Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants, private entities with an interest in protecting Bayou Postillion in Iberia Parish, Louisiana, sued the Program, alleging that the Program violated the conditions of a permit issued to it by the Corps under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of appellants' case after determining that the Act did not allow citizen suits to enforce the conditions of a section 1344 permit. View "Atchafalaya Basinkeeper, et al. v. Chustz" on Justia Law

Petitioner Town of Seabrook appealed an order of the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) which granted Respondent NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (NextEra), several tax exemptions under RSA 72:12-a (Supp. 2011). Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the record supported DES' decisions except for one: the Court found no evidence in the record to support an increase in a percentage allocation allowed under the statute. Accordingly, the Court partly affirmed, partly reversed the DES' decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Town of Seabrook " on Justia Law

In 2001, the Conservancy sold a 100.10 acre farm in Garrard County, Kentucky to the Sims for $60,084, in addition to a $244,939 charitable pledge from the Sims to the Conservancy. The property appraised at $260,400 without the easement at issue, which requires that the land "be retained forever substantially undisturbed in its natural condition and to prevent any use . . . that will significantly impair or interfere with the Conservation Values of the Protected Property." The Conservancy received an annual right to enter and inspect the property. In January 2005, the Conservancy inspected and documented several violations that concerned excavating and filling a sinkhole. The Sims corrected several other violations. The district court granted summary judgment to the Conservancy, concluding that, although the easement allowed some changes to the topography in conjunction with authorized activities, like plowing for commercial agriculture, the easement specifically prohibited the substantial alteration of filling in a sinkhole with an estimated 6,269 cubic yards of fill. The court awarded the Conservancy $99,796.41 in attorneys’ fees and expenses. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "The Nature Conservancy, Inc. v. Sims" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a municipality such as a township could be held responsible under MCL 324.3109(2) of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA)1 for raw sewage discharged into state waters by private citizens within the township's borders. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under NREPA, a municipality can be held responsible for, and required to prevent, the discharge when the raw sewage originates within its borders, even when the raw sewage is discharged by a private party and not directly discharged by the municipality itself. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals because it interpreted MCL 324.3109(2) in a manner that precluded a municipality from being held responsible for such a discharge. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address remaining arguments made on appeal. View "Dept. of Env. Quality v. Worth Twnsp." on Justia Law

OneBeacon and AMICO were insurers of the B.F. Goodrich and, among others, were liable for environmental cleanup at the Goodrich plant in Calvert City, Kentucky. AMICO settled with Goodrich, but OneBeacon’s predecessor went to trial. A state court jury found for Goodrich, and OneBeacon was ordered to pay $42 million in compensatory damages and $12 million in attorney fees. The state court also denied OneBeacon's request for settlement credits to reflect amounts paid by other insurers, such as AMICO, through settlements with Goodrich. OneBeacon sought equitable contribution; AMICO removed to federal court. The district court granted AMICO summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ohio policy favoring settlements provides that a settled policy is exhausted for purposes of equitable contribution; the court declined to address whether Ohio law permits interclass contribution actions or whether the jury finding of bad faith bars equitable relief. View "OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendants were charged with knowingly violating the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., and were convicted on multiple counts. Defendant Pruett, through LLWC and LWC Management, was responsible for the operation of 28 wastewater treatment facilities in northern Louisiana. The court concluded that section 1319(c)(1)(A) of the Act required only proof of ordinary negligence and thus held that the district court's jury instructions were proper; the district court did not err in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence at issue; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting negative character evidence; the district court properly ruled that a government witness's prior conviction was not admissible under Rule 609(a)(2); the district court was within its discretion to excuse Juror No. 8 and replace him with an alternate; the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Pruett used his position as the president and CEO of LLWC and LWC Management to facilitate the commission of the offenses and therefore, did not err in applying the U.S.S.G. 3B1.3 enhancement; and the fines imposed on defendants were reasonable. Accordingly, the convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "United States v. Pruett, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants Richard Barnett and Cedric and Leslie Sanborn appealed a judgment which ruled that the City of Montpelier may prohibit boating, fishing, and swimming in Berlin Pond, a public body of water located outside the City and used as the City's drinking water supply. The City contended that the restrictions were supported by both a state health order and the powers granted to the City by the State. The trial court agreed and issued a permanent injunction preventing Defendants from engaging in the listed recreational activities and from trespassing upon land surrounding the pond that is owned by the City. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "[The Court's] decision reflects the fact that, under the laws of this state, the recreational use of Berlin Pond is a matter of state concern requiring a resolution at the state level. . . . [The Court] determine[d] only that the City's current powers are limited to preventing trespass upon its property." View "City of Montpelier v. Barnett" on Justia Law

