Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Several environmental nonprofit organizations challenged a final rule issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approving California’s State Implementation Plans (SIPs) for air quality in the San Joaquin Valley. The SIPs, developed by the San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District and the California Air Resources Board, were intended to satisfy contingency measure requirements under the Clean Air Act for three particulate matter (PM2.5) standards. The approved measures included stricter wood burning restrictions, enhanced dust control, and expanded vehicle smog checks. However, the groups argued that these measures failed to provide sufficient emissions reductions, particularly for nitrogen oxides (NOx), and contended that the EPA improperly relied on feasibility analyses to justify the shortfall.Prior to reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the SIP submissions underwent notice-and-comment review by the EPA. Despite critical feedback from environmental advocates, the EPA finalized the rule, accepting the agencies’ infeasibility demonstrations and lowering the progress standard for contingency measures from its traditional requirement. This departure from stricter standards allowed approval of the SIPs even though they did not meet the longstanding emissions reduction benchmarks.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the EPA’s approval under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law” standard. The court held that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority by reading a feasibility exemption into Section 172(c)(9) of the Clean Air Act, which does not expressly allow for such consideration. The panel concluded that the statute’s best meaning does not include a feasibility exemption and remanded the rule to the EPA without vacatur, citing the potential disruptive consequences of lacking contingency measures. The court also awarded litigation costs and attorney’s fees to the petitioners. View "COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Inland Empire Waterkeeper and Orange County Coastkeeper, brought a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Corona Clay Company, alleging violations of stormwater-permit requirements at a facility near Temescal Creek in California. The facility discharged stormwater during rainfall, potentially reaching Temescal Creek, a tributary of the Santa Ana River. Plaintiffs claimed Corona failed to implement best management practices, develop a compliant stormwater pollution prevention plan, monitor its facility, and submit accurate reports as required by the permit. Corona defended primarily by arguing it had not discharged pollutants into the creek.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs, but denied it on certain claims. The case proceeded to trial, where the jury found in favor of Corona. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial, in part due to an intervening Supreme Court decision, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, which expanded the Clean Water Act’s coverage to indirect discharges that are the functional equivalent of direct discharges. After a second trial, Plaintiffs prevailed, and the district court entered judgment and assessed penalties against Corona.Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett v. EPA, which narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act, Corona moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and alternatively sought a new trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the question of whether Temescal Creek is a “water of the United States” is a merits issue, not one of subject-matter jurisdiction, affirming the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. However, due to the intervening change in law announced in Sackett, the court reversed the denial of the motion for a new trial under Rule 59 and remanded for further proceedings to litigate whether Temescal Creek falls within the Clean Water Act’s scope. View "INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

Sonoma County amended its ordinance regulating groundwater well permits in 2023 following a prior appellate decision requiring counties to consider the public trust doctrine in such permitting. The Russian River, which runs through Sonoma and serves as habitat for threatened salmonids, is a navigable waterway protected by the public trust doctrine. Sonoma’s new ordinance established a framework for reviewing well permit applications based on their location and potential impact on public trust resources, particularly sensitive aquatic habitats. The amendment process involved extensive public engagement, technical review by experts, and adoption of conservation measures. Some categories of wells were exempt from heightened review due to low impact or overriding public interest.After the amendment, Russian Riverkeeper and California Coastkeeper Alliance filed suit in Sonoma County Superior Court, seeking to invalidate the ordinance. The superior court found Sonoma had failed both to fulfill its public trust obligations and to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). It issued a writ of mandate, set aside the ordinance, rescinded the claimed CEQA categorical exemptions, and suspended non-emergency well permitting.Reviewing the case, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, applied a deferential standard to the public trust claim and concluded that Sonoma’s amendment process was not arbitrary, capricious, or devoid of evidentiary support, given the data gathering and balancing of interests. Thus, it reversed the superior court’s determination on the public trust doctrine. However, the appellate court found that Sonoma failed to demonstrate substantial evidence supporting its claimed CEQA exemptions, as required by law, and affirmed the superior court’s ruling on that point. The judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Russian Riverkeeper v. County of Sonoma" on Justia Law

