Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Alvin Peterson appealed and the State Engineer, Todd Sando, cross-appealed a district court judgment affirming in part and reversing in part a State Engineer order that determined there was an unauthorized dam on Petitioner's property in Walsh County and required Petitioner to construct a drainage ditch to maintain water impounded by the dam at a level of 1543.5 feet mean sea level. The primary issue in this case involved the determination of the natural elevation of land at the site of the dam for purposes of deciding if the land impounded sufficient water to necessitate a water or construction permit. Petitioner owned land in Walsh County, which, along with other land in the area, contains a slough in a closed basin. Sometime before 1973, Petitioner dug a ditch to drain the slough. In 1973, the United States Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, the holder of wetland conservation easement for the slough, required Petitioner to restore the drained wetland. In 2009, Petitioner's neighbor filed a complaint with the State Engineer alleging an unauthorized dam existed on Petitioner's land. The neighbor claimed Petitioner had raised the height of the ditch plug above the slough's natural overflow elevation, which resulted in the impoundment of additional water in the slough without necessary water or construction permits. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment in part, and reversed in part, and affirmed the State Engineer's order. Specifically, the Court found that the district court's decision pertaining to costs was "a boilerplate, conclusory statement awarding the State Engineer 'costs as allowed by law,' and the State thereafter caused entry of a judgment that awarded [the Engineer] costs" without any delineation of those costs, or discussion of whether costs are allowed. "Under our jurisprudence disfavoring piecemeal appeals, [the Supreme Court] conclude[d] the State Engineer's failure to include any further delineation for costs in the final judgment constitutes a waiver of any costs it may have been entitled to in a proceeding before a district court acting as an appellate court in an administrative proceeding." Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's order pertaining to costs, and declined the State Engineer's request to remand for a determination of the costs, if any, to which it may be entitled in the Engineer's cross-appeal. The Court affirmed the district court's order in all other respects.

Plaintiff, engaged in treatment and disposal of regulated biomedical waste, had trouble with its shredder and obtained approval from the Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board to use autoclaves. After a few years, an inspector recommended that plaintiff's facility be shut down and ordered a landfill to stop accepting plaintiff's waste. Unable to resolve the matter with EQB, plaintiff sought a federal court injunction. The injunctions were denied, but plaintiff resumed handling waste. When a second shredder broke, an inspector again ordered the landfill to stop accepting waste and rejected several proposals for dealing with accumulated waste. Plaintiff's suit alleges more favorable treatment of a competitor and other constitutional violations. The district court dismissed for failure to link allegations to any particular defendant. The First Circuit affirmed, finding failure to meet minimal pleading standards. The complaint failed the plausibility test "spectacularly."

This case stemmed from the USFS's issuance of a revised Travel Management Plan governing recreational motorized and nonmotorized use on 1.1 million acres of the Lewis and Clark National Forest, including the Middle Fork Judith Wilderness Study area. At issue was whether the Travel Management Plan violated the Montana Wilderness Study Act of 1977 (Study Act), Pub. L. No. 95-150, section 3(a), 91 Stat 1243, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court held that nothing in the Study Act, which required the USFS to manage a wilderness study area so as to "maintain" its wilderness character as it existed in 1977, prohibited the USFS from exercising its discretion to enhance the wilderness character of a study area. The court also held that NEPA did not require the USFS to prepare a supplemental draft environmental impact statement (EIS) where, as here, the final decision made only minor changes and was qualitatively within the spectrum of the alternatives discussed in the draft EIS. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

This case stemmed from the use of the pesticide dichlorovinyl dimethyl phosphate (DDVP) to kill many types of insects. The NRDC sought review of an EPA order overruling the NRDC's objections to, inter alia, the EPA's risk assessments for the pesticide and denying NRDC's requests for a public evidentiary hearing. Because the EPA conducted certain DDVP risk assessments without using a tenfold children's safety factor that Congress provided should presumptively apply, and the EPA failed to explain why it did not apply this margin of safety, the court granted the NRDC's petition for review in part, vacated the EPA's order in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted after a three-day jury trial of four counts of injecting fluids into deep wells without a permit, in violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. 300h-2(b)(2). Defendant was also convicted of one count of making a "materially false" statement in a "matter within the jurisdiction" of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2). Defendant timely appealed. The court affirmed Counts One through Four under section 300h-2(b)(2) and held that the government was required to prove only that defendant willfully injected water into a well more than eighteen feet deep without a permit, knowing that a permit was required under Idaho law; the reference in 40 C.F.R. 147.650(a)(7) to specific provisions of Idaho law, including those applicable to permitting, make clear that the entire Idaho permitting process was approved and incorporated into the SDWA; and that section 300h-2(b)(2) did not exceed Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. The court affirmed Count Five under section 1001(a)(2) where defendant made a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that its limiting instruction and the stipulation cured any possible prejudice that might have been caused by the three references to "waste" and brief display. The court also held that testimony from a supervisor at the Idaho Department of Agriculture was used for the purpose of showing that defendant injected fluids "willfully" and that the testimony was a small part of the evidence presented to the jury that defendant acted "willfully." Thus, if there was any error in presenting the testimony, the error was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

