Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Sanpete America purchased 110 acres of farmland and water rights from Christian Willardsen pursuant to a land purchase agreement and a warranty deed. After discovering problems with respect to the conveyance of the water right at issue, Sanpete America filed a complaint against Willardsen and Douglas Neeley, Willardsen's attorney, asserting various causes of action and seeking damages. Two successive district court judges issued judgments dismissing Sanpete America's claims against Willardsen and Neeley. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed both judges' conclusion that Sanpete America was entitled to no damages and judgment dismissing Sanpete America's claims, holding (1) Willardsen conveyed his portion of the water right to Sanpete America under a warranty deed, (2) Willardsen breached no covenants in the deed, and (3) Neeley's actions were not the cause of Sanpete America's alleged damages.

The National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) petitioned for review of a final rule promulgated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) setting forth energy conservation standards for electric induction motors ranging in power output from .25 to 3 horsepower (Final Rule). In promulgating the Final Rule, the DOE invoked its authority to establish energy conservation standards for "small electric motor[s]," a term defined by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), 42 U.S.C. 6311(13)(G). NEMA contended that the relevant statutory definition unambiguously excluded all such motors exceeding 1 horsepower, as well as certain motors rated at and less than 1 horsepower, from being regulated as small electric motors. The court held that the Final Rule embodied a permissible interpretation of the statutory definition and therefore, denied the petition for review.

Plaintiff, an environmental organization, filed this administrative mandamus action to challenge the issuance of a federally required permit authorizing the Moss Landing Powerplant (MLPP) to draw cooling water from the adjacent Moss Landing Harbor and Elkhorn Slough. This case presented issues concerning the technological and environmental standards, and the procedures for administrative and judicial review, that apply when a thermal powerplant, while pursuing the issuance or renewal of a cooling water intake permit from a regional board, also sought necessary approval from the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission), of a plan to add additional generating units to the plant, with related modifications to the cooling intake system. The court held that the superior court had jurisdiction to entertain the administrative mandamus petition here under review. The court also held that the trial court erred when it deferred a final judgment, ordered an interlocutory remand to the board for further "comprehensive" examination of that issue, then denied mandamus after determining that the additional evidence and analysis considered by the board on remand supported the board's reaffirmed findings. The court further held that recent Supreme Court authority confirmed that, when applying federal Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1326(b), standards for the issuance of this permit, the Regional Water Board properly utilized cost-benefit analysis. The court declined to address several other issues discussed by the parties. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

This interlocutory appeal arose from an action instituted in the district court to stop the government from rounding up, destroying, and auctioning off wild horses and burros in the Twin Peaks Herd Management Area on the California-Nevada border. Plaintiffs alleged that the government's actions would violate the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (Wild Horses Act), 16 U.S.C. 1331 et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court held that the injunction was moot because the roundup sought to be enjoined had taken place. The court noted that, in the event plaintiffs prevailed on the merits of their claims, the district court should consider what relief was appropriate.

This case stemmed from the proposed redevelopement of private property within the Middlesex Fells Reservation. Plaintiffs commenced an action against Fellsway Development LLC; Langwood Commons LLC; the Secretary of the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (Secretary); and the Commissioner of the Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR), seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief from alleged violations of the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), G.L.c. 30, section 61-62H, and regulations promulgated thereunder, 301 Code Mass. Regs. 11.00. Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing Counts I, II, and III of plaintiffs' complaint, brought under section 7A and G.L.c. 231A, against the Secretary for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As against the developers and the DCR, the court reversed only the judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under section 7A, and alleging a violation of MEPA's antisegmentation regulation promulgated at 301 Code Mass. Regs. 11.01(2)(c). Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings.

This case arose when an ocean-going tanker collided with a barge that was being towed on the Mississippi River, which resulted in the barge splitting in half and spilling its cargo of oil into the river. Following the filing of numerous lawsuits, including personal injury claims by the crew members and class actions by fishermen, the primary insurer filed an interpleader action, depositing its policy limits with the court. At issue was the allocations of the interpleader funds as well as the district court's finding that the maritime insurance policy's liability limit included defense costs. The court affirmed the district court's decision that defense costs eroded policy limits but was persuaded that its orders allocating court-held funds among claimants were tentative and produced no appealable order.

Plaintiffs David Scherer, John Licht, Mike Lopez, Barbara Brickley and Aaron Johnson brought suit to challenge the U.S. Forest Service's "amenity fee" through which it charges visitors to Mount Evans national park in Colorado. Plaintiffs asked the Tenth Circuit to strike down the Forrest Service's fee policy as facially inconsistent with Congress's directions and to hold it null and void in all applications. Upon review, the Court found it cannot strike the fee: "for better or worse, the Legislature has said that the Service may - sometimes - charge visitors. . . so some lawful applications of the policy do exist. . . [the fee] might well be susceptible to a winning challenge as applied to certain particular visitors, perhaps even the plaintiffs themselves. But that's a path the plaintiffs haven't asked us to explore and so one we leave for another day." The Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' case.

This case arose from an oil spill in the Mississippi River when an ocean-going tanker struck a barge that was being towed. Appellants (Excess Insurers) appealed the district court's decision requiring them to pay prejudgment interest on the funds deposited into the court's registry in an interpleader action. The Excess Insurers argued that the district court erred by: (1) finding that coverage under the excess policy was triggered by the primary insurer's filing of an interpleader complaint; (2) holding that a marine insurer that filed an interpleader action and deposited the policy limits with the court was obligated to pay legal interest in excess of the policy limits; and (3) applying the incorrect interest rate and awarding interest from the incorrect date. The court held that because the Excess Insurers' liability had not been triggered at the time the Excess Insurers filed their interpleader complaint, the district court erred in finding that they unreasonably delayed in depositing the policy limit into the court's registry and holding them liable for prejudgment interest. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and did not reach the remaining issues.

This appeal represented "the latest skirmish" in a long-running dispute over plans to develop a Wal-Mart discount retail store on an undeveloped 100-acre parcel of land in the Town of St. Albans. Appellants were interested individuals and groups opposed to the project. They appealed an Environmental Court decision that granted the site plan, conditional use, subdivision, and Act 250 permits for the development. They contended the trial court erred in: (1) approving site plan and conditional use permits despite the alleged conflict of interest of several members of the Town's development review board; (2) finding that the subdivision was compatible with adjacent land uses; and (3) concluding that the developer could reapply for an Act 250 permit despite an earlier denial.  Upon review of the lower court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.  

Appellants challenged a plan to manage the elk and bison populations in the National Elk Refuge and Grand Teton National Park pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge Improvement Act (Improvement Act), 15 U.S.C. 668dd-668ee. At issue was whether the plan's failure to commit to a deadline for ending supplemental feeding was arbitrary and capricious under the Improvement Act. Also at issue was whether the plan unlawfully gave the Wyoming Fish and Game Department a veto over whether supplemental feeding would end. The court held that the record amply demonstrated that the agencies collected the relevant data, identified the dangers posed by supplemental feeding, and adopted a plan to mitigate those dangers. They also determined that the many objectives of the Improvement Act, including conservation, would be best met without implementation of a fixed deadline for stopping supplemental feeding was not arbitrary or capricious. The court took the Secretary at his word that Wyoming had no veto over the Secretary's duty to end a practice that was concededly at odds with the long-term health of the elk and bison in the refuge. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.