A city in Georgia experienced ongoing pollution of its property from hazardous substances, including mercury and PCBs, allegedly released as a result of historical industrial operations at a nearby plant site. Georgia Power initially owned the site and later sold it to a Honeywell predecessor, with both companies involved in activities that contributed to the contamination. Over decades, these pollutants migrated into the city’s property and surrounding waterways. In the 1990s, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) intervened and required the companies to investigate and remediate the site’s contamination under its oversight, culminating in a consent decree that obligated the companies to implement EPA’s official remediation plan.The city filed suit in Georgia’s Superior Court of Glynn County, asserting state-law claims for continuing nuisance and trespass, seeking damages and remediation costs. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, arguing several grounds for federal jurisdiction, including federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The district court rejected all removal grounds and remanded the case to state court, finding that the defendants were not “acting under” a federal officer. The defendants appealed the remand order while litigation continued in state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the remand order, finding that the defendants’ notice of appeal triggered an automatic stay of the district court’s remand, rendering subsequent state court proceedings void for these purposes. On the merits, the court held that federal officer removal was proper because the defendants’ remediation obligations arose from and were controlled by the EPA under a consent decree. The court reversed the district court’s remand order, allowing the case to proceed in federal court. View "City of Brunswick v. Honeywell International, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves environmental organizations seeking to enforce the Clean Air Act (CAA) against a petroleum refinery in Commerce City, Colorado, now operated by Suncor Energy. The refinery emits significant air pollution, affecting nearby residents' health and quality of life. Over twenty years ago, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) entered into consent decrees with Valero Energy Corporation and Conoco Phillips to enforce the CAA at these refineries. Suncor later acquired the facilities and became subject to the consent decrees. Despite ongoing EPA and Colorado enforcement actions, including compliance orders and notices of violation, the organizations allege continued violations of CAA standards and the consent decrees.The environmental groups, including GreenLatinos, Sierra Club, and 350 Colorado, filed a citizen suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging 28 CAA violations and violations of the consent decrees. Suncor moved to dismiss, arguing that the suit was barred by the CAA’s diligent prosecution provision, which prevents citizen suits if EPA or a state is diligently prosecuting a civil action in court for the same violations. The district court granted Suncor’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that ongoing enforcement actions by EPA and Colorado, including the consent decrees and administrative actions, triggered the diligent prosecution bar.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed whether the diligent prosecution bar precluded the organizations’ claims. The court held that only standards or limitations being diligently prosecuted through a present judicial action (such as a consent decree) in court are preclusive, not merely similar standards enforced in administrative actions. The district court erred by applying the bar to claims that were only substantially similar or based on administrative actions. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the lower court to apply the correct standard and to assess diligence only for claims identical to those enforced in the consent decrees. View "GreenLatinos v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.)" on Justia Law

Enbridge sought approval to construct a tunnel beneath the Straits of Mackinac to house a new segment of its Line 5 pipeline, as part of a negotiated agreement with Michigan aimed at decommissioning the existing dual underwater pipelines. The project would replace the above-lakebed pipelines with a 30-inch pipe inside a concrete-lined tunnel, with ownership of the tunnel transferring to the Mackinac Straits Corridor Authority (MSCA) and Enbridge receiving a long-term lease. Several environmental groups and tribal communities opposed the project, citing environmental and public trust concerns, while labor and propane associations supported it.The Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) referred the matter to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who largely limited the scope of review to the tunnel project itself and excluded broader issues such as the overall public need for Line 5, its operational safety, and climate impacts beyond the new segment. The ALJ found that prior approvals in 1953 established Line 5’s public need indefinitely. The PSC affirmed the ALJ’s approach, restricted its environmental review under Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) to the replacement project, and approved Enbridge’s application, finding no feasible or prudent alternatives and declining to examine the common-law public trust doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the PSC’s decision, applying a deferential review standard.The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that courts must review agency MEPA determinations de novo, regardless of procedural origin. The Court found the PSC erred by not considering whether the tunnel project would factually and proximately cause the continued operation of Line 5 and attendant environmental harms, by inconsistently comparing alternatives, and by failing to assess impacts on public trust resources. The Supreme Court vacated the PSC’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In Re Application Of Enbridge Energy To Replace & Relocate Line 5" on Justia Law

A company operates a pipeline transporting oil and natural gas liquids between the United States and Canada. A portion of this pipeline crosses twelve miles of land within a Native American reservation in northern Wisconsin. In 2013, the company’s rights-of-way over certain parcels of reservation land expired. During the intervening years, the tribal band acquired ownership interests in a number of these parcels. The company continued to operate the pipeline without securing the tribal band’s renewed consent for the necessary easements. Following a breakdown in negotiations, the tribal band filed suit, alleging trespass and public nuisance. The band also pointed to the risk of a pipeline rupture near a river bend where erosion threatened pipeline safety.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment for the tribal band on its trespass and unjust enrichment claims, and against the company on its breach-of-contract counterclaim. After a bench trial, the district court awarded the band restitution for past trespass, ordered future disgorgement of profits, and issued an injunction requiring the company to cease operations across the affected parcels within three years and to implement a monitoring and shutdown protocol to abate the alleged nuisance. Both parties appealed; the district court stayed the shutdown portion of the injunction while the appeal was pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding that the company was trespassing on the parcels at issue and that restitution and injunctive relief are appropriate remedies. However, the court vacated the district court’s restitution calculation and the three-year shutdown deadline, remanding for a new determination of remedies that accounts for the public interest and ongoing pipeline reroute efforts. The court also held that federal statutory law displaced the band’s federal common law nuisance claim and vacated the related injunction. View "Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa v Enbridge Energy Company, Inc." on Justia Law

