Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from the multi-district litigation involving the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig oil spill. Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of its action brought under the citizen-suit provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9659(a), and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. 11046(a). The court concluded, with one exception, that the district court did not err by dismissing plaintiff's claims as moot because the Macondo well had been capped and sealed; on the present state of the record, plaintiff had standing to assert its claim for relief based on defendants' alleged failure to comply with the reporting requirements of EPCRA; and the EPCRA claim was not moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case concerned WildEarth Guardians’ challenge to the National Park Service’s (NPS) elk and vegetation management plan for Rocky Mountain National Park. WildEarth filed suit in federal district court challenging the plan and the final environmental impact statement the NPS prepared in conjunction with the plan. WildEarth contended the NPS violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to include the reintroduction of a naturally reproducing wolf population as one of the alternatives considered in the environmental impact statement. WildEarth also challenged the agency’s proposal to allow volunteers to assist the agency in reducing the elk population. The district court affirmed the agency action, and WildEarth appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the record supported the agency’s decision to exclude consideration of a natural wolf alternative from its environmental impact statement. The Court also found the agency’s interpretation of the National Parks Organic Act and Rocky Mountain National Park Enabling Act persuasive, and that its elk management plan did not violate those statutes. View "WildEarth Guardians v. National Park Service" on Justia Law

Los Angeles County Flood Control District operates a “municipal separate storm sewer system” (MS4) drainage system that collects, transports, and discharges storm water. Because storm water is often heavily polluted, the Clean Water Act (CWA) and regulations require certain MS4 operators to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit before discharging storm water into navigable waters. The District has such a permit for its MS4. Environmental groups filed a citizen suit under the CWA, 33 U. S. C.1365, alleging that water-quality measurements from monitoring stations within the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers demonstrated that the District was violating its permit. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that the record was insufficient to warrant a finding that the MS4 had discharged storm water containing the standards-exceeding pollutants detected at the downstream monitoring stations. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the District was liable for discharge of pollutants that occurred when the polluted water detected at the monitoring stations flowed out of the concrete-lined portions of the rivers, where the monitoring stations are located, into lower, unlined portions of the same rivers. The Supreme Court reversed. The flow of water from an improved portion of a navigable waterway into an unimproved portion of the same waterway does not qualify as a “discharge of a pollutant” under the CWA. View "Los Angeles Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the Forest Service's decision adopting the modified Idaho Roadless Rule. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and adopted the district court's comprehensive judgment in Appeal No. 11-35269. The district court found that the Forest Service did not violate the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., in preparing the Biological Opinion and that the Forest Service did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., in relying on the Biological Opinion or in preparing the Final Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision approving the Rule. Consequently, cross appeals were dismissed as moot. View "Jayne, et al v. Sherman, et al" on Justia Law

The NRC granted Entergy an exemption from compliance with certain fire safety regulations at its Indian Point nuclear plant operating unit No. 3. Plaintiffs alleged that the NRC's award of the exemption to Entergy violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Entergy on all of these claims except in one respect. Insofar as plaintiffs contended that the NRC granted the challenged exemption in violation of NEPA's regulations, which allowed for public involvement where appropriate and practicable, the court concluded that the agency record did not permit a reviewing court to determine whether a reasoned basis existed for the NRC's decision not to afford any such public involvement in the exemption decision. View "Brodsky v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of two final rules, promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7501-7509a, 7513-7513b, which governed implementation of the national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for "fine" particulate matter. The court held that the EPA erred in applying the provisions of Subpart 1 of Part D of Title 1 of the Act rather than the particulate-matter-specific provisions of Subpart 4 of Part D of Title I. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA" on Justia Law

Appellees sued to compel the Service to comply with deadlines set forth in the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(3), for determining whether to list species as endangered or threatened. As the case neared settlement, the Safari Club moved to intervene pursuant to Rule 24 in the order to oppose the settlements which would include three species that its members hunt. On appeal, the Safari Club challenged the district court's denial of intervention, contending that it qualified for intervention as of right, as well as permissively. Because the Safari Club failed to identify a violation of a procedural right afforded by the ESA that was designed to protect its interests, the district court did not err in ruling that the Safari Club lacked standing and therefore was ineligible to intervene as of right. The court affirmed the decision of the district court without reaching the Safari Club's objections to the settlement agreements. View "In re: Endangered Species Act Section 4" on Justia Law

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, which operated a nuclear power plant in Seabrook, New Hampshire, applied to renew its operating license. NextEra submitted a required environmental report that concluded that offshore wind electric generation was not a reasonable alternative to the extended licensing of Seabrook. Several environmental groups (collectively, Petitioners) questioned and sought a hearing on NextEra's environmental report. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board admitted the contention, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) denied the admission of the contention, which resulted in Petitioners not being entitled to have a hearing on the merits about their contention that generation of electricity from offshore wind was a reasonable alternative source of baseload energy to the relicensing of Seabrook. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioners' petition for review, holding (1) the NRC did not misapply case law interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act in formulating its contention-admissibility standard; and (2) NRC's conclusion that the contention was inadmissible was not arbitrary or capricious, and there was no basis in law to set it aside. View "Beyond Nuclear v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced a lawsuit against several power companies alleging that the Colstrip power facility, which bordered land owned by Plaintiffs, contaminated groundwater under their property. The parties proceeded with mediation after three years of litigation. The mediation ended with the transmission of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to the parties' counsel. After some of Plaintiffs expressed reservations about accepting the settlement, the power companies filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that the MOU was a written and signed settlement agreement. After a hearing, the district court granted the motion to enforce the settlement agreement, finding that the MOU was a binding, enforceable settlement agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by finding the MOU was an enforceable settlement agreement; (2) did not err by allowing parol evidence to change an option to purchase into a right of first refusal; and (3) erred in admitting evidence protected by the mediation confidentiality statute, but the error was harmless. View "Kluver v. PPL Mont., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned a home on Grassy Pond Road in Hopkinton, Rhode Island. The Hopkinton Planning Board granted a developer's application to develop a residential subdivision on a tract adjacent to Plaintiff's land on the condition that Grassy Pond Road be reconfigured and reconstructed. The reconstruction required a permit from the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM), which was issued. Plaintiff attempted to appeal the issuance of the permit. In the meantime, the developer sold its land, and the DEM permit expired. The subdivision proposal was subsequently abandoned, and Plaintiff's state-court appeal was dismissed as moot. Plaintiff, however, filed suit in federal district court against the State of Rhode Island, the DEM, the town of Hopkinton, the Board, the developer, and others, alleging various constitutional and pendent state-law claims, including a takings claim. The district court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding, among other things, that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's takings claim because Plaintiff failed to pursue available state procedures in an endeavor to secure just compensation. The First Circuit Court of affirmed for substantially the reasons limned in the district court's opinion. View "Marek v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law