Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The NRC granted Entergy an exemption from compliance with certain fire safety regulations at its Indian Point nuclear plant operating unit No. 3. Plaintiffs alleged that the NRC's award of the exemption to Entergy violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Entergy on all of these claims except in one respect. Insofar as plaintiffs contended that the NRC granted the challenged exemption in violation of NEPA's regulations, which allowed for public involvement where appropriate and practicable, the court concluded that the agency record did not permit a reviewing court to determine whether a reasoned basis existed for the NRC's decision not to afford any such public involvement in the exemption decision. View "Brodsky v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of two final rules, promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7501-7509a, 7513-7513b, which governed implementation of the national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for "fine" particulate matter. The court held that the EPA erred in applying the provisions of Subpart 1 of Part D of Title 1 of the Act rather than the particulate-matter-specific provisions of Subpart 4 of Part D of Title I. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA" on Justia Law

Appellees sued to compel the Service to comply with deadlines set forth in the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(3), for determining whether to list species as endangered or threatened. As the case neared settlement, the Safari Club moved to intervene pursuant to Rule 24 in the order to oppose the settlements which would include three species that its members hunt. On appeal, the Safari Club challenged the district court's denial of intervention, contending that it qualified for intervention as of right, as well as permissively. Because the Safari Club failed to identify a violation of a procedural right afforded by the ESA that was designed to protect its interests, the district court did not err in ruling that the Safari Club lacked standing and therefore was ineligible to intervene as of right. The court affirmed the decision of the district court without reaching the Safari Club's objections to the settlement agreements. View "In re: Endangered Species Act Section 4" on Justia Law

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, which operated a nuclear power plant in Seabrook, New Hampshire, applied to renew its operating license. NextEra submitted a required environmental report that concluded that offshore wind electric generation was not a reasonable alternative to the extended licensing of Seabrook. Several environmental groups (collectively, Petitioners) questioned and sought a hearing on NextEra's environmental report. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board admitted the contention, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) denied the admission of the contention, which resulted in Petitioners not being entitled to have a hearing on the merits about their contention that generation of electricity from offshore wind was a reasonable alternative source of baseload energy to the relicensing of Seabrook. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioners' petition for review, holding (1) the NRC did not misapply case law interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act in formulating its contention-admissibility standard; and (2) NRC's conclusion that the contention was inadmissible was not arbitrary or capricious, and there was no basis in law to set it aside. View "Beyond Nuclear v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced a lawsuit against several power companies alleging that the Colstrip power facility, which bordered land owned by Plaintiffs, contaminated groundwater under their property. The parties proceeded with mediation after three years of litigation. The mediation ended with the transmission of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to the parties' counsel. After some of Plaintiffs expressed reservations about accepting the settlement, the power companies filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that the MOU was a written and signed settlement agreement. After a hearing, the district court granted the motion to enforce the settlement agreement, finding that the MOU was a binding, enforceable settlement agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by finding the MOU was an enforceable settlement agreement; (2) did not err by allowing parol evidence to change an option to purchase into a right of first refusal; and (3) erred in admitting evidence protected by the mediation confidentiality statute, but the error was harmless. View "Kluver v. PPL Mont., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned a home on Grassy Pond Road in Hopkinton, Rhode Island. The Hopkinton Planning Board granted a developer's application to develop a residential subdivision on a tract adjacent to Plaintiff's land on the condition that Grassy Pond Road be reconfigured and reconstructed. The reconstruction required a permit from the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM), which was issued. Plaintiff attempted to appeal the issuance of the permit. In the meantime, the developer sold its land, and the DEM permit expired. The subdivision proposal was subsequently abandoned, and Plaintiff's state-court appeal was dismissed as moot. Plaintiff, however, filed suit in federal district court against the State of Rhode Island, the DEM, the town of Hopkinton, the Board, the developer, and others, alleging various constitutional and pendent state-law claims, including a takings claim. The district court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding, among other things, that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's takings claim because Plaintiff failed to pursue available state procedures in an endeavor to secure just compensation. The First Circuit Court of affirmed for substantially the reasons limned in the district court's opinion. View "Marek v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) properly upheld two air permits authorizing exploratory drilling operations in the Arctic Ocean by a drillship and its associated fleet of support vessels. The petition for review challenged two aspects of the permits: (1) the determination that supported vessels, unlike the drillship itself, did not require the best available control technology (BACT) to control emissions; and (2) the exemption of the area within a 500-meter radius of the drillship from ambient air quality standards. The court denied the petition, holding that the EPA's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 7627 was reasonable and that the EPA's grant of a 500 meter ambient air exemption was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the agency's regulations. View "REDOIL, et al v. EPA" on Justia Law

The government alleged, under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, that API and seven other companies caused $1 billion in PCB contamination in the Fox River near Green Bay, Wisconsin, and hired a consultant to prepare reports on the companies’ percentages of responsibility. API unsuccessfully sought discovery of these reports by challenging a consent decree between the government and another company, then filed a Freedom of Information Act request seeking the material. The government refused under the FOIA exemption covering attorney work product. The district court ruled in favor of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government used portions of its reports in two consent decrees, but that use does not waive work product immunity for all the related content. API misconstrued the privilege, erroneously suggesting that facts underlying the conclusions are unprotected.View "Appleton Papers Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

A steel fabrication company deposited solid waste on a landowner's property, after which the landowner (Plaintiff) filed a complaint seeking damages against multiple parties (Defendants) and on multiple grounds, including a claim for an environmental legal action (ELA). Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on his environmental legal action claim and sought to impose corporate liability on Defendants. Defendants filed cross motions for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims, except for his claim of negligence. The trial court denied Plaintiff's motions and granted Defendants' motions as to all claims, leaving for trial only Plaintiff's negligence claim and the claims of potential liability against Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that summary judgment was (1) not proper for either party on Plaintiff's ELA claim; (2) not proper for Defendants on Plaintiff's illegal dumping, fraud, nuisance, and trespass claims; (3) proper for Defendants on Plaintiff's unjust enrichment and intentional torts claims; (4) proper for certain defendants on Plaintiff's responsible corporate officer claim but improper as to others; and (5) proper for Plaintiff on his claims against one defendant as responsible corporate officer. View "Reed v. Reid" on Justia Law

Enviro-Chem conducted waste-handling and disposal operations at three sites north of Zionsville, Indiana, until it ceased operations in 1982, leaving considerable amounts of pollutants. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency undertook cleanup and identified potentially responsible parties (PRPs), including former owners, their corporate entities, and their insurers. A trust was established to fund cleanup and trustees sued to recover cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a) (CERCLA), the Indiana Environmental Legal Actions Statute (ELA), and more. Work continues at the site at issue. The district court dismissed, in part, on limitations grounds, construing the complaint as seeking contribution. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of three counts, holding that claims to recover costs incurred pursuant to the 2002 Administrative Order by Consent between the EPA and PRPs and that related claims, including the ELA claim, were not moot. The court upheld denial of an insurer’s motion for summary judgment on preclusion grounds. View "Bernstein v. Bankert" on Justia Law