Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

A public power and irrigation district (District) filed an action against a development and other sublessees (collectively, Development) to quiet title to land owned by District and leased by Development. Development filed motions to dismiss the complaint, arguing that District's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be grante. The district court sustained the motions and overruled Development's motion for attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting Development's motions to dismiss because (1) the allegations in District's complaint, taken as true, were plausible and thus were sufficient to suggest that District had presented a justiciable controversy, and (2) the motions to dismiss filed in this case provided no notice that Development was asserting the affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel and res judicata. Remanded. View "Central Neb. Pub. Power v. Jeffrey Lake Dev." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the 2006 Gallatin National Forest Management Plan prepared by the United States Forest Service, arguing that the travel plan violated the Montana Wilderness Study Act of 1977, 16 U.S.C. 1131. The court held that the Study Act required the Service to ensure that current users of a wilderness study area were able to enjoy the wilderness character of the area as it existed in 1977, pending a congressional decision on whether to designate the area as wilderness. In this case, the Service had not adequately explained how the 1977 wilderness character of the relevant study area had been maintained despite an increase in the volume of motorized and mechanized recreation in the area. Therefore, the court concluded that the Service's adoption of the travel plan was arbitrary and capricious and affirmed the district court's decision finding that the Service's actions violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. View "Montana Wilderness Assoc., et al. v. McAllister, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner Town of Newington appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to the State through the the Pease Development Authority (PDA) and the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES). Before land from the former Pease Air Force Base was deeded to the PDA, the United States Air Force engaged in a series of environmental impact analyses required by federal law. Following several iterations of environmental documents and deed restrictions, PDA accepted title to the Pease AFB land in three title transfers between 1999 and 2005. Shortly thereafter, the Town began the process of designating prime wetlands within its borders pursuant to state law. Six wetlands were located within the former Pease base. DES initially "approved" the Town's request, but later clarified that it "did not purport to 'approve' the legality of the Town's designation of prime wetlands located within PDA boundaries, nor would the agency have statutory authority to do so." Several months later, as part of a proposed construction project on PDA land to expand an existing office building, an alteration of terrain permit application was filed with DES. The Town rejected, asserting that it involved fill within 100 feet of wetlands that the Town had designated as "prime" and, therefore, required a wetlands permit. DES disagreed. After the Wetlands Council dismissed its appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the Town filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief in superior court. The trial court concluded that PDA was not required to comply with the Town’s prime wetlands designations and, therefore, granted PDA and DES’s motion for summary judgment. Upon careful consideration of the superior court records and the deeds of the wetlands in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the DES' reservation when first 'approving' the six wetlands within the PDA did not confer the Town with standing to challenge any subsequent development. As such, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment. View "Town of Newington v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three environmental groups, brought suit in district court to challenge issuance of a permit authorizing the discharge of dredge and fill material into specified wetlands outside Tampa, Florida. Plaintiffs invoked three statutes: the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(C), the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1311(a), 1362(7), and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2). The district court issued a decision finding that defendants had not fully complied with its obligations under NEPA and the CWA, but rejected plaintiffs' ESA claim, granting summary judgment for plaintiffs on the first two claims and for defendants on the third. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, concluding that defendants did satisfy the demands of the three relevant statutes, except for failing to respond, in its treatment of the NEPA and ESA requirements, to a material contention as to the project's impact on an endangered species, the eastern indigo snake. View "Sierra Club, et al. v. Antwerp, et al." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court pertained to the Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act and whether it preempted a provision in a local zoning ordinance that established a setback for mining activities from all residential structures. The zoning ordinance at issue, which was enacted by Adams Township in Cambria County after the effective date of the Surface Mining Act, permits mining activities in a district known as the Conservancy (S) District only by special exception. Hoffman Mining Company, Inc. (Hoffman Mining) sought to mine for coal on a 182.1-acre tract of land within the Adams Township Conservancy (S) District adjacent to the Village of Mine 42. Hoffman Mining requested a special exception mine which was denied by the Zoning Board. Hoffman Mining appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the Zoning Board's denial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that with enactment of the Surface Mining Act, the General Assembly did not expressly or impliedly preempt a local zoning ordinance that imposes a residential setback from mining activities. The Court did "not discern an intent of the General Assembly to completely deprive local zoning authorities of their MPC-enabled authority and responsibility for land use management and planning as applied to the location and siting of surface mining in their municipalities." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "Hoffman Mining Co., v. Zoning Hearing Board of Adams Twp." on Justia Law

