Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) planned to conduct preconstruction geotechnical work, such as soil and groundwater testing, in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and Suisun Marsh as part of preparations for the Delta tunnel project, which aims to improve water conveyance and environmental protection. Various municipal, tribal, and public interest entities objected, arguing that DWR could not begin this work until it certified that the tunnel project was consistent with the Delta Plan, as required by the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009. The disputed geotechnical work included soil borings, groundwater monitoring, test trenches, and other activities intended to inform the project’s design and mitigation measures.The Superior Court of Sacramento County reviewed several related actions brought by these entities. The plaintiffs sought and obtained preliminary injunctions preventing DWR from conducting the preconstruction geotechnical work until it submitted a certification of consistency with the Delta Plan. The trial court found that the geotechnical work was an integral part of the tunnel project, which was a “covered action” under the Delta Reform Act, and concluded that DWR was required to certify consistency before initiating any part of the project, including the geotechnical work.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s orders. The appellate court held that the Delta Reform Act does not require DWR to submit a certification of consistency before engaging in preconstruction geotechnical work, distinguishing the requirements of the Delta Reform Act from those of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The court found that the geotechnical work was not itself a “covered action” under the Delta Reform Act and that the Act does not incorporate CEQA’s prohibition against “piecemealing.” The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider the motions for preliminary injunction in light of this holding. View "Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

The case concerns the City of San Diego’s approval of a 2022 ballot measure to remove the longstanding 30-foot building height limit in the Midway-Pacific Highway Community Planning area. This height restriction, established by a 1972 voter initiative, was intended to preserve coastal views, community character, and environmental quality. In 2018, the City updated the community plan for the area, assuming the height limit remained in place. In 2020, the City attempted to remove the height limit via a ballot measure, but the measure was invalidated for failing to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), as the environmental impact report (EIR) did not analyze the effects of taller buildings.Following the invalidation of the first ballot measure, the City prepared a supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR) and approved a second ballot measure in 2022 to remove the height limit. Save Our Access, a nonprofit organization, challenged the City’s actions, arguing that the SEIR failed to adequately analyze the environmental impacts of allowing buildings taller than 30 feet, except for visual effects and neighborhood character. The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Save Our Access’s petition for writ of mandate, finding the City’s environmental review sufficient.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether the City complied with CEQA’s requirements to inform the public and decisionmakers of the potential environmental impacts of removing the height limit, to identify mitigation measures, and to disclose reasons for approval despite significant impacts. The appellate court held that the City’s SEIR was inadequate because it failed to analyze the full range of environmental impacts associated with taller buildings, relying improperly on the 2018 EIR. The court reversed the lower court’s judgment, ordered the petition for writ of mandate to be granted, and directed the City to comply with CEQA. View "Save Our Access v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

The case concerns the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), which is responsible for issuing permits for animal waste management systems. In 2019, the DEQ added three new conditions to its general permits for swine, poultry, and cattle operations: requirements for monitoring wells in floodplains, a Phosphorous Loss Assessment Tool analysis with mitigation, and annual reporting. These conditions were not present in the previous 2014 permits but were included in a draft permit as part of a 2018 settlement with environmental groups. The North Carolina Farm Bureau Federation challenged the new conditions, arguing that the DEQ had not followed the rulemaking procedures required by the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) granted summary judgment to the Farm Bureau, finding that the new conditions were “rules” under the APA and thus invalid because they had not been adopted through the required rulemaking process. The Superior Court, Wake County, reversed the OAH, holding that the conditions were not “rules” because they only applied to those who opted for general permits, not all permittees, and thus lacked general applicability. The court also cited legislative history and statutory language to support its conclusion.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court, holding that the conditions were generally applicable regulations and thus “rules” under the APA, requiring formal rulemaking. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the three general permit conditions are “rules” within the meaning of the APA and are invalid until adopted through the APA’s rulemaking process. The court clarified that while general permits themselves need not be adopted as rules, generally applicable conditions within them must be. View "N.C. Dep't of Env't Quality v. N.C. Farm Bureau Fed'n, Inc." on Justia Law

