Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The Minch Family sued the Estate of the Norbys in diversity, seeking injunctive relief and damages for flooding of the Minch Family's property, allegedly caused by a field dike built on the Norbys' land. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that the Minch Family's claims were time-barred and whether the magistrate judge abused its discretion by denying the Minch Family's motion to amend its complaint to allege a claim for punitive damages and the Minch Family's motion to amend the scheduling order. The court held that the Minch Family had failed to meet its burden of showing that the applicable two year-statute of limitations should be tolled and its claims were untimely. The court held that because it had affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Minch Family's claims as time-barred, the issue of punitive damages was moot. The court further held that because the Minch Family's motion only related to its claim for punitive damages, the court need not address the issue of whether the magistrate judge abused its discretion in denying its motion to amend the court's scheduling order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs owned intertidal land on Maine's coast that lay in front of the property of Defendants. Defendants owned a commercial scuba diving business and would walk with their clients from their property onto and across Plaintiffs' intertidal land in order to scuba dive. Plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that Defendants had no right to cross their intertidal land for scuba diving and seeking an injunction prohibiting such use. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, declaring that crossing the Plaintiffs' intertidal land to access the water for recreational or commercial scuba diving was within the public's right to use intertidal land for navigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, as a matter of Maine common law, the public has a right to walk across intertidal lands to reach the ocean for purposes of scuba diving.

Petitioners challenged an order of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) concerning the proposed construction by the Port of Portland of a new runway at Hillsboro Airport (HIO). On appeal, petitioners argued that the decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was unreasonable for several reasons, chief among them the FAA's failure to consider the environmental impacts of any increased demand for HIO resulting from the addition of a runway. Petitioners also argued that the FAA did not afford them a public hearing within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 47106. As a preliminary matter, the court addressed the Port's and the FAA's arguments that petitioners waived their claims because they failed to raise them during the public comment period. The court held, after finding that certain precedents did not apply here, that remand was necessary for the FAA to consider the environmental impact of increased demand resulting from the HIO expansion project, if any, pursuant to the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA), 40 C.F.R. 1508.8(b). The court also held that an EIS was not warranted based on petitioners' contention that the context and intensity of the project independently required an EIS. The court further held that petitioners' arguments regarding whether the FAA afforded them a public hearing was unpersuasive where the hearing afforded petitioners was a "public hearing" within the meaning of section 47106 and FAA Order 5050.4B. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded with instructions to the FAA to consider the environmental impact of increased demand resulting from the HIO expansion project pursuant to section 1508.8(b).

The Rageths filed suit against the Sidon Irrigation District seeking a declaration of their conveyance rights in the Sidon Canal, reimbursement of water delivery fees paid to the District for past irrigation seasons, and the establishment of a reasonable annual water delivery fee in future years. The parties executed a stipulation that the Rageths have a perpetual right, as defined by their adjudicated water rights, to divert water from the District's diversion structure and convey such water through the Sidon Canal to their property, subject to an annual payment to the District. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District on the Rageths' remaining claims. At issue on appeal was, in the absence of an agreement, what water delivery fee may an irrigation district charge a non-member who has a perpetual right to convey that non-member's adjudicated appropriation to that non-member's land outside the irrigation district's boundaries using the irrigation district's canal and related facilities. The Supreme Court reversed the district court, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed and holding that the Rageths' proportionate share of the requisite expenses must be based on an equitable apportionment determined after consideration of the various relevant factors. Remanded.

Named plaintiffs are residents of a residential area of about 2000 people. Defendants, chemical companies, operated a facility one mile north of the area. Plaintiffs allege that defendants dumped wastewater into a lagoon that seeped into an aquifer where it degraded into vinyl chloride, a carcinogen. The district court denied certification of a class seeking medical monitoring for village residents exposed to airborne vinyl chloride between 1968 and 2002, and a liability-only issue class seeking compensation for property damage from the exposure. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in finding plaintiffs would be unable to prove a concentration of vinyl chloride that would create a significant risk of contracting a serious latent disease for all class members. A single injunction or declaratory judgment could not provide relief to each member of the class, due to individual issues unrelated to the monetary nature of the claim. Each person's work, travel, and recreational habits may have affected their level of exposure. Certification of a liability-only issue class could unfairly impact defendants and absent class members.

