Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal raised several issues regarding the scope of the jurisdiction of the department of environmental protection to regulate activity "in the tidal, coastal or navigable waters of the state waterward of the high tide line" under Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-359. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment denying his administrative appeal contesting the department's order directing Plaintiff to remove a seawall that he had constructed on his property along Long Island Sound without having obtained a permit in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-361. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court properly concluded that substantial evidence showed at least part of Plaintiff's seawall was constructed waterward of the high tide line, properly concluded that section 22a-359 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Plaintiff's seawall, and properly denied Plaintiff's discovery request with respect to his claim of unconstitutional vagueness; but (2) in the absence of a finding by the department that the entire seawall was constructed waterward of the high tide line, the trial court improperly determined that the department had jurisdiction under section 22a-361 to order removal of the entire seawall. View "Shanahan v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

In 2010, the EPA promulgated a final rule adopting a new, one-hour primary national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for nitrogen dioxide (NO2). The American Petroleum Institute, the Utility Air Regulatory Group, and the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (collectively the API) petitioned for review of that rule, claiming the EPA, in adopting the NAAQS, was arbitrary and capricious and violated the Clean Air Act. The API also challenged a statement in the preamble to the final rule regarding the EPA's intended implementation of the NAAQS. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (1) denied the petitions insofar as they challenged the EPA's adoption of the NAAQS, holding that the EPA's adoption of the NAAQS for NO2 was neither arbitrary or capricious nor in violation of the Clean Air Act; and (2) dismissed the portions of the petitions challenging the EPA's non-final statement regarding permitting in the preamble to the Final Rule, holding that it did not have jurisdiction to consider those portions of the petitions. View "Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether the renewal of forty-one water supply contracts by the United States Bureau of Reclamation violated section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and illegally threatened the existence of the delta smelt. The contracts at issue fell into two groups: (1) users who obtained water from the Delta-Mendota Canal (DMC contracts), and (2) parties who claimed to hold water rights senior to those held by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation with regard to a Central Valley Project and who previously entered into settlement contracts with the Bureau (settlement contractors). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the DMC contracts and that Plaintiffs' claims against the settlement contractors failed because the contracts were not discretionary and were thus exempted from section 7(a)(2) compliance. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing with regard to the contracts and that section 7(a)(2) of the ESA did not apply to the settlement contracts. View "Natural Res. Defense Council v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Over thirty-five years ago, the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), working with local sponsors, devised a project to provide watershed protection, flood prevention, and recreation along the Lost River Subwatershed. In 1974, the NRCS issued an environmental impact statement relating to the project, and since that time, three dams and most of the land treatment measures have been completed. After preparing a supplemental environmental impact statement in 2009, the NRCS issued a record of decision that eliminated one of the remaining dams from the project and authorized construction of the final dam for the added purpose of providing water supply. Appellants, seven individuals who alleged that their land will be adversely affected by this final dam's construction, filed this action contending that the NRCS failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). They appealed the district court's order granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment. Because the Fourth Circuit determined that the NRCS complied with the procedures mandated by the NEPA and took a hard look at the project's environmental effects, the Court affirmed. View "Webster v. USDA" on Justia Law

The EPA initiated efforts to remediate contamination at the Rhode Island Centredale Manor Superfund Site under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675 and issued a unilateral administrative order to compel entities, including NE Container and Emhart to remove hazardous substances that had been disposed of at the Site as part of the former operations of several companies. Emhart sued NE Container and its insurers, which had provided general commercial liability policies to NE Container during different time periods from the late 1960s through the mid-1980s. Travelers agreed to contribute to NE Container's defense pursuant to a reservation of rights, while PWIC took the position that it had no duty to defend. Travelers has incurred significant defense costs and filed this suit, seeking contribution from PWIC. The district court ruled that PWIC was not contractually obligated to defend NE Container in the Emhart action, observing that the alleged property damage occurred before the commencement of the PWIC policy period between 1982 and 1985. The First Circuit vacated. The district court mistakenly focused solely on the timing of the insured's alleged polluting activities, rather than also considering the potential timing of property damage caused by those activities. View "Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Providence WA Ins. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Philadelphia International Airport is the ninth busiest airport in the U.S. Since 1999, PHL has been among the 10 most delayed airports and has contributed to delays at airports nationwide because its runways are too short, too close together, and too few. After receiving the City’s proposal for expansion in 2003, the FAA prepared an Environmental Impact Statement. In 2008 the FAA published a three-volume, 900-page draft EIS. The EPA submitted comments, citing alleged data omissions in the FAA’s analysis. The FAA considered and responded to each of the EPA’s comments in the final EIS. Although disagreements remained, in 2010, the FAA published its Record of Decision, which approved the expansion and delineated reasons for approval, including a finding that the project was reasonably consistent with existing plans of public agencies for development of areas surrounding the airport, as required by the Airport and Airway Improvement Act (AAIA), 49 U.S.C. 47106(a)(1. Objectors alleged violations of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 and the AAIA. The Third Circuit denied review, finding that the FAA decision was not arbitrary. View "Twp. of Tinicum v. U.S. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