A Colorado-based company applied to the Utah state engineer for permission to divert 55,000 acre-feet of water annually from the Green River in Utah, intending to pipe it across Wyoming for use in Colorado. The company proposed to use the water along Colorado’s Front Range but had not finalized a delivery location or obtained any approvals from Colorado authorities. The application was subject to both the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, which governs interstate water allocations, and Utah’s statutes regulating water appropriation and export.After receiving the application, the Utah state engineer published notice, received protests, and held an administrative hearing. The engineer ultimately denied the application, finding that the company had not demonstrated compliance with Utah’s Export Statute, particularly the requirement to show that the water could be beneficially used in Colorado. The engineer also noted the absence of any guarantee from Colorado that the water would be counted against its compact allocation. The company’s request for reconsideration was denied by default. The company then sought de novo review in the Eighth District Court, Daggett County.The district court granted summary judgment for the state engineer, ruling that the Upper Compact did not preempt Utah’s water laws and that the applicant failed to show beneficial use as required by Utah’s Export Statute. The court also found, in the alternative, that Colorado was a necessary and indispensable party that could not be joined. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Utah’s Export Statute is not preempted by the Upper Compact and that the applicant failed to establish a reason to believe the exported water could be beneficially used in Colorado. View "Water Horse v. Wilhelmsen" on Justia Law

Eduardo Ulises Martinez was investigated by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service after a tip that he was traveling internationally and possibly bringing back ivory. Upon his return to Miami International Airport, Customs and Border Protection found three ivory pieces in his luggage, which he initially denied were ivory. Subsequent searches of his home and business uncovered numerous sculptures containing ivory. Martinez, an experienced art dealer, admitted knowing about the legal requirements to declare ivory imports and exports but had not done so. The government charged him with multiple counts of smuggling ivory into and out of the United States, as well as obstruction of justice for attempting to influence a witness’s testimony and misrepresent the provenance of seized items.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Martinez’s pretrial motion to dismiss the smuggling charges, rejecting his argument that the antique and de minimis exceptions to ivory import/export restrictions absolved him of the duty to declare the items. The court also granted the government’s motion in limine to exclude evidence about these exceptions, finding them irrelevant to the smuggling charges. At trial, Martinez was convicted on most counts, except for three on which he was acquitted. His post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial were denied, and he was sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment, with the court adopting the government’s valuation of the seized statues.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Martinez’s convictions and sentence. The court held that the antique and de minimis exceptions did not eliminate the obligation to declare ivory, and evidence about them was properly excluded. The court also found no error in the exclusion of certain interview statements, the sufficiency of the evidence for obstruction of justice, the government’s closing argument, or the sentencing methodology and valuation. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Martinez" on Justia Law

A longtime Alaska resident with extensive experience in personal-use and commercial fishing brought suit against the State of Alaska, alleging that the State’s management of chinook and chum salmon populations in the Yukon and Kuskokwim Rivers violated the sustained yield principle mandated by the Alaska Constitution. The plaintiff claimed that the significant decline in these salmon populations since statehood was evidence of unconstitutional management. He did not challenge any specific policy, regulation, or action, but instead sought a declaration that the State’s management had been unconstitutional for decades and requested injunctive relief to compel the State to fulfill its sustained yield obligations.The Superior Court for the Fourth Judicial District, Bethel, granted the State’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court found that the claims presented nonjusticiable political questions reserved for the legislative branch, that the plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury or identify specific State actions causing harm, and that deference to agency expertise was warranted in the absence of a challenge to a particular policy or action.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the claims for injunctive relief were nonjusticiable because they would require the judiciary to make initial fisheries policy determinations, a function constitutionally committed to the legislative and executive branches. The Court further held that the claim for declaratory relief was not justiciable because it would not clarify or settle the legal relations between the parties, as it did not identify specific actions or policies to be addressed. The Court concluded that, absent a challenge to a particular State action or policy, the claims did not present an actual controversy suitable for judicial resolution. View "Forrer v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over the State of Hawai‘i Board of Land and Natural Resources’ (the Board) annual continuation of a revocable water permit issued to Kaua‘i Island Utility Cooperative (KIUC) for the diversion of water from state lands to power hydropower plants. The permit, first issued in 2003, was renewed yearly through 2022. In 2019, the diversion infrastructure was severely damaged, and KIUC ceased using the water for hydropower but continued to maintain the system. Petitioners, two organizations with members asserting native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights, requested contested case hearings in 2020 and 2021, arguing that the continued diversion and disrepair of the system harmed their rights and the environment. The Board denied these requests and continued the permit.Petitioners appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Environmental Court), challenging the denial of contested case hearings, the permit’s continuation, and alleging violations of the Board’s public trust duties. While the appeal was pending, the permit expired at the end of 2022. The Environmental Court found that Petitioners had protected property interests under the Hawai‘i Constitution, that their due process rights were violated by the denial of contested case hearings, and that the Board’s failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law prevented meaningful review. The court vacated and reversed the Board’s 2021 and 2022 permit continuations.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the Environmental Court’s decision, holding that Petitioners had standing under the right to a clean and healthful environment, but that the case was moot and no exceptions applied. The ICA also found no due process violation and concluded the Environmental Court exceeded its jurisdiction in reviewing the merits of the permit continuations.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that exceptions to mootness applied, Petitioners had standing based on injury to traditional and customary rights, and that contested case hearings were required to protect their due process rights. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. View "Kia'i Wai o Wai'ale'ale v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

