Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The EPA promulgated an interim final rule (IFR) authorizing it to issue certificates of conformity to diesel truck engines manufacturers for 2012 and 2013 model-year engines notwithstanding the engines did not conform to EPA's emission standard for nitrogen oxides promulgated under section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7521(a) - provided the manufacturer paid the government a non-conformance penalty (NCP) as established in the IFR. After notice and comment, EPA replaced the IFR with a final NCP rule establishing new and higher NCPs. Daimler petitioned for review of the IFR on both procedural and substantive grounds, as well as EPA's issuance to manufacturer Navistar four 2012 model year certificates of conformity. The court concluded that, with the publication of the Final NCP Rule, Daimler's challenge to the certificates was moot and dismissed the petition for review. View "Daimler Trucks North America, et al. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q, seeking to compel the Agencies to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from the state's five oil refineries under the CAA. On appeal, Intervenor WSPA argued that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the parties' dispositive motions on the merits because plaintiffs have not met their burden in satisfying the "irreducible constitutional minimum" requirements for Article III standing under either the causality or redressability prong discussed in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order on the parties' dispositive motions and remanded with instructions that the action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon" on Justia Law

The State filed suit against defendants under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq. The State sought to recover costs incurred in investigating and addressing groundwater contamination in the Town of Hempstead caused by pollution emanating from the New Cassel Industrial Area (NCIA). The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action as time-barred by the six year statute of limitations governing suits to recover costs for remedial actions under section 9613(g)(2)(B). The court held that the cleanup activities here were implemented as removal measures and continued to be removal measures at all relevant times. Accordingly, the district court erred in applying the statute of limitations for remedial rather than removal actions. The court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "State of New York v. Next Millennium Realty" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Navy under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.; the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.; and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701-706. Plaintiffs challenged the Navy's decision to install and operate an instrumented Undersea Warfare Training Range (the range) in waters adjacent to the only known calving grounds of the endangered North Atlantic right whale, and the NMFS's biological opinion assessing the impact of the range on threatened and endangered species. The court concluded that plaintiffs have not pointed to any provision in NEPA requiring an agency to authorize all phases of a proposed action evaluated in an environmental impact statement (EIS) at the time it issued a record of decision (ROD). Therefore, the court found that it was not an independent violation of NEPA, warranting reversal of the district court's judgment, for the Navy to enter into a construction contract after it signed an ROD authorizing construction and after having its NEPA analysis upheld by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the Navy complied with NEPA. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Navy as to plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "Defenders of Wildlife, et al. v. U.S. Dept. of the Navy, et al." on Justia Law

The State, in consolidated petitions for review, challenged the EPA's final rule approving in part and disapproving in part two state implementation plans (SIPs) submitted by the State to address its obligations under sections 110 and 169A of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q. The final rule also promulgated a federal implementation plan (FIP) to address those portions of the SIPs that were disapproved. The court concluded that, even assuming that the State's interpretation of section 7607(d)(3) was correct, the State has failed to demonstrate that the EPA's error in this regard was so serious and related to matters of such central relevance to the rule that there was a substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed if the error had not been made; the EPA's refusal to consider the existing pollution control technology in use at the Coal Creek Station because it had been voluntarily installed was arbitrary and capricious and its FIP promulgating selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR) as the best available retrofit technology (BART) for the Coal Creek Station was therefore vacated; the State's petition for review of the EPA's disapproval of the State's SIP and promulgating of a FIP was denied because the EPA properly disapproved the State's reasonable progress determination; the Environmental Groups' motion to dismiss their petition for review was moot; and the State's petition for review of the EPA's disapproval of the interstate transport SIP was denied because the EPA properly disapproved portions of the State's regional haze SIP. Accordingly, the court granted the State's and Great River Energy's petitions for review to the extent that they challenged the EPA's BART determination for the Coal Creek Station promulgated in EPA's FIP; vacated and remanded that portion of the final rule to the EPA for further proceedings; and denied the remainder of the State's, Great River Energy's, and the Environmental Groups' petitions for review, as well as the Environmental Groups' motion for voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b). View "State of North Dakota v. EPA" on Justia Law