The federal government has maintained navigation in the Delaware River for more than 100 years. In 1992, the Army Corps of Engineers published an Environmental Impact Statement, recommending deepening of five feet along 102-miles. The EIS identified potential adverse impacts, but concluded these would be minimal and were outweighed by benefits of reduced shipping costs. In 1997, after engineering, the Corps published a Supplemental EIS. The project stalled until 2008, when the Philadelphia River Port Authority agreed to share costs. Improved technology reduced the amount of sediment; wetlands restoration was deferred. An oil spill had increased sediment toxicity. Expected expansion of sturgeon, potentially increased blasting risks. A 2009 Environmental Assessment recommended the project proceed. The district court rejected state challenges under the Coastal Zone Management Act, which requires a “consistency determination” for any state whose coastal zone will be affected, 16 U.S.C. 1456(c)(1); the Clean Water Act, which requires compliance with state water pollution law, 33 U.S.C. 1323(a); and the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321. The states had attempted to revoke CZMA clearances. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that dredging has begun. The 2009 EA was not arbitrary. CWA’s “congressionally authorized” exception to state approvals applies. The Corps reasonably concluded that it need not provide supplemental CZMA consistency determinations to states. View "State of DE v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Defendant CB&I Constructors, Inc. negligently caused a June 2002 wildfire that burned roughly 18,000 acres of the Angeles National Forest in Southern California. The United States brought a civil action against CB&I to recover damages for harm caused by the fire. The jury found CB&I liable and awarded roughly $7.6 million in fire suppression, emergency mitigation, and resource protection costs, and $28.8 million in intangible environmental damages. CB&I challenged the award for environmental damages. The district court held that the government provided sufficient evidence for the jury to determine the amount of environmental damages, and that the resulting award was not grossly excessive. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under California law, the government was entitled to full compensation for all the harms caused by the fire, including intangible environment harm; and (2) substantial evidence supported the jury's determination of the amount of environmental damages, and the award was not grossly excessive. View "United States v. CB&I Constructors, Inc." on Justia Law

Chicago Central and Pacific Railroad Company (CCP) voluntarily performed repairs on a drainage improvement. When its request for reimbursement for those repairs was denied by the Calhoun County Board of Supervisors, the party responsible for keeping drainage district improvements in repair, CCP filed a petition for an appeal. The district court dismissed CCP's petition and entered judgment in favor of the Board, concluding that the CCP was liable for the costs of repair. The court of appeals affirmed. the Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, albeit on a different basis, holding (1) under the statutory scheme enacted by the legislature, the Board has the duty to keep improvements in repair, but it also has the discretion to decide how to fulfill that duty; and (2) because CCP's suit essentially asked the Court to remove the Board's discretion while leaving its responsibilities intact, the suit was not permitted by law, and the district court properly dismissed the action. View "Chicago Cent. & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Since at least 1986, the town had a deteriorating sewer system. Defects allowed inflow and infiltration (I/I). Wet weather caused overflow, contaminating the ocean, rivers, and wetlands. To avoid overflow into housing, the town installed, without approval, a bypass pump that discharged raw sewage into the Saugus River. In 2005, the town entered into a consent order with the Department of Environmental Protection, acknowledging violations of the Clean Water Act and state law; the town was required to implement plans to eliminate I/I. There was a moratorium on new connections until the problem was addressed. The town embarked on a 10-year, $27 million dollar plan. Ratepayers were to finance the majority of the plan. In the interim, the town required new connections to pay an I/I reduction contribution, calculated by multiplying, by a factor that decreased as repairs were completed, the number of gallons of new flow to be generated. Plaintiff, developers, paid $670,460 to accommodate new flow from the single-family houses and multifamily housing. The trial court concluded that the charge provided no particularized benefit to the developers; that the amount was excessive compared to regulatory costs involved; and that the charge was an impermissible tax. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated, finding that the charge is a fee. View "Denver St. LLC v. Town of Saugus" on Justia Law