A chemical company sought a declaratory judgment to establish its right to insurance coverage for environmental damage resulting from its operation of a DDT plant. The company’s insurers denied coverage based on “qualified pollution exclusions” (QPEs) in their comprehensive general liability policies, which excluded coverage for pollution unless the discharge was “sudden and accidental” or, in some policies, “sudden, unintended and unexpected.” The company argued that “sudden” could reasonably be interpreted to include gradual, unintended pollution events, and sought to introduce extrinsic evidence, including drafting history and industry statements, to support this interpretation.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, at the parties’ suggestion, divided the case into phases and, in Phase II-A, addressed the interpretation of the QPEs. The parties stipulated to the use of exemplar QPEs for interpretation. The trial court excluded the company’s proffered extrinsic evidence, reasoning that California appellate courts had uniformly held that “sudden” in this context unambiguously does not mean gradual, and that it was bound by this precedent. The court certified a question of law for appellate review regarding whether prior judicial construction of an insurance policy term precludes consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine ambiguity.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that, as a general rule, prior judicial construction of a policy term does not categorically preclude a trial court from considering extrinsic evidence to expose a latent ambiguity. However, in this case, the court found that California appellate decisions have uniformly and specifically rejected the interpretation that “sudden” can mean “gradual” in the context of these pollution exclusions. Therefore, the trial court correctly excluded the extrinsic evidence as irrelevant, and the petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "Montrose Chemical Corp. of California v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

The case concerns the approval of a 32-mile natural gas pipeline intended to supply fuel to a new natural-gas turbine that will replace one of two coal-fired units at the Cumberland Fossil Plant in Tennessee. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal agency, decided to retire the coal units and replace one with a gas turbine, which is expected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved the pipeline after preparing a detailed environmental impact statement. The Sierra Club and Appalachian Voices challenged this approval, arguing that FERC’s decision violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act.Previously, FERC issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the pipeline, finding that market need was established by TVA’s long-term agreement to purchase all pipeline capacity and that the project’s benefits outweighed its harms. FERC also credited the pipeline with enabling a net reduction in emissions due to the coal-to-gas transition. After the Sierra Club requested rehearing, FERC clarified that only one coal unit would be replaced but maintained its approval. The Sierra Club then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the petitions. The court held that FERC’s approval complied with NEPA and the Natural Gas Act. It found that FERC reasonably analyzed downstream emissions, properly considered the no-action alternative, and was not required to analyze the pipeline and power plant as connected actions because FERC lacked regulatory authority over power generation. The court also held that FERC’s reliance on TVA’s precedent agreement established market need and that FERC’s public interest balancing was reasonable. The court emphasized that, following recent Supreme Court precedent, judicial review of NEPA compliance is highly deferential. View "Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The case concerns the repeal of a regulation that had banned the use of personal watercraft, commonly known as jet skis, in two designated Critical Habitat Areas (CHAs) in Alaska: Kachemak Bay and Fox River Flats. The Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) Commissioner originally enacted the ban in 2001, citing concerns about the potential impact of jet skis on fish, wildlife, and their habitats. In 2021, after a review process that included public comment and consideration of scientific literature, the Commissioner repealed the ban, reasoning that technological improvements had reduced the environmental impact of jet skis and that existing studies did not conclusively demonstrate significant harm in these specific northern marine environments.Conservation groups challenged the repeal in the Superior Court for the Third Judicial District, Anchorage, arguing that the Commissioner lacked statutory authority to repeal the regulation and that the repeal was inconsistent with the statutory purpose of protecting critical habitat. The superior court granted summary judgment to the conservation groups, finding that the Commissioner did not have the authority to repeal the ban and that the repeal conflicted with the purpose of the CHA statutes. The court reinstated the ban and awarded attorney’s fees to the conservation groups.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the superior court’s decision de novo. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner had both implied statutory authority and delegated authority from the Boards of Fisheries and Game to enact and repeal regulations governing uses within CHAs. The Court further found that the repeal was consistent with the statutory purpose of the CHA statutes, was reasonable, and was not arbitrary or in conflict with other laws. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision, directed entry of summary judgment in favor of the State, and remanded for further proceedings regarding prevailing party status and attorney’s fees. View "Department of Fish & Game v. Cook Inletkeeper" on Justia Law