Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants Richard Barnett and Cedric and Leslie Sanborn appealed a judgment which ruled that the City of Montpelier may prohibit boating, fishing, and swimming in Berlin Pond, a public body of water located outside the City and used as the City's drinking water supply. The City contended that the restrictions were supported by both a state health order and the powers granted to the City by the State. The trial court agreed and issued a permanent injunction preventing Defendants from engaging in the listed recreational activities and from trespassing upon land surrounding the pond that is owned by the City. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "[The Court's] decision reflects the fact that, under the laws of this state, the recreational use of Berlin Pond is a matter of state concern requiring a resolution at the state level. . . . [The Court] determine[d] only that the City's current powers are limited to preventing trespass upon its property." View "City of Montpelier v. Barnett" on Justia Law

The two appeals consolidated for resolution in this case both arose from an attempt by John C. Harrison, acting as personal representative for the estate of Nolan G. Thorsteinson and trustee of The Margie (Dotts) M. Thorsteinson Trust, to avoid an order declaring abandoned a disputed 1.04 c.f.s. interest in the Mexican Ditch. Harrison appealed directly to the Supreme Court adverse rulings of the Water Court in the two cases. With regard to Harrison's Application for a Change of Water Right, the water court granted the Engineers' motion to dismiss at the close of Harrison's case, finding that he was required but failed, to establish the historic use of the right as to which he sought a change in the point of diversion. With regard to Harrison's protest to the inclusion of the interests he claimed in the Mexican Ditch on the Division Engineer's decennial abandonment list, the water court granted the Engineer's motion for abandonment, as a stipulated remedy for Harrison's failure to succeed in his change application. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Harrison neither proved historic use of the right for which he sought a change nor was excepted from the requirement that he do so as a precondition of changing its point of diversion; and because denying a change of water right for failing to prove the historic use of the right did not amount to an unconstitutional taking of property, the water court's dismissal of Harrison's application was affirmed. But because, Harrison did not stipulate to an order of abandonment as the consequence of failing to succeed in his change application, only as the consequence of failing to timely file an application reflecting historic use, the water court's order granting the Engineers' motion for abandonment was reversed. View "Thorsteinson v. Simpson" on Justia Law

David Caron purchased a majority membership in Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle, LLC without having obtained the written consent of Goodhall's, Inc. (Goodhall's), in violation of Goodhall's lease with Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle. The lease idenitified Goodhall's as the landlord and Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle as the tenant. After a dispute arose concerning the party responsible for remediating certain environmental conditions on the property, Plaintiffs, David Caron and David Caron Chrysler Motors, filed suit against Defendants, Goodhall's and others, claiming that Defendants had violated provisions of its lease regarding Goodhall's responsibility for preexisting environmental conditions and Goodhall's warranty of fitness and habitability. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that no contract existed between the parties to this action because the assignment of the majority interest in the tenant to Caron was invalid. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appellate court improperly failed to consider Plaintiffs' claim that the trial court had improperly concluded that no contract existed between David Caron Chrysler Motors and Goodhall's; and (2) the trial court was incorrect in finding that, because Goodhall's did not consent to the assignment, there was no contract between David Caron Chrysler Motors and Goodhall's. View "David Caron Chrysler Motors, LLC v. Goodhall's, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from the 2008 application of the Honolulu Department of Environmental Services (DES) for a special use permit (SUP) to expand an existing sanitary landfill. The Land Use Commission (LUC) approved the SUP subject to, inter alia, a condition prohibiting the landfill from accepting municipal solid waste after July 31, 2012. The validity of this condition was the sole issue raised by DES on appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment affirming the LUC's approval of the SUP, holding (1) the condition was inconsistent with the evidence shown in the record and was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) because the LUC's approval of the SUP was expressly given subject to the LUC's imposition of the condition, the court's judgment must be vacated. Remanded. View "Dep't of Envtl. Servs. v. Land Use Comm'n" on Justia Law

