Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

During World War II, the U.S. contracted with oil companies for the production of aviation fuel, which resulted in production of hazardous waste. The waste was dumped at the California McColl site. Several decades later, the oil companies were held liable for cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, and sought reimbursement from the government based on the contracts. The district court entered summary judgment on liability, finding that the contracts contained open ended indemnification agreements and encompassed costs for CERLCA cleanup, and awarded $87,344,345.70. The trial judge subsequently discovered that his wife had inherited 97.59 shares of stock in a parent to two of the oil companies. The judge ultimately vacated his summary judgment rulings; severed two companies from the suit and directed the clerk to reassign their claims to a different judge; reinstated his prior decisions with respect to two remaining companies; and entered judgment against the government ($68,849,505). The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for reassignment to another judge. The judge was required to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(4) and the error was not harmless.View "Shell Oil Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

National Grid challenged the constitutional and statutory authority of the District, a New York public benefit corporation, to assess it for benefits that its property along the Hudson River received from a dam and reservoir that the District operated. National Grid argued that the District's assessment and apportionment scheme was federally preempted by the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 803(f), 821, and that even if the assessment authority existed, all assessments made prior to 2010 violated National Grid's protection rights under the U.S. Constitution and constituted impermissible takings under the U.S. and New York State constitutions. Because the FPA did not preempt the District's authority under New York state law to assess National Grid as it did here, the court affirmed the district court's judgment as to federal preemption. The court further found that National Grid had abandoned its appeal of the district court's dismissal of the DEC from this action, and in any event, that the district court's dismissal of the DEC was proper. However, because the court concluded that abstention was not warranted as to National Grid's remaining constitutional claims, the court remanded those claims to the district court for resolution, expressing no view on their merits. View "Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson River-Black River Regulating Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment against their claims under section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767. Plaintiffs also appealed the district court's denial of their Rule 59(e) motion to clarify or amend the summary judgment order. At issue was whether parties subject to a consent decree could file claims for cost recovery under section 107(a) or whether their remedies were limited to filing claims for contribution under section 113(f) of CERCLA. The court agreed with its sister circuits that it must deny the availability of section 107(a) remedy under these circumstances in order "[t]o ensure the continued vitality of the precise and limited right to contribution." The court also held that the Magistrate Judge did not abuse his discretion by denying plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the summary judgment order. View "Solutia Inc., et al. v. McWane, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Anne George wanted to corral her horse on her property with a fence. The United States Forest Service held an easement across Plaintiff's land. Plaintiff offered to leave a gate across the road unlocked, but the Service rejected this option, arguing that the public needs unfettered access to the adjacent Gila National Forest. The parties' wrangling dragged on for years but led nowhere until Plaintiff filed suit to quiet title in 2009. In the end, the Tenth Circuit ruled against her. "Whatever legal entitlement she might have had to build a fence across the Forest Service's road she lost years ago thanks to an even less permeable barrier to entry: the statute of limitations." Plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest to the land granted the government an easement for access to the forest, and each time Plaintiff attempted to fence her property, the government promptly removed it. That, she argued, was inadequate for the government to assert its claim to the easement as being fence-free. Under the plain terms of the Quiet Title Act, the statute of limitations began to run whenever a plaintiff or her predecessor-in-interest knew or should have known of the government’s claim: "[o]ne can be on notice of a claim even if that claim lacks any legal merit. . . . [o]ur precedent does not allow plaintiffs to wait until the adverse claims of the title asserted by them and the United States crystallize into well-defined and open disagreements before commencing a quiet-title action."View "George v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

This case involved the Corps' dredging of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), a shipping channel between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico, as well as levees alongside the channel and around the city. The Corps' negligence in maintaining the channel, grounded on a failure to appreciate certain hydrological risks, caused levees to fail and aggravated the effects of 2005's Hurricane Katrina on the city and its environs. Claimants filed hundreds of lawsuits and this opinion concerned three groups of bellwether plaintiffs, all suing the United States for flood damages. The district court found that neither the Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA), 33 U.S.C. 702, nor the discretionary-function exception (DFE) to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(a), protected the government from suit; the district court found that three plaintiffs had proven the government's full liability and four had not. Another group of plaintiffs (Anderson plaintiffs) had their cases dismissed on the government's motion, the district court finding both immunities applicable. A different group (Armstrong plaintiffs) were preparing for trial of their own case against the government. The government appealed its losses in Robinson; the losing Robinson plaintiffs cross-appealed. The Anderson plaintiffs also appealed. On the theory that a favorable ruling might moot the pending Armstrong trial, the government petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to order the district court to stay trial until the court issued an opinion in Robinson and Anderson. The three cases have been consolidated on appeal. The court held that the district court's careful attention to the law and even more cautious scrutiny of complex facts allowed the court to uphold its ruling in full, excepting the court's minor restatement of FCA immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments in Robinson and Anderson, denying the government's petition for writ of mandamus to stay the Armstrong trial. View "In re: Katrina Canal Breaches" on Justia Law

