Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) disapproval of State Implementation Plans (SIPs) submitted by Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to address interstate air pollution. The EPA disapproved these SIPs, arguing that they did not meet the requirements of the Good Neighbor Provision, which mandates that states prevent their emissions from significantly contributing to nonattainment or interfering with maintenance of national air quality standards in downwind states.The lower courts had not previously reviewed this case. The case was directly brought to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, where the petitioners sought to vacate the EPA's disapprovals. The petitioners argued that the EPA's actions were arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with the CAA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the petitions for review from Louisiana and Texas, finding that the EPA's disapprovals were justified based on the states' own data and interpretations of the Good Neighbor Provision. The court concluded that the EPA had reasonably considered the relevant issues and provided adequate explanations for its decisions.However, the court granted the petition for review from Mississippi, vacated the EPA's disapproval of Mississippi's SIP, and remanded the matter to the EPA. The court found that the EPA's disapproval of Mississippi's SIP was arbitrary and capricious because it was based on updated data that was not available to Mississippi at the time of its SIP submission. The court held that the EPA failed to reasonably explain its decision to use this updated data in an outcome-determinative manner. View "Texas v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs, including United States Sugar Corporation, Okeelanta Corporation, and Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida, challenged the United States Army Corps of Engineers' approval of the Everglades Agricultural Area Project (EAA Project). The plaintiffs argued that the Corps violated the Administrative Procedure Act by using the wrong water supply baseline in its Savings Clause analysis and by failing to conduct a separate analysis for the standalone operation of the storm water treatment area (STA). They also claimed that the Corps violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by not evaluating the effects of the standalone STA operation in its Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).The Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Corps. The district court held that the Corps did not violate the Savings Clause by using the LORS 2008 baseline instead of the year 2000 baseline, as the water supply loss reflected in LORS 2008 was due to structural integrity issues with the Herbert Hoover Dike, not an implementation of the Plan. The court also found that the Corps' decision to use LORS 2008 was reasonable and that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the plaintiffs' first claim, agreeing that the Corps did not violate the Savings Clause. The court also affirmed the district court's decision on the plaintiffs' third claim, holding that the Corps did not violate NEPA by failing to include the standalone STA operation in its EIS, as the standalone STA had independent utility and could be evaluated in a supplemental EIS.However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the plaintiffs' second claim, finding that it was not ripe for review because the Corps had not made a final decision authorizing the standalone operation of the STA. The court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the second claim for lack of finality and ripeness. View "United States Sugar Corp. v. Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

Danny Webb and Danny Webb Construction Company, Inc. (Webb petitioners) appealed a Fayette County Circuit Court order that set aside a jury verdict in their favor and awarded North Hills Group, Inc. (North Hills) a new trial. North Hills had claimed that Webb petitioners contaminated their property by injecting fracking waste into a well on North Hills' land. Webb petitioners argued that the circuit court erred because sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict and because the parties' lease agreement precluded North Hills' claim for unjust enrichment.The Circuit Court of Fayette County had previously found that Webb petitioners breached their lease agreement with North Hills by injecting unauthorized substances into the well. The court set aside the jury's verdict, finding it contrary to the clear weight of the evidence and granting North Hills a new trial. Webb petitioners appealed, arguing that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence and that the lease agreement barred the unjust enrichment claim.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court abused its discretion. The court held that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, including testimony that the substances found on North Hills' property did not exceed health-based standards. The court also held that the lease agreement precluded North Hills' unjust enrichment claim because it governed Webb Construction's injection activities. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict in favor of Webb petitioners and to enter judgment in accordance with the verdict. View "Danny Webb Construction Company, Inc. v. North Hills Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Several young Utah residents filed a lawsuit challenging statutory provisions and government actions related to fossil fuel development. They claimed that these provisions and actions were designed to maximize fossil fuel development in Utah, which they argued endangered their health and shortened their lifespans by exacerbating climate change. They sought a declaration from the district court that these provisions and actions violated their rights under the Utah Constitution.The government defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the requested relief would not redress the alleged injuries. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, agreed and dismissed the claims with prejudice, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their claims were not redressable.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the dismissal on the ground that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that the challenge to the energy policy provision was moot because the legislature had significantly amended the statute since the complaint was filed. The plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the remaining statutory provisions because success on those challenges would not provide relief likely to redress their injuries. The court noted that the challenged provisions did not limit the government defendants' discretion in making decisions about fossil fuel development, and thus, striking these provisions would not necessarily lead to less fossil fuel development.The court also held that the challenges to the government defendants' conduct were not justiciable because they were not supported by a concrete set of facts. The plaintiffs had identified general categories of conduct without tying their claims to any specific government actions. The court instructed the district court to modify its ruling to reflect that the dismissal was without prejudice, allowing the plaintiffs the opportunity to refile their claims if they could address the jurisdictional deficiencies. View "Roussel v. State" on Justia Law