After the Agencies approved the construction of a new 20-mile toll road in North Carolina, the Conservation Groups filed suit, seeking to enjoin construction on the toll road, contending that the process by which the Agencies approved the road violated the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the Agencies. Because the Agencies failed to disclose critical assumptions underlying their decision to build the road and instead provided the public with incorrect information, they did indeed violate NEPA. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "North Carolina Wildlife, et al. v. North Carolina Dept. of Transp., et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a suit filed by plaintiffs against the Water District to enjoin the Water District from pumping polluted canal water into Lake Okeechobee. The Tribe joined the suit on plaintiffs' side. The Tribe subsequently appealed the district court's denial of its motion for attorneys' fees. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the Tribe was not a "prevailing party" because, although the district court had ruled in its favor, the decision was overturned on appeal. View "Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of FL, et al. v. South Florida Water Mgmt., et al." on Justia Law

Landowners brought this lawsuit against their neighbor, seeking compensation for property damage caused by the neighbor, and seeking a determination of access and water rights. The application before the Supreme Court, however, raised questions concerning procedural aspects of the hearings before the trial court and of the appeal to the intermediate court of appeals (ICA). The first question concerned pleading standards of appellate briefs, and the remaining questions addressed the trial court's determination of which parties must participate in a lawsuit, and the procedure an appellate court should follow when reviewing that determination. The Court reversed the decision of the ICA and reinstated the trial court's order, holding (1) the ICA did not err in reviewing the defendants' points of error on appeal; but (2) the ICA erred in vacating the trial court's final judgment. View "Marvin v. Pflueger" on Justia Law

In 2008, Pioneer Irrigation District filed suit against the City of Caldwell seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as the removal of urban stormwater discharge conduits constructed by the City without Pioneer's authorization. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Pioneer. The court held that Pioneer held exclusive interests in its irrigation easements and rights-of-way such that Pioneer could maintain trespass claims against the City. The court also held that I.C. 42-1209 granted Pioneer the power to remove encroachments constructed without its permission that it deemed to unreasonably or materially interfere with its easements and rights-of-way. The district court held that review of certain decisions by the irrigation district would be limited to whether they were arbitrary and capricious or reached in an unreasonable manner. The City moved for permissive appeal, which motion the district court granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, except for its holding that irrigation easements and rights-of-way were exclusive interests. View "Pioneer Irrigation v. City of Caldwell" on Justia Law

Citizen Plaintiffs gave notice of their intent to sue Frasure Creek Mining and another coal mining company pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act. At the close of the statutory sixty-day notice period, the state Energy and Environment Cabinet brought an enforcement action against Frasure Creek and thus invoked the statutory bar to Plaintiffs' suit. Together with its complaint, the Cabinet filed a proposed consent judgment. The trial court subsequently granted Plaintiffs' motion to intervene to allow Plaintiffs an opportunity to voice their objections to the proposed consent judgment. The Cabinet and Frasure Creek sought extraordinary relief against the circuit court, petitioning the court of appeals for writs forbidding the intervention and compelling entry of the consent judgment. They argued that the trial court's intervention order ran counter both to jurisdictional limits imposed by Congress and to state law rules and standards for granting intervention and approving consent judgments. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court was proceeding within its jurisdiction and that the Cabinet and Frasure Creek had an adequate remedy by appeal for the errors they alleged. View "Commonwealth, Energy & Env't Cabinet v. Circuit Court (Shepherd)" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Russell and Mary Ann Rueger and John Moyers appealed a trial courts grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Natural Resources Board and the District #9 Environmental Commission of Vermont. The matter arose from an Access to Public Records Act request. The court concluded that certain records held by Defendants reflected deliberations of an agency acting in a quasi-judicial role, and those were exempt from disclosure. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that the court erred in interpreting the Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the documents in question fell within the plain language of the Act, and were indeed exempt. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Rueger v. Natural Resources Bd." on Justia Law