Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Tarrant Regional Water District ("Tarrant"), a Texas state agency, applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("the OWRB") for permits to appropriate water at three locations in Oklahoma for use in Texas. Just before filing its applications, Tarrant sued the nine members of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board in the district court for the Western District of Oklahoma and sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate certain Oklahoma statutes that govern the appropriation and use of water and an injunction preventing OWRB from enforcing them. Tarrant alleged that the Oklahoma statutes restricted interstate commerce in water and thereby violated the dormant Commerce Clause as discriminatory or unduly burdensome. Tarrant further alleged that Congress did not authorize Oklahoma through the Red River Compact ("Compact") to enact such laws. OWRB responded that Congress did authorize Oklahoma to adopt these statutes by consenting to the Compact. Tarrant also claimed that the Compact preempted the Oklahoma statutes insofar as the Compact applied to Tarrant’s application to appropriate water located in the Red River Basin. The district court granted summary judgment for OWRB on both the dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause claims. After that decision, Tarrant took steps to export to Texas Oklahoma water that was not subject to the Compact. Tarrant negotiated a contract with property owners in Stephens County, Oklahoma to export groundwater to Texas and also entered a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Apache Tribe concerning the Tribe’s potential water rights. In court Tarrant then reasserted its dormant Commerce Clause challenge based on these transactions. The district court dismissed the Stephens County matter for lack of standing and the Apache Tribe matter as not ripe. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grants of summary judgment on the dormant Commerce Clause and preemption issues, and the dismissals based on standing and ripeness: [w]e hold that the Red River Compact insulates Oklahoma water statutes from dormant Commerce Clause challenge insofar as they apply to surface water subject to the Compact."

This dispute emerged from state and federal litigation over liability for damages and defense costs in certain environmental tort suits. At issue was an action for damages that appellants brought in federal court and a declaratory judgment action that appellee brought in state court, which appellants later removed to federal court. The district court dismissed the former and remanded the latter in light of a related third action that had been pending for several years in state court. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding that the parties' claims should be resolved in a more comprehensive action (Vulcan Action). The court also held that the district court had discretion under Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. and Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am. to remand the removed action. The court further held that the district court's concerns about piecemeal litigation and interfering with the progress made in the Vulcan Action supported dismissal under Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

In 2000 the conservancy purchased property, but allowed the farmer to remain as a tenant through 2003. The farmer/seller was required to perform removal of specified substances and warranted that there were no undisclosed underground tanks. The conservancy withheld funds pending clean-up. In 2006 the conservancy sued for breach of the warranty and failure to complete the clean-up. The district court allowed the conservancy to amend and claim damages with respect to newly-discovered contamination and entered judgment in favor of the conservancy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The claim is within the Illinois 10-year limitations period for actions and written contracts; the doctrine of laches does not apply.

Plaintiffs, ranches and their owners, owned an irrigation ditch on which they relied to irrigate hay fields for their cattle operation. The ditch ran through Nataliya Joukova's property. The dispute between the parties arose when Joukova placed a culvert in the ditch bottom and built a bridge of rock and gravel across a portion of the ditch for which Plaintiffs had secondary easement rights for ditch maintenance. The district court concluded that the culvert and bridge could remain in place as they did not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' secondary easement rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in allowing Joukova's culvert and rock bridge to remain in the irrigation ditch as (1) Joukova's construction of a structure permanently blocking use of a portion of Plaintiffs' secondary easement inarguably encroached on the easement, and (2) the law governing easements makes clear that construction of the culvert constituted an unreasonably interference with Plaintiffs' easement rights, for which the statute required Joukova to obtain written permission.

Jefferson Block submitted a claim under the London OPA Insurance Policy for Offshore Facilities (OPA Policy) for indemnification of the removal costs it incurred in responding to a pipeline leak. Underwriters denied the claim and Jefferson filed suit against Underwriters in district court, alleging that Underwriters wrongfully refused to indemnify it for oil pollution removal costs. The court held that the district court erred when it refused to apply the contra-insurer rule where the OPA Policy was ambiguous with respect to the issue of coverage for Jefferson Block's 16-inch pipeline and extrinsic evidence in the record did not conclusively resolve this ambiguity. Therefore, the court held that, since Jefferson Block offered a reasonable interpretation of the policy and did not completely draft the ambiguous provisions of the OPA Policy, the contra-insurer rule should apply and the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the insured, Jefferson Block.

