Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

This case concerned a challenge brought under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551-559, 701-706, to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's denial of petitions to designate critical habitat for the Florida panther. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531-1544, empowered the Secretary of the Interior to designate "critical habitat" for species of fish, wildlife, or plants that have been identified by the Secretary as "endangered" or "threatened." When the Service denied the petitions of environmental advocacy groups, these groups claimed that the denial of their petitions was arbitrary and capricious. The court concluded, however, that the denial of their petitions was not subject to judicial review under the APA because it was "committed to agency discretion by law." Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Conservancy of SW Florida, et al. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, et al." on Justia Law

The Town filed an application with the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) seeking approval for proposed changes to its municipal well water rights. The DNRC notified the Town that its application was deficient because it did not contain information on the Town's historical use of its rights. The Town did not provide the information, contending that the information was irrelevant to its application. The DNRC then determined that the Town's application was not correct and complete as required by Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-302 and informed the Town that its application was terminated. The district court upheld the DNRC's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on established Montana law and the applicable regulations, the DNRC was within its lawful authority to request that the Town provide information on its historical use of water as part of its application for approval of its proposed changes. View "Town of Manhattan v. Dep't of Natural Res. & Conservation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a citizen suit against defendants, alleging violations of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. Defendants filed a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, asserting that the citizen suit was barred under the "diligent prosecution" provision of the Act under section 1365(b)(1)(B). The district court granted the motion to dismiss, but on the ground that the 2002 consent decree mooted plaintiff's claims. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the district court erred in granting defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that the district court improperly dismissed the citizen suit based on mootness where neither party argued that any circumstances subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit rendered it moot. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to consider in the first instance whether the suit was precluded under the "diligent prosecution" provision. View "LA Environmental Action Ntwrk v. City of Baton Rouge, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jesse Reynolds and the owners of several other ditches that divert water from La Jara Creek appealed an order of the Water Court that denied their claim for declaratory relief. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that their appropriative rights to creek water were not limited to water flowing into the creek from the San Luis Valley Drain Ditch. Without directly addressing the merits of their claim, the water court granted summary judgment in favor of the State and Division Engineers (as well as other defendants) on the grounds that substantially the same issue had been litigated and decided against Plaintiffs in a prior declaratory action. The court concluded that all of the water rights of the parties in La Jara Creek were not only at issue, but were finally determined in that prior litigation, and therefore Plaintiffs’ claims were precluded. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiffs' claims had not been determined in the prior litigation (either expressly or by implication), and that the grant of summary judgment was inappropriate. The Court reversed the water court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reynolds v. Cotten" on Justia Law

Junior river water appropriators Jack Bond and Joe McClaren Ranch filed a request for a hearing before the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (Department), challenging the validity of the Department's administration of water in response to a call for administration placed by the Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD). The Department joined the matter as a party litigant against the junior appropriators. Following a hearing, the director of the Department determined that the water administration was proper and denied the junior appropriators' challenge to the sufficiency of the closing notices issued to upstream junior appropriators. The junior appropriators appealed. At issue on appeal was whether the issues of nonuse and abandonment alleged by the junior appropriators were properly before the Department. The Supreme Court reversed the order, holding that the Department erred in refusing to determine the junior appropriators' challenge to the validity of NPPD's appropriations. Remanded with directions to determine whether NPPD's appropriations had been abandoned or statutorily forfeited in whole or in part. View "Bond v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist." on Justia Law

The Dakota Resource Council (DRC) appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a North Dakota Public Service Commission (PSC) order. DRC argued: (1) the PSC's decision was not in accordance with the law; and, (2) the PSC's conclusions of law and order were not supported by its findings of fact. In 2008, Falkirk Mining Company filed an application with the PSC requesting revision of a surface mining permit. Falkirk proposed changing the postmining use of 428 acres of land from agricultural and industrial use to recreational use. The purpose of the revision was to facilitate the transfer of approximately 730 acres of land from Falkirk to the North Dakota Department of Transportation (NDDOT). NDDOT planned to use the land as mitigation acres to eliminate "no mow" areas within the rights-of-way of the state highway system in McLean County. PSC granted the revision subject to the right of adversely affected parties to request a formal hearing. DRC asserted 86 acres located in noncontiguous parcels throughout the proposed wildlife management area should remain designated for agricultural use. Game and Fish planned to allow local farmers to grow crops on the 86 acres, harvesting 70 percent and leaving the remaining 30 percent standing as food for wildlife. McLean County, NDDOT and Game and Fish petitioned to intervene. The PSC then held a public hearing. The PSC affirmed its conditional approval of the revision to Falkirk's permit. DRC appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the PSC's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: “[w]hen considered together, the PSC's findings of fact do not indicate its decision to grant the revision was based on the desire to facilitate the land transfer agreement rather than on consideration of the higher and better use of the land. ... The PSC's conclusions and order affirming its decision granting the revision to recreational use were supported by its findings of fact.” View "Dakota Resource Council v. N.D. Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court addressed the question of what level of participation in an administrative rule-making proceeding gives a participant the right to defend that new rule in an appellate court during a subsequent appeal. Each of the four petitions for writs of superintending control stemmed from an appeal of a decision made by one of two administrative agencies, the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board (EIB) or the New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission (WQCC). Those petitions arose from appeals of administrative rule makings: one appeal challenging rules adopted by EIB and the other challenging rules adopted by WQCC. The Court of Appeals denied appellee status to all four Petitioners, and the Petitioners requested that the Supreme Court issue writs of superintending control to overturn those rulings. The Court consolidated the four petitions and, after hearing oral arguments, issued the writs requested by three of the Petitioners while rejecting the fourth: "[b]eyond the party initiating the proceeding, [the Court] need only decide in this case whether participants who have presented technical testimony are 'parties' to an appeal as contemplated under [New Mexico] rules. [The Court concluded] that they are." [Petitioners] were not just participants who happened to be recognized as parties by EIB and WQCC. Rather, each participated in the rule-making proceedings in a legally significant manner. Each was required to file advance notice of participation, naming their witnesses and the witnesses' qualifications, and each was required to satisfy other prerequisites to their testimony. In addition, Petitioners contributed the kind of evidence that directly informed the inquiries made by EIB and WQCC in making their final decisions. Thus, the Court concluded that the requirements imposed upon Petitioners afforded them a right to defend their positions as parties on appeal. View "New Energy Economy Inc. v. Vanzi" on Justia Law

This case required the court to review the EPA's disapproval, more than three years after the time within which it was statutorily required to act, of three regulations promulgated by the State of Texas. 30 Tex. Admin. Code 116.610(a), 116,610(b), and 116.617. Pursuant to Texas's duty under the Clear Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., to adopt and administer a statewide plan for implementing federal air quality standards, those regulations provided a standardized permit for certain projects that reduce or maintain current emissions rates. Because the EPA had no legal basis on which to disapprove those regulations, the court vacated the agency's disapproval of Texas's regulations and remanded with instructions. View "Luminant Generation Co., et al. v. EPA" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Katrina hit the Mississippi Gulf Coast in August 2005, W. C. Fore entered into a contract with Harrison County, Mississippi, to remove the large amount of debris that was left behind. The Mississippi State Tax Commission (MSTC) then assessed a fee of $1.00 per ton of debris removed. Fore appealed the assessment to the MSTC Board of Review, claiming that the fee did not apply to emergency waste removal. The Board of Review upheld the assessment. Fore appealed the Board of Review’s decision to the MSTC Full Commission, which also affirmed the assessment. Fore then appealed to the Harrison County Chancery Court, First Judicial District. The chancery court upheld the assessment, and Fore appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding that the MSTC's and chancery court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and that there was no misapprehension of the law, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "W. C. Fore, Inc. v. Miss. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM) informed Flexdar, Inc. that Flexdar would be liable for the costs of cleaning up trichloroethylene (TCE) contamination on a site where Flexdar previously had operations. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company (State Auto), with whom Flexdar maintained general liability and umbrella insurance policies for the period when the contamination occurred, filed a declaratory judgment action, contending that coverage for the TCE contamination was excluded pursuant to a pollution exclusion in the policies. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Flexdar, concluding that the language of State Auto's pollution exclusion was ambiguous and therefore should be construed against State Auto and in favor of coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of the pollution exclusion at issue was ambiguous, and therefore, in accordance with precedent, the policies were construed in favor of coverage. View "State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flexdar, Inc." on Justia Law