Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The case involved two permitting actions for a wind energy project in the mountains of Converse County. Objectors included the Northern Laramie Range Alliance (NLRA) and Northern Laramie Range Foundation (NLRF). In the first case (Case 1), Objectors challenged the district court's affirmance of the County Board of County Commissioners (Board) decision to grant Wasatch Wind Intermountain, LLC's (Wasatch) application for a Wind Energy Conversion System Permit (WECS permit). They also challenged the court's rulings that NLRA and NLRF did not have standing to appeal the Board's decision. In the second case (Case 2), Objectors challenged the district court's affirmance of the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, Industrial Siting Council's (ISC) decision to grant a state industrial siting permit for construction of the project. In Case 1, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) NLRA had standing but NLRF did not; and (2) the Board properly granted Wasatch's application for a WECS permit. In Case 2, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ISC acted within its authority in granting the industrial siting permit, and there was sufficient evidence to justify its decision. View "N. Laramie Range Found. v. Converse County Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved plans and specifications for the Brant Lake Sanitary District's wastewater treatment facility in 2012. The Brant Lake facility plans proposed to join and expand the Chester Sanitary District's existing wastewater disposal system. The plans included the construction of an additional treatment lagoon to tie into Chester's existing two-cell lagoon system. The plans also included the construction of additional piping to transport wastewater to the treatment lagoons. Plaintiffs' home and business were near the proposed lagoon. Plaintiffs filed an application for a writ of mandamus requiring DENR to comply with applicable state statutes, administrative rules, and DENR internal guidelines in approving the plans and specifications for the Brant Lake facility. The trial court denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show that DENR disregarded a clear duty to act under the applicable statutes, administrative rules, or manuals, and accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' application for writ of mandamus. View "Krsnak v. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res." on Justia Law

Arkansas Game and Fish Commission owns and manages the Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area, 23,000 acres with multiple hardwood species and used for recreation and hunting. In 1948, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructed Clearwater Dam upstream from the Area and adopted the Water Control Manual, setting seasonally varying rates for release of water from the Dam. From 1993-2000, the Corps, at the request of farmers, authorized deviations from the Manual that extended flooding into peak timber growing season. The Commission objected that deviations adversely impacted the Area, and opposed a proposal to make deviations part of the permanent water-release plan. After testing, the Corps abandoned the proposed Manual revision and ceased temporary deviations. The Commission sued, alleging that the deviations caused sustained flooding during growing season and that the cumulative impact of the flooding caused destruction of Area timber and substantial change in the terrain, necessitating costly reclamation. The Claims Court judgment ($5,778,757) in favor of the Commission was reversed by the Federal Circuit, which held that government-induced flooding can support a taking claim only if “permanent or inevitably recurring.” The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Government-induced flooding of limited duration may be compensable. There is no blanket temporary-flooding exception to Takings Clause jurisprudence and no reason to treat flooding differently than other government intrusions. While the public interests are important, they are not categorically different from interests at stake in other takings cases. When regulation or temporary physical invasion by government interferes with private property, time is a factor in determining the existence of a compensable taking, as are the degree to which the invasion is intended or the foreseeable result of authorized government action, the character of the land, the owner’s “reasonable investment-backed expectations,” and the severity of the interference. View "AR Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1999, the Alaska Board of Fisheries (the Board) made a use finding in the Chitina subdistrict for the first time, changing it from a "personal use" to a "subsistence" fishery. The Board reversed this decision in 2003, returning Chitina to a personal use fishery. The Alaska Fish and Wildlife Conservation Fund (AFWCF) and the Chitina Dipnetters Association, Inc., after asking the Board to reconsider its 2003 finding in both 2005 and 2008, brought this suit to challenge the Board's negative customary and traditional use finding for Chitina. They claimed that the regulation used by the Board to make such a finding was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The superior court held that the regulation was valid and constitutional, but remanded for the Board to fully articulate the standard being used in its application of the regulation. It also instructed the Board not to consider "the per capita consumption of wild food in the home community of various users" upon remand. On remand, the Board codified a definition of "subsistence way of life," allowed the parties to submit evidence, and upheld its previous classification. Because 5 AAC 99.010(b) was consistent with its authorizing statutes, was reasonable and not arbitrary, did not violate the Alaska Constitution's equal access provisions, and was constitutionally applied when the Board made its customary and traditional use finding for the Chitina fishery in 2003, the Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the superior court's rulings. Because there was no indication that the Board actually relied on the per capita consumption of wild foods in the users' home communities when applying 5 AAC 99.010(b) and because that information could have been relevant to the subsistence inquiry, the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the superior court's ruling. View "Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

The Shelly Company, an Ohio corporation engaged in the business of surfacing roads, owned several subsidiaries, including appellants Shelly Materials, Inc. and Allied Corporation (collectively, Shelly). The hot-mix asphalt facilities were regulated by the Ohio EPA pursuant to air-pollution-control permits issued to Shelly. In July 2007, the State filed suit against Shelly, alleging that the companies had violated state law and Ohio's federally approved plan for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of air-quality standards as required by the federal Clean Air Act. The court found for the state on some, but not all, claims for relief, and issued a civil penalty. At issue on appeal was the proper method of calculating the civil penalty to be levied against the industrial facility with the terms of its air-pollution-control permit. The appellate court concluded that according to the terms of the permit, the penalty was to be calculated from the initial date of noncompliance until the facility demonstrated that it no longer violated the permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court reached the proper conclusion in this matter. View "State ex rel. Ohio Attorney Gen. v. Shelly Holding Co." on Justia Law

The Rosenwinkels purchased 160 acres in Kendall County in 1991 and began cattle operations in 1992. Across the road was a farm house, at least 100 years old; in 1991, the tenant moved out and the house was vacant. In 1998, the Toftoys demolished the house. They built a new home, completed in 2004. In 2007, they filed a nuisance action complaining about flies. The Rosenwinkels sought protection under the Farm Nuisance Suit Act (740 ILCS 70/1). The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the Toftoys and ordered remedial measures, including removal of moist bedding and manure. The appellate court affirmed, except as to the remedy. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that plaintiffs did not acquire property rights until six years after the farm began operating, beyond the Act’s one-year limitation. By “coming to the nuisance,” plaintiffs were barred from suit. The Act is a “right-to-farm” law to limit nuisance actions and preserve use of farmland. It provides that no farm “shall be or become a private or public nuisance because of any changed conditions in the surrounding area” when the farm has been in existence for one year and was not a nuisance when it began operations. View "Toftoy et al., etc., v. Rosenwinkel et al." on Justia Law

This case concerned the construction of a new Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) rail/truck terminal outside Kansas City, Kansas. Because the preferred site contained streams and wetlands protected under federal law, several groups (collectively, "Hillsdale") brought challenges to a dredge and fill permit issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) under the Clean Water Act. The district court denied Hillsdale's motion for an injunction and granted summary judgment for the Corps and BNSF. On appeal, Hillsdale requested that the Tenth Circuit set aside the Corps's decision to grant the permit because the Corps inadequately considered alternatives to the selected site under the Clean Water Act and violated the National Environmental Policy Act by preparing an inadequate environmental assessment and failing to prepare a full environmental impact statement. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the Corps's decision was supported by the record, and was not an arbitrary and capricious exercise of its approval powers under federal law. View "Hillside Environmental Loss, et al v. United States Army Corps, et al" on Justia Law

This case involved legal challenges to recent federal management actions taken in New England's sensitive Multispecies Groundfish Fishery (Fishery). The challenges centered on the promulgation of a new groundfish Fishery Management Plan (FMP), Amendment Sixteen, which altered and expanded the Fishery's preexisting "sector allocation program" and established new restrictions on fishing activities to end and prevent overfishing. Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court alleging that Amendment Sixteen conflicted with the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act's provisions governing "limited access privilege programs," with the ten "national standards" applicable to all FMPs, and with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to enjoin implementation of Amendment Sixteen. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants as to all claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed entry of judgment for Defendants, holding (1) Amendment Sixteen was implemented with the protections required by the Reauthorization Act; (2) Amendment Sixteen was consistent with the ten national standards; and (3) Amendment Sixteen was implemented in accordance with the requirements of NEPA. View "City of New Bedford v. Locke" on Justia Law

The Department of Natural Resources restricted the non-winter use of large vehicles on the Rex Trail. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether these restrictions were within the Department's authority. Because the Department has broad authority to manage public lands in general and specific authority to manage rights-of-way such as the Rex Trail, and the restrictions did not violate any statutory limitations on this authority, the Supreme Court concluded that they were authorized. View "Caywood v. Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

This case involved the City of Atlanta's compliance with two consent decrees which resolved complex, multi-party litigation arising from Atlanta's violation of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. The court held that the district court exceeded the scope of its authority by exercising jurisdiction over the state service delivery proceedings. The district court's order enjoining Fulton County and Sandy Springs from pursuing the state service delivery proceedings in state court was vacated and remanded for the district court to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Atlanta's Amended Third-Party Complaint against Sandy Springs. View "City of Atlanta v. City of Sandy Springs, et al" on Justia Law