Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The Town commenced this proceeding to challenge the DEC's denial of portions of its request for information under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), Public Officers Law 87[2][g]. Specifically, the Town, a municipality that obtained its drinking water from the Hudson River, sought information relating to the Hudson River dredging project and the availability of alternative water supplies for local residents. The DEC denied access to certain records exchanged with the EPA by invoking the FOIL exception for inter-agency or intra-agency materials. The court agreed with the Town that this exemption was not applicable under the circumstances presented and therefore modified the determinations. View "Matter of Town of Waterford v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation" on Justia Law

A three-mile public recreational trail runs through 32 acres owned by the state and is used, in part, to access the state-managed Scarborough Marsh Wildlife Management Area. In 1961 Maine purchased the land with federal funds under the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. 669-669k for the approved purpose of “waterfowl habitat, waterfowl management, and access to waterfowl hunting.” The state subsequently granted easements for sanitary pipelines and a town road and to private parties for access to adjoining property. An easement granted in 2005 allowed construction of a road over 766 feet of previously-restricted trail for access to a planned subdivision. Objectors sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging violations of the Wildlife Restoration Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321, and state law. The district court dismissed federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the federal agency’s decision to not enforce the funding provisions of the WRA is within its discretion. The federal government did not grant the easements, so NEPA did not apply. View "Scarborough Citizens Protecting Res. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv." on Justia Law

John Witt, HydroTech Corporation, and attorney Mark Shere (Appellants) were held in contempt of court for violating the terms of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The contempt holding arose from protracted litigation in a lawsuit over the costs of an environmental cleanup. The trial court issued the TRO enjoining work on the site until a preliminary injunction hearing could be held. After the TRO was issued, work on the site commenced. The trial court subsequently issued the preliminary injunction. Later, the court held Appellants in contempt and held them jointly and severally liable for $108,487 in costs and attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, concluding that the trial court did not err in holding Witt, Shere, and HydroTech in contempt, determining the sanction, and imposing it jointly and severally. View "Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners brought a civil action under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., to challenge the issuance by the EPA of an administrative compliance order under section 309 of the Clean Water Act (Act), 33 U.S.C. 1319. The order asserted that petitioners' property was subject to the Act, and that they have violated its provisions by placing fill material on the property; and on this basis it directed them immediately to restore the property pursuant to an EPA work plan. The Court concluded that the compliance order was final agency action for which there was no adequate remedy other than APA review, and that the Act did not preclude that review. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sackett v. EPA" on Justia Law

Defendants, State Five Industrial Park and Jean Farricielli, appealed from a trial court judgment holding them liable, after invoking both reverse and traditional veil piercing principles, for a $3.8 million judgment rendered against Jean's husband, Joseph Farricielli, and five corporations that he owned and/or controlled, in an environmental enforcement action brought by Plaintiffs, the commissioner of environmental protection, the town of Hamden, and the town's zoning enforcement officer. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the facts that were proven in this case did not warrant reverse veil piercing, and judgment on Plaintiffs' veil piercing claims should be rendered in favor of Defendants. View "Comm'r of Envtl. Prot. v. State Five Indus. Park, Inc." on Justia Law

The Point of the Mountain Aqueduct is a sixty-inch diameter pipeline that runs along the Draper Canal and transports culinary water to Salt Lake City and other cities in the Salt Lake Valley. Plaintiffs in this case were homeowners who asserted claims challenging Metropolitan Water District's construction of the aqueduct as exceeding the scope of its real property rights along the canal route. The district court granted summary judgment for the Water District. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision in most respects, but reversed the district court's conclusion that (1) Reaches 16-17 were not limited by restrictive covenants; and (2) enclosing the Draper Canal within a buried pipeline was reasonable as a matter of law and so did not exceed the scope of the Water District's property rights in Reach 19. The Court then (1) held that warranty deeds imposed restrictive covenants that run with the land, limiting Reaches 16-17 to canal purposes only; and (2) remanded for a factual determination of whether the canal enclosure was reasonable and did not materially alter the burden to Appellants' land with respect to Reaches 16, 17, and 19. View "Stern v. Metro. Water Dist." on Justia Law

The Land Use Regulation Commission (LURC) and Plum Creek Timberlands, LLC and Plum Creek Land Company (collectively, Plum Creek) appealed from a judgment entered in the business and consumer docket vacating LURC's approval of a rezoning petition and concept plan submitted by Plum Creek for land it owned in the Moosehead Lake region. LURC and Plum Creek contended that the court erred by concluding that LURC violated its procedural rules by failing to hold an additional evidentiary hearing on amendments to Plum Creek's petition. Forest Ecology Network, RESTORE: The North Woods, and the Natural Resources Council of Maine cross-appealed, arguing primarily that LURC erred in approving the petition because several aspects of the concept plan conflicted with statutory requirements. The Nature Conservancy and Forest Society of Maine intervened. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for the entry of a judgment affirming LURC's decision, holding that LURC did not violate its procedural rules and did not otherwise err by approving the rezoning petition and concept plan. View "Forest Ecology Network v. Land Use Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

Noble Energy and other lessees sued in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging that application of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1451-1464, suspension requests constituted a material breach of their lease agreements to drill for, develop, and produce oil and natural gas on submerged lands off the coast of California. The Court of Federal Claims agreed; on appeal the Federal Circuit affirmed. One year after the Federal Circuit's decision in the breach-of-contract litigation, the Minerals Management Service (MMS), sent a letter to Noble ordering it to plug and abandon Well 320-2 permanently. The district court ruled that the common law doctrine of discharge did not relieve Noble of the regulatory obligation to plug its well permanently, an obligation that the lease did not itself create. Resolution of the dispute depended on what the plugging regulations meant. The court held that it was up to MMS's successor to interpret its regulation in the first instance and to determine whether they apply in situations like Noble's. If they do, the agency must explain why. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to vacate Interior's order and to remand to the Secretary for further proceedings. View "Noble Energy, Inc. v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law

As a consequence of a June 2006 storm, the stormwater drainage and storage system (including the wastewater treatment facility) at the Lake Charles refinery of Defendant CITGO Petroleum Company (CITGO), was filled beyond available capacity and overflowed, resulting in a major oil spill. Over 21 million gallons of waste, including 17 million gallons of contaminated wastewater and 4.2 million gallons of slop oil, escaped from the two existing wastewater storage tanks into an area around the tanks which was surrounded by levees or dikes. The oil spill, which was described at trial as "major" and "catastrophic," eventually contaminated over 100 miles of shoreline along the Calcasieu River, and required several months to clean up. Fourteen plaintiffs, employees of Ron Williams Construction (RWC) working at the Calcasieu Refining Company (CRC) south of the CITGO refinery, filed suit against CITGO and R&R Construction, Inc. (R&R) alleging various injuries due to their exposure to noxious gases emanating from the spill. CITGO and R&R stipulated that they were liable for the spill and agreed to pay plaintiffs for all their compensatory damages assessed to CITGO and R&R. After a two week bench trial, the district court ruled that plaintiffs had proved their injuries were caused by CITGO's admitted negligence in allowing the spill. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the district court's finding the spill caused plaintiffs' injuries was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted review of this case to determine whether the courts below erred as to the allocation of fault, in awarding damages for fear of future injury, and in awarding punitive damages. In sum, the Court held that Louisiana's conflict of laws statutes did not provide for the application of the punitive damages laws of Texas or Oklahoma under the facts of this case, that plaintiffs proved that their damages were caused by their exposure to toxic chemicals contained in the oil spill, that plaintiffs are entitled to damages for fear of contracting cancer, and that CITGO did not produce at the hearing on summary judgment factual support sufficient to establish that it would be able to satisfy its evidentiary burden of proof at trial. The Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

In 1969, the State sued Appellant Yelsen Land Company alleging that the State owned "all tidelands, submerged lands, and waters" adjacent to Morris Island.  Appellant answered and claimed it owned all the tidelands, submerged lands, and marshes adjacent to Morris Island. Appellant also counterclaimed for trespass on those lands by the Corps of Engineers in the form of spoilage dredged from Charleston Harbor, the digging of a ditch, and the erection of a dike. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court held that the legal questions of title to the land should be tried to a jury and that the trial judge erred in denying the State a jury trial. The jury returned a general verdict for the State, having been charged that title to tidelands, submerged lands, and all land below the high water mark on navigable streams were presumptively the State's unless the entity claiming title can show a specific grant from the sovereign that included the words "to the low water mark."  It was also charged that it was to determine title to marshlands and to return damages for appellant if it found the State had trespassed on marshland owned by appellant or if it found a taking. Following the jury verdict, Appellant moved for a judgment non obstante verdicto and a new trial, both of which the trial judge denied in a written order. In 2007, Appellant brought this suit against the State contending that the dredging spoils placed in the tidelands had created new highlands, and that as the adjacent highland owner, it was the owner of the newly “accreted” highlands as well.  The State Ports Authority (SPA) sought to intervene, but in lieu of intervention, Appellant was permitted to amend its complaint to add the SPA. A Master granted the State and the SPA summary judgment, and Appellant appealed.  The Supreme Court affirmed, finding res judicata applied to bar Appellant's attempt to relitigate title to the property. View "Yelsen Land Company v. South Carolina" on Justia Law