This case arose from two civil investigative demands (CIDs) issued to the University of Virginia and the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (collectively, UVA) by the attorney general, pursuant to the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act (FATA). The CIDs sought information relating to the research of a climate scientist that had taught at UVA, received a series of grants to fund his research, and, with other climate scientists, had allegedly falsified data to indicate an upturn in the earth's surface temperatures due to the use of fossil fuels. UVA petitioned the circuit court to set aside the CIDs, arguing that the attorney general had no statutory authority to serve CIDs upon agencies of the Commonwealth and that the CIDs were defective because they failed to state the nature of the conduct alleged. The circuit court granted the petition and set aside the CIDs, without prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, but, unlike the circuit court, set aside the CIDs with prejudice, holding that the University of Virginia, as an agency of the Commonwealth, did not constitute a "person" under the FATA and therefore could not be the proper subject of a CID. View "Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a long-running conflict which has devolved to the present remaining dispute as to the classification of approximately 9,000 acre feet (AF) of water released between June 17 through 24 of 2004 from the Nimbus and New Melones reservoirs within California's Central Valley Project (CVP) by defendant, the U.S. Department of the Interior, acting through the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (collectively, federal defendants). Plaintiffs, water agencies, contended that the Department of the Interior abused its discretion in failing to apply the latter June 2004 releases against the 800,000 AF of CVP yield especially designated for fish, wildlife, and habitat restoration under section 3406(b)(2) of the CVP Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600. Because the court found that the water agencies have standing and the accounting which the Department of Interior conducted for the latter June 2004 releases did not constitute an abuse of discretion, the court affirmed the district court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants and against the water agencies. View "San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth., et al. v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

In 1997, environmental and recreational groups began seeking to limit the daily number of snowmobiles permitted in Wyoming national parks. In several consolidated cases, Petitioners the State of Wyoming and Park County, Wyoming filed petitions for review of agency action, challenging the 2009 rules governing snowmobile use in the parks. The district court dismissed the petitions for review, holding Petitioners lacked standing to pursue their claims. Snowmobile proponents filed suit in a Wyoming district court to challenge a 2001 National Park Service (NPS) rule limiting snowmobiles in the parks. That suit was settled, but ultimately the resolution of the suit brought the promulgation of another rule (the 2003 rule) that set limits on snowmobiles allowed in the parks. A Washington, D.C. district court invalidated the 2003 rule and reinstated the 2001 rule. Another lawsuit was filed in Wyoming district court, the result of which invalidated the D.C. court's ruling. NPS then promulgated a series of rules which contained "sunset clauses" set to expire at end of each subsequent winter season. "Unsuprisingly," the proponents and opponents filed simultaneous challenges in both Wyoming and D.C. to challenge the rules. While the two courts fought on jurisdiction, NPS formulated another new rule (2009 rule). Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that Petitioners' argument was moot: "Even if [the Court] were to conclude Petitioners had standing to challenge the procedure and analysis used to adopt the 2009 rule, and if the district court then found NPS had violated NEPA or the APA in promulgating that rule, [the Court's] decision would still have no effect. [The Court] reach[ed] this conclusion because the analytical and procedural aspects of the 2009 rule have been superseded by the new analysis and procedure underlying the new one-year rule. Because the procedural challenge in this case[was] to the analysis underlying the 2009 temporary rule and that analysis has been redone, [the Court held] that the procedural challenge to the 2009 temporary rule [was] moot." View "Wyoming v. NPCA, et al" on Justia Law

For 30 years, GE manufactured electric capacitors containing Pyranol, an insulation containing PCBs and stored scrap in drums. It sold the scrap to Fletcher, who used it as a paint additive. Fletcher purchased more than 200,000 gallons of GE's scrap Pyranol until 1967. After failing to pay for 14 shipments, Fletcher proposed that GE retrieve the drums. GE did not follow up. In 1987, EPA found hundreds of unmarked drums containing scrap Pyranol at the Fletcher Site. Several had leaked. EPA installed a temporary cap, added the site to the Superfund List, and sought to recover costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3). A 1994 consent decree stipulated that GE would pay costs incurred through April, 1993. GE did not concede liability. In 2006, the government sought recovery for post-1993 costs. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment for the government on "arranger" liability. GE was aware that Fletcher had drums that would not be used and made no effort to deal with it. The court also rejected a statute of limitations defense. View "United States v. Gen. Elec. Co." on Justia Law

In this forfeiture action, the State alleged that Defendant Basil Ryan unlawfully placed and maintained a sunken barge on the bed of the Menomonee River in violation of Wis. Stat. Ann. chapter 30. The circuit court concluded that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precluded Ryan from asserting that he did not own the barge, and it granted summary judgment in favor of the State. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erroneously invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel, as two essential elements of the doctrine were not satisfied; and (2) summary judgment is not permitted in forfeiture actions for violations of chapter 30. Remanded. View "State v. Ryan" on Justia Law