Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, Appalachian Power Company (APCO) sought rate adjustment clause recovery of $33.3 million in environmental compliance costs that the State Corporation Commission denied. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded, holding (1) APCO was entitled to a rate adjustment clause for recovery of actual costs it directly incurred for environmental compliance in 2009 and 2010 but did not recover through its base rates, and the portion of the Commission's decision denying recovery of environmental compliance costs on the basis that those costs were connected with projects included in APCO's base rates which APCO had the opportunity to recover was reversed; and (2) the portion of the Commission's decision denying APCO recovery of environmental compliance costs alleged to be embedded in the capacity equalization charges APCO paid to its affiliates in 2009 and 2010 was affirmed. Remanded. View "Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Vicksburg Chemical Company (VCC) filed for bankruptcy in 2002. Included in its bankruptcy estate was over 500 acres of real property, a portion of which was contaminated. Pursuant to an agreed order, the bankruptcy court allowed VCC to abandon the property and allowed the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) to choose the purchaser. Without the aid of any guidelines or statutory law regarding this process, MDEQ, at the suggestion of the Attorney General's Office (AG), published a Request for Proposals (RFP) to identify interested parties capable of removing the contamination. The plaintiff, Pacific Chlorine, Inc. (PCI), was one of several companies to submit a proposal. MDEQ did not select PCI's proposal, but instead selected Harcros Chemicals, Inc. (Harcros), a company which worked closely with the City of Vicksburg (the City) on its proposal. Aggrieved, PCI sued MDEQ and the City. PCI settled with the City. Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered a judgment against MDEQ. MDEQ appealed to the Supreme Court, raising six assignments of error that fall into three categories: whether PCI is required to exhaust its administrative remedies, whether the trial court erred by denying MDEQ's motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment, and whether MDEQ is immune from suit under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). This case presented an issue of first impression, the issue being whether MDEQ acted within the scope of its authority when assisting a bankruptcy court with finding a purchaser for contaminated land. The Court found that it was. View "Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality v. Pacific Chlorine, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether NMSA 1978, Section 72-2-9.1 (2003), provided a constitutional delegation of authority for the Office of the State Engineer to adopt new regulations to administer water resources according to administrative interim priority determinations based on a number of factors. The district court and Court of Appeals concluded that it did not and that the State Engineer’s lawful authority to supervise water allocations could be exercised only on the basis of licenses issued by the State Engineer and adjudications in court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the Legislature delegated lawful authority to the State Engineer to promulgate the challenged water administration regulations. Furthermore, the Court held that the regulations were not unconstitutional on separation of powers, due process, or vagueness grounds. View "Tri-State Generation & Transmission Assn., Inc. v. D'Antonio" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, in anticipation of Revett Silver Company and RC Resources, Inc. (collectively, "Revett") seeking approval for mine-related construction under a general permit, filed this action against the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) seeking a declaratory judgment that use of general permits to approve stormwater runoff from the Rock Creek Mine would violate Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.1341(4)(e) because Rock Creek is an area of "unique ecological significance" based on considerations of impacts on fishery resource and local conditions at proposed discharge. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and declared the general permit void. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DEQ's approval of the use of the general permit to allow storm water discharges was arbitrary and capricious because DEQ failed to consider the relevant factors set forth in the law prior to its decision, and as a result, committed a clear error of judgment. View "Clark Fork Coalition v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality" on Justia Law

