Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal came from a judgment and decree of the water court and the Alamosa County District Court in two consolidated cases. The combination of the two involved an amended plan for water management adopted by Special Improvement District No. 1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District (Subdistrict). Several parties objected to the approval of the Subdistrict's plan for ground water management. After two trials, the trial court determined the Plan to be "conceptually compatible" with the legal requirements of ground water management plans and the intent of the legislature in enacting SB 04-222. Among a series of findings, it found that (1) the Plan properly sought to stabilize the storage level of the unconfined aquifer at a "sustainable" level; and (2) the strategies proposed to meet that goal were reasonable and supported by the evidence. However, the trial court sent the Plan back to the Subdistrict board of managers and District board of directors for "further consideration and amendment because it lack[ed] detail, grant[ed] discretion with no guidance, fail[ed] to acknowledge the replacement of injurious depletions as a priority, and simply is not a 'comprehensive and detailed plan'" as required by statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Plan as approved and decreed, adequately addressed the replacement of well depletions that injure adjudicated senior surface water rights, along with restoring and maintaining sustainable aquifer levels in accordance with the applicable statutes. "The Subdistrict bears the burden of going forward and the burden of proof to demonstrate that annual replacement plans prevent material injury to adjudicated senior surface water rights caused by ongoing and past well depletions that have future impact." The Court affirmed the water court and Alamosa County District Court's decisions. View "In re Subdistrict No. 1" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought contribution under the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, for both past and future costs of cleaning up industrial pollution. The district court awarded contribution for past cleanup costs but declined to issue a declaratory judgment as to future contribution. The court reversed the denial of a declaratory judgment and held that the judgment would serve a useful purpose in settling the legal issues involved, the judgment was not being used for procedural gamesmanship or a race to res judicata, it would not increase friction between sovereign legal systems, and there was no better or effective remedy. The court noted that it would not matter that a declaratory judgment of liability alone would not finalize the controversy and offer relief from all uncertainty. Numerous other issues raised on appeal were decided in a summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion. View "State of New York v. Solvent Chemical" on Justia Law

Oak Grove Resources, LLC, and Cliffs North American Coal, LLC (Oak Grove) appealed a trial court's order in favor of class Plaintiffs finding that Oak Grove failed to satisfy the requirements of a settlement agreement between the parties, and ordered the continued monitoring of air near Plaintiffs' properties for the presence of coal dust for one year. Plaintiffs sued Oak Grove in 1997 alleging that it operated a preparation plant in a manner that caused coal dust to become airborne and to migrate to their properties, where it settled, causing them to suffer both personal injury and property damage. In October 2002, the parties entered into a settlement agreement the 2002 settlement agreement provided for certain injunctive relief and the payment of attorney fees and expenses. The injunctive relief required Oak Grove to complete 14 specific remedial measures within 24 months of the execution of the 2002 settlement agreement. Oak Grove implemented the remedial measures at the Concord plant following the trial court's approval of the 2002 settlement agreement. However, Plaintiffs continued to complain that the Concord plant emitted coal dust onto their properties and that the remedial measures had not satisfactorily solved the problem. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that no objection was raised by Plaintiffs to the site locations until two months after testing began in July 2009. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' expert did not visit the air-monitoring sites until January 2010. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs inexcusably delayed in asserting their rights under a 2008 supplement and that Oak Grove would be unduly prejudiced if Plaintiffs were allowed to assert those rights. The Court reversed the trial court's award of injunctive relief, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Oak Grove Resources, LLC v. White" on Justia Law

The Corps issued a generic nationwide permit (NWP 46), pursuant to its authority under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1344(e), allowing persons to secure approval for qualifying discharges into "waters of the United States" without going through the more laborious process of securing an individual permit. NAHB appealed from the district court's dismissal of its challenge to the Corps' authority to issue the permit. The district court held that the NAHB had standing to pursue its claim but ultimately granted summary judgment for the Corps on the merits. The court held that because NAHB lacked standing to bring suit, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case. View "Natl Assoc. of Home Builders v. US Army Corps of Engineers, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners Louise Lauer and Darrell de Tienne separately owned properties that border a lot owned by Mike and Shima Garrison. Through a Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) petition, Petitioners challenged a fish and wildlife variance granted to the Garrisons by Pierce County (the County) to build a single family residence within the protective buffer zone of a stream that runs across the Garrisons' property. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Garrisons' rights vested in 2004 when they submitted their building application. The Garrisons also raised questions about the standing and timeliness of Petitioners' claim, as well as whether the relevant critical area regulation even applies to the Garrisons' shoreline property. Upon review, the Court held that Petitioners properly petitioned the superior court for review and that, because the Garrisons' building permit application contained misrepresentations of material fact, the Garrisons' rights did not vest in 2004. View "Laurer v. Pierce County" on Justia Law

