Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from the NRDC's complaint against the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) alleging that SCAQMD violated the Clean Air Act (CAA), section 173(c), by distributing invalid credits from its offset accounts under Rules 1304 and 1309.1 of the Regulation XIII rules; that SCAQMD violated Regulation XIII as well as section 173(c) by maintaining invalid credits in its offset accounts; and that SCAQMD violated the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule approving Regulation XIII and section 173(c) by failing to track emission reductions to show it maintained positive account balances in its offset accounts. The NRDC appealed the district court's grant of SCAQMD's motion to dismiss the NRDC's claims against (SCAQMD). The court held that the district court did not err in determining it lacked jurisdiction under section 304 of the CAA over the alleged violations of section 173(c). The court also held that the district court did not err in concluding that the NRDC otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted where Regulation XIII did not contain validity requirements for SCQMD's internal offsets and the EPA rules did not require SCAQMD to use a tracking system. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgments.

This suit followed BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc.'s (BPXA) temporary shut-down of its pipelines and oil production in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, upon its discovery of a leak in a pipeline located in its Prudhoe Bay Eastern Operating Area. Plaintiff, on behalf of a class of purchasers of BP p.l.c. shares, subsequently brought a class action suit against BPXA alleging claims arising under Sections 10(b), 18, and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act (SEC), 15 U.S.C. 78b(b), 78r, and 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5. Both parties appealled in part from the judgment of the district court. The court held that BPXA's breach of a contractual promise of specific future conduct, even though the contract was filed in conjunction with SEC reporting requirements, was not a sufficient foundation for a securities fraud action. The court declined plaintiff's invitation to review other issues that were not certified for interlocutory appeal. In light of the court's conclusion that breached contractual obligations did not constitute misrepresentations by BPXA that were actionable under the securities laws, the court did not reach the issue of scienter. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

In a 1905 water exchange agreement, Big Ditch Irrigation Company conveyed its Big Cottonwood Creek water right to the Salt Lake City Corporation in exchange for the City's commitment to supply Big Ditch with a specified quantity of irrigation-quality water from City sources. Concerned that Big Ditch was infringing upon the City's water rights, the City initiated this case against Big Ditch and four Big Ditch shareholders in district court. The City sought declaratory judgment on several issues. Big Ditch and the shareholders counterclaimed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on most major issues. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed the defendants' counterclaims and correctly concluded that the City holds title to the water rights conveyed in the agreement. The Court held, however, that the district court erred in (1) determining that Big Ditch did not have a right to file change applications; (2) determining that the parties had modified the agreement or, alternatively, that Big Ditch was estopped from enforcing its right to the amount of water specified in the agreement; and (3) refusing to dismiss the City's claims against the shareholders.

The Georgia Parties, Gwinnett County, Georgia, and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) appealed from a grant of summary judgment in this consolidated suit arising from more than 20 years of litigation between the parties. All of the underlying cases related to the Corps' authority to operate the Buford Dam and Lake Lanier, the reservoir it created, for local water supply. On appeal, the parties raised several jurisdictional matters and asserted a number of substantive claims. The court held that the district court erred in finding that it had jurisdiction to hear certain parties because the Corps had not taken final agency action. The court also held that the district court and the Corps erred in concluding that water supply was not an authorized purpose of the Buford Project under the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), Pub. L. No. 79-525, 60 Stat. 634. The court also held that the district court erred in finding that the 1956 Act expired after 50 years. The court also provided certain instructions to the Corps on remand and the Corps shall have one year to make a final determination of its authority to operate the Buford Project under the RHA and the Water Supply Act, 43 U.S.C. 390b(a).

Appellants formerly maintained railroad tracks on a parcel of land in Stockton, California, that was contaminated by petroleum. The petroleum was spilled at a nearby industrial site and migrated onto the property via an underground french drain that appellants had installed in order to remove water from the roadbed. At issue was whether appellants were liable for the contamination of the property under the law of nuisance or under California's Polanco Redevelopment Act (Act), Cal. Health & Safety Code 33459 et seq. The court held that there was no evidence that appellants actively or knowingly caused or permitted the contamination as required for nuisance liability and liability under the Act's Water Code provision, Cal. Health & Safety Code 33459(h). The court also held that appellants were not "owners" of the property under the Act's Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a), provision when the contamination occurred. The court further held that, because the record established no genuine issue of material fact as to appellants' liability, appellants were entitled to summary judgment. Therefore, the court need not reach any of the damages issues on appeal or cross-appeal.

In 2006, the Upper Yampa Water Conservancy District (District) filed an application for absolute water rights, based on their conditional water rights on "Four Counties Ditch Number 3." The State Engineers opposed the application and moved for summary judgment. The water court denied the Engineers' motion, but ruled as a matter of law that in order to perfect a conditional water storage right, the District needed to show that “it diverted and put to beneficial use water in excess of its existing absolute decrees.” Upon careful consideration of the water court's record, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision.

