Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Jane Huggins, trading as SADISCO of Maryland (SADISCO) sued Prince George’s County, Maryland and five County officials after the County shut down the salvage automobile wholesaling business operated by SADISCO on a parcel of land that SADISCO owned within the County. SADISCO’s complaint alleged one count under federal law and four counts under Maryland’s common law. The district court dismissed certain counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment in favor of the County and officials with respect to the remaining counts. Plaintiff appealed, and after review, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court correctly rejected Plaintiff's arguments. View "Huggins v. Prince George's County, MD" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a rezoning proposal for Sunset Park, a predominantly residential neighborhood in Brooklyn. Following public hearings, the Department of City Planning (DCP), the lead agency here, prepared an environmental assessment statement (EAS) and issued a negative declaration, concluding that the proposed rezoning would not have an adverse impact on the environment. Petitioners sought to annul the negative declaration on the ground that DCP's environmental review of the proposed rezoning was not in compliance with the New York State Environmental Quality Review Act and the City Environmental Quality Review rules. Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that DCP neither abused its discretion nor was arbitrary or capricious when it issued its negative declaration because in its EAS the DCP identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a hard look at them, and made a reasoned elaboration of the basis for its determination. View "Chinese Staff & Workers' Ass'n v. Burden" on Justia Law

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA promulgated a series of greenhouse gas-related rules: (1) an Endangerment Finding, in which the EPA determined that greenhouse gases may "reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare"; (2) the Tailpipe Rule, which set emission standards for cars and light trucks; and (3) the Timing and Tailoring Rules, in which the EPA determined that only the largest stationary sources would initially be subject to the requirements for major stationary sources of greenhouse gases to obtain construction and operating permits. Petitioners, various states and industry groups, challenged all these rules. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction all petitions for review of the Timing and Tailoring Rules and denied the remainder of the petitions, holding (1) the Endangerment Finding and Tailpipe Rule are neither arbitrary nor capricious; (2) EPA's interpretation of the governing Clean Air Act provisions is unambiguously correct; and (3) no Petitioner has standing to challenge the Timing and Tailoring Rules. View "Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Grand Valley Citizens' Alliance filed a complaint alleging that it was entitled to a hearing on an application for permit to drill pursuant to section 34-60-108(7), C.R.S. (2011), of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that under subsection 108(7), Grand Valley Citizens were entitled to a hearing because it had a filed a petition on a matter within the jurisdiction of the Commission. After its review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals judgment, holding that section 34-60-108(7) requires a hearing only for rules, regulations, and orders. Permits are governed by section 34-60-106(1)(f), which grants the Oil and Gas Commission broad authority to promulgate rules governing the permitting process, including the authority to determine who may request a hearing. View "Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission" on Justia Law

With the approval of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), in 2005 the Public Service Company of Colorado (Xcel) began constructing a coal-fired electric power unit known as "Comanche 3." When Xcel sought to recover a portion of its construction costs nearly four years later in a rate proceeding, Petitioner Leslie Glustrom intervened. Petitioner sought to introduce testimony that Xcel acted improperly and, consequently, should not recover its costs. The PUC excluded most of her testimony, a ruling that Petitioner challenged. Petitioner separately challenged the depreciation rate and the possibility that Comanche 3 might not be "used and useful" at the time rates went into effect. The PUC denied her challenges, and the district court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the PUC did not abuse its discretion when it struck substantial portions of Petitioner's testimony pursuant to the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Further, the depreciation rate approved by the PUC was established pursuant to law and in accordance with the evidence. Lastly, the PUC was free to exercise its discretion in departing from a strict application of the "used and useful" principle. Petitioner failed to meet her burden in showing why such a departure here would result in a rate that is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences. View "Glustrom v. Colorado Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

The South Coast Air Quality Management District is charged with regulating nonvehicular air pollution emissions in regions that have some of the worst air pollution in the country. This case concerned the District's 2002 amendments to its Rule 1113, which limits certain pollution-causing substances in paints and coatings. The American Coatings Association challenged the amendments on the ground they exceeded the District's regulatory authority under statutes requiring the use of "best available retrofit control technology." At issue was whether the technology was "available" under the statute. The superior court held that the rule was within the District's authority. The court of appeal reversed in part, concluding that the statutory phrase "best available retrofit control technology" meant technology that was available or capable of being readily assembly when the amendments were promulgated. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the relevant statutes give the District the authority to promulgate pollution standards based on technologies that do not currently exist but are reasonably anticipated to exist by the compliance deadline; and (2) the District sufficiently demonstrated that its challenged emissions limits were achievable in each paint and coating category in Rule 1113 and that the categories were reasonably drawn. View "Am. Coatings Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Dist." on Justia Law

This case was a challenge to the State of Washington's Building Code brought by the Building Industry Association of Washington (BIAW) along with individual builders and contractors. The impetus for this challenge was the State's 2009 requirement that new building construction must meet heightened energy conservation goals. At issue was the Energy Policy and Conservation Act's (EPCA) preemption-exemption provision, which expressly preempts state standards requiring greater efficiency than federal standards but exempts from preemption state building codes promoting energy efficiency, so long as those codes meet statutory conditions. Plaintiffs argued that the Building Code did not satisfy EPCA's conditions for exemption. The district court held that Washington had satisfied EPCA's conditions and therefore was not preempted. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Building Code satisfied the conditions Congress set forth in the EPCA for exemption from federal preemption. View "Bldg. Ind. Ass'n of Wash. v. Wash. State Bldg. Code" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Shinnecock Indian Nation entered began construction of a 61,000-square-foot casino on 80 acres in Southampton, New York. The Tribe did not obtain permits from the state or the town, but began bulldozing trees and brush. The state sued in state court, alleging that the planned casino violates state law, and is outside the scope of the IGRA (a federal act authorizing tribal gaming under certain conditions) because the Tribe is not federally recognized and the site is not “Indian lands” and that construction would violate state environmental laws. The Shinnecock removed the case to federal court on the basis that the complaint pleaded issues of federal law. The State moved to remand the action to state court, arguing that its complaint is based entirely on violations of New York state law, that removal was based on the complaint’s anticipation of defenses, and that the its reference to the IGRA asserts only that the IGRA does not apply. The district court denied remand, conducted a bench trial, and granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the Shinnecock from building a casino without complying with state and local law. The Second Circuit vacated, holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. View "State of New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation" on Justia Law

Applicants Wagonhound Land and Livestock Company, LLC, VenJohn Oil, Inc., and Steven M. VenJohn filed a petition with the Wyoming State Board of Control seeking to change the place of use, point of diversion and means of conveyance for water appropriations attached to 174.8 acres. VenJohn owned the appropriations from the North Platte River and requested that the point of diversion and place of use of the rights be moved upstream to Wagonhound’s land. Vic and Jane Garber and several others who were intervening water right holders, objected to the petition, and the Board held a contested case hearing. The Board granted the Applicants’ petition but reduced the transferred rights to 152.5 acres. The Objectors unsuccessfully petitioned the district court for review of the Board decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, they challenged: the sufficiency of the evidence presented in the Board's record; and whether the final decision was in violation of Wyo. Stats. 41-3-104 and 41-3-114. Although the Objectors claimed the defects in the original petition required reversal of the Board’s decision, the Supreme Court found that they did not sufficiently explain why the amendment process was inappropriate or how it violated statute or board rules. The Objectors also did not demonstrate how the other landowners were injured by the petition or the process employed by the Board. Without further explanation, the Court could not accept their argument, and affirmed the Board's decision. View "Garber v. Wagonhound Livestock & Land Company, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Eleventh Circuit concerned a challenge to an exploratory drilling plan under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OSCLA). The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) approved the Shell Exploration Plan S-7444 (Shell EP) to conduct drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. The Plan covered ten exploratory wells on offshore Alabama leases in the central Gulf. This case was a consolidated appeal in which Petitioners the Defenders of Wildlife, the Gulf Restoration Network and others filed comments on the Shell EP, participated in the ancillary administrative proceedings, and then filed a petition with the Court for review. The only issues for the Court's review were whether the Shell EP violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). After review of the parties' briefs and the record below, the Court denied the petition for review, finding the BOEM's decision to approve the Shell EP was not arbitrary or capricious and instead, "reflected the agency's balance of environmental concerns with the expeditious and orderly exploration of resources in the Gulf of Mexico." View "Defenders of Wildlife, et al v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Managem, et al" on Justia Law