Iron Bar Holdings, LLC, a private landowner in Wyoming, owns a checkerboarded ranch interspersed with federal and state public lands. The only way to access these public lands, other than by aircraft, is by corner-crossing, which involves stepping from one public parcel to another at their adjoining corners without touching the private land in between. In 2020 and 2021, a group of hunters from Missouri corner-crossed to hunt elk on the public lands within Iron Bar's ranch. Iron Bar's property manager confronted the hunters, and law enforcement was contacted, but no citations were issued. In 2021, the hunters were prosecuted for criminal trespass but were acquitted. Iron Bar then filed a civil lawsuit for trespassing, seeking $9 million in damages.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming granted summary judgment in favor of the hunters, holding that corner-crossing without physically contacting private land and without causing damage does not constitute unlawful trespass. Iron Bar Holdings appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that while Wyoming law recognizes a property owner's right to exclude others from their airspace, federal law, specifically the Unlawful Inclosures Act (UIA) of 1885, overrides state law in this context. The UIA prohibits any inclosure of public lands that obstructs free passage or transit over them. The court found that Iron Bar's actions effectively enclosed public lands and prevented lawful access, which is prohibited by the UIA. The court affirmed the district court's decision, allowing the hunters to corner-cross as long as they did not physically touch Iron Bar's land. View "Iron Bar Holdings v. Cape" on Justia Law

The case involves a project to build a four-story hotel and extend a road in the City of Clearlake. The City approved the project after adopting a mitigated negative declaration (MND) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The Koi Nation of Northern California, a Native American tribe, challenged the approval, alleging the City failed to comply with CEQA, particularly the provisions added by Assembly Bill No. 52, which requires consideration of tribal cultural resources and meaningful consultation with tribes.The trial court denied Koi Nation's petition for writ of mandate, concluding that the City had not violated CEQA’s consultation requirements because there was no written request from Koi Nation to invoke the right to consultation. The court also rejected Koi Nation’s claims regarding the City’s failure to investigate and mitigate the project’s impacts on tribal cultural resources.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that Koi Nation had indeed requested consultation in writing, as required by CEQA. The court determined that the City failed to conduct meaningful consultation, as it did not engage in a process of seeking, discussing, and considering the views of Koi Nation, nor did it seek agreement on mitigation measures. The court concluded that the City’s failure to comply with CEQA’s consultation requirements constituted a prejudicial abuse of discretion, as it omitted material necessary for informed decision-making and public participation.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and judgment, instructing the superior court to issue a writ of mandate setting aside the City’s MND and related project approvals. The court did not address Koi Nation’s other arguments, including the need for an environmental impact report (EIR). View "Koi Nation of Northern California v. City of Clearlake" on Justia Law

The case involves the Organization of Professional Aviculturists, Inc. and the Lineolated Parakeet Society, who sought to import two captive-bred parrot species, the Cactus conure and the green form of the Lineolated parakeet, from certain European countries. The Wild Exotic Bird Conservation Act of 1992 prohibits the importation of these species unless they are added to a list of approved species. The plaintiffs petitioned the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to add these species to the list but only those bred in specific European countries. The Service denied the petitions, stating that the Act and its regulations do not allow for species to be approved on a country-by-country basis.The plaintiffs then filed a lawsuit, arguing that the Service's denial violated the Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the claims with prejudice, reasoning that the Act requires the Service to consider species as a whole, not on a country-by-country basis. The court found that this interpretation aligned with the agency's long-standing interpretation and the statute's structure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the text, structure, and purpose of the Act require the Service to determine whether to exempt a species as a whole from the importation moratorium, not on a country-by-country basis. The court found that the Act's language and structure, including the requirement to consider regulatory and enforcement mechanisms in all countries of origin, support this interpretation. The court also noted that the Service's consistent interpretation since 1994 further supports this conclusion. Therefore, the Service's denial of the petitions did not violate the APA. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Organization of Professional Aviculturists, Inc. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service" on Justia Law

