Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The United States District Court certified a question of law to the Washington Supreme Court, asking whether a violation of Washington’s animal protection laws could establish a claim for a public nuisance, absent an indication that the legislature so intended and absent a showing that the violation interfered with the use and enjoyment of property or was injurious to public health and safety. The case was brought by the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) against the Olympic Game Farm Inc. (OGF). ALDF argued OGF violated Washington’s wildlife laws, animal cruelty laws, and both the Washington and federal Endangered Species Act of 1973, thus creating a public nuisance. OGF argued ALDF had no valid legal claim for public nuisance because ALDF did not demonstrate any wildlife statutes have been violated. Even if ALDF could prove such a violation, the Washington Supreme Court determined the state legislature has not named such violations a nuisance nor has ALDF demonstrated that a property interference or threat to public health and safety has occurred. Based on Washington case law and statutory definitions of public nuisance, and the lack of any indication in case law or statute that violation of animal protection laws has been declared a nuisance, the Supreme Court answered the federal court's certified question in the negative. View "Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Olympic Game Farm, Inc." on Justia Law

The County of Santa Barbara (County) appealed from the entry of a preliminary injunction prohibiting its Road Commissioner from removing unpermitted encroachments placed in the public right of way along a portion of East Mountain Drive in Montecito. The County filed a cross-complaint alleging causes of action for public nuisance and trespass against respondents. The trial court issued a preemptory writ that suspends all efforts by County to enforce the right-of-way encroachments.   The Second Appellate District concluded that the trial court erred because Respondents are not correct on the merits of their CEQA claim and will not be irreparably harmed by the removal of encroachments installed without permits in the public right of way of an existing road. The County Road Commissioner is authorized by statute and local ordinance to remove any encroachment on a public right of way. The court explained that Respondents will suffer no irreparable harm because a party suffers no grave or irreparable harm by being prohibited from violating the law. View "Anderson v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

This case involved Wyoming’s plan to regulate emissions from powerplants within its borders that produce pollutants that contribute to regional haze, reducing visibility in and the aesthetics to national parks and wilderness areas. Wyoming produced a state implementation plan (SIP) in 2011. In a 2014 final rule, the EPA approved the SIP in part (as to Naughton) and disapproved it in part (as to Wyodak). Through a federal implementation plan (FIP), the EPA also substituted its determination of the proper technology to install at Wyodak, replacing Wyoming’s SIP. Wyoming and PacifiCorp petitioned for review, arguing the SIP should be entirely approved and claiming the EPA failed to grant Wyoming the deference required by federal law when it disapproved the Wyodak portion. Several conservation groups also challenged the rule, arguing the Naughton 1 and 2 portion should have been disapproved because the EPA failed to require the best available technology to reduce regional haze in a timely manner. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petition as to Wyodak and vacated that portion of the final rule. The Court found the EPA erred in evaluating the Wyodak portion of the SIP because it treated non-binding agency guidelines as mandatory in violation of the Clean Air Act. The Court remanded that part of the final rule to the agency for further review. But because the EPA properly approved Wyoming’s determination of the best technology for Naughton, the Court denied the petition as to those units and upheld that portion of the final rule. View "Wyoming v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

Pursuant to FAA regulations, Terra-Gen Development Company gave the FAA notice of its planned wind turbine development. The FAA conducted an aeronautical study of the project and issued a “no hazard” determination, finding that the turbines did not pose a hazard to air navigation. Backcountry Against Dumps, a non-profit organization, and two individuals who live near the development, petitioned for review of the “no hazard” determination.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the FAA’s denial of a petition for discretionary review of a plan to construct 72 wind turbines to generate renewable energy in Southern California, and remanded to the agency to consider the merits of the petition. The panel held that the FAA’s rejection of Backcountry’s petition for discretionary review, for the sole reason that Backcountry did not comment on the aeronautical study of the project, was arbitrary and capricious. The FAA’s reasonable interpretation of its own regulations specified that interested parties must receive personal notice of the comment period, and Backcountry fits within the plain meaning of an “interested party.” Therefore, the FAA failed to comply with its own regulations by not providing Backcountry with personal notice of the second comment period. In addition Backcountry was substantially prejudiced by the FAA’s procedural error. View "BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS, ET AL V. FAA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Grant Park Neighborhood Association Advocates and four individuals (together, Grant Park) challenged Department of Public Health's (the Department) approval of an entity’s application to operate a needle and syringe distribution program in Santa Cruz County. Grant Park argued the Department’s approval was flawed for four reasons: (1) Department failed to consult with local law enforcement before approving the application; (2) the Department failed to notify three of the affected local law enforcement agencies about the comment period; (3) the Department provided only 45 days for public comment even though its regulations at the time required 90 days; and (4) the Department failed to conduct the environmental review required under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). After Grant Park filed suit, the California Legislature amended Health & Safety Code section 121349 to exempt approvals under the statute from CEQA; Grant Park contended this amendment did not apply retroactively. On Grant Park’s appeal of the trial court’s decision in the Department’s favor, the Court of Appeal found the Department failed to engage in the required consultation, failed to provide the required notice to three local police departments about the comment period, and failed to provide the required 90 days for comment. The Court also found these failures to comply with section 121349 prejudicial. But the Court found it unnecessary to consider Grant Park’s final claim premised on CEQA, because the only relief it sought under CEQA was relief the Court already agreed was appropriate because of the Department’s failures to comply with section 121349. The Court therefore directed the trial court to grant Grant Park’s petition. View "Grant Park Neighborhood Assn. Advocates v. Dept. of Public Health" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for appellate review centered on the air pollution controls on certain coal-fired power plants in Utah that contributed to regional haze. This haze impaired visibility in national parks and wilderness areas across the United States (known as Class I areas). Following Congress’s direction in the Clean Air Act (the CAA or Act) to regulate regional haze, EPA promulgated the Regional Haze Rule to restore natural background visibility conditions in Class I areas by the year 2064. To comply with the CAA’s regional haze requirements, states with Class I areas, or states releasing emissions that may affect visibility in those areas, had to implement the best available retrofit technology (BART) on certain existing sources of air pollution or, alternatively, adopt measures that achieved greater reasonable progress towards improving visibility than BART. The Act required each state to develop a state implementation plan (SIP) for mitigating emissions that contribute to regional haze. The EPA then reviewed the SIP to determine if it satisfied the Act. EPA twice disapproved Utah’s SIPs addressing visibility-impairing emissions at power plants operated by Respondent-Intervenor PacifiCorp. Eventually, EPA approved Utah’s July 2019 revised SIP. In the Final Rule, EPA endorsed Utah’s decision to adopt an alternative measure instead of BART to control for visibility-impairing emissions at the power plants. Petitioners Heal Utah, National Parks Conservation Association, Sierra Club, and Utah Physicians sought review of the Final Rule. According to Petitioners, EPA abused its discretion by approving Utah’s revised SIP because Utah’s alternative measure did not satisfy the CAA’s national visibility goals. They also argued EPA failed to respond to certain comments Petitioners submitted during the rulemaking process. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Heal Utah, et al. v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency extended the deadline for compliance with a revised national drinking water regulation, which in turn extended the deadline for states to enforce conforming revisions to their own regulations. Five states seek to challenge the federal extension, which they say will cause them various harms.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petition for review for lack of Article III standing. The court explained that the states’ uncertainty also is not redressable in this litigation. Their harm is not knowing what future obligations they will face, making it difficult to plan. But the Delay Rule gives the states more time to hedge their bets. Setting it aside would worsen any problem of regulatory uncertainty, taking as a given EPA’s unreviewable decision to consider changes to the Revision Rule. View "State of Arizona v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Draft Environmental Impact Report (EIR) prepared (California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) Pub. Resources Code, 21000) for Santa Rita’s West Area Specific Plan did not discuss or analyze any potential off-site impacts flowing from an assumption that contemplated new schools would never be built. The school districts contended that they would never receive sufficient funding for the new facilities, and would have to accommodate new students from Specific Plan developments at existing school sites or by other means. The Project identified locations for new schools and the EIR addressed anticipated off-site impacts of development at those sites. The City imposed developer impact fees for the Project under Education Code 17620, deemed complete mitigation under CEQA. The City maintained that information relayed by the Districts amounted to no more than speculation, not requiring further review. After the City approved the Project, the Districts filed suit.The court of appeal concluded that the Final EIR complied with CEQA and properly assumed that the contemplated new schools would be built as part of the Specific Plan and Project. The City was not required to analyze any potentially significant off-site impacts of ill-defined, generalized, and speculative alternatives to new-school construction offered by the District The Districts’ expressed concerns about a perennial lack of sufficient funding without providing more detailed information or identifying a specific alternative plan to address this possibility—for which they, not the City, would be responsible—amounted to speculation. View "Santa Rita Union School District v. City of Salinas" on Justia Law

In the first appeal arising from Plaintiff-respondent Margaret McCann’s dispute with the City of San Diego over the City’s environmental review process of a project to convert overhead utility wires to an underground system in several neighborhoods, she alleged the City violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by failing to properly consider the environmental impact of two underground projects. The Court of Appeal concluded the City’s review process was incomplete as to one project (MND Project) because the City failed to analyze whether they were consistent with the City’s Climate Action Plan. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to issue a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the City of set aside three resolutions that approved the projects. After remand, the trial court also ordered it would retain jurisdiction over the matter until the City complied with the relevant provisions of the CEQA. The City rescinded the project approvals and asked the court to discharge the writ. McCann objected to the City’s return and argued the trial court should not discharge the writ because the City did not perform the relevant analysis or affirmatively indicate it abandoned the projects. The trial court sustained McCann’s objection and declined to discharge the writ. The City then appealed, arguing it fully complied with the courts’ mandates. After review, the Court of Appeal determined the City satisfied the writ, and therefore held the writ had to be discharged. View "McCann v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Fisheries Reform Group alleges that shrimp trawlers operating in North Carolina’s Pamlico Sound are violating the Clean Water Act by engaging in two types of unpermitted activity: throwing bycatch overboard and disturbing sediment with their trawl nets.   The Fourth circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Fisheries’ complaint. The court explained that though the Clean Water Act’s includes the term “biological materials” in its definition of “pollutant,” that is not clear authorization for the EPA to regulate bycatch under the Act. So Fisheries Reform Group’s first claim— that shrimpers are violating the Clean Water Act by discarding bycatch overboard without a Section 1342 permit—was properly dismissed. The court further explained that Fisheries’ second claim—that shrimpers are violating the Act by using trawl nets without a permit—fares no better. The shrimpers are not “dredging” the Pamlico Sound with their nets, so they cannot be discharging “dredged spoil.” And the dirt and sand that their nets kick up is not “added”—and thus not “discharged”—into the Sound. View "North Carolina Coastal Fisheries Reform Group v. Capt. Gaston LLC" on Justia Law