The two appeals consolidated for resolution in this case both arose from an attempt by John C. Harrison, acting as personal representative for the estate of Nolan G. Thorsteinson and trustee of The Margie (Dotts) M. Thorsteinson Trust, to avoid an order declaring abandoned a disputed 1.04 c.f.s. interest in the Mexican Ditch. Harrison appealed directly to the Supreme Court adverse rulings of the Water Court in the two cases. With regard to Harrison's Application for a Change of Water Right, the water court granted the Engineers' motion to dismiss at the close of Harrison's case, finding that he was required but failed, to establish the historic use of the right as to which he sought a change in the point of diversion. With regard to Harrison's protest to the inclusion of the interests he claimed in the Mexican Ditch on the Division Engineer's decennial abandonment list, the water court granted the Engineer's motion for abandonment, as a stipulated remedy for Harrison's failure to succeed in his change application. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Harrison neither proved historic use of the right for which he sought a change nor was excepted from the requirement that he do so as a precondition of changing its point of diversion; and because denying a change of water right for failing to prove the historic use of the right did not amount to an unconstitutional taking of property, the water court's dismissal of Harrison's application was affirmed. But because, Harrison did not stipulate to an order of abandonment as the consequence of failing to succeed in his change application, only as the consequence of failing to timely file an application reflecting historic use, the water court's order granting the Engineers' motion for abandonment was reversed. View "Thorsteinson v. Simpson" on Justia Law

David Caron purchased a majority membership in Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle, LLC without having obtained the written consent of Goodhall's, Inc. (Goodhall's), in violation of Goodhall's lease with Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle. The lease idenitified Goodhall's as the landlord and Goodhall's Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle as the tenant. After a dispute arose concerning the party responsible for remediating certain environmental conditions on the property, Plaintiffs, David Caron and David Caron Chrysler Motors, filed suit against Defendants, Goodhall's and others, claiming that Defendants had violated provisions of its lease regarding Goodhall's responsibility for preexisting environmental conditions and Goodhall's warranty of fitness and habitability. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that no contract existed between the parties to this action because the assignment of the majority interest in the tenant to Caron was invalid. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appellate court improperly failed to consider Plaintiffs' claim that the trial court had improperly concluded that no contract existed between David Caron Chrysler Motors and Goodhall's; and (2) the trial court was incorrect in finding that, because Goodhall's did not consent to the assignment, there was no contract between David Caron Chrysler Motors and Goodhall's. View "David Caron Chrysler Motors, LLC v. Goodhall's, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from the 2008 application of the Honolulu Department of Environmental Services (DES) for a special use permit (SUP) to expand an existing sanitary landfill. The Land Use Commission (LUC) approved the SUP subject to, inter alia, a condition prohibiting the landfill from accepting municipal solid waste after July 31, 2012. The validity of this condition was the sole issue raised by DES on appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment affirming the LUC's approval of the SUP, holding (1) the condition was inconsistent with the evidence shown in the record and was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) because the LUC's approval of the SUP was expressly given subject to the LUC's imposition of the condition, the court's judgment must be vacated. Remanded. View "Dep't of Envtl. Servs. v. Land Use Comm'n" on Justia Law