Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The Idaho Wool Growers Association (IWGA) and several of its members brought suit against the State of Idaho, claiming that the State failed to protect domestic sheep operators from curtailment of their grazing allotments by the United States Forest Service. The curtailment of the allotments was designed to accommodate the reintroduction of bighorn sheep in the Hells Canyon area. In their complaint, the Wool Growers alleged that the State was obligated to redress damage caused to domestic sheep operations by virtue of the reintroduction. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Wool Growers appealed that dismissal, but upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho Wool Growers v. State of Idaho Fish & Game" on Justia Law

This was an appeal of a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the State of Idaho, former Governor James E. Risch, and former Fish and Game Department Director Steven Huffaker (collectively "Defendants"). Appellants, Rex and Lynda Rammell, owners of a domestic elk ranch, brought suit against Defendants to recover for the loss and destruction of elk that escaped from their ranch in 2006. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Rammell v. Idaho" on Justia Law

The appellant had filed a petition for reconsideration of an administrative order issued by the Idaho Department of Water Resources, and, when the Department failed to decide the merits of the petition within twenty-one days, the appellant filed a petition for judicial review of the Department’s order, contending that the petition for reconsideration was deemed denied pursuant to Idaho Code section 67-5246(4). The Department later decided the petition for reconsideration and issued an amended order. The district court held that section 67-5246(4) did not require the Department decide the merits of the petition for reconsideration within twenty-one days; it only had to agree to consider the petition within that time frame. The court therefore dismissed appellant’s petition for judicial review on the ground that the order it sought to have reviewed had been superseded by the amended order. The Supreme Court vacated the dismissal because the petition for reconsideration was deemed denied by section 67-5246(4) when the Department failed to decide it within twenty-one days, and the amended order was therefore a nullity because the Department did not have jurisdiction to issue it. View "A&B Irrigation District v. Idaho Dept of Water Resources" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Tim DeChristopher entered a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) oil and gas lease auction in Salt Lake City, Utah, by representing he was a bidder. His purpose was to disrupt the auction and call attention to the potential environmental harms of drilling on the leases. He proceeded to drive up the auction prices and ultimately won almost $1.8 million in bids, for which he was unable to pay. A jury convicted Defendant of interfering with the provisions of Chapter 3A of the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act, and making a false statement or representation. He appealed, raising eight separate issues related to his conviction. Upon review of each, the Tenth Circuit determined they had no merit and affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. DeChristopher" on Justia Law

The State of Arizona filed an interlocutory appeal from an order issued in the general stream adjudications of the Gila River System and Source and the Little Colorado System and Source. At issue was whether federal water rights were impliedly reserved on lands granted by the United States government to the State of Arizona to support education and other public institutions (State Trust Lands). The Supreme Court accepted review and affirmed the superior court's ruling that there was no withdrawal, no reservation for a federal purpose, and no congressional intent to reserve water rights for the State Trust Lands. View "In re Water Rights to Gila / Little Colorado" on Justia Law

GenCorp owned a vinyl-manufacturing facility, including hazardous waste management units (RCRA units), which reclaimed solvent waste. Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901, GenCorp was obligated to obtain permits for the units. GenCorp had not received all of the required permits when it agreed to sell the facility. The agreement specified GenCorp’s retained liabilities, and contained a provision requiring each party to indemnify and defend against their retained liabilities. Textileather became the owner in 1990 and decided to discontinue use of the RCRA units. Textileather began the closure process required by Ohio Administrative Code 3745-66; the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) issued several Notices of Deficiency. Textileather challenged the OEPA’s 2001 closure plan and asserted that GenCorp was obligated to indemnify and defend. The district court ruled in favor of GenCorp, holding that, under the agreement, OEPA did not constitute a “third party” and Textileather’s RCRA closure proceedings did not constitute a “claim or action.” The Sixth Circuit reversed in part and directed the district court to enter judgment for Textileather on the legal question of whether the retained liabilities section of the agreement applies. The court affirmed that GenCorp retained only CERCLA claims covered by certain sections. View "Textileather Corp. v. GenCorp Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are a collection of primarily non-trawl fishermen's associations and groups whose longtime participation in the fishery may shrink under Amendments 20 and 21 to the PacificCoast Groundfish Fishery Management Plan. The Plan was designed to increase economic efficiency through fleet consolidation, reduce environmental impacts, and simplify future decisionmaking. Plaintiffs argued that the Amendments were unlawful under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), 16 U.S.C. 1801-1884, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants where the NMFS complied with both the MSA and NEPA provisions at issue. View "Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Assoc., et al v. Locke, et al" on Justia Law

The named defendant, EAPWJP, LLC (EAP) appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiffs and the defendants-cross claimants a prescriptive easement over a pathway crossing property owned by EAP that the plaintiffs and the defendants-cross claimants had used for many years to access a nearby beach. The pathway traversed protected tidal wetlands and was covered in part by a wooden walkway installed without appropriate permits. The Supreme Court granted certification to appeal to ask whether the appellate court properly concluded that construction and use of a walkway deemed to be a per se public nuisance could establish a prescriptive easement over the underlying tidal wetlands. The Court dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted, concluding that the issue raised by the certified question went beyond the scope of the record below, and therefore, the issue was not properly preserved. View "Murphy v. EAPWJP, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case are companies that submitted high bids on certain oil and gas leases at a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) auction (collectively, the Energy Companies). After the auction but before the leases were issued, newly appointed Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar decided not to lease the parcels at issue. Salazar announced his decision at a February 4, 2009, press conference and memorialized his determination in a February 6 memorandum to the BLM’s Utah State Director. On February 12, 2009, a subordinate BLM official mailed letters to the high bidders indicating that the leases would not be issued. Exactly ninety days later, the Energy Companies filed suit challenging the Secretary’s authority to withdraw the leases. The district court dismissed their suit as time-barred under the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA), which provides that “[n]o action contesting a decision of the Secretary involving any oil and gas lease shall be maintained unless such action is commenced or taken within ninety days after the final decision of the Secretary relating to such matter.” A majority of the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Secretary’s final decision in this matter occurred no later than February 6, and thus, the suit was time-barred. The panel majority also agreed with the district court that the Energy Companies were not entitled to equitable tolling in this matter: the BLM notified the high bidders just six days after the Secretary made his decision. And the government notified the Energy Companies of its position that February 6 was the operative date during agency proceedings. Although the Energy Companies had time to prepare their claims before the limitations period expired, they gambled that a court would accept their proffered limitations theory. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "Impact Energy Resources, LLC, et al v. Salazar, et al" on Justia Law

Congress authorized the State of Colorado to regulate hazardous wasted in the state. Invoking that regulatory authority, Plaintiff-Appellant Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, Hazardous Materials and Waste Management Division (“Colorado” or “CDPHE”), declared the chemical weapons stored at an Army weapons depot near Pueblo awaiting destruction to be hazardous waste. In this action, Colorado sought to enforce its regulation prohibiting storage of any hazardous waste against the Depot. The specific question presented by this appeal was whether Congress’s mandate that the Army destroy these chemical weapons at the Depot by 2017 preempted Colorado’s enforcement against the Depot of its regulation prohibiting storage of any hazardous waste. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit was persuaded by the "detailed manner with which Congress has addressed and mandated the destruction of the chemical weapons stored at the Depot to conclude that that federal law preempts Colorado’s attempt to regulate that destruction process by enforcing its prohibition of the storage of hazardous waste against the Depot." View "Colorado Department of Public v. United States, et al" on Justia Law