Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The Center for Biological Diversity challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s approval of certain air pollution control technology for use at various Pennsylvania industrial facilities. The Center argues that the EPA violated the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, by focusing exclusively on emissions from those facilities instead of examining their impact on air quality more generally and that, even if the EPA is permitted to base its approvals on an emissions-only analysis, it incorrectly concluded that emissions would not be increased by Pennsylvania’s pollution control technologies at issue.The Third Circuit denied petitions for review, interpreting the relevant statutory provisions to permit the EPA’s chosen emissions-based approach. The court reasoned that emissions were the sole air quality variable implicated by Pennsylvania’s revisions of its state implementation plan under the Act; it was therefore not arbitrary for the EPA to use an emissions-based analysis. It was not arbitrary for the EPA to use prior permitting standards, instead of presumptive Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT), as the emissions baseline for its comparative emissions analysis. The Center’s alternative challenges were procedurally and substantively deficient. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Port Hamilton Refinery purchased an existing St. Croix petroleum refinery at a 2021 bankruptcy auction, hoping to resume operations. The Refinery had for decades served as the backbone of St. Croix’s local economy until it ceased operations in 2012. Months later, the EPA notified Port Hamilton that it would need a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit before the Refinery could resume operations.The PSD program is part of the Clean Air Act (CAA); a facility must not contribute to the violation of applicable air quality standards and must implement the “best available control technology” to limit air pollution, 42 U.S.C. 7475(a), 7479(3). PSD applies to newly constructed stationary sources of air pollution and sources that undergo emissions-altering modifications. Under EPA’s “Reactivation Policy,” an existing facility is “new” if EPA concludes that it had previously been “shut down” and restarted. If the EPA determines that the facility had only been “idled,” it need not obtain a permit.In 2018, EPA notified the Refinery’s prior owner that it need not obtain a PSD permit because the Refinery had been only “idled” since 2012. In 2022, EPA reversed course. The Third Circuit vacated the EPA decision. The Reactivation Policy, as applied to the Refinery, exceeds EPA’s statutory authority. View "Port Hamilton Refining and Transportation LLLP v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”) governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. In implementing the RCRA, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) promulgated a rule under which waste is deemed “hazardous” if it is “corrosive.” A scientist and a public interest group, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (“PEER”), unsuccessfully petitioned the EPA to expand the definition of “corrosive” wastes so that more wastes would be subject to the RCRA’s most stringent requirements. The question presented in this case is whether the EPA properly declined to revise its corrosivity regulation.The DC Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that PEER’s arguments concerning the EPA’s erroneous understanding of the ILO encyclopedia analysis and its allegedly improper protection of the commercial use of lime-treated sludge are untimely; the court wrote that, therefore it lacks jurisdiction to consider them. Moreover, the court said it was required to apply a highly deferential standard of review with respect to PEER’s remaining claims and found no basis to disturb the agency’s decisions. View "Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. EPA" on Justia Law

Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, review of orders issued by the Environmental Protection Agency after a “public hearing” lies exclusively in the courts of appeals. 7 U.S.C. Section 136n(b). For orders issued without a public hearing, review lies in the district courts. Petitioners in this case challenged EPA orders regulating the use of a pesticide named dicamba.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the 2020 Registrations unconditionally approve the dicamba products, whereas the previous orders had granted conditional registrations. And EPA needed to make additional findings to issue an unconditional registration, including that use of the products would “not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.” For those reasons, the 2020 and 2022 Registrations, unlike the actions in Costle and National Family Farm Coalition, did not follow a “public hearing” within the meaning of 7 U.S.C. Section 136n(b). View "American Soybean Association v. Michael Regan" on Justia Law

Utility companies responsible for a planned electric transmission line asked the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to allow construction across the Upper Mississippi River National Wildlife and Fish Refuge alongside an existing road and railroad. Rural Utilities Service completed an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). FWS adopted the statement and issued a right-of-way permit.While litigation was pending, the utility companies sought to slightly alter the route and asked FWS to consider a land exchange. FWS discovered that it had relied on incorrect easement documents in issuing its original determination. It revoked the determination and permit but promised to consider the proposed land exchange. The district court ruled in favor of the environmental groups but declined to enjoin ongoing construction of the project on private land outside the Refuge.The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, first rejecting a mootness argument. FWS has revoked the compatibility determination but has not promised never to issue a new permit. However, FWS’s current position does not meet the criteria of finality. Whatever hardship the plaintiffs face comes not from FWS’s promise to consider a land exchange but from the Utilities’ decision to build on their own land, so the district court erred in reviewing the merits of the proposed land exchange. Plaintiffs’ request for relief against the Utilities under NEPA likewise is premature. Adopting the environmental impact statement did not “consummate” the decisionmaking process. View "Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Rural Utilities Service" on Justia Law

