Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game (IDFG) appealed the district court's post-judgment orders (1) refusing to lift a portion of an injunction and (2) declaring the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act unconstitutional. In 2004, IDFG made a public proposal to renovate the Farragut Shooting Range, (owned and operated by IDFG since World War II), based on the "Vargas Master Plan." Citizens Against Range Expansion (CARE), an unincorporated non-profit association comprised of individuals who reside near the range, contended that the plan would greatly increase range usage, and harm the community. CARE sued IDFG in 2005 for nuisance and other related causes of action regarding the range's operation. CARE's claims were grounded in both safety and noise concerns regarding the increased use of the range, and its proposed expansion. Among other relief, CARE sought to enjoin IDFG's operation of the range. The case proceeded to a court trial in December of 2006 and in February of 2007 the court issued its memorandum decision wherein it determined that CARE was entitled to relief enjoining further operation of the Farragut Range until IDFG completed certain safety improvements. Upon completion of its range improvements, IDFG filed a Motion for Partial Lifting of Injunction. CARE then moved for summary judgment, claiming that the Act was a special law in violation of art. III, sec. 19 of the Idaho Constitution, and a deprivation of judicial power in violation of art. V, sec. 13. The district court issued summary judgment in favor of CARE on the constitutional issues in March of 2011. In its order, the court found that the Act was unconstitutional as a special law and a deprivation of judicial power. For this reason alone, it denied IDFG's Relief Motion with regard to the 501-shooter component. The court found that there remained disputed issues of fact regarding range safety. On August 25, 2011, following the evidentiary hearing on safety issues, the district court denied IDFG's Relief Motion with regard to the one component of the injunction. IDFG timely appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court: 1) reversed the district court's order holding that IDFG did not comply with the "500-shooter" component of the injunction; 2) concluded as a matter of law that IDFG complied with the 500-shooter component, and lifted that component of the injunction; 3) reversed the district court's order holding the Act to be unconstitutional; 4) remanded this case to the district court to determine whether IDFG has complied with the "501-shooter" component of the injunction. View "Citizens Against Range Expansion v. Idaho Fish & Game" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's rulemaking regarding hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). At issue was whether section 112(c)(6) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7412(c)(6), required the EPA to impose the same stringency levels in standards for non-112(c)(6) HAPs occurring at section 112(c)(6) sources that it did for section 112(c)(6) HAPs. The EPA rejected the claim that section 112(c)(6)'s cross-reference to section 112(d)(2) required that the EPA subject all HAPs emitted by a section 112(c)(6) source to standards at the stringency level specified by section 112(d)(2). The EPA also made clear that, despite language in the Gold Mine Rule arguably suggesting that it covered "fugitive emissions" - namely emissions from certain sources - in fact the rule did not address such emissions. The court rejected petitioners' claims challenging the EPA's rulemaking and affirmed the EPA's order. View "Desert Citizens Against Pollution, et al v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law

Sierra Club challenged a determination of the EPA, which announced that it had met the regulatory obligations imposed on it by section 112(c)(6) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7412(c)(6). The court concluded that the determination was a legislative rulemaking subject to the notice-and-comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553. Because the EPA issued the determination without providing notice and opportunity for comment, the court vacated and remanded for the agency to follow those procedures. View "Sierra Club v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law

Before 2009, the Alaska Board of Game employed a controversial scoring system in order to distribute permits to subsistence hunters in a popular caribou and moose hunting area between Anchorage and Fairbanks. In 2009, the Board amended its regulations to abolish the scoring system and replace it with two separate subsistence hunts: a community harvest hunt for groups and a separate hunt for individuals. A local tribe was subsequently granted a community harvest permit pursuant to the new rules. An individual resident brought suit challenging the new system, alleging violations of the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act, his due process rights, the Board’s governing statutes, and several provisions of the Alaska Constitution. The tribe intervened on the side of the State and a private organization intervened on the side of the individual. In July 2010, the superior court granted summary judgment and enjoined the community harvest hunt as unconstitutional. The superior court later awarded attorney’s fees to the individual and private organization. The tribe appealed both decisions to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court concluded that the underlying appeal was moot because the challenged regulation had been substantively changed since 2009. Accordingly, the case was dismissed. View "Nene v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