From the 1930s until 1982, NL manufactured pigments on 440 acres surrounded by the Raritan River. NL later leased to manufacturers of sulfuric acid, until 2005, when a redevelopment agency acquired the site by eminent domain. NL had entered into an administrative consent order with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, requiring NL to investigate and perform remediation. The state had identified other sources of contamination and suggested a regional approach, but no action was taken. The redevelopment agreement provided that NL would retain liability for contamination of river sediments, but does not call for any remediation. In 2009, the U.S. EPA ordered remediation of river sediments upstream from the site. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed citizens suits under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(1)(B), and CWA, 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1). The district court dismissed, concluding that abstention was appropriate. The Third Circuit vacated, noting that the state has not taken action with respect to the contamination.

Woodmore Towne Centre applied for a non-tidal wetlands permit to construct a road extension and stream crossing in order to provide primary access into a development. After the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) approved the permit, Patuxent Riverkeeper, a nonprofit environmental group, initiated a judicial review action against MDE and Woodmore. The circuit court dismissed the action for lack of standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Riverkeeper had standing under Md. Code Ann. Envir. 5-204(f) to initiate a judicial review action because one of its members had alleged sufficient harm to his aesthetic, recreational, and economic interests in connection with the issuance of the non-tidal wetlands permit at issue.

This appeal arose from a dispute between a city and a rural water district over their rights to serve customers in several annexed areas of Douglas County, Kansas. Rural Water District No. 4 brought this suit against the City of Eudora under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the City violated the District's exclusive right to provide water service to current and prospective customers in violation of 7 U.S.C. 1926(b). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit was asked to resolve multiple federal and state legal issues concerning the competitive relationship between the water district and local municipality. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted by the parties and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated the trial verdict. The Court remanded the matter for further proceedings solely on the issue of whether the District's cooperation to secure a Rural Development guarantee was necessary to carry out the purposes of its organization. All other issues on appeal and cross-appeal were affirmed.

This case arose when the Port of Los Angeles prohibited motor carriers from operating drayage trucks on port property unless the motor carriers entered into concession agreements with the port. The concession agreements set forth fourteen specific requirements covering, among other things, truck driver employment, truck maintenance, parking, and port security. The agreements were adopted as part of the port's "Clean Truck Program," adopted in response to community opposition that had successfully stymied port growth. Plaintiff challenged the concession agreements, arguing that they were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAA Act), 49 U.S.C. 14501 et seq. The court held that the district court meticulously identified and applied the governing law. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the financial capability, maintenance, off-street parking, and placard provisions were not preempted. The court reversed the district court's conclusion that the employee-driver provision was saved from preemption by the market participant doctrine, and remanded for further proceedings.

This appeal arose from a dispute over an administrative amendment to the master development plan for Killington Resort Village granted to its co-applicants, the current owners of Killington Resort Village and SP Land Company. The District One Environmental Commission originally granted this administrative amendment authorizing the creation of fifteen subdivided lots over approximately 368 acres of Killington Resort Village for transfer to SP Land Company for "future development purposes" pursuant to Act 250 Rule 34(D). Mountainside Properties, LLC, an adjoining property owner, appealed the Environmental Court's denial of its motion to alter and amend the grant of summary judgment in favor of SP Land. Mountainside argued that the Environmental Court erred because: (1) administrative amendments under Rule 34(D) require an underlying Act 250 land use permit, and (2) co-applicants' fifteen-lot subdivision cannot be approved without demonstrating compliance with all Act 250 criteria under 10 V.S.A. 6086(a), as required by 10 V.S.A. 6081(a). Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Mountainside's argument and reversed the Environmental Court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.