Several cities in Minnesota alleged that a chemical in refined coal tar that was used in pavement sealants contaminated their stormwater ponds. They filed an action seeking damages from refiners and manufacturers of the tar. The “refiner” defendants take raw coal tar and refine it into a product used by the “manufacturer” defendants to create pavement sealants. The district court dismissed all of the claims against the refiners and dismissed all but three of the claims against the manufacturers. The Cities moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for entry of final judgment against the refiners. The district court, however, denied the motion because the Cities had not “demonstrated a danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal.” The Cities then entered into an agreement with the manufacturers, which provided that the Cities would conditionally dismiss their claims against the manufacturers. The Cities then appealed the district court’s decision dismissing claims against the refiners, and some of the refiners cross-appealed.   The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that this conditional dismissal of the Cities’ claims against the manufacturers does not create a final decision under 28 U.S.C. Section 1291. The whole purpose of pairing the voluntary dismissal with the tolling agreement was to provide for reinstatement of the claims in the event of reversal—that is, to make the dismissal conditional. The court wrote that its only power to prevent the manipulation of appellate jurisdiction is a rigorous application of the final judgment requirement. View "City of Burnsville v. Koppers, Inc." on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the issue is whether overlapping statutes that affect more than two million acres of federally owned forest land in southwestern Oregon are reconcilable and, therefore, operative. The appeals arise from three sets of cases filed by an association of fifteen Oregon counties and various trade associations and timber companies. Two of the cases challenge Proclamation 9564, through which the President expanded the boundaries of the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument. Two others challenged resource management plans that the United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM), a bureau within the United States Department of the Interior (Interior), developed to govern the use of the forest land. The final case seeks an order compelling the Interior Secretary to offer a certain amount of the forest’s timber for sale each year. The district court entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs in all five cases.   The DC Circuit reversed. The court explained that the O & C Act provides the Secretary three layers of discretion: first, discretion to decide how land should be classified, which includes the discretion to classify land as timberland or not; second, discretion to decide how to balance the Act’s multiple objectives, and third, discretion to decide how to carry out the mandate that the land classified as timberland be managed “for permanent forest production.” Further, the court held that the 2016 RMPs are well within the Secretary’s discretion under the O & C Act and are consistent with the Secretary’s other statutory obligations. View "American Forest Resource Council v. USA" on Justia Law

The Renewable Fuel Standard Program codified in the Clean Air Act requires all transportation fuel sold in the United States to contain an annually determined volume of renewable fuel. As part of its role in implementing the Program, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues renewable fuel standards announcing the annual quantity of renewables that must be sold into United States commerce. EPA failed to meet its deadlines to publish the 2020-2022 renewable fuel standards. As part of its mitigation, EPA issued a rule extending the corresponding compliance reporting deadlines. The leeway provided in that Extension Rule ensures that obligated parties will not have to file compliance reports for 2020-2022 until after EPA has published the standards for those years. In these consolidated petitions, a group of fuel refineries (the Refineries) challenged the Extension Rule. They argue that the Rule violates the Clean Air Act, or is at least arbitrary and capricious, insofar as it provides obligated parties less than 13 months’ compliance lead time and compliance intervals shorter than 12 months.   The DC Circuit denied the petitions for review. The court explained that when EPA fails to timely issue renewable fuel standards, the Clean Air Act does not bind the agency to provide obligated parties a minimum of 13 months’ compliance lead time, nor does it require compliance intervals of at least 12 months. The court likewise rejected the Refineries’ claim that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in setting the compliance schedule in the Rule. Rather, the agency reasonably exercised its authority to establish the compliance timeframe for the Renewable Fuel Standard Program under the circumstances. View "Wynnewood Refining Company, LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

In June 1949, Axel Anderson conveyed to L.S. Youngblood a ½ mineral interest in several tracts of land in Mountrail County, North Dakota (“the Disputed Lands”)In 2011, with the Andersons and Henry Johnson now deceased, grantee Johnson’s successors filed a quiet title action in state court against Nancy Finkle and grantor Andersons’ other successors to resolve the over conveyance, seeking title to a ½ mineral interest in the Disputed Lands (“the Finkle Litigation”).inkle appealed the quiet title order and judgment, arguing that an exception to the Duhig rule that is not at issue in this appeal applied and therefore the trial court should have awarded each side a 1/4 mineral interest in the Disputed Lands. In January 2008, Finkle, a successor to grantor Andersons’ mineral interests, conveyed by oil and gas lease her mineral interest leasehold and operating rights in the Disputed Lands to Montana Oil Properties, Inc. Northern Oil did not participate while Finkle defended the Johnson successors’ quiet title claim and asserted her own deed reformation counterclaim in state court.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendant on the ground that due to an over-conveyance of rights, Plaintiff had not obtained any mineral rights in the subject property when it acquired its interest in a leasehold. Further, the court held that the district court granted summary judgment dismissing Northern Oil’s reformation claim as time-barred by the ten-year statute of limitations in N.D.C.C. Section 28-01-15(2), applying a Supreme Court of North Dakota decision issued after the Finkle Litigation, Western Energy Corp. v. Stauffer, 921 N.W.2d 431, 434-35 (N.D. 2019). View "Northern Oil and Gas, Inc. v. EOG Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants are the City of Niagara Falls ("Niagara Falls"), its water board, and various companies (collectively, "Defendants") tasked with remediation of hazardous waste disposal sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("Superfund"). Plaintiffs -- members of three families residing in Niagara Falls -- brought this action in the State of New York Supreme Court, County of Niagara, in 2012, seeking damages arising from purported deficiencies in Defendants' remediation of one Superfund site, the Love Canal. Between 2013 and 2017, 18 identical complaints were filed by other plaintiffs. In 2013, Defendants removed two of the 19 cases -- including this one -- to the court below on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, but the district court remanded the cases to state court. The cases remained in state court until 2020 when Plaintiffs in all 19 cases filed identical amended complaints. The amended complaints alleged additional sources of injury. Defendants again removed the 19 cases, this time on the basis of both federal officer and federal question jurisdiction. The district court held that the removal was untimely and again remanded the cases to state court. Defendants appealed.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs continue to allege the same injuries against the same Defendants, caused by the same toxins, and resulting in the same damages. The amended complaint highlighted only additional sources of already-alleged injury. The changes in Plaintiffs' pleadings 20 are not substantial, and the amendments did not result in essentially new lawsuits. View "Abbo-Bradley, et al. v. City of Niagara Falls, et al." on Justia Law