Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated appeals, the court addressed the propriety of various actions taken by the EPA under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, with respect to Montana air quality from 1993 to 2008. In No. 02-71657, Montana Sulphur sought review of the EPA's final rule which partially disapproved a proposed revision to Montana's State Implementation Plan (SIP) governing sulfur dioxide (SO2). In No. 08-72642, Montana Sulphur sought review of the EPA's April 2008 final rule promulgating a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) for the State of Montana's SO2 emissions. Because the court concluded that the agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to either the SIP or FIP, the court denied both petitions for review. View "Montana Sulphur, et al. v. EPA" on Justia Law

In 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101–10270, to provide for government collection and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The NWPA authorized the Department of Energy to contract for disposal. In return for payment of fees into the Nuclear Waste Fund, the Standard Contract provided that the DOE would begin to dispose of SNF and HLW not later than January 31, 1998. Because collection and disposal did not begin, courts held that the DOE had breached the Standard Contract with the nuclear energy industry. The trial court found breach of plaintiff's contract, but granted summary judgment in favor of the government regarding the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and set damages for the breach at $10,014,114 plus the cost of borrowed funds for financing construction of a dry fuel storage project. On reconsideration, the trial court reduced damages to $9,735,634 and denied the cost of borrowed funds. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to borrowed fund, but and reversed denial of overhead costs. View "System Fuels, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased approximately 4,000 acres of land in Titus County, Texas, for use as a mitigation bank to offset the environmental impact of more destructive land use. 33 U.S.C. 1344. Before the purchase, the Army Corps of Engineers communicated that it then saw no impediments to creating the mitigation bank. After the Texas Water Development Board announced that the Reservoir would become less viable (if not infeasible) if the mitigation bank were approved, the Corps denied the application because the mitigation bank overlapped with the proposed Reservoir and it concluded that plaintiff's land might not exist in perpetuity. The district court dismissed a claim for just compensation. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not have a cognizable property interest in obtaining a mitigation banking instrument. The claim was essentially that plaintiff detrimentally relied on representations made by the Corps. View "Hearts Bluff Game Ranch v. United States" on Justia Law

In this action, the trial court granted summary judgment against a locality, holding it liable to landowners under the State Water Control Law, Va. Code Ann. 62.1-44.2 through -44.34:28, in particular Code 62.1-44.34:18(C) of the Oil Discharge Law, for the contamination of groundwater by leachate and landfill gas. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to the landowners and finding the locality liable under the Oil Discharge Law, as the Oil Discharge Law does not apply to the passive, gradual seepage of leachate and landfill gas into groundwater. View "Campbell County v. Royal" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the court of appeals erred in (1) reversing a circuit court's judgment and applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to the State Water Control Board's decision to reissue a Virginia pollutant discharge elimination system permit to Virginia Electric and Power Company for its nuclear power station; and (2) reversing the circuit court and affirming the Board's determination that the discharge of heated water from the station into a waste heat treatment facility, classified as a "waste treatment facility" under state and federal regulations, did not require a separate discharge permit. For the reasons stated in Commonwealth v. Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Inc., the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Blue Ridge Envtl. Defense League v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jonathan Doyle appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to Defendants the Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Resources and Economic Development and the Monadnock State Park Manager (collectively, DRED), and that denied his motion for summary judgment. In 2009, Plaintiff staged a "Bigfoot" sighting (with himself dressed as Bigfoot) on Mount Monadnock. At the top of the mountain, he put on a costume, and filmed conversations he had with other hikers. On his way back down, he encountered two park staff members, and persuaded them to write a note saying there had been a "sighting" on the mountain. To garner publicity for his next appearance, Plaintiff had a friend write a press release for the local paper. Much to their annoyance, Park officials began fielding media calls trying to confirm whether reports of the sighting were true. When Plaintiff returned for more filming, he was confronted by park officials checking whether Plaintiff had a "special-use permit" to continue filming. With none, Plaintiff and his crew were asked to leave the mountain. Plaintiff subsequently brought a declaratory judgment action against DRED, arguing that Res 7306.01(a) violated the right to free speech contained in the New Hampshire Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. He also sought a permanent injunction, nominal damages, costs and fees. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DRED, ruling that Plaintiff failed to show that Res 7306.01(a) was unconstitutional. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the trial court erred because Res 7306.01(a) was void for vagueness, overbroad on its face and not narrowly tailored, and also overbroad as applied to Plaintiff's small-scale project. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of DRED: "More troubling is that this regulation needlessly stifles political speech, an integral component to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution." View "Doyle v. New Hampshire Dep't of Resources & Econ. Dev." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court considered this appeal of a district court's decision pertaining to the "Snake River Basin Adjudication" which held: (a) that Pocatello could not use its wells as alternate points of diversion for its surface water rights; (b) that it could use its interconnected wells as alternate points of diversion for all of the associated water rights on the condition that doing so would not change the priority date and quantity of water that could be pumped from each well; (c) that one groundwater right was properly classified as for an irrigation purpose; and (d) that Pocatello failed to establish earlier priority dates for two of its groundwater rights. The City of Pocatello submitted an application to the State for a groundwater right, stating the proposed use was to irrigate crops located outside the city. The State challenged the City's claims of pre-existing rights and water access points upon which it would permit the City to make changes to then-current water rights. Upon careful review of the parties briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to support the district court's holding, and affirmed its judgment. View "City of Pocatello v. Idaho " on Justia Law

