Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sought damages from the United States for injuries to a child allegedly caused by exposure to the toxic heavy metal thallium from soil dumped into a landfill adjacent to the child' residence and school. The child, by her guardian ad litem, appealed a decision of the district court finding that the United States acted "reasonably" and did not breach any duty in conducting the soil remediation projects. The district court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the "discretionary function" exception to tort liability of the United States applied in this case. The court held that because the district court erred in holding that the "discretionary function" exception barred the Navy's liability on and the court's subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim, and clearly erred in finding that the Navy acted "reasonably" and not in breach of its duty in conducting the remediation of contaminated soil in the project at issue here, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court, nevertheless, held that it was unnecessary to reassign the case to a different judge on remand.

The Sierra Club and several related parties brought this action against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) seeking to set aside a Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., permit (the section 404 permit) the Corps had issued to the Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) which planned to construct a new power plant. SWEPCO subsequently appealed the preliminary injunctions ordered by the district court, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the Sierra Club and Hunting Club had Article III standing. The court also held that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success where there was ample evidence in the record to show that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on at least three of their claims; that there was a likelihood of irreparable harm; that the balance of harms weighed in favor of an injunction; and that the public interest that might be injured by a preliminary injunction did not outweigh the public interest that would be served by the injunction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of two municipal entities that plaintiffs alleged were discharging polluted stormwater in violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the Clean Water Act or Act), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. Although all parties agreed that numerous water-quality standards have been exceeded in the Watershed Rivers, defendants contended that there was no evidence establishing their responsibility for, or discharge of, stormwater carrying pollutants to the rivers. The court concluded that the district court erred with respect to the evidence of discharges by the Los Angeles County Flood Control District into two of the Watershed Rivers where plaintiffs provided evidence that the monitoring stations for the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers were located in a section of the municipal separate storm water sewer systems (ms4) owned and operated by the District and, after stormwater known to contain standards-exceeding pollutants passed through these monitoring stations, this polluted stormwater was discharged into the two rivers. Accordingly, plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on the District's liability for discharges into the two rivers and the district court's judgment was reversed. The court held, however, that plaintiffs failed to meet their evidentiary burden with respect to discharges by the District into the Santa Clara River and Malibu Creek where plaintiffs did not provide evidence sufficient for the district court to determine if stormwater discharged from an ms4 controlled by the District caused or contributed to pollution exceedances located in these two rivers. Similarly, plaintiffs did not delineate how stormwater from ms4s controlled by Los Angeles County caused or contributed to exceedances in any of the Watershed Rivers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on these claims.

The FAA issued permits for modernization of the mixed-use Hanscom airport near the historic towns of Lexington and Concord. Opponents raised challenges under the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 303(c), the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 470f, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347. The First Circuit rejected the challenges. The FAA adequately examined alternatives; the determination that none would be prudent was reasonable. The agency went beyond considering reasonably foreseeable impacts and considered worst case scenarios.

Appellant Georgetown County League of Women Voters appealed an order that dismissed its action that sought a declaration that Respondent Smith Land Company had unlawfully filled wetlands and dismissed its request for an injunction requiring Smith to restore those wetlands. Respondent owns a .332 acre lot in Pawleys Island, .19 acres of which are isolated wetlands often referred to as Carolina Bays. Before developing the lot, Respondent notified both the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) of its plans. While the Corps cautioned respondent to notify DHEC before performing the work and respondent did so, it received no response from DHEC. Respondent then filled the wetlands. The League then filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and related equitable relief. After a hearing, the circuit court held that DHEC did not have jurisdiction over isolated wetlands, that Respondent complied with all requirements before filling the wetlands, and that the League could not maintain a private suit under the South Carolina Pollution Control Act. Finding that the circuit court erred in holding that: (1) the DHEC lacked jurisdiction to regulate the wetlands; (2) Respondent did not violate the Act; and (3) the Act does not create a private cause of action, the Supreme Court reversed the reversed the case and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs, commercial fishermen, brought an action against defendant, who was the Commissioner of the Fisheries for the State of Alaska (Commissioner), asking the district court to declare that certain regulations, which shorten the fishing year and limited the number of salmon that commercial fishermen could harvest, were unconstitutional as a taking of property without just compensation and as a violation of plaintiffs' due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner, holding that plaintiffs lacked a property interest in their entry permits, that they had expressly waived any right to compensation with respect to their shore leases, and that they had not suffered a due process violation. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed. The court held that under Alaska law, plaintiffs have only a license, and not a protected property interest, in the entry permits. The court also held that plaintiffs contractually waived their right to challenge the regulations when they signed their lease agreements and the court declined to analyze their claims on the merits. The court further held that Alaska Statutes section 16.43.150(e) did not violate plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Applicant Times and Seasons, LLC, appealed the Environmental Court's grant of summary judgment to the Natural Resources Board and the corresponding denial of Applicant's "Act 250" permit application to construct and operate a gift shop and deli with related improvements in the Town of Royalton. On appeal, Applicant argued that it could avail itself of the definition of "primary agricultural soils" in 10 V.S.A. 6001(15) as it was amended during the course of its litigation to secure compliance with the only Act 250 criterion for which it did not receive approval. Upon review of the legislative history of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that a reconsideration application is a continuation of an original Act 250 permit application. Accordingly, the submission of a reconsideration application is not a separate vesting event: "[c]ontrary to applicant's proposed interpretation, an applicant on reconsideration may not simultaneously take advantage of the laws in effect at the time of the initial application and those in effect at the time of the reconsideration application. It is not a two-way street." The Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment against Applicant.

Redrock Valley Ranch (RVR) proposed to export water from one hydrographic basin to another in northern Nevada. Both basins lie in Washoe County. The state engineer approved the transfer applications. The county, however, declined to grant RVR a special use permit for the pipelines, pump houses, and other infrastructure needed to make the water exportation plan a reality after determining that the issuance of the special use permit could potentially be detrimental to the public, adjacent properties, or surrounding area. The district court upheld the denial of the special use permit, concluding that substantial evidence supported the county's decision and that the denial did not amount to an abuse of discretion. RVR appealed, arguing that the county did not have authority to deny the special use permit application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the state engineer's ruling neither preempted nor precluded the county from denying RVR's application for a special use permit for the reasons it did and that substantial relevant evidence supported the county's denial of the permit.

The Nevada legislature amended a law to require the Colorado River Commission (CRC) to transfer land to Clark County. The state land registrar refused to deed a portion of the land to the county, believing the land, which was adjacent to the Colorado River, was nontransferable under the public trust doctrine. Clark County filed a complaint for declaratory relief, and Lawrence filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment. Clark County then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the county's motion and ordered Lawrence to deed the disputed land to the county. Lawrence appealed. At issue was whether state-owned land once submerged under a waterway can be freely transferred to the county or whether the public trust doctrine prohibits the transfer. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that judgment on the pleadings was improper. The Court concluded that whether the formerly submerged land is alienable turns on the unanswered questions of whether the stretch of water that once covered the land was navigable at the time of Nevada's statehood, whether the land became dry by reliction or by avulsion, and whether transferring the land contravenes the public trust.

In the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) issued a permit to the village of East Troy to construct a municipal well. Lake Beulah Management District (LBMD) sought a declaratory action in circuit court seeking to enforce its ordinance, which purports to regulate and require permits for certain wells that withdraw water from the area around Lake Beulah. The village moved for summary judgment, asserting that the ordinance was invalid as preempted by state law. The circuit court granted the village's motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance was preempted by state law. The ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with, defeated the purpose of, and violated the spirit of the legislature's delegation of authority to the DNR to regulate high capacity wells.