In this matter, the court must decide whether it had original subject matter jurisdiction over several petitions for review of an administrative rule that exempted transfers of waters of the United States from the requirements for a permit under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., or whether the court could avoid deciding that question and instead exercise hypothetical jurisdiction to decide the merits of the petitions. The court held that, under the plain language of the governing statute, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the petitions and could not exercise hypothetical jurisdiction over them. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions. View "Friends of the Everglades v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the New York City School Construction Authority (Authority) violated the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) during a construction project by failing to discuss in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) the methods it adopted for long-term maintenance and monitoring of the controls it used to prevent or mitigate environmental harm. Petitioners brought this action challenging that Authority's SEQRA compliance. Supreme court ordered the Authority to prepare a supplemental EIS based on any changes to the final EIS as a result of the Authority's completed, detailed long-term maintenance and monitoring plan. The Authority did not file a supplemental EIS but, instead, moved for reargument and renewal, asserting that its submission of a site management plan removed the need for any further SEQRA filing. Supreme court adhered to its previous ruling on reargument, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) where important decisions about mitigation can only be made after the initial remedial measures are complete, a supplemental EIS may be called for, as it is here; and (2) nor does the submission of a site management plan justify short-circuiting SEQRA review. View "Bronx Comm. for Toxic Free Schs. v. N.Y. City Sch. Constr. Auth." on Justia Law

At issue on review in this case was whether the State Board of Land Commissioners properly issued leases to Ark Land Co., a subsidiary of Arch Coal, Inc., without first conducting environmental review under the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). The State Land Board did not conduct environmental review prior to entering the leases, relying on Mont. Code Ann. 77-1-121(2). The district court granted summary judgment to the State Land Board, Ark Land Co., and Arch Coal (Defendants), determining that the State retained sufficient ability to require adequate environmental protections sufficient to meet its constitutional and trust responsibilities. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the leases did not allow for any degradation of the environment and specifically required full environmental review and full compliance with applicable State environmental laws, the act of issuing the leases did not impact or implicate the right to a clean and healthful environment in Mont. Const. art II, 3; and (2) therefore, section 77-1-121(2) was not subject to strict or "middle-tier" scrutiny. View "N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the FWS's Biological Opinion regarding the Ruby Pipeline Project, which involved the construction, operation, and maintenance of a 42-inch-diameter natural gas pipeline extending from Wyoming to Oregon. The court set aside the Opinion as arbitrary and capricious and set aside the Record of Decisions because it relied on the invalid Opinion. The court remanded for the agency to formulate a revised Opinion that: (1) addresses the impacts, if any, of Ruby's groundwater withdrawal on listed fish species and critical habitat; and (2) categorizes and treats the Conservation Action Plan measures as "interrelated actions" or excludes any reliance on their beneficial effects in making a revised jeopardy and adverse modification. View "Center for Biological Diversity. v. BLM, et al" on Justia Law

This appeal involved the issuance by the Wyoming Department of Environmental Qualify (DEQ) of two general permits for the discharge of produced water from coal bed methane operations. A petroleum corporation and oil company (Appellants) appealed the DEQ's decision to the Environmental Quality Council (EQC). The Wyoming Outdoor Council (WOC) also sought review of the DEQ's decision to issue the general permits. The EQC rejected WOC's claim that general permits were rules and had to be promulgated through the rulemaking procedures set forth in the Wyoming APA. The district court reversed, determining that DEQ was required to promulgate the general permits as rules. The district court also rejected the argument by Appellants that WOC was not entitled to seek EQC review of the DEQ's decision to issue the general permits, ruling that the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act did allow WOC to seek administrative review by the EQC. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) DEQ was not required to promulgate the general permits as administrative rules; and (2) WOC was entitled to EQC review of DEQ's decision to issue the general permits. View "Wyo. Dep't of Env't Quality v. Wyo. Outdoor Council " on Justia Law

In 2010, the Surface Mine Board ordered the State Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to pay the Hominy Creek Preservation Association's attorney fees for work performed in two administrative appeals. Eighty-two days after the Board granted the fee award to the Association, the DEP appealed the Board's order to the circuit court. The circuit court reversed, finding that the Association was not entitled to recovery attorney fees from the DEP. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order reversing the fee award and reinstated the Board's order, holding that the DEP failed to file a timely appeal of the Board's 2010 order. View "Hominy Creek Pres. Ass'n v. W. Va. Dep't of Env't Prot." on Justia Law