Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

In 2000, the manager of the Goodspeed Airport cut down trees and woody vegetation on property owned by a land trust. A total of six actions were filed as a result of the clear-cutting. In addition to instituting two of three consolidated actions, the airport brought two federal actions, and the district court found in favor of the land trust in both actions. In state court three other actions were consolidated. The trial court concluded that (1) the airport parties' claims for substantive and procedural due process were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and (2) the airport parties' claims claims for first amendment retaliation and abuse of process were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that either the issues were actually litigated in the federal actions and thus are barred by collateral estoppel, or the claims could have been raised in the federal actions and thus are barred by res judicata.

The "American Bottom" is a 175-square-mile floodplain of the Mississippi River in southwestern Illinois, across the river from St. Louis and contains wetlands that provide habitat for birds, butterflies, and wildlife. The owner of a landfill in American Bottom proposed a new landfill on 180 acres of a 220-acre tract between the existing facility and a state park that contains a lake. The tract has 26.8 acres of wetlands and the owner wants to destroy 18.4 acres to obtain fill for daily cover at the existing facility while the application for a new permit is pending with the Illinois EPA. The Army Corps of Engineers issued a permit requiring creation of mitigation wetlands. The district court dismissed the conservation group's suit challenging the Corps permit for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Affidavits from group members, alleging that destruction of the wetlands will diminish their enjoyment of wildlife and bird-watching at the state park, were sufficient to establish standing.

At issue in this case was 4.5 miles of a railroad right-of-way that was railbanked and is now operated as a recreational trail. The appeal focused on the relationship between the Kansas Recreational Trails Act (KRTA) and the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), specifically: (1) whether the Trails Act preempts KRTA, (2) whether KRTA violates equal protection rights, and (3) whether the district court has jurisdiction to set the amount of bond required under KRTA. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that (1) a bond requirement and setting of a bond do not create a conflict with the Trails Act; (2) because KRTA does not provide a benefit to local competitors or burden local, nonpublic competitors, KRTA is not preempted because it violates the dormant Commerce Clause; (3) KRTA does not violate equal protection rights by establishing statutory requirements for interim recreational trails in railroad rights-of-way that differ from other categories of recreational trails that result from the terms of the Trails Act; and (4) the district court did have jurisdiction to set the amount of the bond and to require the appellant, Kanza Rail-Trails Conservancy, to pay the bond.

Petitioner, Performance Coal Company, petitioned the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission ("Commission") for temporary relief from restrictions imposed by the Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA") after a coal mine disaster occurred on April 5, 2010. The Commission denied relief and petitioners appealed. At issue was whether section 105(b)(2) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 20 U.S.C. 815(b)(2), authorized temporary relief from section 103(k) orders. The court held that the plain language of section 105(b)(2) unambiguously provided that petitioner was entitled to seek temporary relief from modification or termination of any order, including a section 103 order. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and set aside the Commission's order denying relief.

Appellants, four natural resources districts ("NRDs"), appealed the Department's 2009 order finding that in 2008, the basin was fully appropriated. Michael Jacobson, a landowner in the basin, cross-appealed. As a threshold matter, the supreme court found the NRDs had standing to challenge the Department's determination, but Jacobson lacked standing because he failed to allege actual or imminent harm. The court then reversed and vacated the Department's order, holding it to be arbitrary and invalid because (1) the Department failed to conform to its own regulations when it determined the basin was fully appropriated and failed to apply its methodologies in a consistent manner, resulting in a designation that was arbitrary and capricious; and (2) the Department failed to plainly describe its methodologies so that they could be replicated and assessed in compliance with Neb. Rev. Stat. 46-713(1)(d).