Petitioners Savannah Riverkeeper, South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, South Carolina Wildlife Federation, and Conservation Voters of South Carolina (collectively, Conservation Groups) petitioned the Supreme Court Court to hear this matter in its original jurisdiction to determine whether the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) acted illegally and usurped the authority of the Savannah River Maritime Commission (the Commission) when it negotiated an agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and the Georgia Ports Authority (GPA) before issuing a 401 Water Quality Certification (the Certification or the 401 Certification) requested for the proposed Savannah Harbor Expansion Project (SHEP). The Court granted the petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that DHEC's action contravened the plain language of S.C. Code Ann. section 54-6-10 (2007). View "Savannah Riverkeeper v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was (1) whether an ordinance authorizing the acquisition of an easement by condemnation also confers the authority to acquire the easement by an action to quiet title, and (2) whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the circuit court's ruling that the City of Virginia Beach proved an implied dedication of the disputed easements and whether the court erred in ruling that Lynnhaven Dunes Condominium Association was not entitled to compensation for its loss of riparian rights. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the authorizing ordinance fully encompassed the City's actions in bringing this condemnation proceeding, and the evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court's ruling that the City had proven it had acquired the easements by implied dedication; but (2) the circuit court erred in ruling that Lynnhaven's loss of riparian rights was non-compensable. View "Lynnhaven Dunes Condo. Ass'n v. City of Virginia Beach" on Justia Law

In this appeal, Appalachian Power Company (APCO) sought rate adjustment clause recovery of $33.3 million in environmental compliance costs that the State Corporation Commission denied. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded, holding (1) APCO was entitled to a rate adjustment clause for recovery of actual costs it directly incurred for environmental compliance in 2009 and 2010 but did not recover through its base rates, and the portion of the Commission's decision denying recovery of environmental compliance costs on the basis that those costs were connected with projects included in APCO's base rates which APCO had the opportunity to recover was reversed; and (2) the portion of the Commission's decision denying APCO recovery of environmental compliance costs alleged to be embedded in the capacity equalization charges APCO paid to its affiliates in 2009 and 2010 was affirmed. Remanded. View "Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Vicksburg Chemical Company (VCC) filed for bankruptcy in 2002. Included in its bankruptcy estate was over 500 acres of real property, a portion of which was contaminated. Pursuant to an agreed order, the bankruptcy court allowed VCC to abandon the property and allowed the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) to choose the purchaser. Without the aid of any guidelines or statutory law regarding this process, MDEQ, at the suggestion of the Attorney General's Office (AG), published a Request for Proposals (RFP) to identify interested parties capable of removing the contamination. The plaintiff, Pacific Chlorine, Inc. (PCI), was one of several companies to submit a proposal. MDEQ did not select PCI's proposal, but instead selected Harcros Chemicals, Inc. (Harcros), a company which worked closely with the City of Vicksburg (the City) on its proposal. Aggrieved, PCI sued MDEQ and the City. PCI settled with the City. Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered a judgment against MDEQ. MDEQ appealed to the Supreme Court, raising six assignments of error that fall into three categories: whether PCI is required to exhaust its administrative remedies, whether the trial court erred by denying MDEQ's motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment, and whether MDEQ is immune from suit under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). This case presented an issue of first impression, the issue being whether MDEQ acted within the scope of its authority when assisting a bankruptcy court with finding a purchaser for contaminated land. The Court found that it was. View "Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality v. Pacific Chlorine, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether NMSA 1978, Section 72-2-9.1 (2003), provided a constitutional delegation of authority for the Office of the State Engineer to adopt new regulations to administer water resources according to administrative interim priority determinations based on a number of factors. The district court and Court of Appeals concluded that it did not and that the State Engineer’s lawful authority to supervise water allocations could be exercised only on the basis of licenses issued by the State Engineer and adjudications in court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the Legislature delegated lawful authority to the State Engineer to promulgate the challenged water administration regulations. Furthermore, the Court held that the regulations were not unconstitutional on separation of powers, due process, or vagueness grounds. View "Tri-State Generation & Transmission Assn., Inc. v. D'Antonio" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, in anticipation of Revett Silver Company and RC Resources, Inc. (collectively, "Revett") seeking approval for mine-related construction under a general permit, filed this action against the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) seeking a declaratory judgment that use of general permits to approve stormwater runoff from the Rock Creek Mine would violate Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.1341(4)(e) because Rock Creek is an area of "unique ecological significance" based on considerations of impacts on fishery resource and local conditions at proposed discharge. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and declared the general permit void. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DEQ's approval of the use of the general permit to allow storm water discharges was arbitrary and capricious because DEQ failed to consider the relevant factors set forth in the law prior to its decision, and as a result, committed a clear error of judgment. View "Clark Fork Coalition v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality" on Justia Law