Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Burglington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Company (BNSF) contaminated the environment surrounding the Livingston Rail Yard (Yard). Plaintiffs, individuals who owned property adjacent to the Yard, sued BNSF in federal court for damages to their property based on claims of, inter alia, nuisance, negligence, and trespass. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in favor of BNSF, finding that the applicable statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' claims. The federal district court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the continuing tort doctrine should apply to the claims presented by Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held (1) the continuing tort doctrine in Montana tolls the statute of limitations for property damage claims of nuisance and/or trespass resulting from contamination that has stabilized, continues to migrate, and is not readily or easily abatable; and (2) the limitations period begins to run when abatement is not reasonable or complete abatement cannot be achieved, and a permanent injury exists. View "Burley v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co." on Justia Law

This case arose out of plaintiffs' second challenge to the sufficiency of the DOE's Environmental Assessment (EA) of a prospective "biosafety level-3" (BSL-3) facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). On appeal, plaintiffs petitioned the court to require the DOE to prepare an Environment Impact Statement (EIS), or in the alternative, to revise its EA, in light of the allegations set forth in its original complaint, to determine whether an EIS was required. The court held that the DOE took the requisite "hard look" at the environmental impact of an intentional terrorist attack in the manner required by the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq., and San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Tri-Valley Cares, et al. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the actions and decisions of the FHWA and FDOT during the planning and development of the Indian Street Bridge Project in Martin County, Florida. Citizens brought this suit under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701-706, alleging that FHWA and FDOT violated both the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, and Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 303, during development of the project. Citizens also requested an injunction to stop construction of the bridge. The court found no error in FHWA's incorporation of the local planning documents in the FEIS; concluded that FHWA's consideration of the relevant factors were sufficient and the Purpose and Needs Statement was not unduly narrow; concluded that appellees' compliance with NEPA was sufficient; rejected Citizens' argument that appellees erred by not completing a SEIS; and held that the analysis in the instant case demonstrated consideration that each of the alternatives was not feasible and prudent within the context of Section 4(f). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of injunctive relief and grant of summary judgment in favor of FHWA and FDOT. View "Citizens For Smart Growth, et al. v. Secretary, Dept. of Transp, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court challenging the 2004 Framework, the Forest Services' recommendations to the Sierra Nevada Forest Plan, as inconsistent with the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., claiming that the 2004 EIS did not sufficiently analyze the environmental consequences of the 2004 Framework for fish and amphibians. The court held that the Forest Service failed to take a hard look at environmental consequences on fish in the 2004 EIS, in violation of NEPA. There was a lack of analysis of the likely impact on individual species of fish in the 2004 EIS and the lack of any explanation in the 2004 EIS as to why it was not "reasonably possible" to perform some level of analysis of such impact. The court held, however, that the Forest Service did take a hard look at environmental consequences on amphibians in the 2004 EIS, in compliance with NEPA. Therefore, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Pacific Rivers Council v. USFS, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizens' organization, filed suit alleging violations of the Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and Reclamation Act, 225 ILCS 720/8.05(a), and the Water Use Act, 525 ILCS 45/1 resulting from a coal mine reclamation. The circuit court dismissed with prejudice. The appellate court reversed the dismissal as to all five counts directed against the mining company and modified the order dismissing the count against Illinois Environmental Protection Agency to be a dismissal without prejudice. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed in part. The trial court properly dismissed counts I through V because those counts constitute a challenge to the provisions of the revised permits authorized by Illinois Department of Natural Resources and could not be brought under the Mining Act. Similarly, there is no statutory basis to conclude that the Water Use Act allows a private right of action to challenge conduct that is specifically mandated by the terms of a permit authorized by IDNR.View "Citizens Opposing Pollution v. Exxonmobil Coal U.S.A." on Justia Law

ESBC, billing agent for the Fire Department, determined that each of the individual defendants owned a vehicle involved in a collision to which the Fire Department responded and each had insurance coverage, and billed response costs incurred for each collision. The defendants refused to pay and ESBC sought a declaration that defendants were liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601. Under CERCLA, the owner of a “facility” from which hazardous substances have been released is responsible for response costs that result from the release. Insurer-defendants counterclaimed for injunctive relief from ESBC’s billing practices and alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, unjust enrichment, unlawful fee collection, fraud, constructive fraud, and insurance fraud. The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings and dismissed counterclaims without prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Motor vehicles for personal use fall under the "consumer product in consumer use” exception to CERCLA’s definition of facilityView "Emergency Serv. Billing Corp., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for a contested case hearing on the Commission on Water Resource Management's amendment of interim flow standards for certain Maui streams. The Commission denied Petitioner's petition in a decision that was reflected in the minutes of the Commission's meeting. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the meeting minutes were not a final order because the document was not signed by any member of the Commission pursuant to Haw. Admin. R. 13-167-7(c). The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's decision, holding that the Commission's decision, as reflected in the meeting minutes, was a final decision of the Commission for which judicial review could be sought because the Acting Deputy Director to the Chairperson of the Board of Land and Natural Resources authenticated the Commission's decision in accordance with section 13-167-7(c). Remanded. View "In re Petition to Amend Interim Instream Flow Standards for Maui Streams" on Justia Law

Petitioners petitioned for review of the EPA's approval of the 2004 State Implementation Plan (2004 SIP) for the San Joaquin Valley's nonattainment area for the one-hour ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard. The court held that the EPA's 2010 approval of the 2004 SIP, which was based on data current only as of 2004, was arbitrary and capricious. The court did not reach petitioners' remaining arguments and granted the petition for review, remanding the matter to the EPA for further proceedings. View "Sierra Club, et al. v. EPA, et al.; Committee for a Better Arvin, et al. v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

Six tribal councils, joined by two other associations, filed an action against the State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in the superior court seeking a declaratory judgment that the 2005 Bristol Bay Area Plan (BBAP, the Plan) was unlawful. DNR’s motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) was denied and the superior court held that: (1) the BBAP is a regulation that must be promulgated under the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and (2) Alaska Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) does not bar the Tribes’ claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) did not bar the Tribe's claims and the that BBAP is not a regulation. View "Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources v. Nondalton Tribal Council" on Justia Law

There was one issue for the Supreme Court's resolution in this, the fifth appeal in this case. After the last remand, the superior court entered a judgment awarding the class a principal refund of $12.4 million with prejudgment interest exceeding $62 million. The question presented on appeal was whether one of the Court's previous decisions in this case, "Carlson III," incorrectly decided that the rate of prejudgment interest for unconstitutional commercial fishing license and limited entry permit fee overpayments was the statutorily imposed punitive interest rate for underpaid and overpaid taxes under Title 43 of the Alaska Statutes. Because the statute establishing prejudgment interest for underpayment and overpayment of taxes did not apply to the refund of overpayment of the commercial fishing fees involved in this case, and because the Court's earlier incorrect holding on this issue resulted in a manifest injustice, the Court concluded that its earlier decision on this issue must be overruled. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case for a new prejudgment interest calculation. View "Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Carlson" on Justia Law