The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (Sault Tribe) objected to the district court’s entry of the 2023 Great Lakes Fishing Decree, which resulted from a three-year negotiation among seven sovereigns, including the United States, the State of Michigan, and several Indian tribes. The 2023 Decree aimed to balance the Tribes’ treaty-reserved fishing rights with the preservation of the fishery waters. The Sault Tribe argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the decree without its consent and failed to evaluate the decree’s tribal fishing regulations based on the standard set out in People v. LeBlanc.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan overruled the Sault Tribe’s objections and entered the 2023 Decree, binding the Sault Tribe to its terms. The court concluded that it had the authority to approve the decree based on its continuing jurisdiction and equitable powers, and that the LeBlanc standard did not apply because the decree was a product of negotiation, not unilateral state regulation. The court also found that the Sault Tribe’s specific objections did not show that the decree was unreasonable or inconsistent with the treaty or the law of the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s entry of the 2023 Decree. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising its continuing jurisdiction and inherent equitable power to enter the decree over the Sault Tribe’s objections. The court found that the district court had followed the appropriate legal standards and provided the Sault Tribe with due process by allowing it to file objections, present evidence, and argue its objections in an oral hearing. The appellate court also dismissed as moot the Sault Tribe’s appeal of the district court’s order extending the 2000 Decree, as the 2000 Decree was no longer in effect. View "United States v. Michigan" on Justia Law

Maryland and South Carolina filed lawsuits in state courts against 3M Company and other chemical manufacturers, alleging contamination of their waterways with per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). The states filed separate complaints for PFAS contamination from aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) and non-AFFF products, explicitly disclaiming any connection between the two in their non-AFFF complaints.In the District of Maryland, 3M removed Maryland's non-AFFF complaint to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, arguing that PFAS from its Military AFFF production was indistinguishably commingled with PFAS from its non-AFFF products. The district court remanded the case, giving dispositive effect to Maryland's disclaimer and concluding that 3M's federal work was not implicated. Similarly, in the District of South Carolina, 3M removed South Carolina's non-AFFF complaint, but the district court also remanded, crediting the state's disclaimer and finding no connection to 3M's federal work.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that the states' disclaimers were not dispositive in determining the connection between 3M's federal work and the charged conduct. The court concluded that 3M plausibly alleged that PFAS contamination from its Military AFFF production was related to the states' claims, satisfying the nexus requirement for federal officer removal. The court vacated the district courts' decisions and remanded for further consideration of whether 3M met the other elements for federal officer removal, including acting under a federal officer and having a colorable federal defense. View "State of Maryland v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

David L. Murphy Properties, LLC and John Schaffer own property adjacent to Painted Rocks Cliff, LLC on Flathead Lake. Painted Rocks constructed a dock after obtaining a permit from Lake County. Murphy Properties claimed the dock violated the Lakeshore Protection Act, interfered with their prescriptive easement, and constituted a nuisance.The Twentieth Judicial District Court dismissed Murphy Properties' Lakeshore Protection Act claim against Lake County and granted summary judgment in favor of Painted Rocks on all claims. The court found that the dock did not interfere with navigation or lawful recreation under the Act, as Murphy Properties could still access the cove with smaller watercraft. The court also ruled that Murphy Properties could not establish a prescriptive easement because their use of the cove was not exclusive, given the public's right to use the waters. Additionally, the court dismissed the nuisance claim, as it was contingent on the alleged violation of the Lakeshore Protection Act.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's rulings. The court held that the Lakeshore Protection Act does not mandate denial of a permit if a project impacts navigation or recreation, but rather favors issuance if it does not. The court agreed that Murphy Properties' use of the cove was not exclusive and thus could not support a prescriptive easement. The court also upheld the dismissal of the nuisance claim, as it was based on the failed Lakeshore Protection Act claim. The judgment in favor of Lake County and Painted Rocks was affirmed. View "David L. Murphy Properties, LLC v. Painted Rocks Cliff, LLC" on Justia Law