Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved the seizure and administrative forfeiture of two leopard trophies by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service from two hunters (plaintiffs) who attempted to import the leopards from African countries without proper export permits. Plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in dismissing their Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) claim for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the district court properly held that plaintiffs' CAFRA claim was barred from judicial review where plaintiffs received proper notice of the proposed forfeitures; plaintiffs chose to pursue an administrative path and filed petitions for remission and petitions for supplemental remission; and plaintiffs' choice to pursue such administrative remedies waived the opportunity for judicial forfeiture proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the action.

Trade associations representing commercial ship owners and operators petitioned for review of a nationwide permit issued by the EPA for the discharge of pollutants incidental to the normal operation of vessels. Petitioners raised a number of procedural challenges, all related to the EPA's decision to incorporate into the permit conditions that states submitted to protect their own water quality. The court held that because petitioners had failed to establish that the EPA could alter or reject state certification conditions, the additional agency procedures they demanded would not have afforded them the relief they sought. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.

This case concerned the San Diego fairy shrimp, an aquatic animal found in southern California, that was designated as an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 1533. Plaintiffs, companies that owned land along the California-Mexico border, sued to challenge the designation of 143 acres of their property as critical habitat for the San Diego fairy shrimp. The court held that because the Fish and Wildlife Services had not reasonably explained how one isolated observation, involving a single 2001 sighting of four ant-sized San Diego fairy shrimp on the property at issue, demonstrated that plaintiffs' property was "occupied" by the San Diego fairy shrimp in 1997 (the relevant statutory date), the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded. On remand, the court ordered the district court to vacate the designation of plaintiffs' property as critical habitat for the San Diego fairy shrimp.

The issue central to this appeal involves the Northern San Juan Basin Coal Bed Methane project (Project) which was approved by the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). The Project contemplates the construction of numerous gas wells within the San Juan National Forest and on other federal lands. San Juan Citizens Alliance (SJCA) and four other environmental advocacy groups filed suit in district court in Colorado for alleged violations of the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The suit contends that the 2007 record of decision approving the Project was unlawful. Several companies holding valid leases in the area and interested in drilling for gas were permitted to intervene. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. SJCA argued on appeal that the Project violated the NFMA because it is inconsistent with provisions of the San Juan National Forest Plan protecting old-growth ponderosa pine forests, wildlife habitat and riparian areas. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit vacated a portion of the district court judgment pertaining to the NFMA claims that challenged approval of the Project. The Court dismissed those claims without prejudice. Additionally, the Court affirmed the district court's order regarding the NEPA. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings.

Appellants Campaign for Ratepayers' Rights, Conservation Law Foundation, Freedom Logistics, Halifax-American Energy Co, TransCanada Hydro Northeast, Union of Concerned Scientists and Jackson Perry appealed orders of the New Hampshire Site Evaluation Committee that denied their motion for declaratory judgment. This case involved the installation of a wet flue gas desulphurization system (also known as a "scrubber") at a electricity generating facility in Bow owned by Appellee Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH). Appellants sought a declaratory judgment from the Committee to determine whether the Committee had jurisdiction over modifications to the scrubber. Any modification would have constituted a 'sizable addition' to the existing substation facility in violation of state environmental law. Appellants argued that the Committee made a number of errors that lead to an erroneous ruling that the scrubber project was not sizable enough to implicate the law. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Committee lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether the scrubber was sizable enough. The Court vacated the Committee's decision.

Oceana, Inc. brought this suit against the National Marine Fisheries Service challenging as unlawful the methodology it used to track bycatch in the fisheries of the Northeastern coast of the United States. At issue was whether the district court properly concluded that the methodology satisfied applicable law and properly entered summary judgment for the Fisheries Service. The court held that because the Fisheries Service had merely described but had not, as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, as amended by the Sustainable Fisheries Act, 16 U.S.C. 1801-1884, required, "established" a "standardized reporting methodology" to assess bycatch in the Northeastern fisheries, the court reversed the judgment and instructed the district court to vacate the ruling adopting the methodology and to remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment of the district court vacating summary judgment for defendants where plaintiffs alleged that defendants, operator of a calcium carbonate mineral processing facility, were liable for creating an "imminent and substantial endangerment" within the meaning of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901-92. Liability was predicated upon a finding that aminoethylethanolamine (AEEA) was present in defendants' waste. The court held that plaintiffs' claim that AEEA presented an imminent and substantial endangerment in violation of the RCRA was properly dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)96) where plaintiffs' failure to specify arsenic in their notice of intent to sue (NOI) supported the district court's dismissal of the endangerment claim and the open dumping claim. The court held that the dismissal of the action would not prohibit plaintiffs from again giving notice to defendants and filing its suit in compliance with RCRA's notice and delay requirements upon future discovery of potential violations of the federal environmental laws. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This case stemmed from the City of Manhattan Beach's adoption of an ordinance banning the use of "point-of-sale plastic carry-out bags" in the city. Plaintiff, a coalition of plastic bag manufacturers and distributors, claimed standing to maintain a citizen suit to vindicate the public interest in environmental quality. At issue was what were the standing requirements for a corporate entity to challenge a determination on the preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR) and whether the city was required to prepare an EIR on the effects of the ordinance. The court held that plaintiff would qualify for public interest standing here and disapproved Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc. v. County of Alameda's holding that corporations were subject to heightened scrutiny when they filed citizen suits. The court also held that plaintiff, which represented businesses directly affected by the ordinance, had standing in its own right to challenge the city's analysis of environmental impacts. On the merits, the court held that substantial evidence and common sense support the city's determination that its ordinance would have no significant environmental effect. Therefore, a negative declaration was sufficient to comply with the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Pub. Resources Code, section 21000 et seq. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed.

Plaintiff sought damages from the United States for injuries to a child allegedly caused by exposure to the toxic heavy metal thallium from soil dumped into a landfill adjacent to the child' residence and school. The child, by her guardian ad litem, appealed a decision of the district court finding that the United States acted "reasonably" and did not breach any duty in conducting the soil remediation projects. The district court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the "discretionary function" exception to tort liability of the United States applied in this case. The court held that because the district court erred in holding that the "discretionary function" exception barred the Navy's liability on and the court's subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim, and clearly erred in finding that the Navy acted "reasonably" and not in breach of its duty in conducting the remediation of contaminated soil in the project at issue here, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court, nevertheless, held that it was unnecessary to reassign the case to a different judge on remand.

The Sierra Club and several related parties brought this action against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) seeking to set aside a Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., permit (the section 404 permit) the Corps had issued to the Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) which planned to construct a new power plant. SWEPCO subsequently appealed the preliminary injunctions ordered by the district court, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the Sierra Club and Hunting Club had Article III standing. The court also held that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success where there was ample evidence in the record to show that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on at least three of their claims; that there was a likelihood of irreparable harm; that the balance of harms weighed in favor of an injunction; and that the public interest that might be injured by a preliminary injunction did not outweigh the public interest that would be served by the injunction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the preliminary injunction.