Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, manufactures of a bear-resistant container called the Ursack S29 model and three individual users of the Ursack, sued the Sierra Interagency Black Bear Group ("SIBBG"), as well as national and forest park services (collectively, "defendants"), where defendants withdrew conditional approval of the S29 model and refused to permit backpackers to use the S29 in the container-only areas of defendants' national parks and forests. At issue was whether SIBBG's decision to revoke conditional approval of the S29 model was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that SIBBG's decision to revoke conditional approval of the S29 model was not arbitrary or capricious where the court could not conclude that the SIBBG, although it did not mention overflow food problems in the course of its debate, ignored this aspect of the problem; where the distinctions the SIBBG made between the BearVault and the Ursack were rational; and where SIBBG's tree-damage rationale, prohibiting users from tying the S29 model to trees, was not arbitrary or capricious.

Intervenor State of Alaska appealed the district court's judgment in favor of Southeast Alaska Conservatory Council and five other groups (collectively, "SEACC") in their suit against the Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") and other defendants arising from the initiation of the Juneau Access Improvements Project ("Project") to improve surface access between Juneau and the communities of Haines and Skagway in the Lynn Canal corridor of Southeast Alaska. At issue was whether the district court properly ordered the State to consider improving existing ferry service between Juneau and the communities of Haines and Skagway before proceeding with expensive construction of a new ferry terminal and highway through a national forest. The court held that the district court properly concluded that it was arbitrary for the FHWA to refuse to consider reassigning vessels as a project alternative on the basis that it would increase costs and reduce services elswhere when the chosen project alternative could have been rejected for the same reason. By failing to examine a viable and reasonable alternative to the proposed project, and by not providing an adequate justification for its omission, the Environmental Impact Statement issued by the FHWA violated the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(a).

As part of the cleanup of PCBs in Wisconsin's Fox River, the EPA filed suit against de minimus potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9601). The district court approved a settlement and other PRPs appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the government's estimate of fault was supported by the record and accounted for all sources of PCB discharge. The district court properly approved the settlement before making a divisibility determination.

The Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM) ordered the company to remedy certain conditions at its solid waste dump in Goshen; the company moved the operation to Elkhart. Following complaints, IDEM found violations and entered into an agreement with the company. The company did not honor the agreement and IDEM filed suit. After their attempt to intervene in the state court suit was limited, residents filed suit under the Resource Recovery and Conservation Act (RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6901), specifically differentiating their claims from those in the state suit. IDEM subsequently filed a second state suit. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that, excepting violation claims concerning âCâ grade waste that were part of the first IDEM lawsuit, the plaintiffs met the requirements of RCRA for bringing a citizen suit, so abstention should not apply to deny them a right created by Congress. While a citizens' violation action may not âbe commencedâ if the EPA or state agency âhas commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action,â the citizens' suit went beyond the scope of the first IDEM suit. The RCRA suit complements and does not conflict with state efforts.

Appellant Shirley Collins filed suit against Appellees-Defendants Koppers, Inc. and several others, alleging she was injured as a result of environmental contamination caused by a wood-treatment facility. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss after Collins repeatedly failed to comply with a court order to provide expert opinions that causally linked her injuries to the alleged contamination. The trial court granted the Defendantsâ motion to dismiss and awarded them attorneyâs fees. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not grant her enough time to respond to Defendantsâ discovery requests. âIt is obvious that the trial judge exercised considerable patience and restraint in dealing with the delays caused by [Appellantâs] counsel. The record is replete with examples of instances of the failure of [Appellantâs] counsel to abide by the orders of the trial court.â Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial courtâs ruling.

Montana alleged that Wyoming breached Article V(A) of the Yellowstone River Compact ("Compact"), 65 Stat. 666, by allowing its pre-1950 water appropriators to increase their net water consumption by improving the efficiency of their irrigation systems where the new systems employed sprinklers that reduced the amount of wastewater returned to the river, thus depriving Montana's downstream pre-1950 appropriators of water to which they were entitled. At issue was whether Article V(A) allowed Wyoming's pre-1950's water users, diverting the same quantity of water for the same irrigation purpose and acreage as before 1950, to increase their consumption of water by improving their irrigation systems even if it reduced the flow of water to Montana's pre-1950 users. The Court held that Montana's increased-efficiency allegation failed to state a claim for breach of the Compact under Article V(A) where Article V(A) incorporated the ordinary doctrine of appropriation without significant qualification and where, in Wyoming and Montana, that doctrine allowed appropriators to improve their irrigation systems, even to the detriment of downstream appropriators.

The Chamber of Commerce and the National Automobile Dealers Association petitioned for review of a decision by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") granting California a waiver from federal preemption under the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. 7543(a). At issue was whether Article III of the Constitution granted the court jurisdiction to decide the case. The court dismissed the petition for review without reaching its merits and held that even if the EPA's decision to grant California a waiver for its emissions standards once posed an imminent threat of injury to petitioners, the agency's subsequent adoption of federal standards eliminated any independent threat that may have existed.

A 1935 settlement gives the tribe specific irrigation rights in the Gila River. The government filed another water rights claim on behalf of the tribe in 1979, resulting in a 2006 Arizona Supreme Court decree that the 1935 decree resolved all of the tribe's rights under all theories and that federal court was the proper forum for interpretation and enforcement of that decree. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed a claim against the United States for failure to secure and protect the tribe's water rights. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding the claim barred by the six-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. 2501. Rejecting an argument that the tribe was not on notice of its harm until the 2006 decision, the court stated that the plain terms of the 1935 decree indicated that the tribe would have no further rights and that the government was representing multiple parties.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant alleging that defendant was violating the Clean Air Act ("Act") by constructing a coal-fired power plant without a determination that the power plant would achieve a level of air pollution control that satisfied the Act's Maximum Achievable Control Technology provisions. At issue was whether the district court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to plaintiffs based on the merits of an order that granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The court held that attorneys' fees were properly awarded based on plaintiffs' success in the litigation where defendant was subject to state administrative proceedings as a consequence of plaintiffs' suit. The court also held that defendant's merits argument was irrelevant to the court's determination where plaintiffs achieved success supporting the fee award.

Plaintiffs brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act seeking to compel defendant to prohibit off-road vehicle use of Oregon's Little Canyon Mountain area. At issue was whether defendant's failure to close Little Canyon Mountain to off-road vehicle use violated the Federal Land and Policy Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. 1701-1785, and 43 C.F.R. 8340-8342. The court held that defendant did not, and was not required to, make a finding that the off-road vehicle use of which plaintiff complained had caused "considerable adverse effects" on the resources enumerated in 43 C.F.R. 8341.2(a) and therefore, the court could not compel defendant to close Little Canyon Mountain to off-road vehicle use. The court also held that defendant's denial of plaintiff's petition to close Little Canyon Mountain to off-road vehicle use was not arbitrary and capricious.