The United States filed suit under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., against Alabama Power, alleging principally that Alabama Power made major modifications at three of its coal-fired power plants without obtaining a permit or installing modern pollution control devices. The court reversed the district court's wholesale exclusion of the expert testimony of two experts, a power plant reliability engineer (Mr. Koppe) and an environmental permitting engineer (Dr. Ranajit), in Alabama Power I, vacated the judgment in favor of Alabama Power, and remanded for further proceedings. The Koppe-Sahu model, as utilized here, was sufficiently reliable to establish a relationship between potential generation of electricity and expected pollutant emissions at Alabama Power's modified plants. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Cinergy Corp did not preclude admission of the expert testimony. The court affirmed the district court's striking of the additional statements and calculations in Dr. Sahu's supplemental declaration in Alabama Power II. View "Alabama Environmental Council v. Alabama Power Co." on Justia Law

NRIC challenged the Sixth Northwest Power Plan (the Plan) that the Council adopted in May 2010. NRIC argued that the Plan failed to give due consideration for protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife as the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (the Power Act), 16 U.S.C. 839-839h, required. The court concluded that the NRIC had not pointed to any part of the Power Act that required the Council to reconsider fish and wildlife measures in light of its evaluation of the regional power system from the subsequent power-planning process. Absent such a showing, the court would not second-guess the due consideration that the Council gave to fish and wildlife interests in the adoption of the Plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Plan with respect to NRIC's due-consideration challenge. The court remanded, however, the Plan to the Council for the limited purposes of (1) allowing public notice and comment on the proposed methodology for determining quantifiable environmental costs and benefits, and (2) reconsidering the inclusion in the Plan of the BPA's estimate of the 2009 Program's costs to hydrosystem operations. View "NW Res. Inf. Ctr. v. NW Power & Conserv. Council" on Justia Law

Title V of the Clean Air Act (CCA), 42 U.S.C. 7661-7661f, established an operating permit program to assure compliance with the CAA's requirements during a facility's ongoing operation. In this case, LDEQ petitioned for review of an EPA objection to three title V permits issued by LDEQ to Nucor for an ironmaking facility near the town of Convent, Louisiana. The court dismissed the petition for judicial review because the court lacked jurisdiction where the EPA has not taken final action to issue or deny a permit under title V. View "LA Dept. of Environmental Quality v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Conservancy alleged that the United States was improperly diverting water from Icicle Creek, a tributary of the Wenatchee River, to the Leavenworth National Fish Hatchery and otherwise violating Washington state law. The court dismissed the action, concluding that the Conservancy lacked prudential standing to bring its claim that the Hatchery operation violated the Washington water code, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Conservancy's other claims because they either did not challenge final agency action or rested on provisions of Washington law that were not incorporated into federal reclamation law. View "Wild Fish Conservancy v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Drakes Bay challenged the Secretary's discretionary decision to let Drakes Bay's permit for commercial oyster farming expire according to its terms. Drakes Bay subsequently sought a preliminary injunction under Section 124 of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and various federal regulations. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider whether the Secretary violated constitutional, regulatory, or other legal mandates or restrictions. On the merits, the court concluded that a preliminary injunction was not warranted where the likelihood of success on the merits of these claims was too remote to justify the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction. Congress left the decision to grant or deny an extension to the Secretary's discretion; the Secretary neither violated any statutory mandate nor did he misapprehend his authority under the various statutes raised by Drakes Bay; even if NEPA compliance was required in this instance, the Secretary conducted an adequate NEPA review process; and Drakes Bay lacked standing to challenge the publication of the notice in the Federal Registrar. Further, Drakes Bay has failed to show that the balance of the equities weighs in its favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell" on Justia Law