Petitioners petitioned for review of a regulation promulgated by the EPA setting performance standards for new and existing hospital/medical/infection waste incinerators ("HMIWI"). Petitioners argued that the data set EPA used to establish these standards was flawed, that the agency's pollutant-by-pollutant approach to setting target emissions levels was impermissible, and that the agency acted arbitrarily when it removed a provision exempting HMIWI from complying with the standards during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction. The court held that the EPA's decision to use emissions data from the HMIWI units remaining in operation after the implementation of the 1997 standards, once it determined that the data set upon which it had relied in 1997 was flawed, was reasonable. The court held, however, that it did not have jurisdiction to review the challenges to the EPA's long-standing practice of setting emissions floors based on emissions levels achieved by the best performing unit or units for each individual pollutant, and to the agency's removal of an exemption from compliance with emissions limitations during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction. Accordingly, the petitioned was dismissed in part and denied in part.

Montana Trout Unlimited (MTU) appealed from an order of the water court dismissing its objections to water right claims by claimants Beaverhead Water Company, et al. Those claims were contained in the water court's temporary preliminary decree for the Big Hole River Basin. At issue in the appeal was whether the water court erred in holding (1) that only the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks may represent the public recreational and conservation interests in water adjudication proceedings, and (2) that only water right claimants may request a hearing on their objections in water adjudication proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) there is no statutory or regulatory restriction on who is entitled to file an objection to a claim of water right contained in a temporary preliminary decree, and (2) based on the state's ownership of the waters of Montana which it holds in public trust and the undisputed specific interests of the members of MTU in the Big Hole River basin, MTU has a sufficient ownership interest in water or its use to demonstrate good cause to require the water court to hold a hearing on its objections under Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-223.

A group neighbors (Neighbors-Appellants) in the Town of Dorset appealed an Environmental Court decision that granted Applicant Bradford Tyler’s application for a zoning permit for the construction of a self-storage facility in the Dorset Village Commercial District. Appellants contend that the court erred in determining the rental storage units to be an authorized land use within the applicable Dorset zoning district. Applicant Tyler owns and resides on a 5.6-acre property located in the Village Commercial District (VC District) of Dorset. He filed for a zoning permit to construct a self-storage facility on his property. The Town Planning Commission issued written approval of applicant’s site development plan. Following this, the Town Zoning Administrator issued a zoning permit. Interested neighbors appealed to the Dorset Zoning Board of Adjustment, contending that applicant’s proposed self-storage facility is not a “retail sales/rentals” use, as required by the town’s Zoning Bylaws for development in the VC District. Neighbors, in response to applicant questioning the validity of a decision rendered by less than a majority of the Board, appealed to the Environmental Court. They asserted that, regardless of the majority vote issue, the earlier approval by the Zoning Administrator was erroneous and should be voided. Applicant cross-appealed, arguing that the Board’s denial was invalid and that the proposed facility was a permitted use in the VC District. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the question of whether a storage facility was permitted. The Environmental Court granted applicant’s motion and denied Neighbors’, holding that the proposed use was permissible as a “retail rental.” Upon review of the lower court's record and the applicable zoning statutes, the Supreme Court acknowledged the conflict created by a plain reading of the definition of "retail" in the statute: "[d]efining “retail” in terms of sales arguably creates a conflict when used to define “retail rentals” . .. Using the common understanding of the words involved, and in the context of the overall scheme and purpose of the VC District, it is clear that the Bylaws’ drafters intended “retail sales/rentals” to include only residential and small-scale commercial establishments trading in services or in goods, for sale and for rent, as opposed to renting storage space as applicant proposes." Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the Environmental Court.

The City of Great Falls, Benefis Health Care, and Electric City Power (ECP) filed a complaint with the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) challenging the lawfulness of NorthWestern Energy's (NWE) refusal to allow ECP to provide electricity supply to meters owned by the City and Benefis. The PSC issued a final order concluding that ECP could not provide electricity supply service to the disputed meters, basing its decision upon its interpretation that "customer," as contained in Mont. Code Ann. 69-8-201(2), meant an individual meter or point of delivery, rather than an entity or person. The City, Benefis, and ECP appealed the final order. The district court reversed, finding error in the PSC's statutory interpretation, and remanded the matter to the PSC to allow all of the City's and Benefis' meters to receive electricity supply service from ECP. NWE and the PSC appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court correctly determined that under the statute, the term "customer" means an entity or person rather than an individual meter and, accordingly, correctly permitted the City and Benefis to receive electricity from ECP at the disputed meters.