Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Hardin County Drainage District 55 provided Union Pacific Railroad Company with statutory notice requiring the railroad to rebuild and reconstruct damaged subterranean drainage tile found under the railroad's roadbed. Railroads are statutorily required to pay for the construction and maintenance of culverts and bridges occurring at natural waterways on the railroad's right-of-way. Union Pacific countered that the underground drainage tiles were not "culverts" as defined by the relevant statute. The district court entered judgment for the drainage district, finding the railroad breached its statutory duty to repair the drainage tile. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the drainage tile did not fit the statutory definition of a culvert, and thus the railroad was not obligated to pay for the repairs. Remanded. View "Hardin County Drainage Dist. 55 v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Hyperion Refining, LLC applied for an air quality permit to begin construction of a proposed petroleum refinery and power plant. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) issued the permit, and the Board of Minerals and Environment (Board) approved DENR's issuance of the permit. Three citizens appealed the issuance of the permit to the circuit court. Hyperion also appealed a permit condition that limited the amount of carbon monoxide that could be emitted from the proposed facility. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision in all respects. The citizens and Hyperion appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not abuse its discretion in issuing the air quality permit; and (2) the Board did not clearly err in determining the carbon monoxide limit. View "In re Application of Hyperion Refining, LLC" on Justia Law

The Sierra Club sought review of the EPA's regulations regarding particulate matter less than 2.5 micrometers under Section 166 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7476. After the Sierra Club filed its petition, the EPA acknowledged that portions of the rule establishing Significant Impact Levels (SILs) did not reflect its intent in promulgating the SILs, and requested that the court vacate and remand some parts of its regulations. Notwithstanding the EPA's concession, the Sierra Club maintained that the EPA lacked authority to establish SILs. The court vacated and remanded to the EPA for further consideration the portions of the EPA's rule addressing SILs, except for the parts of its ruling in 40 C.F.R. 51.165(b)(2). The court granted Sierra Club's petition as to the parts of the EPA's rule establishing the Significant Monitoring Concentration (SMC), and vacated them because these parts of the rule exceeded the EPA's statutory authority. View "Sierra Club v. EPA" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the EPA's administration of a cap-and-trade program regulating the production and consumption of hydrochlorofluorcarbons (HCFCs) under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7671d(c), 7671e(b). The program entailed overall caps on production and consumption of various HCFCs for each year, as well as EPA-administered baseline allowances of HCFCs for each participating company. Companies were then permitted to transfer their allowances subject to certain statutory and regulatory restrictions. Honeywell complained that certain 2008 transfers made by their competitors Arkema and Solvay were deemed to permanently increase those competitors' future baseline allowances of HCFCs. The court concluded that Honeywell's claim was foreclosed by the court's decision in Arkema, Inc. V. EPA, which held that the EPA, having approved the 2008 interpollutant transfers, had to honor them in the future at least so long as the EPA continued to set baselines by considering the historical usage of HCFCs by participating companies. The Arkema Court necessarily concluded that permanent interpollutant transfers were permissible under the statute. Absent en banc review, the court must adhere to circuit precedent. Because Honeywell's other challenges to the 2008 transfers were meritless, the court denied the petition for review. View "Honeywell International, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

In 2009 the Department of Natural Resources issued two decisions, one removing the classification of certain lands as wildlife habitat and the other allowing for the conveyance of these lands to the Denali Borough for further development. A wildlife biologist and others submitted comments challenging the Department's actions; the biologist's comments and requests for reconsideration were denied and he filed an appeal in the superior court. While the appeal was pending, the wildlife biologist died in a plane crash and his sister, the personal representative of his estate, filed a motion to substitute an individual and an organization as appellants in this case. The court allowed for substitution of the personal representative, but prohibited the substitution of third parties; after the personal representative declined to personally continue the appeal, the superior court dismissed the case. The personal representative appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court correctly articulated the proper test for substitution on appeal, but because it did not acknowledge the comments that the proposed appellant submitted during agency proceedings, the Court remanded the case for the court to consider whether these comments indicated the proposed appellant was entitled to prosecute in the review proceeding below, thereby making her a proper party for substitution. The Court affirmed the superior court's conclusion that the personal representative could not transfer or assign her right to appeal. View "Licht v. Irwin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff here was Boston Gas Company and Defendant was Century Indemnity Company, one of Boston Gas's insurers. Environmental contamination was later found at many of Boston Gas's former gas plant sites. Boston Gas filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment as to Century's obligations under policies issued to Boston Gas. Jury trials were held with respect to two sites included in the cleanup, the Everett and Commercial Point sites. The Everett site litigation first went to trial. Before the parties reached a settlement, the supreme judicial court (SJC) found a pro rata allocation method applied for allocating liability for the contamination where Century had provided coverage for the risk for only a portion of the time during which the contamination took place. Meanwhile, the jury found Century liable for $1,699,145 in the Commercial Point litigation. The trial judge deferred entry of final judgment pending the outcome of the Everett appeal. The district court ultimately (1) concluded that in the wake of the SJC ruling in the Everett litigation, by allocating damages across a 121-year span in the case of the Commercial Point site, this reduced Century's share of damages from 100 percent to less than fifteen percent; and (2) vacated the damages award and ordered a new trial on the issue of which of the costs were subject to an exclusion in the GCL policy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. View "Boston Gas Com. v. Century Indem. Co." on Justia Law

ARTBA challenged the EPA's regulations relating to nonroad engines and vehicles several years after the regulations were promulgated. As such, ARTBA's challenges to the regulations were time-barred under the Clean Air Act's, 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), 60-day filing period. ARTBA also challenged the EPA's approval of California's State Implementation Plan, but that challenged must be brought in the Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "American Road & Transportation v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute between the government and the county concerning the clean up of an abandoned landfill. The government entered into a consent decree with the county and the county then moved to modify the decree. The district court suspended the decree pending further findings and the government appealed. The county later moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the order was not appealable because it was nonfinal. Because the government failed to satisfy the Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc. factors, the court held that it did not have jurisdiction at this time and dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. El Dorado County, et al" on Justia Law

Indian Harbor sought reimbursement under the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993, 106 Stat. 2315, 2371; 107 Stat. 1547, 1745 for environmental cleanup costs associated with the development of the former Marine Corps Air Station Tustin military base in southern California. The Court of Federal Claims determined that Indian Harbor failed to identify a “claim for personal injury or property” that triggered the government’s duty to indemnify and dismissed. The Federal Circuit reversed, relying on the purposes of the Act, to encourage cleanup and redevelopment of former military installations. View "Indian Harbor Ins. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1968, Lost Tree entered an option to purchase approximately 2,750 acres on Florida’s coast, near Vero Beach, encompassing a barrier island, bisected by the A-1-A Highway, and stretching west to islands on the Indian River. Lost Tree purchased substantially all of the land, including the 4.99-acre “Plat 57” on John’s Island. Through the mid-1990s, Lost Tree developed approximately 1,300 acres into the gated residential community, John’s Island, which includes golf courses, a beach club, a hotel, condominiums, and single family homes. In 2002 Lost Tree first considered development of Plat 57 and applied to the Army Corps of Engineers for a permit under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344, to fill 2.13 acres of wetland. The Corps denied the application in 2004, reasoning that the parcel as a whole included Plat 57, a neighboring upland plat, and scattered wetlands in the vicinity stating that less environmentally damaging alternatives were available, and that Lost Tree “has had very reasonable use of its land.” The Court of Federal Claims denied takings claim. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the court erred in determining the relevant parcel. Plat 57 alone was the relevant parcel: Lost Tree had distinct economic expectations for Plat 57. View "Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law