy, claiming that the defendants knowingly contributed to climate change while misleading the public about its impacts.The case was initially filed in Boulder County District Court but was removed to federal district court by the defendants. The federal district court remanded the case back to state court, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed this decision. The Boulder County District Court then denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, rejecting their arguments that Boulder's claims were preempted by federal law, including the Clean Air Act (CAA) and federal common law.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that Boulder's claims were not preempted by federal law. The court held that the CAA displaced federal common law in this area, and thus, federal common law did not preempt Boulder's state law claims. The court also determined that the CAA did not preempt Boulder's claims under principles of express, field, or conflict preemption. Consequently, the court discharged the order to show cause and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, without expressing any opinion on the ultimate merits of Boulder's claims. View "Cnty. Comm'rs of Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy U.S., Inc." on Justia Law

Floyd Ruffin, a shoreline clean-up worker in Louisiana following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, was diagnosed with prostate cancer five years later. Ruffin sued BP, alleging that his exposure to crude oil during the clean-up caused his cancer. He designated Dr. Benjamin Rybicki, a genetic and molecular epidemiologist, as his expert to establish causation. Rybicki claimed that Ruffin was exposed to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in crude oil, specifically pointing to benzo(a)pyrene as a carcinogen.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana excluded Rybicki’s testimony, finding it inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The court concluded that Rybicki failed to identify a harmful level of exposure to PAHs necessary to cause prostate cancer and noted several methodological flaws in his analysis. Consequently, the court granted BP’s motion for summary judgment, determining that Ruffin lacked the necessary evidence to prove causation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s exclusion of Rybicki’s testimony and the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that Rybicki’s testimony was inadmissible due to significant analytical gaps. The court noted that Rybicki’s testimony did not establish a link between PAHs and prostate cancer, as his analysis focused on benzo(a)pyrene, which Ruffin did not specifically claim to have been exposed to. Additionally, the court emphasized that general causation requires showing that a substance is capable of causing the specific injury in the general population, which Rybicki’s testimony failed to do. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion of the expert testimony and the summary judgment in favor of BP. View "Ruffin v. BP Exploration & Production, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP and other plaintiffs incurred cleanup costs at a site on the Kalamazoo River in Michigan due to pollution from paper mills. In 1995, Georgia-Pacific and other companies formed the Kalamazoo River Study Group (KRSG) and sought a declaration of shared liability for cleanup costs under CERCLA § 107. In 1998, the district court declared KRSG members, including Georgia-Pacific, liable for the entire cost of response activities at the site. Subsequent judgments in 2000 and 2003 confirmed this liability.In 2010, Georgia-Pacific filed a lawsuit against NCR Corporation, International Paper Company, and Weyerhaeuser Company, asserting claims under both CERCLA § 107(a) and § 113(f) for cleanup costs. The district court found NCR and International Paper liable and apportioned liability among the parties. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Georgia-Pacific’s § 113(f) claims were time-barred and that Georgia-Pacific could not pursue § 107(a) claims for costs within the scope of the 1998 judgment.On remand, the district court vacated its judgment under § 113(f) but re-entered a declaratory judgment under § 107, declaring Georgia-Pacific, International Paper, and Weyerhaeuser liable for future response costs. International Paper and Weyerhaeuser appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s declaratory judgment under § 107. The court held that Georgia-Pacific could not pursue a § 107(a) claim for costs within the scope of the 1998 judgment, as those costs were recoverable only under § 113(f). The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the scope of the 1998 judgment and allowed Georgia-Pacific to bring § 107(a) claims for costs outside that scope. View "Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. NCR Corp." on Justia Law

Two environmental groups, WildEarth Guardians and Western Watersheds Project, challenged a decision by the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) to open new domestic sheep grazing allotments, known as the Wishbone Allotments, in the Rio Grande National Forest, Colorado. The groups argued that the allotments posed a high risk of disease transmission to local populations of Rocky Mountain bighorn sheep, which are vulnerable to diseases from domestic sheep.The USFS had previously vacated larger grazing allotments in 2013 and 2015 due to high risks to bighorn sheep, based on a "risk of contact model" (RCM). However, in 2017, the USFS decided to open the Wishbone Allotments despite the RCM predicting a high risk of contact. The USFS justified this decision by considering additional local factors, such as geography and herding practices, which they claimed would mitigate the risk. The environmental groups objected, arguing that these local factors were unsupported by scientific data.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the groups' petition, finding that the USFS did not violate the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). The groups then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.The Tenth Circuit found that the USFS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the Wishbone Allotments. The court held that the USFS failed to provide a reasoned explanation for downgrading the RCM's high-risk rating based on local factors, which lacked scientific support. The court also found that the USFS did not adequately consider the cumulative impacts on neighboring bighorn sheep herds. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case to determine the appropriate remedy. View "WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service" on Justia Law

Several hundred children in Benton Harbor, Michigan, suffered from elevated lead levels in their blood after drinking lead-contaminated water from the city’s public water system for three years. Plaintiffs, represented by their guardians, filed a lawsuit against various state and city officials, as well as two engineering firms, alleging that these parties failed to mitigate the lead-water crisis and misled the public about the dangers of the drinking water. The claims included substantive-due-process and state-created-danger claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state-law negligence claims.The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the complaint in full. The court found that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a violation of their constitutional rights and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their federal claims against the city and state officials and the state-law claims against one of the engineering firms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the state officials, finding that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that these officials acted with deliberate indifference. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the claims against the city officials and the City of Benton Harbor, finding that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that these officials misled the public about the safety of the water, thereby causing the plaintiffs to drink contaminated water. The court also reversed the district court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against the engineering firm and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "Mitchell v. City of Benton Harbor" on Justia Law