Plaintiffs, 25 members of the Achuar indigenous group dependent for their existence upon the rainforest lands and waterways along the Rio Corrientes in Peru, and Amazon Watch, a California corporation, sued Occidental Peruana ("OxyPeru") in Los Angeles County Superior Court for environmental contamination and release of hazardous waste. OxyPeru's headquarters were located in Los Angeles County but OxyPeru removed the suit to federal district court where it successfully moved for dismissal on the ground that Peru was a more convenient forum. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the suit on the basis of forum non conveniens. The court reversed the dismissal and held that the district court failed to consider all relevant private and public interest factors, entirely overlooking enforceability of judgments factor, which weighed heavily against dismissal. The court also held that the district court correctly assumed that Amazon Watch was a proper domestic plaintiff, but erroneously afforded reduced deference to its chosen forum and ignored the group entirely in the analysis of numerous factors. Therefore, these errors led the district court to misconstrue factors that were neutral or weighed against dismissal, and to strike an unreasonable balance between the factors and deference due a domestic plaintiff's chosen forum. The court further held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to impose conditions on its dismissal that were warranted by facts in the record showing justifiable reasons to doubt OxyPeru's full cooperation in the foreign forum.

Plaintiffs sued defendant to enforce the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") unilateral administrative order that commanded defendant to conduct a remedial investigation and feasibility study to assess the site conditions in the Columbia River and to implement a cleanup. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CLERCA"), 42 U.S.C. 9613(h). The court held that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims for penalties for the 892 days of noncompliance with the unilateral administrative order and properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims where subsection (h)(2) did not apply to citizens suits.

Plaintiff-Appellant Sierra Club filed a petition with the Tenth Circuit in an attempt to stop Defendant-Appellee Two Elk Generation Partners, LP (Two Elk) from building a coal-fired power plant in Wyoming. Sierra Club argued that Two Elk was building the plant in violation of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7604. For over ten years, Two Elk had planned to build the power plant, and filed the appropriate applications with the local environmental authorities to receive permission to start construction. In late 2007, state authorities notified Two Elk that its environmental permit had expired. In the process of getting the permit renewed, Sierra Club tried to intervene to stop the process. While Two Elk and Sierra Club were fighting one another in the state administrative bodies and courts, Sierra Club filed a citizen suit with the federal district court. The federal district court dismissed Sierra Club's case, holding that the state courts already decided the same issues in its suit. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Sierra Club argued that it was not a party to the permit-application proceedings, and that it should not be precluded from bringing suit now. Furthermore, the Club argued that the Clean Air Act established the circumstances under which a citizen suit may be brought, and those circumstances were not met at the state court level. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court found that Sierra Club's arguments under the Clean Air Act were indeed precluded by decisions from the state court proceedings. The Court dismissed Sierra Club's appeal.

Burlington Ditch, Reservoir & Land Company (Burlington) and Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Company (FRICO) filed applications to change its 1885, 1908 and 1909 water rights. The changes to Burlington and FRICO's rights were precipitated by a new water supply project by the United Water & Sanitation District (United) and East Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation District (ECCV). Approximately fifty parties argued for their particular interests in relation to Burlington and FRICO's applications. The water court imposed conditions on Burlington and FRICO's historic water rights to prevent injury to all other interested parties' rights. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Burlington, FRICO, United and ECCV challenged the water court's order regarding its determination of the historical consumptive use of the water rights. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the water court's decision.

Jensen Family Farms, Inc. ("Jensen") sued the Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District ("District"), alleging that the District's Rules 220, 310, and 1010 were preempted by the federal Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.; Rules 220 and 310 violated certain provisions of California law; and the Rules violated Jensen's due process rights. Jensen moved for summary judgment and while it's motion was pending, the district court granted the California Air Resources Board's ("CARB"), California's air pollution control agency, motion to intervene. CARB and the District (collectively, "defendants") subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Jensen appealed the district court's judgment. The principal question in this case, among other questions, was whether the District's rules were preempted by the CAA. The court held that Rules 220 and 310 were not standards or other requirements related to the control of emissions and therefore, not preempted by CAA 209(e). The court also held that Rule 1010 did not apply to any "nonroad engines," as that term was used in the CAA and therefore, was not preempted under section 209(e). The court further held that there was no basis for Jensen's claim under Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, 93116 or Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, 2450 et. seq.; that the Rules did not violate Jenson's due process rights where it admitted that the Rules served the legitimate government interest in minimizing air pollution from diesel engines; and the Rules did not violate California Constitution, Article 13A because Jensen waived this argument in its complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants.