Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

West Coast Seafood Processors Association (WCSPA) appealed from the district court's denial of its motion to intervene as a defendant in this case, in which the NRDC challenged the National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) program to preserve groundfish species off the coast of California, Oregon, and Washington. The Magistrate Judge denied the motion as untimely because of the age of the litigation where WCSPA sought to intervene when the case was already eight years old. While that appeal was pending, however, the underlying litigation -the dispute between NRDC and NMFS- fully ran its course. At issue was whether WCSPA could appeal the denial of its motion to intervene when the district court had entered final judgment on the underlying lawsuit. The court held that the WCSPA's appeal was moot where it was not reasonable to expect that the dispute about timeliness would arise again and where the intervention controversy did not evade review because the intervention dispute was not "inherently limited in duration" nor "likely always to become moot." Accordingly, the appeals were moot and no exceptions to mootness could revive them.

This case stemmed from a challenge to the EPA's regulation of ozone under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7409(a). At issue was an EPA "guidance document" addressing obligations of regions still in nonattainment of a now-revoked ozone air quality standard. The court held that the Guidance qualified as a legislative rule that the EPA was required to issue through notice and comment rulemaking and that one of its features, the so-called attainment alternative, violated the Clean Air Act's plain language. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the Guidance.

This case stemmed from petitioner's rates filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for its Michigan oil pipeline where petitioner agreed with two of its three shippers to restrict rate increases for a three-year moratorium period. At issue was the initial rate petitioner must use to calculate its new annual ceiling levels. Petitioner argued that after the end of the moratorium period, its ceiling levels should be calculated as if its maximum rates had been set under FERC's indexing methodology all along. In contrast, FERC would simply pick up the rates where the settlement agreement left off, using the last rate under the agreement as the initial rate for the period after the agreement. The court held that neither the agreement nor the relevant regulations clearly laid out how to determine the rates petitioner could charge now that the three-year period had past. Therefore, finding both the agreement and the regulations ambiguous, the court deferred to the reasonable views of FERC and denied petitioner's petition for review.

Appellants Shenandoah, LLC, David Shlansky, Ting Chang, and other entities and individuals, appealed the Environmental Court's summary judgment decision upholding an "Act 250" jurisdictional opinion. Appellants have a variety of overlapping interests. Mr. Shlansky created an irrevocable trust (Trust) to benefit his and his wife Chang's children. As settler of the Trust, Mr. Shlansky contributed the property that is the subject of the underlying jurisdictional opinion. The Trust has an ownership stake in various companies that have engaged in land-development activities in the relevant jurisdictional area. Shenandoah, LLC, one such created entity, sought to build a ten-unit residential housing project. In August 2008, Shenandoah requested a jurisdictional opinion to determine if the project required an "Act 250" permit. In a September 2008 decision, the district coordinator found that the project required an Act 250 permit because it involved the construction of a housing project with ten or more units. Appellants appealed portions of this decision to the Environmental Court. The court upheld the district coordinator's jurisdictional opinion. The court concluded that Mr. Shlansky and Ms. Chang benefited from the Trust's land-development activities so the Trust's development activities were attributable to them personally. Appellants challenged this conclusion on appeal. As support for their position, they pointed to the affidavits filed by Mr. Shlansky, Ms. Chang and "the legal existence of the Trust, which is irrevocable." Upon review of the lower court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Court's decision. As the Environmental Court concluded, benefit to the parents rendered them "persons" affiliated with subdivisions and development previously undertaken by entities owned or affiliated with the Trust as defined by Act 250.

Three state and local governmental units, along with individual citizens, petitioned the court for review of and other relief from two "determinations" made by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the other respondents: the DOE's attempt to withdraw the application it submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a license to construct a permanent nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada; and the DOE's apparent decision to abandon development of the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste depository. The court concluded that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101-270, set forth a process and schedule for the siting, construction, and operation of a federal repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. At this point in that process, the DOE had submitted a construction license application for the Yucca Mountain repository and the NRC maintained a statutory duty to review that application. Therefore, the court held that unless and until petitioners were able to demonstrate that one of the respondents had either violated a clear duty to act or otherwise affirmatively violated the law, petitioners' challenges to the ongoing administrative process was premature. Accordingly, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over petitioners' claims and dismissed the petitions.

Appellants, nonprofit environmental organizations, appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered by the district court in an action against the EPA under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., challenging the EPA Administrator's failure to take action to prevent the construction of three proposed pollution-emitting facilities in Kentucky. The court held that the validity of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permits issued under the noncompliant State Implementation Plan (SIP), and the possible invalidity of the amended SIP, sufficiently raised a current controversy to save the litigation from mootness. The court also held that the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., did not provide a cause of action to review the EPA Administrator's failure to act under section 7477 of the CAA because her decision was an agency action "committed to agency discretion by law." Therefore, the EPA Administrator's decision was discretionary and not justiciable and thus, appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Although the district court dismissed the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court affirmed the district court's action because dismissal would otherwise have been proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Defendant Robert St. Onge, president and member of Winterwood, operated a composting facility at his farm that accepted solid waste and converted it into compost for sale. The Department of Environmental Protection filed a land use complaint against Winterwood related to the discharge of pollutants from its composting operation into a nearby brook. The court entered a contempt order that required Winterwood to cease the discharge of pollutants into state waters. On the Department's motion to enforce the contempt order, the court ordered that Winterwood was immediately prohibited from receiving any other composting material. Later, four different waste companies delivered waste to Winterwood for composting. The state filed a criminal complaint and summons, charging St. Onge as principal of Winterwood with contempt. In superior court, St. Onge signed a jury trial waiver. The court adjudicated St. Onge to be in contempt as a Class D crime and sentenced him to six months in jail. St. Onge appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed all aspects of the judgment with the exception of the Class D modification. Because an adjudication of contempt with punitive sanctions is not a Class D crime, the judgment was modified accordingly.

This case stemmed from the NRDC's complaint against the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) alleging that SCAQMD violated the Clean Air Act (CAA), section 173(c), by distributing invalid credits from its offset accounts under Rules 1304 and 1309.1 of the Regulation XIII rules; that SCAQMD violated Regulation XIII as well as section 173(c) by maintaining invalid credits in its offset accounts; and that SCAQMD violated the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule approving Regulation XIII and section 173(c) by failing to track emission reductions to show it maintained positive account balances in its offset accounts. The NRDC appealed the district court's grant of SCAQMD's motion to dismiss the NRDC's claims against (SCAQMD). The court held that the district court did not err in determining it lacked jurisdiction under section 304 of the CAA over the alleged violations of section 173(c). The court also held that the district court did not err in concluding that the NRDC otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted where Regulation XIII did not contain validity requirements for SCQMD's internal offsets and the EPA rules did not require SCAQMD to use a tracking system. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgments.

This suit followed BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc.'s (BPXA) temporary shut-down of its pipelines and oil production in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, upon its discovery of a leak in a pipeline located in its Prudhoe Bay Eastern Operating Area. Plaintiff, on behalf of a class of purchasers of BP p.l.c. shares, subsequently brought a class action suit against BPXA alleging claims arising under Sections 10(b), 18, and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act (SEC), 15 U.S.C. 78b(b), 78r, and 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5. Both parties appealled in part from the judgment of the district court. The court held that BPXA's breach of a contractual promise of specific future conduct, even though the contract was filed in conjunction with SEC reporting requirements, was not a sufficient foundation for a securities fraud action. The court declined plaintiff's invitation to review other issues that were not certified for interlocutory appeal. In light of the court's conclusion that breached contractual obligations did not constitute misrepresentations by BPXA that were actionable under the securities laws, the court did not reach the issue of scienter. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

In a 1905 water exchange agreement, Big Ditch Irrigation Company conveyed its Big Cottonwood Creek water right to the Salt Lake City Corporation in exchange for the City's commitment to supply Big Ditch with a specified quantity of irrigation-quality water from City sources. Concerned that Big Ditch was infringing upon the City's water rights, the City initiated this case against Big Ditch and four Big Ditch shareholders in district court. The City sought declaratory judgment on several issues. Big Ditch and the shareholders counterclaimed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on most major issues. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed the defendants' counterclaims and correctly concluded that the City holds title to the water rights conveyed in the agreement. The Court held, however, that the district court erred in (1) determining that Big Ditch did not have a right to file change applications; (2) determining that the parties had modified the agreement or, alternatively, that Big Ditch was estopped from enforcing its right to the amount of water specified in the agreement; and (3) refusing to dismiss the City's claims against the shareholders.