Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

This case concerned the construction of a new Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) rail/truck terminal outside Kansas City, Kansas. Because the preferred site contained streams and wetlands protected under federal law, several groups (collectively, "Hillsdale") brought challenges to a dredge and fill permit issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) under the Clean Water Act. The district court denied Hillsdale's motion for an injunction and granted summary judgment for the Corps and BNSF. On appeal, Hillsdale requested that the Tenth Circuit set aside the Corps's decision to grant the permit because the Corps inadequately considered alternatives to the selected site under the Clean Water Act and violated the National Environmental Policy Act by preparing an inadequate environmental assessment and failing to prepare a full environmental impact statement. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the Corps's decision was supported by the record, and was not an arbitrary and capricious exercise of its approval powers under federal law. View "Hillside Environmental Loss, et al v. United States Army Corps, et al" on Justia Law

This case involved legal challenges to recent federal management actions taken in New England's sensitive Multispecies Groundfish Fishery (Fishery). The challenges centered on the promulgation of a new groundfish Fishery Management Plan (FMP), Amendment Sixteen, which altered and expanded the Fishery's preexisting "sector allocation program" and established new restrictions on fishing activities to end and prevent overfishing. Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court alleging that Amendment Sixteen conflicted with the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act's provisions governing "limited access privilege programs," with the ten "national standards" applicable to all FMPs, and with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to enjoin implementation of Amendment Sixteen. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants as to all claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed entry of judgment for Defendants, holding (1) Amendment Sixteen was implemented with the protections required by the Reauthorization Act; (2) Amendment Sixteen was consistent with the ten national standards; and (3) Amendment Sixteen was implemented in accordance with the requirements of NEPA. View "City of New Bedford v. Locke" on Justia Law

The Department of Natural Resources restricted the non-winter use of large vehicles on the Rex Trail. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether these restrictions were within the Department's authority. Because the Department has broad authority to manage public lands in general and specific authority to manage rights-of-way such as the Rex Trail, and the restrictions did not violate any statutory limitations on this authority, the Supreme Court concluded that they were authorized. View "Caywood v. Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

This case involved the City of Atlanta's compliance with two consent decrees which resolved complex, multi-party litigation arising from Atlanta's violation of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. The court held that the district court exceeded the scope of its authority by exercising jurisdiction over the state service delivery proceedings. The district court's order enjoining Fulton County and Sandy Springs from pursuing the state service delivery proceedings in state court was vacated and remanded for the district court to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Atlanta's Amended Third-Party Complaint against Sandy Springs. View "City of Atlanta v. City of Sandy Springs, et al" on Justia Law

The Idaho Department of Fish and Game (IDFG) appealed the district court's post-judgment orders (1) refusing to lift a portion of an injunction and (2) declaring the Idaho Outdoor Sport Shooting Range Act unconstitutional. In 2004, IDFG made a public proposal to renovate the Farragut Shooting Range, (owned and operated by IDFG since World War II), based on the "Vargas Master Plan." Citizens Against Range Expansion (CARE), an unincorporated non-profit association comprised of individuals who reside near the range, contended that the plan would greatly increase range usage, and harm the community. CARE sued IDFG in 2005 for nuisance and other related causes of action regarding the range's operation. CARE's claims were grounded in both safety and noise concerns regarding the increased use of the range, and its proposed expansion. Among other relief, CARE sought to enjoin IDFG's operation of the range. The case proceeded to a court trial in December of 2006 and in February of 2007 the court issued its memorandum decision wherein it determined that CARE was entitled to relief enjoining further operation of the Farragut Range until IDFG completed certain safety improvements. Upon completion of its range improvements, IDFG filed a Motion for Partial Lifting of Injunction. CARE then moved for summary judgment, claiming that the Act was a special law in violation of art. III, sec. 19 of the Idaho Constitution, and a deprivation of judicial power in violation of art. V, sec. 13. The district court issued summary judgment in favor of CARE on the constitutional issues in March of 2011. In its order, the court found that the Act was unconstitutional as a special law and a deprivation of judicial power. For this reason alone, it denied IDFG's Relief Motion with regard to the 501-shooter component. The court found that there remained disputed issues of fact regarding range safety. On August 25, 2011, following the evidentiary hearing on safety issues, the district court denied IDFG's Relief Motion with regard to the one component of the injunction. IDFG timely appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court: 1) reversed the district court's order holding that IDFG did not comply with the "500-shooter" component of the injunction; 2) concluded as a matter of law that IDFG complied with the 500-shooter component, and lifted that component of the injunction; 3) reversed the district court's order holding the Act to be unconstitutional; 4) remanded this case to the district court to determine whether IDFG has complied with the "501-shooter" component of the injunction. View "Citizens Against Range Expansion v. Idaho Fish & Game" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's rulemaking regarding hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). At issue was whether section 112(c)(6) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7412(c)(6), required the EPA to impose the same stringency levels in standards for non-112(c)(6) HAPs occurring at section 112(c)(6) sources that it did for section 112(c)(6) HAPs. The EPA rejected the claim that section 112(c)(6)'s cross-reference to section 112(d)(2) required that the EPA subject all HAPs emitted by a section 112(c)(6) source to standards at the stringency level specified by section 112(d)(2). The EPA also made clear that, despite language in the Gold Mine Rule arguably suggesting that it covered "fugitive emissions" - namely emissions from certain sources - in fact the rule did not address such emissions. The court rejected petitioners' claims challenging the EPA's rulemaking and affirmed the EPA's order. View "Desert Citizens Against Pollution, et al v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law