In this case, the court considered an appeal from a final circuit court judgment validating revenue bonds proposed to be issued by the county to finance a beach restoration project. The court held that appellants erroneously contended that in adopting the Assessment Resolution, the county failed to comply with the requirements of its MSBU Ordinance, and as a result, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction; appellants contention, that the county failed to demonstrate that the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) would issue the permits at issue for the beach renourishment project and thus the circuit court erred in validating the bonds, was rejected; beach and shore preservation projects confronted a critical threat to the welfare of the people of the state and those special benefits that flow incidentally to certain properties because of the nature of the project did not diminish its predominately public nature; competent, substantial evidence supported the trial court's determination that the county's methodology was fair and reasonable; and regardless of how much sand was added outside the boundaries of the MSBU, the special benefits were nevertheless provided. Accordingly, the court affirmed the circuit court's final judgment of validation of the bonds. View "Donovan, et al. v. Okaloosa County, FL, etc., et al." on Justia Law

Sussex County filed a complaint against DNREC asserting that it exceeded its constitutional and statutory authority in promulgating the PCS Regulations, which were promulgated in 2008 to effect DNREC's Pollution Control Strategy for the Inland Bays Watershed. At issue was the validity of Sections 4 and 5 of the PCS Regulations. The Superior Court held that Section 4, which established the water quality buffer, and the related stormwater control provisions of Section 5, constituted "zoning," and thus directly conflicted with the Sussex County Zoning Ordinance. The Superior Court held those portions of the PCS Regulations were void and ordered that they be stricken. The court concluded that DNREC's "no zoning" argument was contradicted by language in those portions of the PCS Regulations that were at issue. Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "DE Dept. of Natural Resources & Environmental Control v. Sussex County, et. al." on Justia Law

This case arose out of three applications by the TRRC to build a a railroad line in Southeastern Montana to haul coal. The Board, or its predecessor, approved each of the three applications (TRRC I, II, and III). Petitioners challenged TRRC II and III on a number of environmental and public convenience and necessity grounds. The court held that the Board failed to take the requisite "hard look" at certain material environmental impacts inherent in TRRC II and III in the manner required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., prior to approving those applications. The court further held that the Board did not err in its public convenience and necessity analyses, except with respect to its reliance on the viability of TRRC II during the approval of TRRC III. View "Northern Plains, et al. v. Surface Transp." on Justia Law