Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

This diversity case involved a dispute over insurance coverage between Starr and SGS. The district court, relying on Matador Petroleum Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., held that Starr did not need to show prejudice before denying coverage to SGS for late notice under the pollution buy-back provision. Bound by Matador, which concluded that a notice requirement in this type of supplemental pollution endorsement was essential to the bargained-for coverage, the court affirmed the judgment and found SGS's arguments unpersuasive. View "Starr Indemnity & Liablity Co. v. SGS Petroleum Serv. Corp." on Justia Law

Appellants, hunters and hunting organizations, challenged the Service's bar against the importation of polar bear trophies under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. 1361 et seq., and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. In regard to statutory challenges, the court concluded that Congress intended to extend the protections of sections 101(a)(3)(B) and 102(b)(3) of the MMPA to all depleted species, regardless of their depleted status; although section 104(c)(5) did authorize trophy importation, that provision remained subject to the MMPA's more stringent protections for depleted species; section 102(b)(3) referred not only to mammals taken from species the Secretary had designated as depleted but instead mammals taken from species the Secretary has so designated; and section 101(a)(3)(B) could not permit what section 102(b)(3) expressly prohibited. In regards to procedural challenges, the court concluded that section 115(a) was inapplicable because an ESA listing resulted in a depleted designation under the MMPA but entailed no "determination" to that effect. Finally, the Listing Rule provided adequate notice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing" on Justia Law

ATO challenged the City's enactment of an ordinance offering taxicabs certified to run on compressed natural gas (CNG) a "head-of-the-line" privilege at a municipally-owned airport. At issue was whether the ordinance was preempted by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7543(a). The court concluded that the ordinance, enacted using traditional police powers, was not superseded by any clear and manifest purpose of Congress, above all where Congress's term "standard" had been identified as one "susceptible" to a mandate/incentive distinction. The court also concluded that the ordinance could have its intended effect and substitute CNG cabs for traditional cabs at the airport but it did not show that the City's cab drivers faced such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects as to force them to switch vehicles. Accordingly, the ordinance was not preempted by section 209(a) of the Act and the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ass'n of Taxicab Operators USA v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sold a parcel of land adjacent to a golf club to New South Properties (New South) for development as a residential community. New South hired Hunter Construction Group (Hunter) to prepare the parcel for construction. Hunter built erosion control structures and devices, including a silt collection basin. However, a dam Hunter constructed to form the silt collection basin ruptured, causing mud, water, and debris to flood the golf course. As a result of the damage to the golf course, Plaintiffs filed an action against New South, Apple Creek and Hunter, alleging negligence, nuisance, trespass, and violations of the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act (SPCA). The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the SPCA claim. Plaintiffs appealed and withdrew their appeal against all defendants except Hunter. The court of appeals affirmed. Without considering the merits of Plaintiffs' appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that because Hunter was never cited for a violation for section 113A-66 of the SPCA, Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a civil action against Hunter pursuant to section 113A-66. View "Applewood Props., LLC v. New S. Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Doe Run commenced a declaratory action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in two underlying lawsuits (the Briley Lawsuit and the McSpadden Lawsuit). These underlying lawsuits sought damages arising out of Doe Run's operation of a five-hundred-acre waste pile (Leadwood Pile). The court concluded that the pollution exclusions in the CGL policies precluded a duty to defend Doe Run in the Briley Lawsuit. The court concluded, however, that the McSpadden Lawsuit included allegations and claims that were not unambiguously barred from coverage by the pollution exclusions in the policies. The McSpadden Lawsuit alleged that the distribution of toxic materials harmed plaintiffs, without specifying how that harm occurred. The McSpadden complaint also alleged that Doe Run caused bodily injury or property damage when it left the Leadwood Pile open and available for use by the public without posting warning signs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants alleging that they had failed to adequately evaluate the effects of the Mudflow Vegetation Management Project on the Northern Spotted Owl's critical habitat, in violation of section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits as to its ESA claim that defendants arbitrarily or capriciously approved the Mudflow Project. Plaintiff's challenge was premised on a misunderstanding of regulatory terms, an unsupported reading of a duty to consider cumulative effects under section 7(a)(2), and selected portions of the record taken out of context. View "Conservation Congress v. U.S. Forest Serv." on Justia Law

The Institute challenged the final rule promulgated by the FRA to implement section 104 of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432 section 104(a)(1), 122 Stat. 4848, 4857. Section 104 required a qualifying rail carrier to submit an implementation plan to install a "positive train control" (PTC) system no later than December 31, 2015 on certain tracks used for passenger service or for transporting "poison- or toxic- by-inhalation" hazardous material (PIH or TIH). The court concluded that the Institute's challenge was not ripe because it had not established that its members now faced a present or imminent injury from the 2012 Final Rule's omission of a two-part risk assessment test. Accordingly, the court dismissed the Institute's petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Chlorine Institute, Inc. v. FRA, et al." on Justia Law

The Sierra Club and two of its local members challenged the Iowa Department of Transportation's (IDOT) decision to locate a highway adjacent to and through the Rock Island State Preserve by filing a petition for judicial review in the district court. The district court granted IDOT's motion to dismiss, finding that the Sierra Club had not exhausted all administrative remedies before filing its petition. The court of appeals dismissed the Sierra Club's appeal, finding (1) the notice of appeal was timely filed; (2) the Sierra Club was required to seek a declaratory order from IDOT before requesting court intervention; and (3) the case was not ripe for adjudication. The Supreme Court affirmed as to all issues except for ripeness, holding (1) the notice of appeal was timely because the Sierra Club triggered the tolling exception by filing a proper posttrial motion; (2) the Sierra Club must seek a declaratory order before petitioning for judicial review; and (3) the matter was ripe for adjudication. View "Sierra Club Iowa Chapter v. Iowa Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Millard petitioned for review of the Commission's affirmance of citations issued to Millard for committing violations of emergency response, training, record-keeping, and other requirements after more than 30,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia escaped from one of Millard's refrigerated storage facilities. The court concluded that Millard's challenges to the two process safety management violations, Millard's contention that OSHA was estopped from asserting that the company violated agency regulations, and Millard's ten remaining challenges either lacked merit or merited neither reversal nor further discussion. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Millard Refrigerated Services v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants claiming that the BLM's management of grazing within the Breaks Monument violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 1701-1787; Proclamation No. 7398, 3 C.F.R. 7398; and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347. The court held that the BLM reasonably interpreted the Proclamation to not require programmatic changes to grazing management policies and that the Breaks environmental impact statement complied with NEPA. The court held, however, that the environmental assessment for the Woodhawk Allotment violated NEPA by not considering a reasonable range of alternatives that included a no- or reduced-grazing option. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Western Watersheds Project v. Abbey" on Justia Law