Sierra Club challenged a determination of the EPA, which announced that it had met the regulatory obligations imposed on it by section 112(c)(6) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7412(c)(6). The court concluded that the determination was a legislative rulemaking subject to the notice-and-comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553. Because the EPA issued the determination without providing notice and opportunity for comment, the court vacated and remanded for the agency to follow those procedures. View "Sierra Club v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law

Before 2009, the Alaska Board of Game employed a controversial scoring system in order to distribute permits to subsistence hunters in a popular caribou and moose hunting area between Anchorage and Fairbanks. In 2009, the Board amended its regulations to abolish the scoring system and replace it with two separate subsistence hunts: a community harvest hunt for groups and a separate hunt for individuals. A local tribe was subsequently granted a community harvest permit pursuant to the new rules. An individual resident brought suit challenging the new system, alleging violations of the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act, his due process rights, the Board’s governing statutes, and several provisions of the Alaska Constitution. The tribe intervened on the side of the State and a private organization intervened on the side of the individual. In July 2010, the superior court granted summary judgment and enjoined the community harvest hunt as unconstitutional. The superior court later awarded attorney’s fees to the individual and private organization. The tribe appealed both decisions to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court concluded that the underlying appeal was moot because the challenged regulation had been substantively changed since 2009. Accordingly, the case was dismissed. View "Nene v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

Petitioners Savannah Riverkeeper, South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, South Carolina Wildlife Federation, and Conservation Voters of South Carolina (collectively, Conservation Groups) petitioned the Supreme Court Court to hear this matter in its original jurisdiction to determine whether the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) acted illegally and usurped the authority of the Savannah River Maritime Commission (the Commission) when it negotiated an agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and the Georgia Ports Authority (GPA) before issuing a 401 Water Quality Certification (the Certification or the 401 Certification) requested for the proposed Savannah Harbor Expansion Project (SHEP). The Court granted the petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that DHEC's action contravened the plain language of S.C. Code Ann. section 54-6-10 (2007). View "Savannah Riverkeeper v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was (1) whether an ordinance authorizing the acquisition of an easement by condemnation also confers the authority to acquire the easement by an action to quiet title, and (2) whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the circuit court's ruling that the City of Virginia Beach proved an implied dedication of the disputed easements and whether the court erred in ruling that Lynnhaven Dunes Condominium Association was not entitled to compensation for its loss of riparian rights. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the authorizing ordinance fully encompassed the City's actions in bringing this condemnation proceeding, and the evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court's ruling that the City had proven it had acquired the easements by implied dedication; but (2) the circuit court erred in ruling that Lynnhaven's loss of riparian rights was non-compensable. View "Lynnhaven Dunes Condo. Ass'n v. City of Virginia Beach" on Justia Law