Superfund Coalition commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action to challenge certain regulations promulgated by the Department with respect to remedial programs implemented to clean "inactive hazardous waste disposal sites." The Superfund Coalition asserted that the regulations were ultra vires and impermissibly allowed the Department to order expansive remedial programs that contravened the limited legislative goal of article 27, title 13 of the Environmental Conservation Law to identify and remove only "significant threats." The court held that the Department did not exceed its authority or act contrary to law in enacting the subject regulations. View "Matter of New York State Superfund Coalition, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation" on Justia Law

In 1979, plaintiff bought land from the Michigan State Transportation Commission. A decade later, he sued the Department of Transportation under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, claimed that there was contamination on the site. After discovery, the parties settled. The district court entered a consent decree in 1991 that required the Department to remediate the property by March 31, 1995. If by then the Department failed to make a good-faith effort to remediate, the decree required payment of $2,000 per month until remediation was complete. The Department failed to remediate or to pay the liquidated damages. On a 2009 motion to enforce the decree, the court held that the Department had waived its sovereign immunity and that a 10-year statute of limitations barred enforcement of the remediation obligation, but that each of the missed $2,000 payments triggered its own 10-year limitations period. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the court should have relied on the doctrine of laches rather than the limitations period because the consent decree amounted to a remedy in equity. The waiver of immunity remained effective. View "Bergmann v. MI State Transp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In this joint opinion, the Supreme Court addressed two direct appeals from the same water court proceedings. Meridian Service Metropolitan District's motion to intervene in a declaratory judgment action between Cherokee Metropolitan District and Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Management District (UBS) was denied by the water court. Meridian appealed the water court’s ruling to the Supreme Court. However, while Meridian’s appeal was pending, the declaratory judgment proceedings continued without Meridian’s participation, and the water court entered an order granting UBS's motion for declaratory judgment. Cherokee then appealed that order to the Supreme Court. The underlying water action began in 1998 as litigation between Cherokee and UBS over Cherokee’s water rights in the UBS basin. In 1999, Cherokee and UBS settled the litigation by entering a Stipulation and Release. In 2003, Cherokee and Meridian entered into an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) to build a new wastewater treatment facility. According to the IGA, wastewater from both Cherokee and Meridian would be treated at the facility, and the return flows would go back into the UBS basin. Upon learning of the Cherokee/Meridian Replacement Plan Application in late 2008, UBS filed a statement of objection with the Colorado Ground Water Commission and moved to dismiss the Replacement Plan Application. Meridian moved to intervene as of right in the underlying water action between UBS and Cherokee to challenge both the preliminary injunction and the motion for declaratory judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the water court’s order denying Meridian’s motion to intervene, and vacated the water court's order granting declaratory judgment. View "Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court involved orders of the District Court for Water Division No. 2 regarding the administration of water on Alvarado Creek in Custer County. Applicants-Appellants Catherine and Peter LoPresti and Opposers-Appellants City of Fountain and Widefield Water and Sanitation District claimed the water court erred in voiding a rotational no-call agreement titled the "Beardsley Decree." Opposers-Appellees John Brandenburg, Douglas and Nancy Brandon, Dilley Family Trust, James D. Hood, Ronald Keyston, Arlie Riggs, Schneider Enterprises, Inc., Dr. Charles Schneider, and Mund Shaikly argued that the Beardsley Decree was an improperly noticed change in water rights, and as such the water court correctly declared it void. The Supreme Court held that the Beardsley Decree was a valid rotational no-call agreement because, and by its plain language, it did not sanction a change in water rights. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the water court. View "LoPresti v. Brandenburg" on Justia Law

Appellant Jim Widmyer, a commercial fisher, applied for a permit to fish for sablefish. The State distributes these permits largely on the basis of past participation in the sablefish fishery, specifically participation between 1975 and 1984. Though Appellant had been unable to land many fish between 1975 and 1984, argued that he qualified for participation due to extraordinary circumstances. The Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission and the superior court both determined that Appellant did not qualify for participation due to extraordinary circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed those decisions after review of the Commission record. View "Widmyer v. Alaska" on Justia Law