Cromwell Township appealed a Commonwealth Court's order that sentenced its supervisors to three to six months' imprisonment for contempt. The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) had approved the Township's comprehensive plan for sewage services, but the Township decided the Plan was too expensive to implement. Despite requesting several extensions of time, the Township failed to implement its plan. At the time, the Orbisonia Rockhill Joint Municipal Authority (ORJMA) which operated public sewage systems including those within the Township, was experiencing an overload in its wastewater treatment plant. The Township Board of Supervisors approached ORJMA and proposed a joint venture that would increase the capacity of ORJMA's plant and simultaneously decrease the anticipated cost to the Township for sewage treatment. The Township submitted an amended Plan which was accepted by the DEP. But prior to implementing the Plan, the Township Board elected new members. New members who openly opposed the Plan repealed the ordinances required under the amended Plan. The Township then stopped cooperating. The DEP filed suit to enforce the Plan asking that fines be levied against Board members and to set a timeline to purge the contempt. The court, unsatisfied with the Township's efforts to purge the contempt sentenced its members to jail time. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Township's failing to timely appeal the Plan and its amendment when new supervisors took office meant that the DEP's act was final, and the Township was foreclosed from challenging the Plan. However, the Court found that the Commonwealth Court's failing to use less restrictive means prior to imposing prison sentences on Board members compelled reversal: "the Commonwealth Court had lesser alternatives available to it in its attempt to compel Township's compliance with the court's prior order… but the Commonwealth Court inexplicably refused." The Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order sentencing Township Board members to imprisonment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pa. Dept. of Environ. Prot. v. Cromwell Twp." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of an oil spill on the Neches River. Appellants challenged the National Pollution Funds Center's (NPFC) final claim determination denying reimbursement for costs arising from the spill. The district court rejected appellants' challenge to the agency determination. The court concluded that the NPFC's interpretation of 33 U.S.C. 2703 was entitled to deference and that appellants have not demonstrated that the NPFC's denial of the third-party affirmative defense claim should be overturned under the standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. View "Buffalo Marine Services Inc., et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

Washington Township and the West Central Conservancy District (WCCD) owned property within the Town of Avon's boundaries that overlay an underground aquifer. After the Township and WCCD began exploring the possibility of drilling wells into the aquifer in order to withdraw water and sell it to third parties, the Town passed an ordinance that (1) prohibited taking water from a watercourse for retail, wholesale, or mass distribution unless done on behalf of the Town, and (2) defined a watercourse as any body of water whether above or below ground. The Township and WCCD filed complaints challenging the ordinance's validity under the state's Home Rule Act. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Township and WCCD. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the aquifer at issue was a watercourse under Indiana law; (2) the Home Rule Act permitted the Town to regulate another political unit's attempt to withdraw water from the aquifer; and (3) the Town's proposed regulation was not preempted by statutes authorizing the Department of Natural Resources to regulate aquifers. View "Town of Avon v. W. Cent. Conservancy Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs' insurance policy indemnifies them against liability under several federal environmental protection laws or the state-law equivalents. They attempted to invoke their policy for up to $10 million in coverage following an explosion on one of their vessels that resulted in an oil spill in the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal. The district court granted the insurer judgment on the pleadings that: it owed $5,000,000 per vessel, per incident and had fully honored the policy with respect to one vessel; it owed no coverage for either two others for in rem liability. It granted the insureds summary judgment on their breach of contract claim, finding that the insurer owed $5,000,000 in coverage for a vessel, was obligated to pay defense costs up to that amount, and had breached its contract by not doing so. It denied summary judgment on a claim of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Defendants Robin Colburn and Ronald and Richard Tennant appealed a superior court order that denied their motion to dismiss this action by Plaintiffs Richard and Cheryl Fellows and Benjamin Bellerose. Plaintiffs were successors-in-interest to property once owned by Defendants' parents. The property was subject to a 1996 lead paint abatement order. Defendants' parents sold the property to Jesus and Eileen Guzman who were not aware of the abatement order when they sold the property to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then brought suit upon discovery of the abatement order. Defendants argued that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over them because despite being administrators of their parents' estate, none of the Defendants actually lived in New Hampshire. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs failed to plead facts suffiient to justify the court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over Defendants as either successor trustees or beneficiaries. Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not plead facts sufficient for the court to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment.