Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Sixteen years tardy, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) disapproved a revision to Texas's plan for implementing the requirements of the Clean Air Act (CAA). The untimely disapproval unraveled approximately 140 permits issued by Texas under the revision's terms and required regulated entities to qualify for pre-revision permits or risk federal sanctions. Petitioner - the State of Texas, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and representatives of nationwide manufacturing, chemical and petroleum industries - petitioned for review of the EPA's action under the APA. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the EPA's disapproval of Texas's plan, holding that the EPA's disapproval failed APA review, as the EPA based its disapproval on demands for language and program features of the EPA's choosing without basis in the CAA or its implementing regulations. View "State v. EPA" on Justia Law

Grand Canyon Trust appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) rejecting the Trust's claims alleging that Reclamation and FWS violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Administrative Procedure Act in the operation of the Glen Canyon Dam. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed as moot in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) several of the Trust's claims were moot; (2) Reclamation did not violate the ESA by not consulting with FWS before issuing each annual operating plan (AOP) for the Dam; and (3) Reclamation did not violate NEPA by not preparing an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement for each AOP. View "Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation" on Justia Law

This was a dispute over rights to use water from the Teton River in Montana. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt use water from the downstream portion of the Teton near Fort Benton, Montana. They claimed generally that they are damaged by diversion practices on the upstream portion of the Teton near Choteau, Montana, and that their "calls" on upstream appropriators to release water for their downstream use have been ignored. They first filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the District Court in February, 2011, and ultimately filed second and third amended petitions seeking to halt certain water diversions from the Teton. The issue underlying this case arose in part from the decision in "Perry v. Beattie." "Perry" decreed the priority date and flow rate of about 40 water right claims in the upper Teton River west of Choteau. The District Court appointed a Water Commissioner pursuant to 85-5-101, MCA, to administer the water rights decreed in "Perry." The majority of water users on the Teton (and their successors in interest, including downstream users Giese, Kelly and Reichelt) were not parties to the Perry case. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt claimed water rights from the Teton with priority dates that are senior to or contemporary with the upstream rights decreed in Perry. Water right claimants on the Teton were participating in the Water Court’s on-going adjudication of water rights under Title 85, Chapter 2 of the Montana Code. While that process was nearing its final stages, it was not yet complete and the Water Court did not issue a final decree. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt challenged the Water Commissioner’s practice of diverting the flow of the Teton down the Bateman Ditch. They contended that their water rights pre-date the rights of many upstream Perry decree rights and pre-date the Water Commissioner’s diversion of the Teton through the Bateman Ditch. They contended that since the Bateman Ditch was not used to divert the entire river at the time of the Perry decree, the Water Commissioner lacked the authority to make the diversion. The Supreme Court restated the issue on appeal as whether the District Court erred in dismissing Appellants’ request for certification to the Chief Water Judge pursuant to 85-2-406(2)(b), MCA. Upon review, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to certify all appropriate issues to the Chief Water Judge as provided in 85-2-406(2)(b), MCA, and to grant such injunctive or other relief that, in the District Court’s discretion, it determined to be necessary and appropriate. View "Giese v. Blixrud" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Fellows appealed a district court's order that dismissed his complaint. Plaintiff owned a water right in Spring Creek. He claimed that the flow of the creek was for many years recharged by water seeping from the natural channel of the Teton River. He claimed that the practice of diverting water from the natural channel of the Teton implemented by the district court's water commissioner on the Teton adversely affected the water available to satisfy his water right in Spring Creek. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court held that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring an action as a dissatisfied water user unless he could prove a hydrological connection between Spring Creek and the Teton River. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's factual allegations and his request for a declaratory ruling were sufficient to invoke the district court's power to issue a ruling on the issue of connectivity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Fellows v. Water Commissioner et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant WildEarth Guardians sued Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCo) pursuant to the Clean Air Act's citizen-suit provisions seeking civil penalties and an injunction to halt construction for a new coal-fired power plant in Pueblo, Colorado. WildEarth's principal argument was that PSCo failed to obtain a valid construction permit. Although the project initially complied with all applicable federal and state laws when construction commenced in 2005, the regulatory landscape changed in 2008. A decision of the D.C. Circuit required regulators to impose additional Clean Air Act requirements upon new power plant construction. While litigation was pending, PSCo finished constructing the plant and came into compliance with the new regulatory regime. The district court dismissed the suit, reasoning that to find a Clean Air violation under the circumstances would be to give unwarranted retroactive effect to the decision of the D.C. Circuit. The question before the Tenth Circuit was whether WildEarth's allegations that PSCo violated the Act became moot. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "under the unusual circumstances of this case . . . PSCo's violations could nto reasonably be expected to recur, and thus no deterrent effect could be achieved." Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "WildEarth Guardians v. Public Service Company" on Justia Law