A Georgia limited liability company purchased property in Greensboro, North Carolina, next to a gas station and convenience store owned by the defendants. After environmental testing revealed hazardous chemicals in the soil and groundwater on the company’s property, the company installed a vapor barrier and sought to recover the associated costs from the gas station owner and its members under both CERCLA and North Carolina law. The evidence showed that both properties had a long history of commercial and automotive use, with various underground storage tanks having been installed, removed, or closed in place over several decades. Notably, a waste-oil tank installed in the 1950s was closed in 1996 after evidence of petroleum and other contaminants was found in the soil.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The court held that the plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence that the contamination on its property was caused by releases from the defendants’ property, and that any released substances were covered by CERCLA’s petroleum exclusion. The court also excluded the plaintiff’s expert’s later declaration referencing chromium contamination, finding it was untimely new opinion testimony.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit clarified that the petroleum exclusion in CERCLA covers unadulterated petroleum and its fractions, but not petroleum contaminated with hazardous substances not normally found in such products. The appellate court found that evidence regarding the leaking waste-oil tank raised a factual question as to whether a contaminant outside the petroleum exclusion was released. The Fourth Circuit vacated the summary judgment and the exclusion of certain evidence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Harris Investment Holdings, LLC v. BFJ of USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Several environmental organizations brought an action contesting a groundwater sustainability plan that had been adopted by two local groundwater agencies under California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). The plaintiffs alleged that the plan failed to achieve sustainable groundwater management, specifically raising concerns about inadequate measurable objectives, unreasonably low minimum thresholds for groundwater levels, and insufficient measures to address impacts on surface waters and land subsidence. After the plan was adopted, it was submitted to the California Department of Water Resources (the Department) for review as required by the Act.The Superior Court of Butte County initially overruled the defendants’ demurrer, finding that the Act permitted reverse validation actions by interested parties, and allowed the action to proceed even though the complaint was filed slightly before the statutory waiting period had expired. The court later denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, holding it was premature and that an administrative record was necessary. While the litigation was pending, the Department completed its review and approved the plan, finding it likely to achieve the basin’s sustainability goal, though it identified corrective actions to be addressed going forward. The defendants then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Department’s approval rendered the judicial challenge moot. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case, reasoning that further judicial review would improperly intrude on the Department’s administrative functions.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s orders. The appellate court held that while the Act permits reverse validation actions by interested parties, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the action under the primary jurisdiction doctrine after the Department completed its evaluation. The court concluded that, where a plaintiff’s challenge is based on the same sustainability evaluation committed to the Department’s expertise, courts may defer to the agency’s process to ensure uniform and technically informed application of the Act. View "AquAlliance v. Vina Groundwater Sustainability Agency" on Justia Law

A municipality in Alabama brought a lawsuit against a chemical manufacturer, alleging that the company’s products containing per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) contaminated the Alabama River. The contamination allegedly originated from PFAS-containing wastewater discharged by paper mills, which used the manufacturer’s products. The municipality relies on water from the river for its drinking supply, and PFAS are difficult to remove with its current filtration system, necessitating expensive upgrades.After being sued in Alabama state court for negligence, nuisance, and trespass, the manufacturer removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, asserting jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute. The municipality expressly disclaimed any claims related to PFAS contamination from aqueous film forming foam (AFFF), a firefighting product produced by the manufacturer for the military. The district court found that the heart of the claims was the supply of PFAS products to paper mills, not federal conduct, and remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court held that the manufacturer sufficiently alleged facts supporting federal officer removal jurisdiction. It concluded that the manufacturer plausibly acted under a federal officer when producing AFFF and that the complaint’s gravamen encompassed PFAS contamination generally, not just from paper mills. The court found the municipality’s disclaimers to be mere artful pleading that did not sever the causal connection required for removal. The manufacturer also plausibly asserted a colorable federal government contractor defense. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "The Town of Pine Hill, Alabama v. 3M Company" on Justia Law