Asian carp have migrated up the Mississippi River and are at the brink of the man-made Chicago-Area Waterway System path to the Great Lakes. The carp are dangerous to the eco-system, people, and property. States bordering the Lakes filed suit, alleging that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago manage the system in a manner that will allow carp to move into the Great Lakes, in violation of the federal common law of public nuisance. The district court denied a preliminary injunction that would have required additional physical barriers, new procedures to stop invasive carp, and an expedited study of how best to separate the Mississippi and Great Lakes permanently. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs presented enough evidence to establish a likelihood of harm, a non-trivial chance that carp will invade Lake Michigan in numbers great enough to constitute a public nuisance and that harm to the plaintiff states would be irreparable. The defendants have, however, mounted a full-scale effort to stop the carp and has promised that additional steps will be taken in the near future. This effort diminishes any role that equitable relief would otherwise play and an interim injunction would only get in the way.

Original defendants wanted to build a power plant in southern Illinois. In the first appeal, the Seventh Circuit concluded that defendants' Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) permit (42 U.S.C. 7475(a)), had expired. After the ruling, the district court assessed a penalty of $100,000 on all defendants, jointly and severally, and awarded attorneys' fees to Sierra Club. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that defendant waived constitutional arguments by not raising them before the district court. The court acted within its discretion; it considered all of the relevant statutory factors and did not make any clearly erroneous findings of fact in assessing a penalty and awarding fees.

Appellant, Summer Night Oil Company, and Appellees, individuals and oil companies, resolved a dispute over the operation of two oil wells through a settlement agreement. Appellant filed a motion to compel performance of the agreement after the parties failed to perform timely their obligations under the agreement. Specifically, Appellant asked the district court to compel Appellees to deliver all title clearance documents under the agreement. Appellees responded with a request to compel Appellant to pay a fine due to the EPA and a payment owed to Appellees under the agreement. Both parties sought attorney fees. The district court enforced what it determined to be the plain meaning of the agreement's terms, and (1) ordered Appellant to pay the fine owed to the EPA, (2) ordered Appellant to pay Appellee the amount owed it under the agreement, (3) ordered Appellees to deliver all title clearance documents to an escrow agent, and (4) declined to award attorney fees to either party. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Appellant's motion to compel performance of the agreement according to Appellant's terms, and (2) the district court correctly denied Appellant's motion to alter or amend its judgment.

The superior court interpreted a statutory preference for the purchase of state land in a manner that disqualified Appellant Melvin Gillis, from which he appealed. Appellant is a professional sport hunting and fishing guide. He obtained a 25-year lease of five acres of state land in April 1989. Appellant built a lodge on the land, and the operation of the lodge and his guiding business were his principal sources of income. In 2005, the state Department of Natural Resources (DNR) conveyed lands, including the land Appellant leased, to Aleutians East Borough. DNR also transferred its interest in Appellant's lease to the Borough. Appellant offered to purchase the land in November 2005. The Borough Assembly rejected Appellant's offer but proposed a new lease agreement. Appellant did not execute the proposed lease, and in 2007 he claimed he was eligible to purchase the land under state law. The Borough then filed a declaratory judgment action, asking the superior court to determine whether Appellant qualified for a preference right to purchase the land. The issue on appeal was whether the applicable statute required an applicant to enter land while it was under federal ownership as a condition of the preference right. The superior court concluded that the plain meaning of the statute required an applicant to enter land when it was under federal ownership before the federal government conveyed the land to the state. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the Borough and DNR. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's interpretation of the applicable statute and its summary judgment decision.

This case stemmed from a challenge by environmental groups to a proposed incremental drawdown of water from Lake Roosevelt in eastern Washington. At issue was whether the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) took a "hard look" and genuinely scrutinized the environmental consequence of its proposed action. The court held that, under its precedents and the circumstances presented, Reclamation's actions did not violate the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court also held that its review revealed no other deficiencies in the substance of the Environmental Assessment (EA), and although Reclamation took several steps toward implementing the drawdown project before drafting the EA, it scrupulously adhered to NEPA's timing requirements. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.