This case considered complex questions of insurance policy coverage interpretation in connection with a federal court-ordered cleanup of the state's Stringfellow Acid Pits waste site. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's judgment, holding (1) the "continuous injury trigger" and "all sums" rule announced in Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co. and Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co. applied to the State's successive property or long-tail first party property loss, triggering the duty to indemnify here; and (2) the court of appeal correctly applied the "all-sums-with-stacking" allocation rule in allocating the indemnity duty among the insurers responsible for covering the property loss. View "State v. Cont'l Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners, the Native Village of Kilalina IRA Council and other Alaskan groups, appealed the EPA Environmental Appeals Board's (EAB) order denying review of their challenges to a permit authorizing Intervenor Teck Alaska, Inc. to discharge wastewater caused by the operation of Red Dog Mine. The EAB concluded that Kivalina had not satisfied the procedural requirements to obtain review under 40 C.F.R. 124.19(a) because it did not demonstrate why the EPA's responses to comments were clearly erroneous or otherwise warranted review. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioners' petition for review, holding that Petitioners did not meet the requirements of section 124.19. View "Native Village of Kivalina IRA Council v. EPA" on Justia Law

Summit’s natural gas sweetening plant in Michigan makes gas usable by removing hydrogen sulfide. Summit owns all of the production wells and subsurface pipelines that connect wells to the plant. The wells are located over a 43-square-mile area, from 500 feet to eight miles from the plant. Summit does not own property between the wells or property between the wells and the plant. Flares burn off gas waste to relieve pressure on gas collection equipment. The closest flare is about one half-mile from the plant, others are over one mile away. The plant and most of the wells and flares are located on a tribal reservation. All emit sulfur dioxides and nitrous oxides, air pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q. The plant alone has potential to emit just under 100 tons of these pollutants per year. Each flare and well has potential to emit lower amounts. The EPA determined that the plant, flares, and wells constituted a single stationary source under the CAA. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for determination of whether the plant and wells are sufficiently physically proximate to be considered “adjacent” within the ordinary meaning of that requirement. Interpreting the requirement in terms of mere functional relatedness was unreasonable. View "Summit Petroleum Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

US Magnesium sought review of a recent final rule from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In its rule, the EPA called for Utah to revise its State Implementation Plan (SIP) for the federal Clean Air Act (CAA). Under the CAA, the EPA may call for a state to revise its SIP (a SIP Call) if the EPA finds the state’s current SIP substantially inadequate. Here, the EPA determined that Utah’s SIP was substantially inadequate because it contained an Unavoidable Breakdown Rule (UBR), which permits operators of CAA-regulated facilities to avoid enforcement actions when they suffer an unexpected and unavoidable equipment malfunction. In this SIP Call, published as a final rule in April 2011, the EPA requested that Utah promulgate a new UBR—one that conforms with the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA. US Magnesium maintained that the SIP Call was arbitrary and capricious and asked the Tenth Circuit to vacate it. Upon review, the Court did not find the EPA's decision arbitrary and capricious, and denied US Magnesium's petition for review. View "U.S. Magnesium LLC v. Env. Protection. Ag'y" on Justia Law

Defendant Gary Weddle and the intervening Defendant, the conservation commission of the town of Fairfield, appealed from the trial court's decision granting the writ of quo warranto filed by Plaintiffs, certain concerned taxpayers of the town of Fairfield, and ordering Weddle's removal from the office of wetlands compliance officer. On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the procedural and substantive requirements for maintaining a quo warranto action. The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding (1) plaintiffs demonstrated sufficient interest to establish standing to pursue the quo warranto action; and (2) the trial court properly granted Plaintiffs' writ of quo warranto on the basis that Weddle's appointment to the wetland compliance officer position violated the town charter by usurping the office of the conservation director. View "Bateson v. Weddle" on Justia Law