The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) approved an application by BHP Navajo Coal Company (BNCC) to revise the mining plan at its Navajo Mine. Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment and San Juan Citizens Alliance (collectively Citizens) sought the Tenth’s Circuit’s review of the application under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Navajo Mine is a large open pit coal mine on tribal reservation lands in northwestern New Mexico. BNCC operates the mine under a long-standing lease with the Navajo Nation and a surface coal mining permit issued by OSM. In October 2005, after performing an Environmental Analysis (2005 EA) and making a finding of no significant impact (FONSI), OSM approved the application. In July 2007, Citizens filed this case. BNCC intervened. The district court concluded OSM’s approval of BNCC’s application was the type of action which normally requires preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under NEPA rather than the less comprehensive Environmental Assessment. The court then turned to the 2005 EA and concluded it was deficient in several respects. It remanded the matter to OSM to correct the deficiencies and reassess its FONSI. OSM and BNCC appealed the court’s decision. OSM later dismissed its appeal, but BNCC attacked the district court’s decision on all fronts. Citizens claimed there was no final, appealable, order under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because the district court remanded the case to OSM for further proceedings. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that there was no appealable order issued by the district court and dismissed the OSM’s and BNCC’s appeals.

The Minch Family sued the Estate of the Norbys in diversity, seeking injunctive relief and damages for flooding of the Minch Family's property, allegedly caused by a field dike built on the Norbys' land. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that the Minch Family's claims were time-barred and whether the magistrate judge abused its discretion by denying the Minch Family's motion to amend its complaint to allege a claim for punitive damages and the Minch Family's motion to amend the scheduling order. The court held that the Minch Family had failed to meet its burden of showing that the applicable two year-statute of limitations should be tolled and its claims were untimely. The court held that because it had affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Minch Family's claims as time-barred, the issue of punitive damages was moot. The court further held that because the Minch Family's motion only related to its claim for punitive damages, the court need not address the issue of whether the magistrate judge abused its discretion in denying its motion to amend the court's scheduling order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs owned intertidal land on Maine's coast that lay in front of the property of Defendants. Defendants owned a commercial scuba diving business and would walk with their clients from their property onto and across Plaintiffs' intertidal land in order to scuba dive. Plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that Defendants had no right to cross their intertidal land for scuba diving and seeking an injunction prohibiting such use. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, declaring that crossing the Plaintiffs' intertidal land to access the water for recreational or commercial scuba diving was within the public's right to use intertidal land for navigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, as a matter of Maine common law, the public has a right to walk across intertidal lands to reach the ocean for purposes of scuba diving.

Petitioners challenged an order of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) concerning the proposed construction by the Port of Portland of a new runway at Hillsboro Airport (HIO). On appeal, petitioners argued that the decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was unreasonable for several reasons, chief among them the FAA's failure to consider the environmental impacts of any increased demand for HIO resulting from the addition of a runway. Petitioners also argued that the FAA did not afford them a public hearing within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 47106. As a preliminary matter, the court addressed the Port's and the FAA's arguments that petitioners waived their claims because they failed to raise them during the public comment period. The court held, after finding that certain precedents did not apply here, that remand was necessary for the FAA to consider the environmental impact of increased demand resulting from the HIO expansion project, if any, pursuant to the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA), 40 C.F.R. 1508.8(b). The court also held that an EIS was not warranted based on petitioners' contention that the context and intensity of the project independently required an EIS. The court further held that petitioners' arguments regarding whether the FAA afforded them a public hearing was unpersuasive where the hearing afforded petitioners was a "public hearing" within the meaning of section 47106 and FAA Order 5050.4B. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded with instructions to the FAA to consider the environmental impact of increased demand resulting from the HIO expansion project pursuant to section 1508.8(b).

The Rageths filed suit against the Sidon Irrigation District seeking a declaration of their conveyance rights in the Sidon Canal, reimbursement of water delivery fees paid to the District for past irrigation seasons, and the establishment of a reasonable annual water delivery fee in future years. The parties executed a stipulation that the Rageths have a perpetual right, as defined by their adjudicated water rights, to divert water from the District's diversion structure and convey such water through the Sidon Canal to their property, subject to an annual payment to the District. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District on the Rageths' remaining claims. At issue on appeal was, in the absence of an agreement, what water delivery fee may an irrigation district charge a non-member who has a perpetual right to convey that non-member's adjudicated appropriation to that non-member's land outside the irrigation district's boundaries using the irrigation district's canal and related facilities. The Supreme Court reversed the district court, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed and holding that the Rageths' proportionate share of the requisite expenses must be based on an equitable apportionment determined after consideration of the various relevant factors. Remanded.