Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a citizens' organization, filed suit alleging violations of the Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and Reclamation Act, 225 ILCS 720/8.05(a), and the Water Use Act, 525 ILCS 45/1 resulting from a coal mine reclamation. The circuit court dismissed with prejudice. The appellate court reversed the dismissal as to all five counts directed against the mining company and modified the order dismissing the count against Illinois Environmental Protection Agency to be a dismissal without prejudice. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed in part. The trial court properly dismissed counts I through V because those counts constitute a challenge to the provisions of the revised permits authorized by Illinois Department of Natural Resources and could not be brought under the Mining Act. Similarly, there is no statutory basis to conclude that the Water Use Act allows a private right of action to challenge conduct that is specifically mandated by the terms of a permit authorized by IDNR.View "Citizens Opposing Pollution v. Exxonmobil Coal U.S.A." on Justia Law

ESBC, billing agent for the Fire Department, determined that each of the individual defendants owned a vehicle involved in a collision to which the Fire Department responded and each had insurance coverage, and billed response costs incurred for each collision. The defendants refused to pay and ESBC sought a declaration that defendants were liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601. Under CERCLA, the owner of a “facility” from which hazardous substances have been released is responsible for response costs that result from the release. Insurer-defendants counterclaimed for injunctive relief from ESBC’s billing practices and alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, unjust enrichment, unlawful fee collection, fraud, constructive fraud, and insurance fraud. The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings and dismissed counterclaims without prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Motor vehicles for personal use fall under the "consumer product in consumer use” exception to CERCLA’s definition of facilityView "Emergency Serv. Billing Corp., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for a contested case hearing on the Commission on Water Resource Management's amendment of interim flow standards for certain Maui streams. The Commission denied Petitioner's petition in a decision that was reflected in the minutes of the Commission's meeting. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the meeting minutes were not a final order because the document was not signed by any member of the Commission pursuant to Haw. Admin. R. 13-167-7(c). The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's decision, holding that the Commission's decision, as reflected in the meeting minutes, was a final decision of the Commission for which judicial review could be sought because the Acting Deputy Director to the Chairperson of the Board of Land and Natural Resources authenticated the Commission's decision in accordance with section 13-167-7(c). Remanded. View "In re Petition to Amend Interim Instream Flow Standards for Maui Streams" on Justia Law

Petitioners petitioned for review of the EPA's approval of the 2004 State Implementation Plan (2004 SIP) for the San Joaquin Valley's nonattainment area for the one-hour ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard. The court held that the EPA's 2010 approval of the 2004 SIP, which was based on data current only as of 2004, was arbitrary and capricious. The court did not reach petitioners' remaining arguments and granted the petition for review, remanding the matter to the EPA for further proceedings. View "Sierra Club, et al. v. EPA, et al.; Committee for a Better Arvin, et al. v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

Six tribal councils, joined by two other associations, filed an action against the State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in the superior court seeking a declaratory judgment that the 2005 Bristol Bay Area Plan (BBAP, the Plan) was unlawful. DNR’s motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) was denied and the superior court held that: (1) the BBAP is a regulation that must be promulgated under the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and (2) Alaska Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) does not bar the Tribes’ claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) did not bar the Tribe's claims and the that BBAP is not a regulation. View "Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources v. Nondalton Tribal Council" on Justia Law

There was one issue for the Supreme Court's resolution in this, the fifth appeal in this case. After the last remand, the superior court entered a judgment awarding the class a principal refund of $12.4 million with prejudgment interest exceeding $62 million. The question presented on appeal was whether one of the Court's previous decisions in this case, "Carlson III," incorrectly decided that the rate of prejudgment interest for unconstitutional commercial fishing license and limited entry permit fee overpayments was the statutorily imposed punitive interest rate for underpaid and overpaid taxes under Title 43 of the Alaska Statutes. Because the statute establishing prejudgment interest for underpayment and overpayment of taxes did not apply to the refund of overpayment of the commercial fishing fees involved in this case, and because the Court's earlier incorrect holding on this issue resulted in a manifest injustice, the Court concluded that its earlier decision on this issue must be overruled. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case for a new prejudgment interest calculation. View "Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Carlson" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the court addressed the propriety of various actions taken by the EPA under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, with respect to Montana air quality from 1993 to 2008. In No. 02-71657, Montana Sulphur sought review of the EPA's final rule which partially disapproved a proposed revision to Montana's State Implementation Plan (SIP) governing sulfur dioxide (SO2). In No. 08-72642, Montana Sulphur sought review of the EPA's April 2008 final rule promulgating a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) for the State of Montana's SO2 emissions. Because the court concluded that the agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to either the SIP or FIP, the court denied both petitions for review. View "Montana Sulphur, et al. v. EPA" on Justia Law

In 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101–10270, to provide for government collection and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The NWPA authorized the Department of Energy to contract for disposal. In return for payment of fees into the Nuclear Waste Fund, the Standard Contract provided that the DOE would begin to dispose of SNF and HLW not later than January 31, 1998. Because collection and disposal did not begin, courts held that the DOE had breached the Standard Contract with the nuclear energy industry. The trial court found breach of plaintiff's contract, but granted summary judgment in favor of the government regarding the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and set damages for the breach at $10,014,114 plus the cost of borrowed funds for financing construction of a dry fuel storage project. On reconsideration, the trial court reduced damages to $9,735,634 and denied the cost of borrowed funds. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to borrowed fund, but and reversed denial of overhead costs. View "System Fuels, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased approximately 4,000 acres of land in Titus County, Texas, for use as a mitigation bank to offset the environmental impact of more destructive land use. 33 U.S.C. 1344. Before the purchase, the Army Corps of Engineers communicated that it then saw no impediments to creating the mitigation bank. After the Texas Water Development Board announced that the Reservoir would become less viable (if not infeasible) if the mitigation bank were approved, the Corps denied the application because the mitigation bank overlapped with the proposed Reservoir and it concluded that plaintiff's land might not exist in perpetuity. The district court dismissed a claim for just compensation. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not have a cognizable property interest in obtaining a mitigation banking instrument. The claim was essentially that plaintiff detrimentally relied on representations made by the Corps. View "Hearts Bluff Game Ranch v. United States" on Justia Law

In this action, the trial court granted summary judgment against a locality, holding it liable to landowners under the State Water Control Law, Va. Code Ann. 62.1-44.2 through -44.34:28, in particular Code 62.1-44.34:18(C) of the Oil Discharge Law, for the contamination of groundwater by leachate and landfill gas. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to the landowners and finding the locality liable under the Oil Discharge Law, as the Oil Discharge Law does not apply to the passive, gradual seepage of leachate and landfill gas into groundwater. View "Campbell County v. Royal" on Justia Law